ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
25 September 2019 (*)
(Procedure — Taxation of costs)
In Case T‑689/13 DEP,
Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA, established in Luchana-Baracaldo, Biscay (Spain), and the other applicants whose names are listed in the Annex, represented by K. Van Maldegem, P. Sellar, M. Grunchard and S. Saez Moreno, lawyers,
applicants,
v
European Commission, represented by M. Wilderspin, R. Lindenthal and K. Talabér-Ritz, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION for taxation of costs further to the judgment of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767),
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber),
composed of A. Dittrich (Rapporteur), acting as President, V. Tomljenović and J. Schwarcz, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Facts, procedure and forms of order sought
1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 20 December 2013 and registered under number T‑689/13, the applicants brought an action for annulment in part of Commission Regulation (EU) No 944/2013 of 2 October 2013 amending, for the purposes of its adaptation to technical and scientific progress, Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures (OJ 2013 L 261, p. 5). The applicants sought annulment of Regulation No 944/2013 in so far as it classified the substance pitch, coal tar, high-temperature (EC No 266-028-2, ‘CTPHT’), namely a black solid, composed primarily of a complex mixture of three or more membered condensed ring aromatic hydrocarbons, as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance.
2 By judgment of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767), the Court annulled in part Regulation No 944/2013 in so far as it classified CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 (H400) and Aquatic Chronic 1 (H410) substance and ordered the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the applicants.
3 By its appeal, lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 17 December 2015, the Commission requested the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of 7 October 2015. An application for interim measures made by the applicants seeking suspension of the effects of the partially annulled regulation was dismissed by order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 7 July 2016, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P-R, not published, EU:C:2016:597). By judgment of 22 November 2017, Commission v Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others (C‑691/15 P, EU:C:2017:882), the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal brought against the judgment of the General Court of 7 October 2015, which therefore became final, and ordered the Commission to pay, in addition to its own costs, those incurred by the applicants, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings that gave rise to the order of 7 July 2016.
4 By letters of 29 January 2018, the applicants requested the Commission to reimburse a total amount of EUR 227 900.35 in respect of their costs incurred in Cases T‑689/13, C‑691/15 P-R and C‑691/15 P. After several exchanges of letters, the Commission proposed, by letter of 20 July 2018, to make a payment of EUR 84 500 in respect of all the costs and expenses relating to the proceedings before the General Court and the Court of Justice. The applicants declined that proposal by letter of 13 September 2018, while making a counter-offer amounting to EUR 160 000. On 15 November 2018 the Commission made a new proposal of EUR 100 000, which was also rejected by the applicants by letter of 19 December 2018. Consequently, the applicants and the Commission did not reach any agreement on the amount of recoverable costs.
5 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 20 June 2019, the applicants submitted the present application for taxation of costs in accordance with Article 170(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
6 The applicants claim that the Court should:
– fix the amount of recoverable costs in the case giving rise to the judgment of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767) at EUR 104 356.56;
– fix the amount of recoverable costs relating to the present taxation of costs proceedings at EUR 20 000;
– apply to those amounts interest for late payment from the date of service of the order on the application for taxation of costs until the date of actual payment, at the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its principal refinancing operations in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline for payment falls, increased by three and a half percentage points.
7 In its observations lodged at the Court Registry on 7 August 2019, the Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the applicants’ application for taxation of costs; and
– fix the recoverable costs pursuant to Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure at EUR 30 000 or, in any event, at an amount lower than the sum offered by the Commission in its letter of 20 July 2018 or orally in the settlement negotiations.
Law
8 Under Article 170(3) of the Rules of Procedure, if there is a dispute concerning the costs to be recovered, the Court, on application by the party concerned and after hearing the observations of the opposite party, is to give its decision by way of an order from which no appeal lies.
9 According to Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers, are regarded as recoverable costs. It follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those costs incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (order of 6 June 2019, European Dynamics Luxembourg and Others v ECHA, T‑477/15 DEP, not published, EU:T:2019:419, paragraph 10).
10 With regard to lawyers’ fees, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the Courts of the European Union are authorised not to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but to determine the amount up to which that remuneration may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs (order of 27 October 2017, Heli-Flight v EASA, T‑102/13 DEP, not published, EU:T:2017:769, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
11 It is also settled case-law that, failing any provisions of EU law relating to fee scales or to the necessary working time, the Court is to make an unfettered assessment of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of EU law and also the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the case for the agents or advisers involved and the economic interests that the parties had in the proceedings (order of 19 June 2018, Accorinti and Others v ECB, T‑79/13 DEP, not published, EU:T:2018:365, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
12 In order to determine, on the basis of the criteria set out in paragraph 11 above, whether the costs actually incurred for the purposes of the proceedings were necessary, precise information must be supplied by the applicant. Whilst the absence of such information does not prevent the Court from fixing, on the basis of an equitable assessment, the amount of recoverable costs, it nonetheless places it in a situation in which its assessment of the applicant’s claims must necessarily be strict (order of 3 November 2014, FRA.BO v Commission, T‑381/06 DEP, not published, EU:T:2014:1123, paragraph 33).
13 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine whether the costs claimed by the applicants are recoverable and determine the amount up to which those costs may be recovered from the Commission.
14 In the present case, it follows from the application for taxation that the costs in respect of which the applicants seek reimbursement amount to EUR 124 356.56, namely EUR 104 356.56 in respect of costs incurred in the case in the main proceedings and EUR 20 000 in respect of costs relating to the present taxation of costs proceedings.
The costs relating to the case in the main proceedings
15 As regards the case in the main proceedings, it is apparent from a combined reading of the application for taxation of costs and of the documents annexed thereto that the amount of EUR 104 356.56 referred to in paragraph 14 above corresponds to the sum of the lawyers’ fees (EUR 98 708) and the costs claimed in respect of disbursements (EUR 5 648.56).
The lawyers’ fees
16 In support of their request that the recoverable costs in respect of lawyers’ fees be fixed at EUR 98 708, the applicants claim that the case in the main proceedings presented a high degree of difficulty and complexity from both a legal and a scientific perspective and that it was of great significance from the point of view of EU law. Furthermore, the applicants submit that the case was also of economic interest to them as suppliers and downstream users of CTPHT for the manufacture of aluminium. In those circumstances, according to the applicants, the amount of work dedicated to the case in the main proceedings was objectively necessary.
17 The Commission rejects the applicants’ arguments and contends that the sum claimed in respect of lawyers’ fees is excessive. In essence, the Commission disputes the recoverability of several items taken into account by the applicants and contends that the number of hours claimed manifestly exceeds what is objectively necessary for the handling of a case such as the case in the main proceedings.
18 In the present case, the recoverable amount of the lawyers’ fees must be assessed in the light of the criteria set out in paragraph 11 above.
19 In the first place, with regard to the purpose and nature of the proceedings, the significance of the case from the point of view of EU law and the difficulties presented by the case, it must be noted that the case in the main proceedings concerned an action for annulment in part of Commission Regulation No 944/2013. The Commission had determined the classification of the mixture CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance on the basis of the summation method. According to the rules for applying that method, defined in point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008, a mixture is to be classified as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance if the sum of the concentrations of its components, classified in those categories and multiplied by a factor M which depends on the toxicity level of the component in question, is greater than or equal to 25%.
20 In support of their action, the applicants put forward three pleas in law alleging (i) breach of Regulation No 1907/2006 and of Regulation No 1272/2008 and infringement of the principle of equal treatment; (ii) a manifest error of assessment; and (iii) failure to respect the principle of transparency and the rights of the defence. The second plea was divided into four parts, the second of which alleged a manifest error of assessment in applying the summation method to CTPHT.
21 In its judgment of 7 October 2015, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v Commission (T‑689/13, not published, EU:T:2015:767), the Court confined itself to analysing the second part of the second plea. The Court held that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment in that, when applying the summation method to CTPHT, it failed to comply with its obligation to take into consideration all the relevant factors and circumstances so as to take due account of the proportion in which the 16 constituents analysed are present in CTPHT and their chemical effects. Accordingly, the Court held that the Commission had wrongly limited its assessment solely to the factors expressly referred to in point 4.1.3.5.5 of Annex I to Regulation No 1272/2008 and had not taken account of the fact that CTPHT, as a whole, had a maximum rate of water solubility of 0.0014%, even though that fact was incompatible with the hypothesis underlying the application of the summation method in the present case that the 16 components analysed, representing 9.2% of CTPHT, dissolved completely in water.
22 It follows that the case in the main proceedings presented some degree of factual complexity by reason of the scientific nature of the data relevant to the classification of the mixture CTPHT. From a legal standpoint, it must be considered that the issue at the heart of the case, as it emerges from paragraphs 19 and 21 above, could not be resolved merely by application of EU law. However, the case cannot be classified as atypical or as presenting a particularly high degree of legal complexity either. Thus, the difficulty in law of the issues raised in the case in the main proceedings was not deemed sufficient to justify its referral to a chamber sitting in extended composition. Furthermore, as follows from paragraph 29 of the judgment delivered in the case in the main proceedings, the Court was able to rely on the consideration already recognised in case-law and in particular in the judgment of 7 March 2013, Bilbaína de Alquitranes and Others v ECHA (T‑93/10, EU:T:2013:106), according to which it cannot be held that, merely because a constituent of a substance has a certain number of properties, the substance itself also has those properties, but, rather, the proportion in which that constituent is present and the chemical effects of such presence must be considered. In that context, it must be noted that the judgment cited above concerns an action brought by the first nine applicants in the case in the main proceedings (or their predecessor in title), that the latter were represented, as in the case in the main proceedings, by Mr K. Van Maldegem and Mr P. Sellar, and that the judgment cited also concerned the mixture CTPHT.
23 With regard to the significance of the case in the main proceedings from the point of view of EU law, it admittedly provided clarifications as to the Commission’s obligations when applying the summation method. However, account must also be taken of the considerations set out in paragraph 22 above and of the fact that the legal issues raised by the case in the main proceedings are limited to a specific field narrowly defined under EU law, without major repercussions for EU law as a whole.
24 In the second place, as regards the applicants’ economic interest in the dispute, it must be recalled that the applicants in the case in the main proceedings are either suppliers of CTPHT or downstream users of CTPHT for the manufacture of aluminium, carbon, graphite, ferro-alloys or steel. Owing to the adoption and subsequent entry into force of Regulation No 944/2013, the applicants were required to take measures to comply with the legal consequences of the classification of CTPHT as an Aquatic Acute 1 and Aquatic Chronic 1 substance. It must therefore be acknowledged that the case in the main proceedings was of some economic significance for the applicants.
25 In the third place, as regards the assessment of the amount of work generated by the proceedings before the Court for the applicants’ lawyers, it is clear from the invoices reproduced in Annex A.14 and from the table on page 161 thereof that the applicants estimate that the working time necessary for the purposes of the main proceedings was 349.35 hours that were billed at an average hourly rate of approximately EUR 280.
26 The tasks performed included, in essence, the drafting of the application (125.1 hours, 34 pages), the reply (80.95 hours, 26 pages), the observations on the statements in intervention lodged by the interveners GraftTech Iberica and ECHA (28.8 hours, 11 pages), the response to the questions put to the parties by the Court (36.3 hours, 7 pages) and, in respect of the oral part of the procedure, preparation of and participation in the hearing of 10 June 2015 (78.2 hours, duration of the hearing: 3 hours).
27 Performance of those tasks involved 35.6 hours of work by a partner at an hourly rate of EUR 440 (Mr K. Van Maldegem), 192.5 hours of work by an experienced associate lawyer at an hourly rate of between EUR 250 and EUR 280 (Ms M. Grunchard), 98.25 hours of work by an external lawyer at an hourly rate of approximately EUR 253 (Mr P. Sellar), 20 hours of work by four associates at an hourly rate of between EUR 190 and 290, and 3 hours of work by an external adviser at an hourly rate of approximately EUR 65 (Ms P. Dilkova).
28 It must be stated that, even bearing in mind that the case in the main proceedings presented some complexity and difficulty, the number of hours of work claimed by the applicants seems excessive so far as the assessment of the amount of recoverable costs is concerned.
29 In that regard, it is appropriate to bear in mind, first, the case-law cited in paragraph 10 above, according to which the Courts of the European Union are authorised not to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but to determine the amount up to which that remuneration may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs.
30 Secondly, it must be stated that lawyers whose services are, as in the present case, billed at an average hourly rate of approximately EUR 280 must prove that they are highly qualified and experienced and are presumed to handle the cases entrusted to them, including those involving some complexity, efficiently and speedily. Accordingly, for remuneration at such a rate to be taken into account there must in return be a strict assessment of the total number of hours of work necessary for the purposes of the proceedings in question (see, to that effect, order of 11 January 2019, Orange v Commission, T‑444/04 RENV-DEP, not published, EU:T:2019:24, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
31 Thirdly, the fact that the work was split between five lawyers from one law firm and two external advisers had, in the present case, the consequence that there was some overlap and a duplication of the efforts undertaken and a multiplication of costs at all stages of the proceedings before the Court. Accordingly, the Court cannot accept the totality of the hours of work claimed as being objectively necessary for the purpose of those proceedings (see, to that effect, order of 18 October 2018, Moravia Consulting v EUIPO — Citizen Systems Europe (SDC‑554S), T‑316/16 DEP, not published, EU:T:2018:743, paragraph 27).
32 Fourthly, the 28.8 hours claimed for the drafting of 11 pages of observations on the statements in intervention seem particularly excessive. It should be noted that the applicants’ representatives also represented the intervener GraftTech Iberica and that the statement in intervention lodged by ECHA was only 4 pages in length. Likewise, the 36.3 hours dedicated to drafting the 7 pages of the response to the four questions put to the parties by the Court manifestly exceed what may be considered objectively necessary for the purposes of the proceedings.
33 Fifthly, it is apparent from the application for taxation of costs and from the invoices provided by the applicants that the latter take into account certain expenses which, in the present case, cannot be considered to be recoverable.
34 First of all, it emerges from a combined reading of the file for the case in the main proceedings and of invoice 104 013 6, reproduced on pages 96 and 97 of Annex A.14, that the amount claimed of EUR 2 635 corresponds to fees incurred in respect of the rectification of the application. However, according to case-law, additional expenditure arising from rectification necessitated by the failure to observe certain formal criteria when lodging the documents initially cannot be charged to the other party (order of 6 October 2017, Keil v EUIPO — NaturaFit Diätetische Lebensmittelproduktions (BasenCitrate), T‑330/15 DEP, not published, EU:T:2017:708, paragraph 26).
35 Moreover, the applicants’ recovery of expenses relating to the representation of the intervener GraftTech Iberica must also be rejected. It is apparent from invoice 104 123 9, reproduced on page 102 of Annex A.14, that the applicants seek reimbursement of the total amount of EUR 12 183.12 invoiced to them for the services of the external lawyer Mr Sellar during the months of July and August 2014. However, it follows from page 106 of Annex A.14 that the invoice sent by Mr Sellar to the law firm representing the applicants also covered costs relating to the drafting of the statement in intervention of the intervener GraftTech Iberica. Likewise, the applicants claim the total amount of EUR 9 874.14 invoiced to them for the services of Mr Sellar in June 2015 (see invoice 104 797 3, page 113 of Annex A.14), even though it is apparent from the invoice drawn up by Mr Sellar, reproduced on page 142 of Annex A.14, that it includes hours committed to drafting the pleadings for the intervener GraftTech Iberica.
36 In addition, it must be noted that the invoices submitted by the applicants reveal a number of hours of work dedicated to coordinating the work between the five lawyers of the law firm representing the applicants and the two external lawyers (see invoices 103 664 3, 103 743 5, 103 987 7, 104 013 6, 104 797 3, 104 301 5, pages 81, 83, 94, 97, 115 and 157 of Annex A.14). However, it is clear from the case-law that expenses for the coordination of lawyers cannot be considered to be expenses necessarily incurred which have to be taken into account when calculating the amount of recoverable costs (order of 18 October 2018, Moravia Consulting v EUIPO — Citizen Systems Europe (SDC‑554S), T‑316/16 DEP, not published, EU:T:2018:743, paragraph 26).
37 Lastly, since the applicants have not made an application for the grant of interim measures before the Court, recovery from the Commission of fees relating to the analysis of the conditions and chances of success of such an action must be refused (see invoice 104 165 9, page 108 of Annex A.14).
38 In the light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that the working time of 349.35 hours indicated by the applicants manifestly exceeds what may be considered objectively necessary for the purpose of the main proceedings. As regards the written part of the procedure, the Court considers that, in the present case, 60 hours dedicated to drafting the application, 40 hours spent on drafting the reply and 15 hours on drafting the observations on the statements in intervention and the responses to the questions put to the parties by the Court constitute the limit of what might be considered necessary. As regards the oral part of the procedure, it is appropriate to recognise a total of 15 hours of work as being necessary in the present case. The average hourly rate of EUR 280 billed by the applicants seems to be appropriate remuneration for the services of a particularly experienced professional, capable of working very efficiently and quickly.
39 Therefore, the main proceedings objectively necessitated activity of a total duration of 130 hours of work at an average hourly rate of EUR 280. Accordingly, the costs recoverable in respect of lawyers’ fees can be assessed on an equitable basis at EUR 36 400.
The disbursements
40 It follows from a combined reading of the application for taxation of costs and the documents annexed thereto that the amount of EUR 5 648.56, reimbursement of which is sought by the applicants in respect of disbursements, corresponds to the sum of the travel costs and related non-legal costs (EUR 2 364.27), the administrative costs (EUR 3 190.34) and the postage costs (EUR 93.95).
41 In that regard, it is appropriate to recall at the outset the case-law cited in paragraph 9 above, according to which it follows from Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those costs incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose.
42 In the first place, as regards the travel costs and related non-legal costs, it follows from a combined reading of the invoices reproduced in Annex A.14 and the table on page 161 thereof that the amount of EUR 2 364.27 is broken down as follows:
– EUR 45.06 for the costs incurred in connection with a conference call on 8 December 2014 (pages 113 and 118 of Annex A.14);
– EUR 59.28 for the postage costs of 20 May 2015 (pages 113 and 135 of Annex A.14);
– EUR 1 311.84 for travel costs (pages 113, 122 to 125, 144 and 149 to 155 of Annex A.14);
– EUR 949.60 for accommodation and catering costs (pages 113, 130 and 133 of Annex A.14).
43 However, the conditions set by the case-law referred to in paragraph 41 above are not met for all of those costs.
44 First, the applicants have not produced evidence making it possible to establish the link between the costs incurred in respect of the conference call on 8 December 2014 and the main proceedings. Therefore, it does not seem justified to charge those costs to the Commission.
45 Secondly, the postage costs were incurred, as is apparent from the invoice reproduced on page 135 of Annex A.14, in respect of a delivery from the law firm instructed by the applicants, based in Belgium, to the address of the external lawyer Mr Sellar in Scotland. According to case-law, however, the costs of communications between two lawyers representing the same party cannot be justified as expenses that have been necessarily incurred (order of 13 January 2017, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09 DEP, EU:T:2017:5, paragraph 25).
46 Thirdly, as regards the travel costs, it must be stated that the applicants have not produced evidence making it possible to identify precisely the composition of the claimed amount of EUR 1 311.84. The absence of such information makes it particularly difficult to verify the costs incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court and the costs that were necessary for that purpose, and places the Court, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 12 above, in a situation where its assessment must necessarily be strict.
47 It may be inferred from the invoices reproduced in Annex A.14 that the applicants seek reimbursement of travel costs in respect of two events, namely a meeting held in Brussels on 26 May 2015, on the one hand, and the hearing in the case in the main proceedings on 10 June 2015, on the other. The invoices relating to 26 May 2015 correspond to the costs of a return flight between Edinburgh and Brussels (GBP 338.25, approximately EUR 470 at the time, pages 122 and 123 of Annex A.14) and a taxi journey (EUR 37, page 144 of Annex A.14), which were incurred in order to enable the external lawyer Mr Sellar to travel to Brussels for a meeting with the applicants’ other lawyers. However, as stated in paragraph 36 above, expenses for the internal coordination of the applicants’ various lawyers cannot be considered to have been necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
48 As regards the invoices relating to the hearing of 10 June 2015, they cover the costs of plane tickets between Edinburgh and Brussels (GBP 298.55, approximately EUR 415 at the time, pages 124 and 125 of Annex A.14), train tickets between Brussels and Luxembourg (EUR 43.74, pages 154 and 155 of Annex A.14) and taxi fares (the total amount of the legible invoices on pages 130, 132, 144 to 146 and 152 of Annex A.14 is EUR 120.88). Those expenses enabled Mr Sellar to take part in the hearing of 10 June 2015 and to represent the applicants’ interests there, as confirmed by the minutes. Since the amounts of those costs are not excessive, the amount of recoverable costs in respect of travel costs must be fixed at EUR 580.
49 Fourthly, as regards the accommodation and catering costs, claimed by the applicants in connection with participation in the hearing that took place on the morning of 10 June 2015, namely EUR 949.60, it must be noted that, although the applicants have not provided precise information on the composition of that sum, it may nevertheless be inferred from the statement of travel costs reproduced on page 130 and the invoices set out on pages 131 and 147 of Annex A.14 that, in respect of hotel costs, the applicants seek reimbursement of an amount of EUR 837.
50 However, that sum corresponds to the hotel costs incurred for Ms Grunchard (EUR 274), Mr Sellar (EUR 274) and Mr Van Maldegem (EUR 289). In the light of the fact, confirmed by the minutes of the hearing of 10 June 2015, that Mr Van Maldegem represented the intervener GrafTech Iberica at that hearing, the applicants are not entitled to claim reimbursement of his hotel costs. As regards the costs incurred by Ms Grunchard’s participation, it must be noted that the case in the main proceedings did not give rise to any specific circumstances enabling the expenses incurred in respect of two advisers, for the purpose of their participation in the hearing, to be regarded as necessary within the meaning of Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure. The fact that the applicants deemed it appropriate for Ms Grunchard to take part in the hearing in order to assist Mr Sellar therefore cannot be financially attributed to the Commission (see, to that effect, order of 8 October 2014, Coop Nord v Commission, T‑244/08 DEP, not published, EU:T:2014:899, paragraph 33). It is therefore appropriate to accept only the expenses incurred for Mr Sellar.
51 Regarding the other evidence provided in Annex A.14 which could relate to the remaining part of the sum claimed by the applicants in respect of accommodation and catering costs, it must be stated that the receipts reproduced at the bottom of page 132 and on pages 145 and 146 of Annex A.14 are illegible and cannot therefore be taken into consideration. Moreover, the invoices reproduced on pages 133 and 149 of Annex A.14 correspond to a meal delivery on 26 May 2015 in Brussels and therefore have no connection with the hearing of 10 June 2015.
52 In those circumstances, the amount of recoverable costs in respect of travel costs and related non-legal costs must be fixed at EUR 854.
53 In the second place, regarding the sum of EUR 3 190.34 billed in respect of administrative costs, it must be noted that, even though each of the invoices reproduced on pages 80, 82, 88, 93, 96, 102, 107, 110, 113 and 156 of Annex A.14 indicates a precise amount of administrative costs, the applicants have not provided evidence making it possible to assess the nature of those costs and whether they were necessarily incurred. In those circumstances, it appears justified to fix a lump sum of approximately 5% of the recoverable fees as fixed in paragraph 39 above in respect of administrative costs, amounting to EUR 1 820 (see, by analogy, order of 12 July 2019, RA v Court of Auditors, T‑874/16 DEP, not published, EU:T:2019:550, paragraph 45).
54 In the third place, as regards the amount of EUR 93.95 claimed by the applicants in respect of postage costs, it is apparent from the invoices reproduced on pages 90 and 91 of Annex A.14 that that amount covers costs incurred for several deliveries from the law firm representing the applicants to the Court Registry on 6 and 24 January and on 4 and 14 February 2014. It follows from the considerations made in paragraph 34 above that the applicants were required to lodge rectified versions of their application in January and February 2014 and that, according to the case-law, additional expenditure arising from such rectification is not recoverable.
55 In those circumstances, the amount of recoverable costs in respect of disbursements must be fixed at EUR 2 674.
The costs relating to the present taxation of costs proceedings
56 Regarding the costs relating to the present taxation of costs proceedings, which the applicants estimate at EUR 20 000, it must recalled that the Court, when fixing the recoverable costs, takes account of all the circumstances of the case up to the signing of the order on taxation of costs (see order of 13 February 2008, Verizon Business Global v Commission, T‑310/00 DEP, not published, EU:T:2008:32, paragraph 55).
57 In the present case, taking into account the outcome of the present proceedings and the fact that the Commission had proposed, at the pre-litigation stage, to pay a sum exceeding that which the Court considers to be necessary (see page 51 of Annex A.10 and page 57 of Annex A.12), the amount of recoverable costs should not be increased by adding an amount relating to the present proceedings for taxation of costs (see, to that effect, orders of 13 February 2008, Verizon Business Global v Commission, T‑310/00 DEP, not published, EU:T:2008:32, paragraph 56, and of 13 January 2017, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09 DEP, EU:T:2017:5, paragraph 43).
The claim for interest for late payment
58 As regards the applicants’ claim for interest for late payment, this must be upheld for the period between the date of the service of this order on taxation of costs and the date of the actual reimbursement of the costs (order of 12 October 2017, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑207/12 P-DEP, not published, EU:T:2017:727, paragraphs 34 and 35). The applicable interest rate is to be calculated, taking into account the provision of Article 99(2)(b) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1), on the basis of the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its main refinancing operations in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline for payment falls, increased by three and a half percentage points.
59 It follows from all of the foregoing that the total amount of the costs recoverable by the applicants from the Commission in respect of Case T‑689/13 is EUR 39 074 plus interest for late payment from the date of the service of this order.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fifth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The total amount of the costs to be reimbursed by the European Commission to Bilbaína de Alquitranes, SA, and the other applicants whose names are listed in the Annex is fixed at EUR 39 074.
2. That sum is to bear interest for late payment from the date of the service of this order until the date of payment.
Luxembourg, 25 September 2019.
Registrar | | Acting President |