Appeal brought on 22 March 2017 by Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne S.A. against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 10 January 2017 in Case T-577/14 Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH and Gascogne v European Union

(Case C-146/17 P)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Gascogne Sack Deutschland GmbH, Gascogne S.A. (represented by: F. Puel and E. Durand, avocats)

Other parties to the proceedings: European Union, represented by the Court of Justice of the European Union, European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

set aside in part the contested judgment, notified by e-Curia to the appellants’ legal advisers on 16 January 2017, by which the General Court, whilst recognising the infringement of the right to adjudication within a reasonable period in the cases which gave rise to the judgments of 16 November 2011, Group Gascogne v Commission (T-72/06) and Sachsa Verpackung v Commission (T-79/06) and the existence of material and non-material damage sustained by the applicants as a result of the infringement of the ‘reasonable period’ rule, ordered the Union to pay inadequate and incomplete compensation for the harm suffered;

give final judgment on the financial compensation for material and non-material damage sustained by the appellants in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, in accordance with the appellants’ requests;

order the defendant to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

By the first ground of appeal, Gascogne claims that, by refusing to award compensation for the material damage sustained for a period prior to 30 May 2011, on the ground that it could not rule ultra petita, the General Court made a manifest error in law in the interpretation and application of that principle.

By the second ground of appeal, Gascogne argues that, by deciding to take as the starting point of the material damage, for the purpose of calculating that damage, the point determined by Gascogne in reverse on the basis of an excessive period which it estimated at 30 months, but which the General Court, for its part, estimated at 20 months, and by thus compensating the material damage sustained by Gascogne over a period of six months, although the General Court expressly ruled that the material damage sustained consists in the payment of bank guarantee costs in the course of the period during which the reasonable time for adjudicating was exceeded (namely a period of 20 months), the General Court formally contradicted itself and did not give effect to its findings.

By the third ground of appeal, Gascogne claims that, by applying different rules for calculating the material damage than those initially presented by the appellants, without the latter being able to give their opinion on the consequences that method of calculation may have, the General Court infringed the rights of defence.

By the fourth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that, by finding that it could not award compensation for the non-material damage sustained, the amount of which was proportionally too high by comparison to the fine imposed by the European Commission, on the ground that, according to case-law, the judicature of the Union cannot call into question, in full or in part, the amount of the fine by reason of the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period, the General Court erred in law in the interpretation and application of that case-law.

By the fifth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that, by refusing to allow the request for compensation for non-material damage sustained, on the ground that, in the light of its scale, the award of the relief sought by the appellants would, in the present case, call into question the amount of the fine imposed on the latter, even though the provisions of Articles 256(1) and 340(2) TFEU seek specifically to enable any applicant who has sustained harm caused by the European institutions to obtain redress by bringing proceedings before the General Court, the General Court rendered redundant and infringed the provisions of Articles 256(1) and 340(2) TFEU, as well as the right to an effective remedy.

By the sixth ground of appeal, the appellants claim that, by awarding the appellants EUR 5 000 compensation for the non-material damage sustained, although the Court, first, considered that compensation for non-material damage could not call into question, even in part, the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission, and, second, expressly recognised the existence of non-material damage sustained by the appellants, which it was appropriate to compensate in the light of the ‘extent of the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable period’ and the ‘the need to ensure that… the present action is effective’, the General Court formally contradicted itself.

By the seventh ground of appeal, the appellants claim that, by ruling, without any supporting element, that, first, the finding that there has been a breach of the obligation to adjudicate within a reasonable time is, in the light of the object and gravity of that breach, sufficient to make good the reputational harm, and, second, compensation of EUR 5 000 is adequate reparation for the non-material damage sustained, the General Court failed in its duty to state reasons.

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