Appeal brought on 9 June 2011 by Legris Industries SA against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 24 March 2011 in Case T-376/06 Legris Industries v Commission

(Case C-289/11 P)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellant: Legris Industries SA (represented by: A. Wachsmann and S. Thibault-Liger, avocates)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Forms of order sought

First:

Set aside in its entirety, on the basis of Article 256 TFEU and Article 56 of Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the judgment of the General Court of 24 March 2011 in Case T-376/06 Legris Industries v European Commission;

Grant the order sought by Legris Industries SA at first instance before the General Court;

Consequently,

Annul European Commission decision C (2006) 4180 of 20 September 2006 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/F-1/38.121 - Fittings) as it concerns Legris Industries SA, and the grounds underlying the decision adopted, in so far as that decision imposes a fine on Legris Industries SA on the basis that the practices found to have been committed by Comap were attributed to Legris Industries SA; and

Allow Legris Industries SA to adopt the written submissions, heads of claim and applications of Comap in respect of the abovementioned decision of the European Commission;

In the alternative annul, on the basis of Article 261 TFEU, the fine of EUR 46.8 million imposed on Legris Industries SA, of which EUR 18.56 million was imposed jointly and severally with Comap SA, pursuant to Article 2(g) of the abovementioned decision of the European Commission or reduce, on the basis of Article 261 TFEU, that fine of EUR 46.8 million to an appropriate amount;

In any case, order the European Commission to pay all the costs, including those incurred by Legris Industries SA before the General Court.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The applicant relies on four pleas in law in support of its appeal.

By its first plea, Legris Industries alleges the infringement of the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal to the extent that the review carried out by the General Court of the decision of the Commission, an institution combining both investigatory and penal functions, limited itself to manifest errors of law and fact and was not a full review involving a complete re-examination of the facts of the case and, in particular, the proof adduced.

By its second plea, which comprises three branches, the applicant alleges infringement of the principles governing the attributability to a parent company of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU found to have been committed by its subsidiary. By the first branch, the applicant claims first that the application to it of a de facto irrebuttable presumption of liability is not permitted under European Union law, taking into account the penal nature of the sanction imposed on it. By its second branch, the applicant then submits that the application to it of that de facto irrebuttable presumption of liability stems from the General Court's rejection of its arguments when relying on insufficient and contradictory reasoning. In the third branch, the applicant alleges finally failure to comply with the case-law which disapplies that presumption of liability to financial holdings which do not engage in operational activity, and infringement of the principles of equal treatment and legitimate expectations.

By its third plea, the parent company complains of the infringement of the principles of equal treatment, personal liability and the principle that the penalty must be specific to the offender, stemming from the General Court's refusal to allow the applicant to use the pleas in law seeking annulment of the contested decision submitted by its subsidiary Comap, while holding the applicant liable for the practices found to have been committed by Comap.

By its fourth and final plea, the applicant finally requests the Court to draw the appropriate conclusions, with regard to it, from the possible setting aside of the Comap judgment on the basis of Comap's grounds of appeal.

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