Language of document : ECLI:EU:F:2013:131

JUDGMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL

(Second Chamber)

16 September 2013

Case F‑46/12

Dagmar Höpcke

v

European Commission

(Civil service — Open competition — Competition notice EPSO/AST/111/10 — Non-inclusion in the reserve list — Instruction to draft a text of a minimum length — Failure to comply)

Application:      brought by Ms Höpcke under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty by virtue of article 106a thereof, seeking annulment of the decision of 8 August 2011 of the selection board for competition EPSO/AST/111/10 not to include her in the reserve list.

Held:      The application is dismissed. Ms Höpcke is to bear her own costs and is ordered to pay those costs incurred by the European Commission.

Summary

1.      Officials — Competitions — Selection Board — Rejection of application — Obligation to state reasons — Scope — Secrecy of proceedings

(Staff Regulations, Art. 25; Annex III, Art. 6)

2.      Officials — Competitions — Organisation and content of tests — Selection Board’s discretion — Judicial review — Limits

(Staff Regulations, Annex III)

3.      Officials — Competitions — Organisation and content of tests — Marking methods — Selection Board’s discretion — Judicial review — Limits

(Staff Regulations, Annex III)

1.      The requirement that a decision adversely affecting a person should state the reasons on which it is based is intended to provide the person concerned with sufficient details to allow him to ascertain whether or not the decision is well founded and make it possible for the decision to be the subject of judicial review. In relation to the decisions of a competition selection board, the obligation to state reasons must be reconciled with observance of the secrecy surrounding the proceedings of selection boards pursuant to Article 6 of Annex III of the Staff Regulations.

Having regard to the secrecy which must surround the proceedings of a selection board, communication of the marks obtained in the various tests constitutes an adequate statement of the reasons on which the board’s decisions are based. In view of the wide discretion enjoyed by a competition selection board in evaluating the results of the tests in a competition, the board cannot be required, in giving the reasons for a candidate’s failure of a test, to identify the answers which were considered unsatisfactory or to explain why they were considered unsatisfactory. Therefore, the board may legitimately make observations on a candidate’s results in the general tests, without doing so in relation to the specific tests.

(see paras 37-38, 40, 44)

See:

4 July 1996, C‑254/95 P Parliament v Innamorati, paras 21 to 31

14 July 1995, T‑291/94 Pimley-Smith v Commission, paras 63 and 64; 19 February 2004, T‑19/03 Konstantopoulou v Court of Justice, para. 34

30 April 2008, F‑16/07 Dragoman v Commission, para 63 and the case-law cited

2.      The selection board has a wide discretion with regard to the organisation and content of the tests in a competition. The Courts of the Union may therefore review the procedures for the tests only in so far as is necessary to ensure equal treatment of the candidates and objectivity in the choice made between them. It is likewise not for those Courts to review the detailed content of a test, unless that content is not confined within the limits laid down in the competition notice or is not consonant with the purposes of the test or the competition.

An instruction given by the selection board to write a minimum number of lines in one of the competition tests, being applicable to all candidates and intended, firstly, to ensure that the written test is taken by all candidates under the same conditions, and secondly, to enable the markers to apply objective criteria in a uniform manner to comparable work, is directed to ensuring equal treatment of candidates.

This conclusion is not undermined by the argument that the board does not specify the font or size of the characters to be used, given that the form of the text in terms of font and letter size, as determined by the board through the configuration of the computers made available to candidates in the competition, represents standard text, configured in the same way for all candidates. If a candidate modifies the configuration, this will be evident to the board. In such circumstances, it must be accepted that the configuration of the computers is mandatory, that the board does not have to give instructions relating to the font or size of characters, that candidates are not permitted to modify the configuration, and that sanctions may be imposed if they do so.

Equally, the above conclusion is not undermined by the argument that the board does not indicate the number of indents or carriage returns to be used, given that, as the test in question is directed to evaluating knowledge of spelling, syntax and grammar, it is for each candidate to satisfy himself that his text is sufficiently long and includes at least the minimum number of lines required. Every candidate must take care to ensure that indents and carriage returns are not used in an arbitrary way, artificially increasing the number of lines, but meet a drafting need and are compatible with the text. Thus, when the selection board verifies that candidates have followed the instruction to write a minimum number of lines, it must consider the indents and carriage returns in light of the marking criteria that it has determined in advance of the tests, which are covered by the principle of secrecy of proceedings.

(see paras 63-67)

See:

Konstantopoulou v Court of Justice, para. 48

28 March 2012, F 19/10 Marsili v Commission, para. 20

3.      In relation to a competition it is not for the Courts of the Union to censure the marking methods chosen by the selection board in the context of its wide discretion, except in so far as is necessary to ensure equal treatment of the candidates and objectivity in the choice made between them.

(see para. 76)

See:

Konstantopoulou v Court of Justice, para. 60; 26 January 2005, T‑267/03 Roccato v Commission, para. 49