Language of document : ECLI:EU:T:2014:909

Case T‑327/13

Konstantinos Mallis
and
Elli Konstantinou Malli

v

European Commission
and
European Central Bank (ECB)

(Actions for annulment — Programme of stability support for Cyprus — Euro Group statement on the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus — Mistaken designation of defendant in the application — Inadmissibility)

Summary — Order of the General Court (First Chamber), 16 October 2014

1.      Judicial proceedings — Application initiating proceedings — Formal requirements — Identification of the defendant — Designation as defendant, without error on the part of the applicant, of a person other than the author of the contested measure — Inadmissibility — Limits — Factors permitting unequivocal identification of the defendant

(Art. 263, first para., TFEU; Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 21; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 44(1)(b))

2.      Economic and monetary policy — Monetary policy — Coordination of monetary policies — Informal meeting within the Euro Group of Member States using the euro as their currency — Autonomous entity — Not possible to impute the statements adopted to the Commission or the European Central Bank

(Art. 137 TFEU; Protocol No 14 annexed to the EU and FEU Treaties)

3.      Economic and monetary policy — Economic policy — Coordination of economic policies — European Stability Mechanism — Not possible for the Commission and the European Central Bank to exercise review powers

(Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Arts 1, 2 and 32(2))

4.      Actions for annulment — Actionable measures — Concept — Measures producing binding legal effects — Assessment of those effects by reference to the substance of the measure — Statements adopted by the Euro Group — Not included

(Arts 137 TFEU and 263(1) TFEU; Protocol No 14 annexed to the EU and FEU Treaties)

5.      Actions for annulment — Jurisdiction of the EU judicature — Claim for a declaratory judgment — Inadmissibility

(Art. 263 TFEU)

1.      The mistaken designation in the application of a defendant other than the body which adopted the contested measure does not render the application inadmissible if the application contains information which makes it possible to identify unambiguously the party against whom it is made, such as the designation of the contested measure and the body responsible for it. In such a case, the defendant must be considered to be the body responsible for the contested measure, even if not referred to in the introduction to the application. However, that situation must be distinguished from the case in which the applicant persists in the designation of the defendant referred to in the introduction to the application, in full awareness of the fact that that defendant is not the author of the contested measure. In the latter case, the Court must treat as defendant the party designated in the application and, where appropriate, draw the necessary consequences of that designation in so far as concerns the admissibility of the action.

(see para. 36)

2.      The statements adopted by the Euro Group referred to in Article 137 TFEU and Protocol No 14 cannot be imputed to the Commission or the European Central Bank. First of all, the Euro Group is a forum for discussion, at ministerial level, between representatives of the Member States whose currency is the euro, and not a decision-making body. That informal forum, the purpose of which is to facilitate the exchange of views on certain specific questions of common interest to the Member States which participate in it, has a certain institutional structure, inasmuch as it has a President who is elected for a fixed term. There is, however, no reason to regard that structure as being subsumed within the structure of the Commission or the European Central Bank.

Secondly, even though provision is made in Article 1 of the Protocol on the Euro Group for the Commission and the European Central Bank to take part in meetings of Euro Group, and for the Commission also to assist with the preparation of the meetings, the Euro Group is nevertheless an informal meeting of the ministers of the Member States concerned. Thirdly, it is not apparent from the rules which apply to the Euro Group that that latter body has received any delegation of powers from the Commission or the European Central Bank, or that those institutions have any power of review with regard to the Euro Group or can issue recommendations to it or, still less, give it binding instructions. Therefore, the Euro Group cannot be regarded as being under the control of the Commission or the European Central Bank, or that it acts as an agent of those institutions.

(see paras 39, 41-45)

3.      Whilst the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism entrusts certain tasks to the Commission and the European Central Bank relating to the attainment of the objectives which it defines, there is nothing in that Treaty to support the conclusion that the ESM received a delegation of powers from those institutions or that those institutions are entitled to exercise powers of review with regard to the ESM or issue directives to it.

The duties conferred on the Commission and European Central Bank within the ESM Treaty do not entail any power to make decisions of their own, the activities pursued by those two institutions within the ESM Treaty committing only the European Stability Mechanism.

(see paras 47, 48)

4.      Only measures the legal effects of which are binding on and capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position are acts or decisions which may be the subject of an action for annulment in terms of the first paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. In order to determine whether an act or decision produces binding legal effects capable of affecting the interests of the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his legal position, it is necessary to look to its substance.

As regards the statements of the Euro Group referred to in Article 137 TFEU and Protocol No 14, since the Euro Group cannot be regarded as a decision-making body, in that the provisions governing its operation do not empower it to adopt legally binding measures, a statement made by the Euro Group cannot, therefore, in principle be regarded as a measure intended to produce legal effects with respect to third parties. That applies to a Euro Group statement of a purely informative nature concerning the restructuring of the banking sector in Cyprus.

(see paras 51-53, 60)

5.      See the text of the decision.

(see para. 64)