Language of document :

Appeal brought on 13 September 2017 by Talanton AE — Symvouleftiki-Ekpaideftiki Etaireia Dianomon, Parochis Ypiresion Marketing kai Dioikisis Epicheiriseon against the judgment delivered by the General Court (Seventh Chamber) on 13 July 2017 in Case T-65/15 Talanton AE v European Commission

(Case C-539/17 P)

Language of the case: Greek

Parties

Appellant: Talanton AE — Symvouleftiki-Ekpaideftiki Etaireia Dianomon, Parochis Ypiresion Marketing kai Dioikisis Epicheiriseon (represented by: K. Damis, dikigoros)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

set aside in its entirety the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 13 July 2017 in Case T-65/15 Talanton AE — Symvouleftiki-Ekpaideftiki Etaireia Dianomon, Parochis Ypiresion Marketing kai Dioikisis Epicheiriseon v European Commission;

uphold the company’s action of 6 February 2015;

dismiss the Commission’s counterclaim;

order the Commission to pay all the appellant’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Incorrect application of the principle of good faith in the performing of the agreement at issue — Infringement of the provisions concerning subcontracting under the financial regulation in force.

The General Court assessed Article 1134 of the Belgian Civil Code incorrectly, as regards application of the principle of good faith in the performing of the agreement.

The General Court erred as to the interpretation of the provisions concerning subcontracting, as laid down in Article 130 et seq. of Regulation (EU) No 2342/2002 and in contractual clauses I.II.2.4 and II.13.1 of the Framework Contract signed under number FP7/2009/1.

Incorrect interpretation and application of a contractual clause and manifestly incorrect assessment of the evidence.

The General Court erred as to the interpretation of clause II.22., Financial audits and controls, of Annex II to the agreement that was signed, mistakenly rejecting claims in that regard by the applicant/appellant.

Manifestly incorrect assessment of the evidence and defective reasoning.

The General Court erred as it manifestly distorted key evidence that was relied on by the appellant and admitted by the respondent.

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