Language of document : ECLI:EU:F:2010:171


16 December 2010

Case F-25/10



European Parliament

(Civil service — Officials — Dismissal at the end of the probationary period — Manifest inadmissibility — Action brought out of time — Notice by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt)

Application: brought under Article 270 TFEU, applicable to the EAEC Treaty pursuant to Article 106 thereof, in which AG seeks, in particular, annulment of the Parliament’s decision of 14 May 2009 dismissing him at the end of his probationary period, and of the Parliament’s decision of 21 December 2009 rejecting his complaint against that first decision, as well as an order that the Parliament compensate for the loss she alleges she has suffered as a result of those decisions.

Held: The application is dismissed as manifestly inadmissible. The applicant is ordered to pay all the costs.


Officials — Actions — Time-limits — Point from which time starts to run — Notification — Definition

(Staff Regulations, Art. 90(2))

Where a decision is notified by registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt, its addressee is deemed to be apprised of that decision by signing the acknowledgement of receipt. Where a registered letter cannot be signed for by its addressee because he is not at home when the postman calls, and then takes no action or does not collect the letter within the period for which it is usually held by the postal service, it must be considered that the decision was duly notified to its addressee on the date on which that period expired.

However, the presumption that the addressee received notification of the decision at the expiry of the period for which a registered letter is usually held by the postal service is not absolute. Its application is subject to the provision of evidence by the administration of proper notification by registered letter, in particular through the leaving of a notice of attempted delivery at the latest address supplied by the addressee. Furthermore, that presumption is not irrebuttable. The addressee may seek to prove that he was prevented, in particular by illness or by reasons beyond his control, from taking effective cognizance of the notice of attempted delivery.

However, an absence solely for holiday reasons cannot be regarded as a legitimate ground preventing that presumption of notification. If that presumption could be overturned purely for reasons of personal convenience, the addressee of the decision could, to a certain extent, choose the point at which he considers he was actually apprised of it.

The presumption of notification in no way prejudices the right to an effective remedy, or in particular the predictability of the rules that should govern access to the Union judicature. The time-limit of 3 months and 10 days for bringing an action is long enough for a situation of absence for holiday reasons not to prejudice the possibilities of remedy.

(see paras 41-44, 48, 50)