JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL
(First Chamber)

26 March 2015

Case F‑38/14

Ángel Coedo Suárez

v

Council of the European Union

(Civil service — Officials — Disciplinary proceedings — Disciplinary measure — Removal from post and reduction of the invalidity allowance — Proportionality of the measure — Manifest error of assessment — Concept of the conduct of the official throughout the course of his career — Adhering to working hours)

Application:      under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106a thereof, in which Mr Coedo Suárez brought the present action seeking annulment of the decision of the Council of the European Union of 11 June 2013 to impose the measure of removing him from his post and reduction of the invalidity allowance by 15% from 1 July 2013 until retirement age.

Held:      The action is dismissed. Mr Coedo Suárez is to bear his own costs and is ordered to pay the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union.

Summary

1.      Officials — Disciplinary regime — Disciplinary measure — Principle of proportionality — Definition — Discretion of the appointing authority — Judicial review — Limits

(Staff Regulations, Arts 86 to 89, Annex IX, Art. 9)

2.      Officials — Disciplinary regime — Disciplinary measure — Seriousness of the infringement — Criteria for assessment — Conduct of the official throughout the course of his career — Overall assessment

(Staff Regulations, Annex IX, Art. 10(i))

1.      Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations do not lay down any fixed relationship between the disciplinary measures referred to and the different types of infringement committed by officials, nor do they specify to what extent the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances comes into play in the choice of measure and the determination of whether it is proportionate.

In order to assess whether a disciplinary measure is proportionate to the seriousness of the offence found to have been committed, the Union judicature must first consider the fact that the measure is to be determined on the basis of an overall assessment by the appointing authority of all the concrete facts and matters appertaining to each individual case. Consequently, the examination by the court of first instance is limited to the question whether the weight attached by the appointing authority to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances is proportionate, and in that examination it cannot substitute its own assessment for the value-judgments made by the appointing authority in that regard.

In particular, as regards the measure of removal from post, the most serious of those listed in Article 9 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations, its adoption necessarily entails a careful consideration on the part of the institution in view of the especially serious consequences arising from it, both for the official concerned and for the institution. In any event, the legality of any disciplinary measure presupposes that it has been established that the person concerned actually committed the offence alleged against him.

(see paras 35-37)

See:

Judgment in Tzikis v Commission, T‑203/98, EU:T:2000:130, paras 48-51

Judgment in BG v European Ombudsman, T‑406/12 P, EU:T:2014:273, para. 64

Judgment in EH v Commission, F‑42/14, EU:F:2014:250, para. 93

2.      When it comes to determining the disciplinary measure to be imposed, the criterion of ‘the conduct of the official throughout the course of his career’ as provided for in Article 10(i) of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations does not necessarily mean that the Disciplinary Board must assess the official’s conduct from the time of his recruitment and at every subsequent point in his career, but that it should instead make an overall assessment of his conduct over the whole of his career.

(see para. 61)