Language of document : ECLI:EU:T:2019:770

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINTH CHAMBER (EXTENDED COMPOSITION) OF THE GENERAL COURT

8 October 2019 (*)

(Confidentiality — Challenge by the interveners)

In Case T‑612/17,

Google LLC, formerly Google Inc., established in Mountain View, California (United States),

Alphabet Inc., established in Mountain View, California,

represented by T. Graf, R. Snelders, and C. Thomas, lawyers, K. Fountoukakos-Kyriakakos, Solicitior, R. O’Donoghue, QC, D. Piccinin, Barrister, and M. Pickford, QC,

applicants,

supported by

Computer & Communications Industry Association, established in Washington, DC (United States), represented by J. Killick and A. Komninos, lawyers,

intervener,

v

European Commission, represented by T. Christoforou, N. Khan, A. Dawes, H. Leupold and C. Urraca Caviedes, acting as Agents,

defendant,

supported by

Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs (BEUC), established in Brussels (Belgium), represented by A. Fratini, lawyer,

by

EFTA Surveillance Authority, represented by C. Zatschler and C. Simpson, acting as Agents,

by

Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger eV, established in Berlin (Germany), represented by T. Höppner, university teacher, and P. Westerhoff, lawyer,

by

Federal Republic of Germany, represented by M. Möller, acting as Agent,

by

Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger eV, established in Berlin, represented by T. Höppner, university teacher, and P. Westerhoff, lawyer,

by

Visual Meta GmbH, established in Berlin, represented by T. Höppner, university teacher, and P. Westerhoff, lawyer,

by

Twenga, established in Paris (France), represented by L. Godfroid, S. Hautbourg and S. Pelsy, lawyers,

by

Kelkoo, established in Paris, represented by J. Koponen and B. Meyring, lawyers,

and by

Infederation Ltd, established in Crowthorne (United Kingdom), represented by A. Morfey, N. Boyle, S. Gartagani, L. Hannah, A. D’heygere, K. Gwilliam and T. Vinje, Solicitors, S. Ford, Barrister, and D. Paemen, lawyer,

interveners,

APPLICATION under Articles 261 and 263 TFEU seeking, principally, annulment of Commission Decision C(2017) 4444 final of 27 June 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT. 39740 — Google search (Shopping)) and, in the alternative, annulment or reduction of the fine imposed on the applicants,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINTH CHAMBER (EXTENDED COMPOSITION) OF THE GENERAL COURT

makes the following

Order

 Procedure

1        By application lodged at the Court Registry on 11 September 2017, Google LLC, formerly Google Inc., and Alphabet Inc. (together, ‘Google’) brought an action for annulment and, in the alternative, for variation of Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (Case AT.39740 — Google search (Shopping)), finding an abuse on their part of a dominant position on a number of national markets and accordingly imposing a financial penalty on them (‘the contested decision’).

2        By documents lodged at the Court Registry on 28 November and 19 December 2017, the Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs (‘BEUC’) and the company Kelkoo (‘Kelkoo’) respectively requested leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Commission.

3        By orders of the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court of 17 December 2018, BEUC, Kelkoo and the other interveners mentioned in the introductory part of this order were granted leave to intervene.

4        On 15 March 2019, BEUC and Kelkoo lodged their statements in intervention at the Court Registry.

5        By order of the President of the Ninth Chamber of the General Court of 11 April 2019, a ruling was made on the requests for confidentiality concerning elements of the application, the defence, the reply, the rejoinder and their annexes, made by the main parties vis-à-vis the intervening parties and on the challenge by certain intervening parties to those requests. One of those intervening parties was authorised to lodge a supplementary statement in intervention.

6        The main parties lodged observations with the Court Registry on the statements in intervention during the months of May, June and July 2019. In particular, Google submitted observations on the statements in intervention of BEUC and Kelkoo on 21 June 2019.

7        By decision of the plenary meeting of the General Court of 10 July 2019, the case was referred to the Ninth Chamber (Extended Composition) of the General Court.

8        By documents lodged at Registry on 9 and 23 August 2019, the main parties requested the confidential treatment, vis-à-vis all of the intervening parties, of certain information contained in Google’s observations on the statements in intervention and in the annexes to those observations. They provided non-confidential versions of those documents prepared, as appropriate, in a coordinated way where they each had confidentiality requests concerning the same document. In that context, Google has in particular requested confidential treatment of certain passages of its observations on BEUC’s statement in intervention and of the data in Annex O-BEUC 5 to those observations, as well as certain passages of its observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention and of the entire Annex O-Kelkoo 7 to those observations.

9        By a document lodged at the Registry on 5 September 2019, BEUC contests Google’s requests for confidentiality concerning paragraphs 28 and 29 of Google’s observations on its statement in intervention.

10      By a document lodged at the Registry on 10 September 2019, Kelkoo contests Google’s requests for confidentiality concerning paragraphs 38 to 41 and 56(i) of Google’s observations on its statement in intervention.

 Applications for confidential treatment

 Outline of principles

11      Article 144(7) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court states:

‘If the application to intervene is granted, the intervener shall receive a copy of every procedural document served on the main parties, save, where applicable, for the confidential information excluded from such communication [by order of the President of the Chamber before which the case is pending, adopted] pursuant to paragraph 5.’

12      That provision lays down the principle that interveners are to receive a copy of every pleading served on the parties and permits only by way of derogation that certain confidential documents or information may be excluded from that communication (order of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited).

13      In that regard, in the first place, it is clear from settled case-law, the substance of which is reproduced in paragraph 182 of the Practice Rules for the Implementation of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, that the party submitting a request for confidential treatment must accurately identify the particulars or passages to be excluded, that that request must state the reasons for which each of those particulars or passages is regarded as confidential and that failure to provide such information may result in the request being refused by the Court (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 31; of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraph 12; and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 36).

14      The degree of reasoning required may vary depending on the actual nature of each document and item of information concerned, with some being inherently confidential, whereas for others specific reasons must be provided for their confidential nature (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 34; of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraph 16; and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 40).

15      In the second place, as a rule, the President of the Chamber before which the case is pending must make a ruling only on the confidentiality of the documents or items of information in respect of which that request is contested (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 36; of 15 June 2006, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑271/03, EU:T:2006:163, paragraphs 11 and 12; and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 46).

16      Indeed, the objection raised by an intervener against the confidentiality of information in the case file claimed by another party must relate to specific information which is redacted and state the reasons why the confidentiality of that information should be refused.

17      In the present case, there appears to be no particular reason to rule on the uncontested aspects of the requests for confidentiality made by the main parties concerning Google’s observations on the statements in intervention and the annexes to those observations.

18      In the third place, with regard to the information in respect of which confidentiality is expressly and precisely contested, it is incumbent on the President of the Chamber before which the case is pending to examine initially whether or not that information is confidential (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 38; of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraph 15; and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 39).

19      In that regard, as is apparent from paragraph 14 above, a statement of reasons in the request for confidential treatment of information which is limited to a description of its content may suffice only for information which is inherently confidential. Moreover, even for that type of information, the inherent confidentiality may disappear over time. Thus, it has been consistently held that information which was confidential, but which is at least 5 years old, must for that reason be considered historical and be forwarded to the other parties, unless, exceptionally, the party seeking to preserve that confidentiality shows that, in spite of its age, that information still constitutes essential secrets, such as industrial or commercial secrets, disclosure of which would harm that party or the third party concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 March 2017, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P, EU:C:2017:205, paragraph 64, and order of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).

20      Moreover, some circumstances may lead to the conclusion that a request for confidential treatment of an item of information in the case file is not justified. That is the case, for example, for information which is already public or to which the general public or certain specialist circles have access (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 56, and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 60), for information also in other passages or documents in the case file in respect of which the party seeking to preserve the confidential nature of the information in question neglected to make a request to that effect (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraphs 49 and 53; of 30 April 2013, PT Musim Mas v Council, T‑26/12, not published, EU:T:2013:728, paragraph 32; and of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraphs 25 and 26), for information which is not sufficiently specific or precise to reveal confidential data (see, to that effect, order of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 59), or for information which is largely apparent or may be deduced from other information which is legitimately available to the interested parties (see, to that effect, order of 8 May 2012, Spira v Commission, T‑108/07, not published, EU:T:2012:226, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited).

21      In the fourth place, where the examination leads the President of the Chamber before which the case is pending to conclude that information in the case file in respect of which confidential treatment is expressly and precisely contested is in fact confidential, it is incumbent on the President to strike a balance between the legitimate interest of the party seeking to have that confidentiality preserved in not having those secrets disclosed and the equally legitimate concern of the parties seeking to have that confidentiality withdrawn in having the information necessary for the purpose of being fully in a position to assert their rights and to state their case before the EU courts (see, to that effect, orders of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 42; of 21 September 2015, Deloitte Consulting v Commission, T‑688/13, not published, EU:T:2015:745, paragraph 18; and of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraphs 42 and 43).

22      In that regard, the main parties must, in view of the adversarial and public nature of judicial proceedings, envisage the possibility that some of the confidential documents or information which it has decided to place on the file may appear necessary for the exercise of the intervening parties’ procedural rights and, consequently, must be disclosed to the latter (order of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, paragraph 46).

23      Finally, it should be recalled that acceptance of a request for confidential treatment does not prevent an intervener from using the information concerned in the context of its intervention if it turns out that that information appears elsewhere in the case file which it received (see, to that effect, order of 15 September 2016, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, T‑827/14, not published, EU:T:2016:545, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). If an intervener lawfully became aware of such information by any other means, it may also use it, as appropriate, in order to support its position, under its own responsibility having regard to the limitations on using that information which may be imposed upon it, for example as a result of obligations arising from professional secrecy or confidentiality agreements (order of 11 April 2019, Google and Alphabet v Commission, T‑612/17, not published, EU:T:2019:250, paragraph 22).

 The requests for confidentiality contested by BEUC

24      BEUC contests to some extent Google’s requests for confidentiality concerning paragraphs 28 and 29 of Google’s observations on its statement in intervention. BEUC stipulates that it does not seek to know the figures, in particular, concerning the activation of internet links (clicks), the ranking percentages or the technical details regarding the selected results made by Google that could appear in the passages in respect of which it seeks redaction vis-à-vis the intervening parties. Nevertheless, BEUC states that it intends to contest at the hearing Google’s arguments in support of its third and fourth pleas for annulment, according to which the conduct alleged against it did not lead to a diversion of traffic from its generic results pages and could not have anti-competitive effects.

25      However, in paragraph 28 of its observations, Google states that it did not hide from internet users, on its generic results pages, competing comparison shopping sites. However, the explanation provided in support of that assertion, citing the role of the Panda algorithm in the poor ranking of some comparison shopping sites within the generic results is, it is claimed, too widely redacted in the non-confidential version of the document to identify the rationale and comment on it.

26      Google, for its part, justifies the redaction in question on the ground that it contained information about the operation of a ‘proprietary’ algorithm, the disclosure of which would cause it serious harm.

27      It is true that the redacted information relates to a specific rule of the operation of the Panda algorithm, which is still in use, and thus constitutes a trade secret. It is therefore necessary to balance the legitimate interests of Google and BEUC as to whether or not it should be disclosed.

28      In the present case, a reading of paragraphs 25 to 29 of Google’s non-confidential observations allows BEUC to understand that Google maintains that the introduction of Panda did not lead to a lower ranking in the generic results for all comparison shopping services, but only those with certain characteristics. This level of information seems sufficient for BEUC to be able to effectively support the Commission at a hearing in its rebuttal of Google’s arguments mentioned in paragraph 24 above, according to which the alleged conduct did not lead to a diversion of traffic from its generic results pages and could not have anti-competitive effects. Moreover, the redacted information forms part of that to which BEUC does not request access, since it provides technical details regarding Google’s selected results.

29      It is therefore appropriate, in view of what is stated in paragraph 21 above, to accept Google’s application for confidentiality with regard to paragraph 28 of its observations on BEUC’s statement in intervention.

30      With regard to paragraph 29 of those observations, BEUC states that Google answers the argument that the increase in traffic from its generic results pages to its own comparison shopping service has been at the expense of competing comparison shopping services and has resulted in less consumer choice. However, in the non-confidential version of that paragraph, most of the explanation supporting Google’s position that it has preserved consumer choice is, it is claimed, redacted, which does not allow a meaningful position to be taken in that regard.

31      Google, for its part, justifies the redacted passages in question on the ground that they relate to traffic data (clicks) from its generic search result pages, which is confidential and the disclosure of which would cause it serious harm.

32      However, it must be noted, on the one hand, that the first sentence of the paragraph in question, which Google wishes to be redacted, is far too general to provide information on the matters which Google claims it wants to keep confidential, and that the substance of the second sentence of that paragraph is repeated in footnote 23, to which it refers, whereas that footnote is not redacted. The information in question is therefore not confidential.

33      In those circumstances, in view of what is stated in paragraph 20 above, Google’s application for confidentiality concerning paragraph 29 of its observations on BEUC’s statement in intervention must be rejected.

 The requests for confidential treatment contested by Kelkoo

34      Kelkoo states, at the outset, that the question of whether Google has employed a strategy of foreclosing its competitors by demoting them in its search results using algorithms while promoting its own comparison shopping service by not subjecting it to the same algorithms is a matter of law. It is therefore essential, having regard to the adversarial principle, that Kelkoo should be able to take a position on all the legal and factual arguments that Google puts forward on that question. However, the redactions requested by Google would not make it possible to understand its arguments. Kelkoo points out that it is clear from the case-law that a main party must envisage that the arguments and facts it puts forward may be disclosed to the interveners in order to ensure that their procedural rights are respected.

35      More specifically, the first objection is to Google’s requests to redact the part of its observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention in which Google claims that the criteria for its ranking algorithms reflect user preferences. In paragraphs 38, 39 and 40 of those observations, Google relies, in that respect, on its Panda algorithm, and perhaps on another algorithm, which, it is argued by Kelkoo, demotes the comparison shopping services in the generic results. However, anything that would actually help Google’s argument to be understood is redacted, even though the algorithms in question were introduced in 2011, well over 5 years ago. The next paragraph, 41, is completely redacted. However, footnote 49, which is associated with it, itself refers to paragraphs in the application and the defence which have not been redacted in the non-confidential versions of those procedural documents.

36      Google, for its part, justifies the redactions in question on the ground that they contain information on the operation of ‘proprietary’ algorithms, the disclosure of which would cause it serious harm.

37      As observed in paragraph 27 above, the redacted information includes a specific rule for the operation of the Panda algorithm, which is still in use. It also includes a specific rule for the operation of another algorithm, itself still in use. Those items of information are, therefore, trade secrets. It is therefore necessary to balance the legitimate interests of Google and Kelkoo as to whether or not they are disclosed.

38      A reading of paragraphs 38 to 41 of Google’s non-confidential observations, including that of the unredacted information referred to in footnote 49, allows Kelkoo to understand that Google supports ranking websites, in particular those of competing comparison shopping services, in its generic results, inter alia according to their popularity among users, that in that regard the Panda algorithm does not take into account, it is alleged, the lack of original content of a website, that a comment on the demotion of such sites in the generic results, noted by the Commission on a Google blog and highlighted by Kelkoo, did not relate to the Panda algorithm and that Panda nevertheless sought to demote sites that were apparently relevant having regard to other generic results adjustment algorithms, but which in fact were of low quality. It can be deduced from this that, according to Google, the ranking of websites in Google’s generic results derives from the action of several algorithms, but that Panda in particular uses criteria other than the originality of the content.

39      However, those elements alone do not make it possible to understand the basis for Google’s denial of Kelkoo’s assertion in its statement in intervention that Kelkoo, like other comparison shopping services, was demoted in Google’s generic results due to a lack of original content, whereas its website includes and compares the content of many on-line sales sites, which, it is argued, is useful to the consumer. Google’s response in that regard, which may be relevant to the resolution of the dispute, is essentially that Kelkoo has been demoted in the generic results for reasons other than a lack of original content. However, the non-confidential version of Google’s observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention does not provide any explanation in that respect, other than the assertion at the beginning of paragraph 40 that ‘Google did not have a strategy to demote aggregators’. In so far as Google’s response is intended to refute a specific assertion by Kelkoo, that it has been the victim, like other comparison shopping services, of anti-competitive behaviour, that this response could be raised again at a hearing, and that it could, as stated above, have importance in the settlement of the dispute, the balancing of interests referred to in paragraph 21 above has the result that the request for confidential treatment concerning paragraph 39 of Google’s observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention, including footnote 43, to which it refers, must be refused. Access to this entire paragraph, which concerns an algorithm other than Panda, will allow Kelkoo to know the justification provided by Google for its assertion that it did not demote Kelkoo and the other comparison shopping services, as a matter of principle, in the generic results due to a lack of original content.

40      This level of information appears sufficient for Kelkoo to argue in a sufficiently adversarial context, at a hearing, that Google employed a strategy of foreclosing competing comparison shopping services by demoting them in its generic results by means of its algorithms. In this respect, it is not necessary to know in detail the role of each of Google’s algorithms, such as Panda, since Google does not dispute that those algorithms take into account criteria supposed to measure the popularity of websites or their usefulness for consumers.

41      Google’s application for confidentiality concerning paragraphs 38, 40 and 41 of its observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention must therefore be accepted, but refused vis-à-vis Kelkoo in so far as it concerns paragraph 39 and footnote 43 thereof.

42      Kelkoo then contests the requests for confidential treatment of two passages in paragraph 56(i) of Google’s observations on its statement in intervention. That paragraph forms part of the demonstration that Google has not adopted a strategy of promoting its comparison shopping service. Kelkoo argues that the redacted information relating to e-mails is old (2006 and 2009), and that Google has not proven why it still constitutes a trade secret. Kelkoo reiterates that it should be able to review all the arguments and evidence put forward by Google concerning its strategies of promotion or demotion.

43      Google, for its part, justifies the redactions in question on the ground that they contain information about its policy of including web pages in its generic results, the disclosure of which would cause it serious harm.

44      However, it must be noted that the relevant information on the policy of including web pages in Google’s generic results appears in substance in point 62 of the non-confidential version of Annex A9 to the application, entitled ‘report on the Technologies and Designs of Google’s Product Results and Product Ads’. It states that Google does not index its own results pages in its generic results, which concerned in particular the Froogle specialised results page for products. The content of the first passage of paragraph 56(i) above, which Google requests to be redacted, which corresponds to that information, is therefore not confidential. The second passage of the same paragraph which Google requests to be redacted, in which Google relies on that information, cannot therefore be confidential with regard to the reasoning supporting the request for its redaction.

45      In those circumstances, in view of what is stated in paragraph 20 above, Google’s request for confidentiality concerning paragraph 56(i) of its observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention must be rejected.

 Dissemination to the intervening parties of information which has not been found to justify confidential treatment

46      It should be pointed out that in the present dispute, the main parties did not request specific confidential treatment with regard to a particular intervener, but rather made identical requests with regard to all the interveners. Furthermore, the information for which confidentiality is refused in the present order following BEUC’s objections and one of Kelkoo’s objections is not confidential information. Nevertheless, a request for confidentiality by Google is refused in this order following a specific balancing of its interests with those of Kelkoo. Accordingly, it is appropriate, first, subject to what is stated in the following sentence, to forward to all the intervening parties the new non-confidential version of Google’s observations on BEUC’s statement in intervention, such as is required by this order, and a new non-confidential version of Google’s observations on Kelkoo’s statement in intervention, in which paragraph 56(i) does not contain any redactions (see, to that effect, order of 22 February 2005, Hynix Semiconductor v Council, T‑383/03, EU:T:2005:57, points 2 and 4 of the operative part). Second, Kelkoo must receive a new specific version of Google’s observations on its statement in intervention, in which not only paragraph 56(i) but also paragraph 39 and footnote 43 are not redacted.

On those grounds,

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NINTH CHAMBER (EXTENDED COMPOSITION) OF THE GENERAL COURT

Hereby orders:

There is no need to adjudicate on the requests for confidential treatment that are not contested by the interveners concerning the observations of Google LLC, formerly Google Inc., and Alphabet Inc. on the statements in intervention submitted by the latter and the European Commission.The request for confidential treatment, concerning paragraph 28 of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statement in intervention of the Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs, submitted by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., is granted.The request for confidential treatment, concerning paragraph 29 of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statement in intervention of the Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs, submitted by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., is rejected with respect to all of the intervening parties.The requests for confidential treatment, concerning paragraphs 38, 40 and 41 of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statement in intervention of Kelkoo, submitted by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., are granted.The request for confidentiality, concerning paragraph 39 and footnote 43 of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statement in intervention of Kelkoo, submitted by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., is rejected with regard to Kelkoo and granted with regard to the other intervening parties.The request for confidential treatment, concerning paragraph 56(i) of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statement in intervention of Kelkoo, submitted by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc., is rejected with regard to all of the intervening parties.


New non-confidential versions of the observations of Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. on the statements in intervention of the Bureau européen des unions de consommateurs and Kelkoo, in accordance with the present operative part, shall be forwarded by Google LLC and Alphabet Inc. within the period stipulated by the Registrar, who will notify the intervening parties of any such new versions, taking into account points 3, 5 and 6 of the present operative part.

Luxembourg, 8 October 2019.

E. Coulon

 

S. Gervasoni

Registrar

 

President


*      Language of the case: English.