Case C‑64/16
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses
v
Tribunal de Contas
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Supremo Tribunal Administrativo)
(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Article 19(1) TEU — Legal remedies — Effective judicial protection — Judicial independence — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 — Reduction of remuneration in the national public administration — Budgetary austerity measures)
Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 27 February 2018
1. Member States — Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection — Scope
(Arts 2 TEU and 19 TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47, second para.)
2. EU law — Principles — Right to effective judicial protection –Principle of judicial independence — Scope
(Art. 19(2), third subpara., TEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 47, second para.)
3. Member States — Obligations – Provision of remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection — Observance of the principle of judicial independence – National legislation temporarily reducing remuneration in the national public administration — Infringement — None
(Art. 19(1), second para., TEU)
1. Article 19 TEU, which gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2 TEU, entrusts the responsibility for ensuring judicial review in the EU legal order not only to the Court of Justice but also to national courts and tribunals (see, to that effect, Opinion 1/09 (Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation System), of 8 March 2011, EU:C:2011:123, paragraph 66; judgments of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraph 90, and of 28 April 2015, T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 45).
The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the essence of the rule of law (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 March 2017, Rosneft, C‑72/15, EU:C:2017:236, paragraph 73 and the case-law cited). It follows that every Member State must ensure that the bodies which, as ‘courts or tribunals’ within the meaning of EU law, come within its judicial system in the fields covered by that law, meet the requirements of effective judicial protection. In order for that protection to be ensured, maintaining such a court or tribunal’s independence is essential, as confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, which refers to the access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the fundamental right to an effective remedy.
(see paras 32, 36, 37, 41)
2. The guarantee of independence, which is inherent in the task of adjudication (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 49; of 14 June 2017, Online Games and Others, C‑685/15, EU:C:2017:452, paragraph 60; and of 13 December 2017, El Hassani, C‑403/16, EU:C:2017:960, paragraph 40), is required not only at EU level as regards the Judges of the Union and the Advocates-General of the Court of Justice, as provided for in the third subparagraph of Article 19(2) TEU, but also at the level of the Member States as regards national courts.
The concept of independence presupposes, in particular, that the body concerned exercises its judicial functions wholly autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever, and that it is thus protected against external interventions or pressure liable to impair the independent judgment of its members and to influence their decisions (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 51, and of 16 February 2017, Margarit Panicello, C‑503/15, EU:C:2017:126, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). Like the protection against removal from office of the members of the body concerned (see, in particular, judgment of 19 September 2006, Wilson, C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraph 51), the receipt by those members of a level of remuneration commensurate with the importance of the functions they carry out constitutes a guarantee essential to judicial independence.
(see paras 42, 44, 45)
3. The second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judicial independence does not preclude general salary-reduction measures, such as those at issue in the main proceedings, linked to requirements to eliminate an excessive budget deficit and to an EU financial assistance programme, from being applied to the members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors, Portugal).
Those salary-reduction measures provided for a limited reduction of the amount of remuneration, up to a percentage varying in accordance with the level of remuneration. The measures were applied not only to the members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors), but, more widely, to various public office holders and employees performing duties in the public sector, including the representatives of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Those measures cannot, therefore, be perceived as being specifically adopted in respect of the members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors). They are, on the contrary, in the nature of general measures seeking a contribution from all members of the national public administration to the austerity effort dictated by the mandatory requirements for reducing the Portuguese State’s excessive budget deficit. Lastly, as is apparent from the title of Law No 75/2014 and the actual wording of Article 1(1) thereof, the salary-reduction measures introduced by that Law, and that entered into force on 1 October 2014, were temporary in nature. In those circumstances, the salary-reduction measures at issue in the main proceedings cannot be considered to impair the independence of the members of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors).
(see paras 47-52, operative part)