Case T‑90/11

Ordre national des pharmaciens (ONP) and Others

v

European Commission

(Competition — Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — French market for clinical laboratory tests — Decision finding an infringement of Article 101 TFEU — Association of undertakings — Professional association — Subject-matter of the inspection and the investigation — Conditions for the application of Article 101 TFEU — Infringement by object — Minimum price and barriers to the development of groups of laboratories — Single and continuous infringement — Proof — Errors of assessment of fact and errors of law — Point 37 of the 2006 Guidelines on the method of setting fines — Unlimited jurisdiction)

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Ninth Chamber), 10 December 2014

1.      Competition — EU rules — Undertaking — Concept — Exercise of an economic activity — Activities connected with the exercise of public power prerogatives — Not included — Limits — Misuse of powers

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

2.      Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Decisions of associations of undertakings — Concept of an association of undertakings — Professional association — Criteria for assessment — National association of pharmacists — Included — Adverse effect on competition — Justification based on the public interest — None where the professional association exceeds the framework laid down by the legislature — Application of the competition rules

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

3.      Competition — EU rules — Power of Member States to restrict the freedom of establishment for reasons of protecting public health — Private operators not thereby absolved from the competition rules

(Arts 49 TFEU and 101(1) TFEU)

4.      Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission decision finding an infringement — Burden of proving the infringement borne by the Commission — Extent of the burden of proof — Assessment of the evidence as a whole — Judicial review — Scope

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Arts 2 and 31)

5.      Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Decisions of associations of undertakings — Order of pharmacists — Obligation to act within a framework laid down by national legislation in conformity with EU law

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

6.      Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Decisions of associations of undertakings — Order of pharmacists — Decisions taken in excess of their legal power —Unlawful

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

7.      Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission’s power of inspection — Decision ordering an inspection — Obligation to state reasons — Scope — Obligation to state the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection without making a legal classification of the infringements concerned

(Arts 101(1) TFEU and 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 20(4))

8.      Actions for annulment — Admissibility — Natural or legal persons — Undertaking to which statement of objections addressed not challenging the factual or legal content thereof during the administrative procedure — No limitation of the right to bring an action

(Arts 101 TFEU, 102 TFEU and 263, fourth para., TFEU; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 47 and 52(1))

9.      Competition — Administrative procedure — Commission’s powers of investigation — Use of information gathered during a check — Limits — Opening of an investigation into conduct contrary to the competition rules in another sector revealed incidentally on the occasion of a check — Lawfulness

(Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 20(4))

10.    Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Concerted practice — Concept — Anti competitive object or effect — Criteria for assessment — Same criteria to be applied to an agreement, decision or concerted practice

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

11.    Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Adverse effect on competition — Criteria for assessment — Anti-competitive object — Sufficient — Distinction between infringements by object and infringements by effect

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

12.    Agreements, decisions and concerted practices — Adverse effect on competition — Agreement intended to restrict competition — Simultaneous pursuit of legitimate objectives — No effect — Professional association exceeding the limits of its statutory mission — Penalties for breach of the competition rules

(Art. 101(1) TFEU)

13.    Judicial proceedings — Introduction of new pleas during the proceedings — Conditions — Amplification of an existing plea — No amplification — Inadmissibility

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Arts 44(1)(c), and 48(2))

14.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Discretion of the Commission — Judicial review — Unlimited jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Scope

(Arts 101 TFEU and 261 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Arts 23(2), and 31)

15.    Competition — Fines — Decision imposing fines — Obligation to state reasons — Scope — Indication of the factors which led the Commission to assess the gravity and the duration of the infringement — Sufficient indication

(Arts 101 TFEU, 261 TFEU and 296 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Arts 23(2), and 31)

16.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Discretion of the Commission — Commission not obliged to abide by its previous decision-making practice

(Arts 101 TFEU and 261 TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

17.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Deterrent effect of the fine — Deterrent effect on both the undertaking in breach and third parties

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

18.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringement — Criteria for assessment

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

19.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Gravity of the infringement — No obligation to take account of the actual impact on the market — Primary criterion the nature of the infringement

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

20.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — Mitigating circumstances — Actions of the public authorities having influenced the conduct complained of

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

21.    Competition — Fines — Amount — Determination — Criteria — No obligation to take account of the financial situation of the undertaking concerned — Undertaking’s actual ability to pay in a specific social context — Whether to be taken into consideration

(Art. 101(1) TFEU; Council Regulation No 1/2003, Art. 23(2))

1.      In the area of competition law, an activity which, by its nature, its aim and the rules to which it is subject does not belong to the sphere of economic activity, or which is connected with the exercise of the powers of a public authority falls outside the scope of the Treaty rules on competition. However, the exercise of a power of a public authority cannot afford absolute protection against any allegation of conduct in restriction of competition, since the manifestly inappropriate exercise of such a power would in any event constitute a misuse of that power.

(see paras 36, 197, 207)

2.      Not every decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) TFEU. For the purposes of applying that provision to a particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which a decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects, and more particularly of its objectives. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives. Reasons of general interest, in particular the interest in the proper exercise of a profession, may justify the non-application of Article 101 TFEU to certain restrictions of competition when they are necessary. In that regard, the action of a professional association of pharmacists, at least some of whom exercise an economic activity and may be regarded as undertakings, must remain within the legal framework set up by the legislature and the administrative authorities, as the Association itself has no regulatory powers.

Accordingly, when it acts on the basis of an interpretation that is contrary to the literal meaning of the relevant provisions, and indeed adopts the most restrictive interpretation in the context of a particular strategy, its conduct cannot fall outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU on the basis of the argument that it is inherent in the pursuit of a legitimate objective. It is not for a body representing private persons to extend the scope of protection of the law with the desire of protecting the interest of a group when the legislature had defined the limits of the protection offered and left the possibility for a certain amount of competition.

(see paras 37, 38, 40, 41, 347)

3.      Recognition of the power of the Member States to restrict freedom of movement by invoking the protection of public health does not authorise private players or their representative bodies to ignore the Treaty rules on competition law by imposing restrictions on competition for which the State itself does not make provision.

(see para. 49)

4.      See the text of the decision.

(see paras 53-57, 61)

5.      In the matter of applying the competition rules, where a national legislature has taken the view that the independence of a profession can be adequately guaranteed by the combined application of two safeguards, namely limiting the shareholding of persons outside the profession in a professional partnership (société d’exercice libéral; ‘SEL’) to a maximum of 25% and providing that the majority of the voting rights must be held by persons practising within the SEL, an association of pharmacists must act within those limits, since the principle of professional independence cannot be a pretext for restricting access to the capital of SELs in structures that are in accordance with the law. It follows that interventions by such an association, which has systematically chosen to apply the interpretation least favourable to the opening of the market to groups of laboratories, are excessive.

Similarly, as regards the technique of dismemberment, which consists in splitting the ownership of shares in an SEL between the usufruct, which gives the right to vote on the allocation of profits and to receive dividends, and the bare ownership, such an association adopts a position of principle that is not consistent with the applicable legal framework and results in its being opposed to constructions that are in accordance with the law where it requires that the statues make no reference to any dismemberment whatever the shareholding held.

(see paras 89, 91, 100, 110, 125, 126)

6.      In the matter of application of the competition rules, in a national legal framework which may undeniably give rise to interpretation, an association of pharmacists exceeds the limits of its legal powers in assuming a certain regulatory power and making more onerous the obligations of SELs wishing to avail themselves of the legal possibilities of opening up their capital, in particular where it demands, repetitively and on the basis of its own legal interpretation, that share movements in the capital of such companies acting within a group be communicated to it, where, in the case of refusal, it lodges complaints and systematically initiates disciplinary proceedings against the SELs concerned, and where documentary evidence reveals a strategy intended to hinder groups of laboratories from penetrating the market.

(see paras 170, 180, 186, 192)

7.      In the matter of implementation of the competition rules, a duty to state reasons for an inspection decision of the Commission arises under Article 20(4) of Regulation No 1/2003, which provides that the inspection decision is to state the subject-matter and purpose of the inspection in order to protect the rights of defence of the undertakings concerned at that stage of the investigation. Although the Commission must state as precisely as possible the presumptions which it intends to verify, it is not required to provide a precise legal classification of the infringements concerned. The Commission is required only to give a description of the essential features of the suspected infringement, since it does not yet have precise information to issue a specific legal opinion, but must first of all verify the substance of its suspicions and also the extent of the facts that have taken place.

(see paras 219-221, 231)

8.      See the text of the decision.

(see para. 223)

9.      See the text of the decision.

(see para. 235)

10.    See the text of the decision.

(see para. 305)

11.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 307-310)

12.    In an economic and legal context characterised by a regulated and protected market for clinical laboratory tests leaving only a small possibility of competing on prices by means of discounts for tests carried out in the context of occupational medicine, between laboratories and with hospitals or social security schemes, the decisions and practices of an association of pharmacists aimed at price-fixing on the market have an anti-competitive object contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU without it being necessary to demonstrate their actual effects on the market. In those circumstances, it cannot be maintained that the objective of the association in relation to discounts was to protect public health by ensuring compliance with the principle of the professional independence of biological pharmacists since the association’s action in relation to discounts is based on a broad interpretation of the legal framework. In any event, the fact that the association may have pursued a legitimate objective does not mean that its action in relation to discounts cannot be considered to have an object restrictive of competition.

(see paras 322, 327, 346, 347)

13.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 334-342)

14.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 351-353)

15.    See the text of the decision.

(see para. 356)

16.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 359, 360)

17.    See the text of the decision.

(see para. 362)

18.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 359, 361, 365, 369)

19.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 370, 371)

20.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 375-382)

21.    See the text of the decision.

(see paras 384-388)