Case T‑104/13
Toshiba Corp.
v
European Commission
(Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Global market for cathode ray tubes for television sets and computer monitors — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Agreements and concerted practices on pricing, market sharing, capacity and production — Proof of participation in the cartel — Single and continuous infringement — Imputability of the infringement — Joint control — Fines — Unlimited jurisdiction)
Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber), 9 September 2015
1. Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Burden of proving the infringement and its duration on the Commission — Presumption of innocence — Scope
(Art. 101 TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Art. 48(1); Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
2. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Agreements and concerted practices constituting a single infringement — Undertakings that may be held responsible for participating in an overall cartel — Criteria — Joint intention between the undertakings concerned — Intention to contribute to the common objectives pursued by all the undertakings concerned — Knowledge of the general scope and essential characteristics of the overall cartel — Burden of proof
(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
3. Competition — Union rules — Infringements — Attribution — Parent company and subsidiaries — Economic unit — Criteria for assessment — Control exercised by the parent company over its subsidiary — Actual exercise of decisive influence by a parent company with a minority holding — Burden of proof — Decisive influence capable of being inferred from a set of indicators relating to legal, economic and organisational links
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
4. Competition — Union rules — Infringements — Attribution — Parent company and subsidiaries — Economic unit — Criteria for assessment — Control exercised by the parent company over its subsidiary — Joint control by two independent parent companies — Actual exercise of a decisive influence by the parent company with a minority shareholding — Criteria for assessment
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
5. Competition — Administrative procedure — Observance of the rights of the defence — Access to the file — Scope — Refusal to communicate an inculpatory document — Proof of infringement capable of being adduced by reference to other documentary evidence communicated to the parties — No infringement of the rights of the defence
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 27(2))
6. Competition — Union rules — Infringements — Attribution — Parent company and subsidiaries — Economic unit — Liability of the parent company not capable of being regarded as strict liability
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
7. Competition — Fines — Joint and several liability for payment — Scope — Attribution to the parent company of the infringing conduct of its subsidiary — Consequences for the parent company in the event of annulment or amendment of the Commission’s decision
(Art. 101(1) TFEU)
8. Competition — Union rules — Territorial scope — Cartel between undertakings established outside the European Economic Area but implemented and producing its effects in the internal market — Sale in the Union of the cartelised product — Competence of the Commission to apply EU competition rules — Conformity with public international law — Intervention of subsidiaries, agents or branches established outside the Union — Irrelevant
(Art. 101 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 53)
9. Competition — Union rules — Territorial scope — Implementation of the cartel within the EU — Vertically integrated undertaking having production units outside the EEA — Incorporation of the cartelised products in finished products by those production units — Sale of the said finished products in the EEA by the integrated undertaking — Included
(Art. 101 TFEU; EEA Agreement, Art. 53)
10. Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Agreements and concerted practices constituting a single infringement — Concept — Criteria — Single objective and overall plan — Links of complementarity between the agreements — Detailed way in which infringement committed — Irrelevant — Meetings organised and conducted separately in several continents — Interconnection between the meetings
(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 2)
11. Competition — Fines — Guidelines on the method of setting fines — Legal nature — Indicative rule of conduct implying a self-limitation on the discretion of the Commission — Obligation to comply with the principles of equal treatment, protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02)
12. Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Fixing of the base amount — Proportion of the sales value determined by reference to the degree of gravity of the infringement — Criteria
(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02, points 19 to 23)
13. Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Adjustment of the base amount — Mitigating circumstances — Commission’s margin of discretion for making an overall assessment — Limited involvement — Cartel not implemented — Conditions
(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02, point 29)
14. Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Adjustment of the base amount — Mitigating circumstances — Passive or ‘follow-my-leader’ role of the undertaking — Aspect not included in the new guidelines — Commission’s margin of discretion
(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notices 98/C 9/03, points 2 and 3, and 2006/C 210/02, point 29)
15. Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Fixing of the base amount — Determination of the value of sales — Sales carried out in direct or indirect relationship with the infringement — Incorporation of the cartelised products in finished products by production units vertically integrated into the incriminated undertaking — Sale of finished products in the EEA by the incriminated undertaking — Account taken of the sales value of the finished products only up to the fraction of that value corresponding to the value of the cartelised products — Lawfulness
(Art. 101 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2); Commission Notice 2006/C 210/02, point 13)
1. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 49, 50)
2. In cartel matters, the fact that there is a single and continuous infringement does not necessarily mean that an undertaking participating in one or more aspects can be held liable for the infringement as a whole. The Commission still has to establish that that undertaking was aware of the other undertakings’ anticompetitive activities at European level or that it could reasonably have foreseen them. The mere fact that there is identity of object between an agreement in which an undertaking participated and an overall cartel does not suffice for a finding that the undertaking participated in the overall cartel. Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply unless there is a joint intention between the parties concerned.
Accordingly, it is only if the undertaking knew or should have known when it participated in an agreement that in doing so it was joining in the overall cartel that its participation in the agreement concerned can constitute the expression of its accession to that same cartel. In other words, the Commission must show that the undertaking intended to contribute by its own conduct to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the unlawful conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and that it was prepared to take the risk.
The undertaking concerned must therefore be aware of the general scope and the essential characteristics of the cartel as a whole. In the absence of evidence establishing that it was aware of the existence or content of the agreements and concerted practices agreed on at the overall level, the mere fact that there is identity of object between the meetings in which it participated and the overall cartel and also the fact that it had contacts with undertakings whose participation in that cartel was established are not sufficient to demonstrate that it was aware of that overall cartel.
(see paras 52-54, 56)
3. In competition law, the conduct of a subsidiary can be imputed to its parent company, in particular where, although it has separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide independently on its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company, having regard in particular to the economic, organisational and legal links between those two legal entities. It is, in principle, for the Commission to demonstrate such decisive influence on the basis of factual evidence.
Even if it is generally the case that a parent company’s holding of a majority interest in the subsidiary’s share capital can enable it actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary and, in particular, on the subsidiary’s market conduct, a minority interest may enable a parent company actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary’s market conduct, if it is allied to rights which are greater than those normally granted to minority shareholders in order to protect their financial interests and which, when considered in the light of a set of consistent legal or economic indicators, are such as to show that a decisive influence is exercised over the subsidiary’s market conduct.
(see paras 93, 95-97)
4. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 99-102, 122)
5. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 127-131)
6. See the text of the decision.
(see para. 136)
7. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 145-148, 235)
8. When undertakings established outside the EEA, but which produce goods that are sold within the EEA to third parties, concert on the prices they charge to their customers in the EEA and put that concertation into effect by selling at prices which are actually coordinated, they are taking part in concertation which has the object and effect of restricting competition within the internal market within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU and which the Commission has territorial jurisdiction to proceed against.
An infringement of Article 101 TFEU consists of two elements, the formation of the cartel and its implementation. If the applicability of prohibitions laid down under competition law were to depend on the place where the cartel was formed, the result would obviously be to give undertakings an easy means of evading those prohibitions. What counts is therefore the place where it is implemented. In that regard, in determining whether that place is in the EEA, it is immaterial whether or not the participants in the cartel had recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within the EEA in order to make their contacts with purchasers established there. Moreover, the criterion as to implementation of the cartel as a factor linking the latter to EU territory is satisfied by mere sale within the Union of the cartelised product, irrespective of the location of the sources of supply and the production plant.
Where the condition relating to implementation is satisfied, the Commission’s jurisdiction to apply the EU competition rules to such conduct is covered by the territoriality principle as universally recognised in public international law.
(see paras 154-157)
9. In competition law, the conduct of a subsidiary can be imputed to its parent company, in particular, when a vertically integrated undertaking incorporates the goods in respect of which the infringement was committed into the finished products in its production units situated outside the EEA, the sale by that undertaking of those finished products in the EEA to independent third parties is liable to affect competition on the market for those products and, therefore, such an infringement may be considered to have had repercussions in the EEA, even if the market for the finished products in question constitutes a separate market from that concerned by the infringement.
(see para. 161)
10. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 162-168)
11. See the text of the decision.
(see para. 184)
12. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 187-197)
13. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 201-205)
14. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 207-210)
15. See the text of the decision.
(see paras 212-228)