ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)
11 December 2014 (*)
(Procedure — Taxation of costs — Lawyers’ fees — Representation of an EU body by a lawyer — Flat rate of remuneration — Agent’s travel and subsistence expenses — Translation costs — Recoverable costs — Applicant’s financial situation)
In Case T‑283/08 P-DEP,
APPLICATION for taxation of recoverable costs further to the judgment of 7 July 2011 in Longinidis v Cedefop, T‑283/08 P, EU:T:2011:338,
Pavlos Longinidis, residing in Thessaloniki (Greece), represented by P. Yatagantzidis, lawyer,
applicant,
the other party to the proceedings being
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), represented by M. Fuchs, acting as Agent,
defendant at first instance,
THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber),
composed of M. Jaeger, President, M. Prek and G. Berardis (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Facts, procedure and forms of order sought
1 By statement lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 16 July 2008, Mr Pavlos Longinidis lodged an appeal pursuant to Article 9 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union seeking to have set aside the judgment of 24 April 2008, Longinidis v Cedefop, F‑74/06 (EU:F:2008:48), by which the Civil Service Tribunal dismissed his action seeking inter alia annulment of the decision of the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) du 30 November 2005 terminating his employment as a temporary agent under a contract of indefinite duration.
2 By judgment of 7 July 2011 in Longinidis v Cedefop (T‑283/08 P, ECR-SC, EU:T:2011:338), the General Court dismissed that appeal in its entirety, holding that the six pleas in law put forward in essence by Mr Longinidis were inadmissible, unfounded or ineffective. The General Court also ordered Mr Longinidis to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by Cedefop in connection with those proceedings.
3 By letter of 14 December 2011, Cedefop requested Mr Longinidis to reimburse a total amount of EUR 16 641.28 by way of expenses connected with the appeal proceedings, comprising the fees paid to Mr P. Anestis, the lawyer retained for those proceedings, travel and subsistence expenses for the journey to Luxembourg (Luxembourg) for Cedefop’s agent for the purposes of the hearing, and translation costs.
4 Despite several attempts by a private messenger service to effect notice of the letter of 14 December 2011, it was received by Mr Longinidis only as an attachment to a letter to him from Cedefop dated 19 January 2012, which also concerned the expenses at issue. By that latter letter, Cedefop called on Mr Longinidis to submit his observations to it by 10 February 2012.
5 After obtaining an extension of that time-limit following an exchange of emails with Cedefop, Mr Longinidis replied to the letter of 19 January 2012 by letter of 2 March 2012, the date on which the extended time-limit expired.
6 In that letter Mr Longinidis stated firstly that Cedefop’s interim director, who had signed the letters of 14 December 2011 and 19 January 2012, was in a conflict of interest in relation to him. Secondly, he argued that those letters and their attachments were too vague since, in his submission, they were not clear as to the reasons why Cedefop had been represented not only by an agent but also by a lawyer, whose hourly rate and number of hours worked were not indicated; nor did they set out translation costs. Thirdly, he asked for the proceedings concerning the costs he was to reimburse to Cedefop to be suspended until a new director could be appointed.
7 By email of 23 March 2012, Cedefop replied to Mr Longinidis, stating that the amount of EUR 16 641.28 was correct and that his objections were unfounded. However, Mr Longinidis did not reply to that email or make any payment.
8 Considering that Mr Longinidis’s attitude constituted a challenge to the recoverable costs under Article 92(1) of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure, Cedefop, by document lodged at the Court Registry on 30 September 2013, brought the present application for taxation of costs, by which it asked the Court to fix the costs recoverable by it at EUR 16 641.28 further to the judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:T:2011:338), together with EUR 2 061.25 for the cost of translating the present application from English into the language of the case.
9 In his observations lodged at the Court Registry on 13 December 2013, Mr Longinidis asked the Court to dismiss Cedefop’s application as inadmissible or unfounded or, in the alternative, to reduce the amount of costs considered recoverable and, in any event, not to allow them to exceed EUR [confidential]. (1)
Law
Admissibility
10 In his observations on the present application for taxation of costs, Mr Longinidis challenges the admissibility of the action.
11 He argues, first of all, that the application is inadmissible on the ground that the parties do not dispute the recoverable costs. He states, in particular, that his email of 2 March 2012 cannot be considered proof of his having challenged the amount that Cedefop had asked him to reimburse. That email is, in essence, merely a request to suspend the administrative procedure for recovery of costs undertaken by Cedefop in order to avoid it being led by a director who allegedly is not impartial in respect of Mr Longinidis.
12 Under Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure, if there is a dispute concerning the costs to be recovered, the General Court, on application by the party concerned and after hearing the opposite party, is to make an order, from which no appeal lies.
13 It cannot be that a dispute for the purposes of that provision can be deemed to arise only when the party who has been requested to reimburse the costs advanced by the successful party provides an explicit, comprehensive refusal. If that were so, it would be sufficient for a party to proceedings who has been ordered to pay the costs incurred by the other party to refrain from engaging in any reaction or use delaying tactics in order to make it impossible to lodge an application for taxation of costs pursuant to Article 92. That would render nugatory the procedure provided for in Article 92 of the Rules of Procedure, which serves to achieve a definitive ruling on the costs of the proceedings (see, to that effect, order of 25 March 2014 in Marcuccio v Commission, T‑126/11 P‑DEP, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 13).
14 Secondly, Mr Longinidis submits that the application is too vague, in that Cedefop failed to specify how and why the expenses incurred by it were necessary; nor did it state the number of hours worked by its lawyer and that lawyer’s hourly rate.
15 This objection of inadmissibility must also be rejected, since the question whether an application for taxation of costs contains sufficient detail as to whether those costs were necessary goes to the merits and not the admissibility of the application.
Substance
16 As evidenced by paragraphs 3 and 8 above, Cedefop is asking that Mr Longinidis pay it a total amount of EUR 18 702.53, covering the following items:
– EUR 8 869.04, corresponding to the amount paid to Mr Anestis for the appeal proceedings, of which EUR 869.04 for disbursements;
– EUR 923.49, corresponding to travel and subsistence expenses for the journey to Luxembourg for Cedefop’s agent for the appeal proceedings;
– EUR 6 848.75, corresponding to costs of translation allegedly necessary for the appeal proceedings;
– EUR 2 061.25 corresponding to costs of translating the present application for taxation of costs from English into the language of the case.
17 Mr Longinidis submits, firstly, that it was not necessary for Cedefop to retain the services of an external lawyer to assist its agent; secondly, that the amount of the fees of that lawyer is neither justified or verifiable; thirdly, that it was not necessary for that agent to be present at the hearing before the General Court; and, fourthly, that the translation costs incurred by Cedefop are not recoverable. In any event, he adds that his financial situation does not enable him to pay Cedefop more than EUR 4 000.
Preliminary observations
18 Under Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure, expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purpose of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers are to be regarded as recoverable costs.
19 It follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the General Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (orders of 31 March 2011 in Tetra Laval v Commission, T‑5/02 DEP and T‑80/02 DEP, EU:T:2011:129, paragraph 53, and of 23 March 2012 in Kerstens v Commission, T‑498/09 P‑DEP, EU:T:2012:147, paragraph 13).
20 It is settled case-law that, in the absence of provisions of EU law laying down fee scales, the General Court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of EU law, the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the case for the agents or advisers involved and the financial interest which the parties had in the proceedings (orders of 28 June 2004 in Airtours v Commission, T‑342/99 DEP, ECR, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 18, and Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2012:147, paragraph 14).
21 In fixing the recoverable costs, the Court takes account of all the circumstances of the case up to the making of the order on taxation of costs, including the expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation of costs proceedings (order in Kerstens v Commission, EU:T:2012:147, paragraph 15).
The use of external legal counsel
22 Cedefop submits that, contrary to Mr Longinidis’s assertions in his email of 2 March 2012, it was necessary for it to be represented not only by an agent but also by a lawyer, a choice which it is not open to challenge by the party ordered to pay the costs. Cedefop adds that it was the same lawyer who had represented it previously before the Civil Service Tribunal and who spoke Greek, a language not spoken by the agent in charge of the case.
23 Mr Longinidis argues that Cedefop has not demonstrated that it was necessary to retain external legal counsel to assist the agent in charge of the case. Mr Longinidis states in particular that his choice of the language of the case did not make it necessary to retain external counsel.
24 In that regard, it is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court, applicable before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, that the institutions of the European Union are free to have recourse to the assistance of a lawyer. When they do so, the lawyer’s remuneration is covered by the concept of expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings, without the institution being required to show that such assistance is objectively warranted. For the purposes of the application of that provision of the Statute, EU bodies such as Cedefop are to be equated with those institutions (see, to that effect, order of 10 October 2013 in CPVO v Schräder, C‑38/09 P‑DEP, EU:C:2013:679, paragraphs 20 to 22 and the case-law cited).
25 Moreover, whilst the fact that Cedefop instructed an agent and an external lawyer has no impact on the possible recoverability of those costs, since there is nothing to preclude such recovery in principle, it may have an impact on the determination of the amount of costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings which may ultimately be recovered. There is thus no question of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment between applicants in the event that the defending EU body decides to have recourse to the services of a lawyer in certain cases, whereas in others it is represented by its agents (see, to that effect, order of 28 May 2013 in Marcuccio v Commission, T‑278/07 P‑DEP, ECR, EU:T:2013:269, paragraph 14).
26 Any other assessment which makes the right of an EU body to claim all or part of the fees paid to a lawyer subject to proof of an ‘objective’ need to use that lawyer’s services would in fact constitute an indirect restriction on the freedom conferred by the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and entail for the EU judicature a duty to substitute its own assessment for that of the institutions and bodies responsible for the organisation of their departments. Such a task is compatible neither with the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, nor with the power to adopt rules for their own internal organisation enjoyed by the institutions and bodies of the European Union in relation to the management of their cases before the courts of the European Union (order in Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2013:269, paragraph 15).
27 It follows from that case-law that Mr Longinidis’s argument challenging the necessity for Cedefop to retain the services of an external lawyer cannot be upheld (see, to that effect, orders in CPVO v Schräder, EU:C:2013:679, paragraph 23, and Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 30).
The fees of Cedefop’s lawyer
28 In order for an assessment to be made on the basis of the criteria listed in paragraph 20 above as to whether the expenses actually incurred for the purposes of the proceedings were in fact necessary, the applicant must provide specific information. Whilst the absence of such information does not preclude the Court fixing the amount of the recoverable costs on the basis of an equitable assessment, it none the less places it in a situation where its assessment of the appellant’s claims must necessarily be strict (see order in Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
29 In the present case, Cedefop claims an amount of EUR 8 000, corresponding to the lump sum negotiated with its external lawyer. It states that the flat rate of remuneration reflects the usual amount of fees charged by lawyers specialising in EU law and that those fees probably would have been higher had they been established on the basis of an hourly rate.
30 Mr Longinidis submits, first of all, that Cedefop did not specify the hourly rate paid to its lawyer or the number of hours worked by that lawyer for the purposes of the appeal proceedings. Next, he states that the lump sum in question, agreed upon by Cedefop and its lawyer before the lawyer performed the work associated with the appeal proceedings, cannot be considered to reflect the actual value of the services provided. Lastly, he observes that the application for taxation of costs does not specify how the tasks necessary for Cedefop’s defence were distributed among its agent and its lawyer.
31 It should be recalled as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union are not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but may determine the amount of those fees to be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. Similarly, the fixed nature of the remuneration has no effect on the Court’s assessment of the amount recoverable by way of costs, since it bases its decisions on well-established criteria laid down by case-law and precise information which the parties must provide to it. Whilst the absence of such information does not prevent the Court from fixing, on the basis of an equitable assessment, the amount of recoverable costs, it none the less places it in a situation where its assessment of the applicant’s claims must necessarily be strict, as stated in paragraph 28 above (orders in Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2013:269, paragraph 20, and Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 38).
32 As Cedefop has not provided any further detail, it is appropriate to apply the criteria set out in paragraph 20 above on the basis of the evidence which the Court does have at its disposal.
33 As regards, firstly, the nature of the dispute, the present application concerns the expenses incurred in appeal proceedings before the General Court, proceedings which, by their very nature, are restricted to questions of law and do not involve an assessment of the facts (see order in Marcuccio v Commission, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
34 However, account must be taken of the fact that, in his appeal, Mr Longinidis had argued that the Civil Service Tribunal had distorted certain evidence, as is apparent from paragraphs 32 and 35 of the judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:T:2011:338). Thus, in its response, Cedefop had to adopt a position on the point.
35 In the second place, regarding the subject-matter of the dispute, the difficulties presented by the case and the amount of work that the judicial proceedings have generated for Cedefop, it must be borne in mind that Mr Longinidis’s appeal, comprising 20 pages and numerous annexes, challenged a number of points of the judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:F:2008:48), which comprised 185 paragraphs. The appeal put forward, in essence, six grounds: (i) infringement of the rules governing the bringing of evidence and distortion of the evidence; (ii) infringement of the Court’s obligation to state reasons; (iii) misinterpretation of the administration’s obligation to state reasons; (iv) incorrect finding that there was no manifest error of assessment; (v) incorrect interpretation of the principle of observance of the rights of the defence; and (vi) infringement of the principle of impartiality, as is apparent from paragraph 27 of the judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:T:2011:338).
36 In the response, comprising 21 pages, Cedefop stated its position on all of the grounds put forward by Mr Longinidis. However, as rightly pointed out by Mr Longinidis, Mr Anestis’s work was facilitated by the fact that he had already had thorough knowledge of the questions arising from the appeal, since he had represented Cedefop previously, at first instance.
37 It should also be noted that there was an issue of admissibility with the sixth ground, which led the Court to put written questions to the parties, who replied with statements of 20 pages in the case of Mr Longinidis and 10 pages in the case of Cedefop.
38 Moreover, further to a request from Mr Longinidis, the Court decided to hold a hearing, which necessarily required preparation by Mr Anestis.
39 It follows that the dispute involved a certain amount of complexity, as confirmed by the length of the judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:T:2011:338), which comprised some 133 paragraphs.
40 In the third place, regarding the financial interest of the dispute, it should be noted, as rightly pointed out by Mr Longinidis, that although the case involved only one agent of Cedefop, it was a matter of upholding a judgment by which a claim had been dismissed for compensation for alleged non-material loss in the amount of EUR 50 000 and alleged material loss equal to basic salary, salary supplements and pension rights to which Mr Longinidis would have been entitled had he not been dismissed.
41 Thus, contrary to Mr Longinidis’s assertions, the dispute did involve a certain financial interest, not only for Mr Longinidis, but also for Cedefop.
42 In the fourth place, regarding the importance of the dispute from an EU law standpoint, it should be noted that a number of the grounds of appeal put forward by Mr Longinidis were dismissed by the Court simply by applying the case-law following from the judgment of 8 September 2009 in ETF v Landgren, T‑404/06 P, ECR, EU:T:2009:313, concerning inter alia the administration’s obligations in connection with the dismissal of a temporary agent and well-established principles governing the jurisdiction of the appeal court. The judgment in Longinidis v Cedefop (EU:T:2011:338), however, gives more detailed guidance on inter alia the scope of the presumption of lawfulness of acts of the Union (paragraph 39), the possibility that the decision dismissing a claim completes the reasons of the act having an adverse effect (paragraph 72) and on the impartiality of a body such as Cedefop’s appeal board (paragraph 115). It must accordingly be accepted that the dispute carried a certain importance from an EU law standpoint.
43 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the amount of EUR 8 000 claimed by Cedefop seems excessive, in the absence of any other evidence adduced by it in support of its contentions. Thus, under a fair assessment of the circumstances of the case, a lump sum of EUR 6 000 should be fixed to cover Mr Anestis’s fees, which fall to be regarded as recoverable costs.
The disbursements of Cedefop’s lawyer
44 Cedefop claims that Mr Longinidis should cover not only its lawyer’s fees, but also his disbursements, as evidenced by the invoices annexed to the application for taxation of costs submitted in the present proceedings.
45 Mr Longinidis replies that no written evidence has been submitted substantiating Mr Anestis’s disbursements.
46 It should be noted in this regard that the invoices lodged by Cedefop annexed to its application for taxation of costs show only two amounts, EUR 355.54 and EUR 513.50 for disbursements by Mr Anestis, without any breakdown.
47 Since Cedefop has not provided any further details, those amounts, totalling EUR 869.04, seem excessive. Therefore, the amount of disbursements of Cedefop’s lawyer, which come under recoverable costs, should be fixed at EUR 300 (see, to that effect, orders of 1 October 2013 in Elf Aquitaine v Commission, C‑521/09 P‑DEP, ECR, EU:C:2013:644, paragraph 26, and CPVO v Schräder, EU:C:2013:679, paragraph 41).
Travel costs for Cedefop’s agent
48 Cedefop contends that its agent’s travel and subsistence costs for the journey to Luxembourg for the hearing on 13 December 2010 are recoverable costs. A single agent and a single lawyer are the minimum representation.
49 Mr Longinidis argues that the presence of Mr Anestis alone at the hearing would have sufficed. Accordingly, Cedefop’s agent’s travel and subsistence costs for the journey to Luxembourg do not come under recoverable costs.
50 It should be borne in mind in that regard that expenses for one lawyer and one agent for each party may be considered necessary for the purposes of Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure. Costs associated with the involvement of a second lawyer or agent are therefore recoverable only where warranted by specific circumstances relating, in particular, to the nature of the dispute in question (see order of 20 January 2014 in Schönberger v Parliament, T‑186/11 DEP, EU:T:2014:40, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited).
51 The present case does not involve any such specific circumstances, however. Cedefop itself acknowledged that it had retained the services of an external lawyer in the appeal proceedings brought by Mr Longinidis, on the ground that that lawyer had thorough knowledge of the case, having represented Cedefop previously at first instance (see, to that effect and by way of analogy, order in CPVO v Schräder, EU:C:2013:679, paragraph 40), that he specialised in EU staff cases and that its agent did not have sufficient knowledge of the language of the case.
52 Consequently, the amount of EUR 923.49, corresponding to Cedefop’s agent’s travel and subsistence costs for the journey to Luxembourg for the purposes of the hearing, do not come under recoverable costs.
Translation costs
53 Cedefop submits that, since Mr Longinidis chose Greek as the language of the case, which neither its agent nor its director knows, recoverable costs in this case include, firstly, the costs of translating a number of procedural documents for the appeal into English and, secondly, the costs of translating the present application for taxation of costs, drafted in English by the agent, into Greek. It adds that the relevant translations were done by the Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, whose invoices were annexed to the application.
54 Mr Longinidis argues that translation costs cannot be considered recoverable costs, given inter alia that Cedefop chose to use an external Greek-speaking lawyer and that it would have been possible for it to have the documents in question translated in-house.
55 It should be borne in mind, firstly, that under Article 35(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the Civil Service Tribunal by virtue of the reference in Article 29 of its Rules of Procedure, the language of a case is chosen by the applicant from among the official languages of the European Union, subject to exceptions which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
56 It follows that Mr Longinidis was entirely free to choose Greek as the language of the case before the Civil Service Tribunal.
57 Secondly, under Article 136a of the Rules of Procedure, the language of the appeal case brought by Mr Longinidis had to be Greek, which was the language of the decision of the Civil Service Tribunal against which he was bringing an appeal.
58 Thirdly, under Article 35(3) of the Rules of Procedure, Cedefop was obliged to use the language of the case as chosen by Mr Longinidis.
59 Fourthly, Article 1 of Council Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community (JO 1958, 17, p. 385), as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No 517/2013 of 13 May 2013 adapting certain regulations and decisions in the fields of free movement of goods, freedom of movement for persons, company law, competition policy, agriculture, food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, transport policy, energy, taxation, statistics, trans-European networks, judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security, environment, customs union, external relations, foreign, security and defence policy and institutions, by reason of the accession of the Republic of Croatia (OJ 2013 L 158, p. 1), lists Bulgarian, Croatian, Spanish, Czech, Danish, German, Estonian, Greek, English, French, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Finnish and Swedish not only as official languages but also as working languages of the EU institutions (judgment of 16 October 2013 in Italy v Commission, T‑248/10, EU:T:2013:534, paragraph 29). Moreover, although Article 6 of Regulation No 1 provides that the institutions may determine the detailed rules of application of the language rules in their domestic legislation, Cedefop does not allege that such detailed rules would have been applicable to it and that they justify reimbursement of translation costs in the present case (see, to that effect and by way of analogy, judgment in Italy v Commission, EU:T:2013:534, paragraph 38).
60 Fifthly, Article 1d(1) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union provides that any discrimination based on, inter alia, language, is prohibited in the application of those regulations. According to the first sentence of Article 1d(6), any limitation of the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality must be justified on objective and reasonable grounds and must be aimed at legitimate objectives in the general interest in the framework of staff policy (judgment in Italy v Commission, EU:T:2013:534, paragraph 30).
61 In the present case, if the translation costs reimbursement of which is sought by Cedefop were upheld as recoverable costs, that would amount to discrimination against Mr Longinidis on grounds of language, as Cedefop would not have incurred those costs had Mr Longinidis chosen another language of the case, such as English, the language into which and from which Cedefop had the translations in question done.
62 As regards the translations of the procedural documents for the appeal proceedings, it should be noted that, in the circumstances of the present case, such discrimination cannot in any event be justified, since Cedefop used the services of an external lawyer speaking the language of the case, which it was entitled to do under the case-law referred to in paragraphs 24 to 26 above. The use of that lawyer should be considered sufficient in order to enable Cedefop to work in Greek in the judicial proceedings brought by Mr Longinidis before the General Court, in accordance with the obligations provided for by the provisions referred to in paragraphs 58 and 59 above.
63 As regards the translation of the application for taxation of costs in the present case, it should be recalled that proceedings of this nature call more for accounting than legal expertise (order of 26 September 2013 in Schräder v CPVO, T‑187/06 DEP, EU:T:2013:522, paragraph 68), although the agent representing Cedefop could have drafted in the language of the case, with the support, as needed, of other Cedefop agents not necessarily possessing specific legal expertise but speaking Greek.
64 It is also appropriate to apply by analogy the case-law according to which costs relating to translations which EU institutions are required to produce before the General Court under Article 43(2) of the Rules of Procedure cannot be held to be recoverable costs (see, to that effect and by way of analogy, order of 26 November 2004 in EIB v De Nicola, C‑198/02 P(R)‑DEP, EU:C:2004:754, paragraphs 21 and 22). Moreover, the General Court has allowed recoverable costs to include translation costs only for interveners and subject to certain conditions (see, to that effect, order of 18 April 2006 in Euroalliages and Others v Commission, T‑132/01 DEP, EU:T:2006:112, paragraph 46).
65 In those circumstances, the translation costs incurred by Cedefop should not be included in recoverable costs.
Mr Longinidis’s financial situation
66 Mr Longinidis submits that, in any event, his financial situation is such that it is not possible for him to reimburse Cedefop any amount over EUR [confidential] without jeopardising his family’s means of subsistence. He states that his tax return for 2012, annexed to his observations on the application for taxation of costs, shows that his income, derived solely from his legal practice, totalled a mere EUR [confidential].
67 The financial situation of the party ordered to pay the costs is not one of the criteria in the light of which the amount of recoverable costs is fixed by the EU judicature in proceedings for taxation of costs. Accordingly, Mr Longinidis’s argument on this point is entirely irrelevant.
68 Furthermore, the tax return relied on by Mr Longinidis shows merely his income for 2012 and therefore does not, in any event, shed any light on his overall financial situation.
69 In the light of all the foregoing, the recoverable costs in the present case, including those relating to the present proceedings involving the application for taxation of costs, should be fixed at EUR 6 300.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)
hereby orders:
The total amount of costs to be reimbursed by Mr Pavlos Longinidis to the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) is fixed at EUR 6 300.
Luxembourg, 11 December 2014.