JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
4 May 2018 (*)
(EU trade mark — Opposition proceedings — Application for the EU figurative mark EW — Earlier EU word mark WE — Relative ground for refusal — No likelihood of confusion — Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
In Case T‑241/16,
El Corte Inglés, SA, established in Madrid (Spain), represented by J.L. Rivas Zurdo, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Botis and J. Ivanauskas, acting as Agents,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
WE Brand Sàrl, established in Luxembourg (Luxembourg), represented by R. van Oerle and L. Bekke, lawyers,
ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 11 February 2016 (Case R 426/2015-2), relating to opposition proceedings between WE Brand and El Corte Inglés,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),
composed of V. Tomljenović, President, E. Bieliūnas (Rapporteur) and A. Marcoulli, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
having regard to the application lodged at the Court Registry on 13 May 2016,
having regard to the response of EUIPO lodged at the Court Registry on 29 May 2017,
having regard to the response of the intervener lodged at the Court Registry on 16 July 2017,
having regard to the orders of 26 July and 11 November 2016 and of 28 February 2017 staying the proceedings,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
Background to the dispute
1 On 20 November 2013, the applicant, El Corte Inglés, SA, filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1)).
2 Registration as a mark was sought for the following figurative sign:
3 The goods in respect of which registration was sought are in Classes 3, 18 and 25 of the Nice Agreement concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and correspond, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 3: ‘Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; soaps; perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions; dentifrices’;
– Class 18: ‘Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; animal skins, hides; trunks and travelling bags; umbrellas and parasols; walking sticks; whips, harness and saddlery’;
– Class 25: ‘Clothing, footwear, headgear’.
4 The EU trade mark application was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 228/2013 of 29 November 2013.
5 On 28 February 2014, the intervener, WE Brand Sàrl, filed a notice of opposition pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 46 of Regulation 2017/1001) to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
6 The opposition was based on the earlier EU word mark WE, which was registered on 22 June 2010 under the number 7209571 and covers, inter alia, goods in Classes 3, 18 and 25 corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 3: ‘Soaps, perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair lotions’;
– Class 18: ‘Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; umbrellas and parasols; trunks and travelling bags; bags not included in other classes’;
– Class 25: ‘Clothing, footwear, headgear’.
7 The grounds relied on in support of the opposition were those set out in Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) and (5) of Regulation 2017/1001).
8 On 28 January 2015, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition in respect of all of the contested goods, except for the ‘walking sticks’ in Class 18 covered by the mark applied for, since it took the view that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. By contrast, it rejected the opposition in so far as it was based on Article 8(5) of Regulation No 207/2009 since the evidence which the intervener had provided in order to show that the earlier mark had a reputation was not sufficient.
9 On 17 February 2015, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO, pursuant to Articles 58 to 64 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Articles 66 to 71 of Regulation 2017/1001), against the decision of the Opposition Division.
10 By decision of 11 February 2016 (‘the contested decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed the appeal. In the first place, it pointed out that, since the intervener had not filed an appeal or a response seeking a decision annulling or altering the Opposition Division’s decision on a point not raised in the applicant’s appeal, in accordance with Article 8(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 216/96 of 5 February 1996 laying down the rules of procedure of the Boards of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OJ 1996 L 28, p. 11), as amended, the decision of the Opposition Division had become final in so far as it had accepted the mark applied for in respect of the ‘walking sticks’ in Class 18. In the second place, the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s assessments and found that the signs at issue exhibited significant visual and phonetic similarities, with the result that there was, on the part of the relevant public, consisting of average Italian- and Spanish-speaking consumers, a likelihood of confusion, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, in respect of all the goods that had been found to be identical, similar or similar to a low degree.
Forms of order sought
11 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order EUIPO and, as the case may be, the intervener to pay the costs.
12 EUIPO and the intervener contend that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The general reference to the written pleadings submitted before EUIPO
13 In its response, the intervener refers, in a general manner, in order to complete the arguments it puts forward in the present action, to the arguments in the written pleadings it submitted in the course of the administrative proceedings before EUIPO.
14 It must be borne in mind that, pursuant to Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and to Article 177(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, an application must contain a brief statement of the pleas in law on which it is based. According to settled case-law, although specific points in the text of the application can be supported and completed by references to specific passages in the documents annexed to it, a general reference to other documents cannot compensate for the failure to set out the essential elements of the legal argument which must, under the provisions referred to above, appear in the application itself (see judgment of 16 February 2017, Jaguar Land Rover v EUIPO — Nissan Jidosha (Land Glider), T‑71/15, not published, EU:T:2017:82, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
15 That case-law can be transposed to the response of the other party to opposition proceedings before a Board of Appeal who intervenes before the General Court. It is not for the General Court to take on the role of the parties by seeking to identify the relevant pleas and arguments in the documents they refer to (see judgment of 16 February 2017, Land Glider, T‑71/15, not published, EU:T:2017:82, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
16 It follows that the general reference, in the intervener’s response, to the written pleadings it lodged with EUIPO is inadmissible.
Substance
17 In support of its action, the applicant relies on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.
18 The applicant submits, in essence, that there is no likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue, for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, on the part of the relevant public because there are sufficient visual, phonetic and conceptual differences between those signs to rule out such a likelihood of confusion.
19 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments. In essence, they take the view that the Board of Appeal was right in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
20 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
21 According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically-linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. According to the same case-law, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM — Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).
22 For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM — easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
23 It must be stated that the parties do not dispute that the goods in Classes 3, 18 and 25 covered by the mark applied for are, except for the ‘walking sticks’ in Class 18 covered by the mark applied for, identical, similar or similar to a low degree to the goods in Classes 3, 18 and 25 covered by the earlier mark. Those assessments on the part of the Board of Appeal must, since they appear to be correct, be upheld.
The relevant public
24 According to the case-law, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, account should be taken of the average consumer of the category of goods concerned, who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (see judgment of 13 February 2007, Mundipharma v OHIM — Altana Pharma (RESPICUR), T‑256/04, EU:T:2007:46, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
25 It is apparent from paragraphs 18, 21 and 22 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal defined the relevant public as consisting of average, well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect consumers and as being located in the territory of the European Union. It stated, in paragraph 26 of the contested decision, that, for reasons of procedural economy, the signs would be compared from the standpoint of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking publics.
26 The applicant disputes the contested decision inasmuch as the Board of Appeal took into consideration only the Spanish- and Italian-speaking publics and not also the English- or French-speaking publics.
27 In that regard, it is sufficient to state that, where the protection of the earlier EU trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods or services in question in that territory. However, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 exists in part of the European Union (see judgment of 13 September 2016, Perfetti Van Melle Benelux v EUIPO — PepsiCo (3D), T‑390/15, not published, EU:T:2016:463, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
28 Consequently, the Board of Appeal did not err in deciding to assess the likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue with regard to the Italian- and Spanish-speaking publics in the European Union.
The comparison of the signs
29 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In this regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
30 The Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue were visually and phonetically similar to an average degree (paragraphs 29 and 30 of the contested decision) whereas the conceptual comparison remained neutral as the signs were meaningless for the relevant public (paragraph 31 of the contested decision). It admitted, however, that both signs may be perceived as abbreviations composed of the same letters (paragraph 31 of the contested decision). It concluded that there were certain visual and phonetic coincidences between the signs in question, but that the differences owing to the letters’ inverted order and the use of a very banal typeface in the mark applied for could not outweigh their overall similarity (paragraph 33 of the contested decision).
31 The applicant maintains, in the first place, that the earlier mark is one which has little phonetic and visual complexity, with the result that it is necessary, when comparing that mark with other marks, to take into account the factor resulting from any changes or modifications observed in the later trade mark. In the second place, it submits that the mark applied for differs from the earlier mark since there are a number of elements in the mark applied for which are not present in the earlier mark. It maintains that that is so as regards its visual aspect, which is particularly characteristic of short marks that have a simple verbal and visual composition, but also as regards its phonetic aspect given that the pronunciation of the two marks is different, since the mark applied for consists of a word which begins with a vowel, whereas the earlier mark begins with a consonant. Consequently, the applicant takes the view that the differences between the signs at issue are substantial and it complains that the Board of Appeal focused excessively on the fact that the marks consisted of a single syllable. In the third place, the applicant submits that, from a conceptual standpoint, the earlier mark has a meaning in English, namely ‘we’, whereas the mark applied for is devoid of any meaning in any of the languages of the European Union. It maintains that the mark applied for may, however, for the Spanish public, bring to mind another trade mark registered by the applicant, namely the trade mark ‘EASY WEAR’, which is widely known and covers goods that are sold in its shopping centres.
32 EUIPO and the intervener submit that the fact that the signs at issue both consist of the letters ‘w’ and ‘e’ is sufficient to conclude that they are visually and phonetically similar. They maintain, in that regard, that the fact that the two letters are inverted in both of the signs cannot automatically preclude those signs from being similar. Lastly, they submit that the conceptual comparison between the signs does not have any influence since the marks WE and EW are devoid of any meaning for the relevant public.
33 As regards, first, the visual comparison, it must be stated that there is nothing to prevent a determination as to whether there is any visual similarity between a word mark and a figurative mark, since the two types of mark have graphic form capable of creating a visual impression (see judgment of 4 May 2005, Chum v OHIM — Star TV (STAR TV), T‑359/02, EU:T:2005:156, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
34 It must be pointed out, as the Board of Appeal observed in paragraph 29 of the contested decision, that the signs at issue both consist of the two letters ‘e’ and ‘w’. However, the mere presence of those two letters in the signs at issue cannot be sufficient to conclude that there is an average degree of visual similarity.
35 It must be observed that, when faced with short signs, the relevant public is likely to perceive the differences between them more clearly (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 December 2014, Max Mara Fashion Group v OHIM — Mackays Stores (M & Co.), T‑272/13, not published, EU:T:2014:1020, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). In the present case, there are differences between the sign at issue inasmuch as, first, the letters ‘w’ and ‘e’ are not arranged in the same order and, secondly, although the typeface used in the mark applied for is indeed banal, it is, however, necessary to note the interconnection in the upper part of the letters ‘e’ and ‘w’ which, though barely visible, nevertheless strengthens the impression that the mark applied for forms a single syllable and an indivisible whole.
36 Consequently, it must be held that there is a low degree of visual similarity between the signs at issue.
37 As regards, secondly, the phonetic comparison, it must be pointed out that the relevant public will pronounce the earlier mark as ‘ve’ or ‘güe’, or even, with regard to the part of that public which has a knowledge of English, as ‘wi’. As for the mark applied for, the relevant public will, as was stated by the Board of Appeal, pronounce it as ‘ev’.
38 Furthermore, the fact that the mark applied for begins with a vowel whereas the earlier mark begins with a consonant creates a difference in the pronunciation of the signs at issue, contrary to what EUIPO and the intervener submit.
39 Consequently, the signs at issue are phonetically similar to a low degree, or even different for the part of the relevant public with a knowledge of English.
40 As regards, thirdly, the conceptual comparison, it must be pointed out that the Board of Appeal was right in stating, in paragraph 31 of the contested decision, that the mark applied for was meaningless for the relevant public.
41 In that regard, the applicant’s argument that the relevant public will, when faced with the mark EW, recognise the trade mark EASY WEAR of which it is the proprietor must, in any event, be rejected as being unfounded. Although it is true that it is common in the clothing sector for the same mark to be configured in various ways according to the type of product which it designates, since it is common for a single clothing manufacturer to use sub-brands (signs that derive from a principal mark and which share with it a common dominant element) in order to distinguish its various clothing lines from one another (see judgment of 17 February 2011, Annco v OHIM — Freche et fils (ANN TAYLOR LOFT), T‑385/09, EU:T:2011:49, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), in the present case, the applicant merely made a general statement and did not support it with specific evidence.
42 As regards the earlier mark, it must be observed that, for that part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking publics which has no knowledge of English, the term ‘we’ will have no meaning, but that, for the part of that public which has some understanding of English, that term will refer to the personal pronoun of the first person plural (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 November 2015, Hong Kong Group v OHIM — WE Brand (W E), T‑718/14, not published, EU:T:2015:916, paragraph 59).
43 Consequently, the conceptual comparison is neutral so far as concerns the part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking publics which has no knowledge of English, but, for the part of those publics which does have a knowledge of English, that comparison leads to the conclusion that the signs at issue are not similar, since the earlier mark has a meaning whereas the mark applied for does not.
44 Furthermore, although the Board of Appeal pointed out, in paragraph 31 of the contested decision, that both of the signs at issue may also be perceived as abbreviations composed of the same letters, it did not, however, conclude from this that the signs at issue should therefore be found to be similar or, on the contrary, different.
45 The Court finds that the fact that the signs at issue are understood as abbreviations does not on its own make it possible to ascertain whether there is any conceptual similarity or difference between those signs. In order to do that, it would have been necessary to know the complete term or terms of which the marks at issue are supposedly the abbreviations, which the Board of Appeal did not mention.
46 Lastly, as regards the previous decisions of EUIPO relied on by the applicant and the intervener, it is sufficient to note that the decisions concerning the registration or the protection of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal take under Regulation No 207/2009 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers. Accordingly, the legality of those decisions must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (see judgment of 12 April 2016, Auyantepui Corp. v EUIPO — Magda Rose (Mr Jones), T‑8/15, not published, EU:T:2016:213, paragraph 48 and the case-law cited).
47 In view of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the signs at issue exhibited significant visual and phonetic similarities. Furthermore, the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue is either neutral, as the Board of Appeal pointed out, or leads to the signs at issue being found to be dissimilar for part of the relevant public.
The likelihood of confusion
48 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM — Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
49 The Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, that the inherent distinctive character of the earlier mark was normal in relation to the goods at issue. It observed, in paragraph 42 of the contested decision, that the signs exhibited significant visual and phonetic similarities with the result that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, not only as regards the goods that had been found to be identical, but also as regards the goods that had been found to be similar or similar to a low degree.
50 The applicant takes the view that the differences between the signs at issue are sufficient to rule out any likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. Furthermore, it takes the view that the judgment of 6 October 2004, New Look v OHIM — Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection) (T‑117/03 to T‑119/03 and T‑171/03, EU:T:2004:293), is applicable in the present case and deduces from this that the intervener cannot prevent the registration of other trade marks which use the same letters as its own trade mark, particularly where, as in the present case, the trade marks differ with regard to the order in which the letters are placed and are phonetically, visually and conceptually different.
51 EUIPO and the intervener maintain that there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue. In particular, EUIPO submits that the relevant public will not notice either the negligible stylisation of the typeface or the barely noticeable interconnection between the two letters of the mark applied for. Furthermore, it takes the view that, since the marks are meaningless, the consumers will focus on the letters as such when confronted with them and will not remember their exact positioning.
52 In the first place, it must be pointed out that the Board of Appeal was right in finding that the inherent distinctive character of the earlier mark was normal with regard to the goods at issue since the relevant public, including the part which has a knowledge of English, will not make an immediate and direct link between the earlier mark and the goods at issue.
53 In the second place, it must be pointed out that, in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the judgment of 6 October 2004, NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection (T‑117/03 to T‑119/03 and T‑171/03, EU:T:2004:293), the Court stated that the legislature had expressly included signs consisting of a letter in the list of examples in Article 4 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 4 of Regulation 2017/1001) of signs which may constitute an EU trade mark and that Articles 7 and 8 of that regulation (now Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation 2017/1001), concerning refusal of registration, do not lay down specific rules for signs consisting of a letter or a combination of letters not forming a word. It follows that the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion between such signs pursuant to Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 in principle follows the same rules as those relating to word signs comprising a word, a name or a fanciful term. Consequently, as EUIPO has observed, the intervener has the right to prevent registration of any trade mark that is so similar to its mark that it may give rise to a likelihood of confusion, without that having the effect that the intervener has an unjustified monopoly over the letters ‘w’ and ‘e’.
54 In the third place, since the signs at issue are short, it must be held that the differences between the marks at issue will not escape the relevant public’s attention, even when account is taken of the fact that the average consumer only rarely has a chance to compare the various marks directly and must therefore rely on his imperfect recollection of them (see, by analogy, judgment of 5 February 2016, Kicktipp v OHIM — Italiana Calzature (kicktipp), T‑135/14, EU:T:2016:69, paragraph 196 (not published) and the case-law cited).
55 In particular, since, as EUIPO has, moreover, noted, the letter ‘w’ is little used in Spanish and Italian and is most often used in words of foreign origin, its position in the signs at issue will attract the relevant public’s attention. Furthermore, when faced with the combination of letters ‘we’, the average consumer will be capable of associating it with the personal pronoun in the first person plural in English, whereas, when faced with the combination of letters ‘ew’, the relevant public, even the part which has a knowledge of English, will not recognise any term or concept that is capable of having a meaning.
56 In addition, the presence of the interconnection between the letters ‘e’ and ‘w’ in the mark applied for confers on the sign a unity which the earlier mark does not have.
57 Consequently, the overall impression made on the relevant public by the signs at issue cannot be capable of giving rise to a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue, even though the goods at issue are identical or similar. That conclusion applies a fortiori with regard to the goods that are similar to a low degree.
58 The Board of Appeal therefore erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009.
59 In view of all of the foregoing, the single plea in law must be upheld and the contested decision must therefore be annulled.
Costs
60 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Moreover, under Article 134(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where there is more than one unsuccessful party the Court is to decide how the costs are to be shared.
61 Since EUIPO and the intervener have been unsuccessful in the present case, they must, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant, be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the applicant.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
hereby:
1. Annuls the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 11 February 2016 (Case R 426/2015-2);
2. Orders EUIPO and WE Brand Sàrl to bear their own respective costs and to pay those incurred by El Corte Inglés, SA.
Tomljenović | Bieliūnas | Marcoulli |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 May 2018.