Language of document :

Appeal brought on 22 May 2020 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 12 March 2020 in Case T-732/16, Valencia Club de Fútbol v European Commission

(Case C-211/20 P)

Language of the case: Spanish


Appellant: European Commission

Other parties to the proceedings: Valencia Club de Fútbol, S.A.D. and Kingdom of Spain

Form of order sought

The appellant claims that the Court should:

set aside the judgment under appeal in so far as, in that judgment, the General Court annuls Commission Decision (EU) 2017/365 of 4 July 2016 on the State aid SA.36387 (2013/C) (ex 2013/NN) (ex 2013/CP) implemented by Spain for Valencia Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva, Hércules Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva and Elche Club de Fútbol Sociedad Anónima Deportiva (OJ 2017 L 55, p. 12) in respect of Measure 1, consisting in the State guarantee provided by the IVF on 5 November 2009 to cover the bank loan to Fundación Valencia for the subscription of shares in Valencia CF, in the context of the operation to increase the capital of Valencia CF;

refer the case back to the General Court of the European Union; and

reserve the decision on costs.

Sole ground of appeal:

The Commission bases its appeal on a single ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court erred in law by incorrectly interpreting Article 107(1) of the Treaty, in particular with regard to demonstrating the existence of an advantage. More specifically, in paragraphs 124 to 138 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court (i) misinterpreted the Commission Notice on the application of Articles [107 TFEU] and [108 TFEU] to State aid in the form of guarantees (OJ 2008 C 155, p. 10) in connection with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ 2008 C 14, p. 6) and misinterpreted the decision at issue; (ii) erred in law as regards the standard of the burden of proof concerning the existence of an advantage arising from an individual guarantee and as regards the Commission’s obligation of due diligence in a formal investigation procedure; and (iii) distorted the facts.