Language of document : ECLI:EU:F:2015:58


(First Chamber)

16 June 2015

Case F‑118/10 DEP

Aristidis Psarras


European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)

(Civil service — Procedure — Taxation of costs)

Application:      for taxation of costs pursuant to Article 106 of the Rules of Procedure, following the judgment of 2 October 2012 in Psarras v ENISA (F‑118/10, EU:F:2012:138).

Held:      The total amount of the costs to be repaid by the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security to Mr Psarras in respect of recoverable costs in Case F‑118/10 is fixed at EUR 17 456.75, together with default interest from the date of service of the present order to the date of actual payment, at the rate fixed by the European Central Bank for its main refinancing operations and applicable during the period concerned, increased by three-and-a-half points.


1.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Elements to be taken into consideration — Fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers — Necessity of lawyer’s services able to be inferred from measures taken in the context of the proceedings before the Tribunal

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 105(c))

2.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Application for taxation — Time-limit for submission — Duty to act within a reasonable period

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 106(1))

3.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Definition — Involvement of more than one lawyer

(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 105(c))

1.      The Union judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but to determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for taxation of costs, it is not obliged to take account of any national scales of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in that regard between the party concerned and his agents or advisers.

In the absence of Union provisions laying down fee scales, the court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Union law, the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the case for the agents or advisers involved and the financial interest which the parties had in the proceedings.

In that regard, it may be inferred from the fact that a lawyer submitted an application, attended the hearing and drew up various documents that that lawyer did indeed perform acts and services necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Civil Service Tribunal.

As regards the determination of the amount of costs incurred for those necessary services, evidence of payment of the costs whose recovery is sought is not a precondition for taxation by the Tribunal of the recoverable costs.

(see paras 24, 25, 33-35)


Order of 4 July 2013 in Kronofrance v Germany and Others, C‑75/05 P-DEP and C‑80/05 P-DEP, EU:C:2013:458, para. 30

Orders of 10 November 2009 in X v Parliament, F‑14/08 DEP, EU:F:2009:149, para. 22; 26 April 2010 in Schönberger v Parliament, F‑7/08 DEP, EU:F:2010:32, para. 24; 27 September 2011 in De Nicola v EIB, F‑55/08 DEP, EU:F:2011:155, paras 40 and 41; 2 July 2013 in Martinez Erades v EEAS, F‑64/12 DEP, EU:F:2013:111, para. 21; 14 November 2013 in Cuallado Martorell v Commission, F‑96/09 DEP, EU:F:2013:186, para. 28, and 3 July 2014 in Bogusz v Frontex, F‑5/12 DEP, EU:F:2014:179, paras 30 to 33 and the case-law cited therein

2.      An application for taxation of costs must be made within a reasonable period, beyond which the party ordered to bear the costs would be justified in considering that the party to which costs are payable has waived its right. Moreover, the reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of all the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties.

As regards the conduct of the parties, although the initiation of appeal proceedings does not have suspensory effect, it is perfectly understandable that a party entitled to costs should be able to await the expiry of the time-limit for lodging an appeal before submitting its application for reimbursement of costs.

(see paras 28, 30)


Order of 21 June 1979 in Dietz v Commission, 126/76 DEP, EU:C:1979:158, para. 1, and judgment of 28 February 2013 in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paras 28 and 33

Order of 17 April 1996 in Air France v Commission, T‑2/93 DEP, EU:T:1996:48, paras 10 to 12

3.      An application for taxation of costs is of a fairly standardised nature and generally presents no problems for a lawyer who has already dealt with the substance of the case.

However, as regards the costs of the involvement of a new lawyer after the proceedings before the Court, those costs cannot be borne by the party ordered to pay costs except in so far as they correspond to time which that new lawyer spent on the file, other than time necessarily required in familiarising himself with that file.

(see paras 53, 54)


Orders of 7 June 2012 in France Télévisions v TF1, C‑451/10 P-DEP, EU:C:2012:323, para. 32; and 10 October 2013 in CPVO v Schräder, C‑38/09 P-DEP, EU:C:2013:679, para. 42

Order of 15 March 2000 in Enso-Gutzeit v Commission, T‑337/94 DEP, EU:T:2000:76, para. 21

Order of 3 July 2014 in Bogusz v Frontex, EU:F:2014:179, para. 47