Language of document : ECLI:EU:T:2011:744

JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)
14 December 2011

Case T‑433/10 P

John Allen and Others

v

European Commission

(Appeal — Staff employed at the JET joint undertaking — Application of a legal status different from that of members of the temporary staff — Compensation for material damage suffered — Time-limit for instituting proceedings — Late submission — Reasonable period)

Appeal:      against the order of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (First Chamber) of 13 July 2010 in Case F‑103/09 Allen and Others v Commission, seeking to have that order set aside.

Held:      The appeal is dismissed. Mr John Allen and the 109 other appellants whose names are listed in the annex are to bear their own costs and are ordered to pay those incurred by the European Commission in the present proceedings.

Summary

1.      Officials — Actions — Time-limits — Claim for compensation addressed to an institution — Duty to act within a reasonable time — Determination of a reasonable period — Jurisdiction of the Courts of the European Union — Limits

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46; Staff Regulations, Art. 90)

2.      Officials — Actions — Time-limits — Claim for compensation addressed to an institution — Duty to act within a reasonable time — Criteria for assessment

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 46; Staff Regulations, Art. 90)

1.      There is an obligation to act within a reasonable time in all cases except those where the legislature has expressly excluded or expressly laid down a specific time-limit. The legal basis for setting a reasonable time-limit, in the absence of any statutory rule, is the principle of legal certainty, which precludes institutions and natural or legal persons from acting without any time-limits, thereby threatening to undermine the stability of legal positions already acquired. Thus, in the absence of any statutory rule, it is for the European Union judicature to decide on the length of the reasonable period for submitting a claim for damages, in the light of the circumstances of the case.

Therefore, the absence of a time-limit in the Staff Regulations cannot in itself be regarded as meaning that it is possible to bring a claim for damages without any time-limit, since the general principle of a reasonable period applies in all cases except those in which the legislature has expressly excluded it or expressly laid down a specific time-limit.

In that connection, the absence of a time-limit imposed on the Commission for bringing infringement proceedings is a consequence of the particular nature of such proceedings and cannot be applied by analogy to proceedings for damages.

(see paras 26, 31, 35)

See:

T‑192/99 Dunnett and Others v EIB [2001] ECR II‑813, paras 51 to 54; T‑281/01 Huygens v Commission [2004] ECR‑SC I‑A‑203 and II‑903, paras 46, 47 and 49; T‑144/02 Eagle and Others v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3381, paras 57 and 58

2.      Where the Courts of the European Union are called on to decide on the duration of the reasonable period to be complied with they must take into account the relevant circumstances. The limitation period of five years laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applied by analogy by the Civil Service Tribunal, by weighing up the interests at stake, on the one hand, allows the persons concerned sufficient time from the occurrence of the actionable event to assess whether it is appropriate to claim damages and to make known their claims to the institution concerned and, on the other hand, allows the European Union to safeguard its interests, in particular its financial interests, from claims made by persons who have shown too little diligence in pursuing them.

Thus, the imposition by analogy in the case at hand of the limitation period laid down in Article 46 of the Statute of the Court of Justice is justified by the similarity of the factual circumstances in that case and other cases where that limitation period was applied.

(see paras 45, 46)