JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber)

24 October 2011

Case T-213/10 P

P

v

European Parliament

(Appeal – Civil service – Members of the temporary staff – Dismissal – Loss of confidence – Statement of reasons – Distortion of the clear sense of the evidence)

Appeal:      brought against the judgment of the European Civil Service Tribunal (Third Chamber) of 24 February 2010 in Case F‑89/08 P v Parliament, and seeking to have that judgment set aside. 

Held:      The appeal is dismissed. Ms P is to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Parliament in the present proceedings.

Summary

1.      Officials – Members of the temporary staff – Temporary staff coming under Article 2(c) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants – Temporary staff member assigned to a political group of the Parliament – Decision to dismiss a member of the temporary staff on the ground of loss of confidence – Obligation to state the reasons on which the decision is based – Scope

(Staff Regulations, Art. 25(2); Conditions of Employment of Other Servants, Art. 2(c))

2.      Appeals – Pleas in law – Inadequate statement of reasons – Use of implicit reasoning by the Civil Service Tribunal – Lawfulness – Conditions

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 36 and Annex I, Art. 7(1))

3.      Appeals – Pleas in law – Mistaken assessment of the facts – Inadmissibility – Review by the General Court of the assessment of the evidence – Possible only where the clear sense of the evidence has been distorted

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 11)

1.      Observance by the administration of the scope of the obligation to state reasons is a point of law that can be reviewed by the General Court in an appeal.

The obligation to state reasons under the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations applies to decisions to terminate a contract of indefinite duration as a member of the temporary staff governed by the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants. That provision states that ‘[a]ny decision relating to a specific individual which is taken under these Staff Regulations shall at once be communicated in writing to the official concerned’ and that ‘[a]ny decision adversely affecting an official shall state the grounds on which it is based’.

In particular, as regards the ground of dismissal resulting from the loss or breach of mutual confidence between a member of the temporary staff and the political group of the European Parliament to which he is assigned, in the absence of an obligation to state reasons, even minimal review by the European Union Courts would be impossible. The fact that the contracting authority does not have any margin of discretion as regards compliance with the political group’s request does not in any way limit the scope of the obligation to state reasons. In such a case, the statement of reasons for the contracting authority’s decision must at least reflect the grounds of the political group’s request on the basis of which the contracting authority is obliged to take the decision terminating the contract. The group’s request may, in itself, contain irregularities which render it unlawful and must therefore be amenable to effective judicial review. Finally, it is in fact only in the light of the statement of reasons that, on the one hand, the official concerned is able to assess the appropriateness of bringing an action before the courts against the decision adversely affecting him and, on the other hand, the European Union Courts are able to carry out their review.

The extent of that duty to state reasons must be assessed in the light of the actual circumstances, notably the content of the act, the nature of the reasons relied on and the addressee’s interest in receiving explanations, and it is necessary, in order to determine whether the statement of reasons is adequate, to place it in the factual and legal context in which the contested act was adopted. Thus, the reasons given for a decision are sufficient if the measure against which the action is brought was adopted in circumstances known to the member of staff concerned which enable him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him.

(see paras 27-30)

See:

C‑189/02 P, C‑202/02 P, C‑205/02 P to C‑208/02 P and C‑213/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, para. 453; judgment of 28 February 2008 in C‑17/07 P Neirinck v Commission, not published in the ECR, paras 50 to 52; C‑413/06 P Bertelsmann and Sony Corporation of America v Impala [2008] ECR I‑4951, para. 30

T‑237/00 Reynolds v Parliament [2005] ECR-SC I-A-385 and II‑1731, para. 96; T‑406/04 Bonnet v Court of Justice [2006] ECR-SC I‑A‑2‑213 and II‑A‑2‑1097, para. 52; T‑404/06 P ETF v Landgren [2009] ECR II‑2841, paras 143 to 171

2.      The obligation placed on the Civil Service Tribunal to state the reasons on which its judgments are based, under Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, in conjunction with Article 7(1) of Annex I to that Statute, does not compel it to furnish an exhaustive account of every single argument put forward by the parties to the dispute. The reasoning may thus be implicit, provided that it enables the persons concerned to know why the measures in question were taken and provides an appeal court with sufficient information for it to carry out its judicial review. That obligation cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Civil Service Tribunal was required to respond in detail to every single argument on which the applicant relies, particularly if the argument is not sufficiently clear and precise and is not adequately supported by evidence.

The question whether the statement of reasons for a judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal is contradictory or inadequate is a point of law which may, as such, be raised on appeal.

(see paras 31, 32)

See:

Judgment of 21 January 2010 in C‑150/09 P Iride and Iride Energia v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 42 and the case-law cited; judgment of 24 June 2010 in C‑117/09 P Kronoply v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 52 and the case-law cited

Bonnet v Court of Justice, paras 52 and 64 and the case-law cited; T‑498/07 P Krcova v Court of Justice [2009] ECR-SC I‑B‑1‑35 and II‑B‑1‑197, para. 34

3.      It follows from Article 11 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice, which reproduces the wording of Article 58 of that Statute, that an appeal is to be limited to points of law and is to lie on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal, a breach of the procedure before the Civil Service Tribunal which adversely affects the interests of the appellant or the infringement of EU law by the Civil Service Tribunal.

Consequently, the Civil Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to establish the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and to assess those facts. The assessment of the facts does not, therefore, save where the clear sense of the evidence submitted to the Civil Service Tribunal has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject as such to review by the Court hearing the appeal.

Such distortion must be clear from the documents in the file, without there being any need to make a fresh assessment of the facts and evidence, or indeed to consider new evidence.

(see paras 46-48)

See:

Judgment of 9 November 2007 in C-74/07 P Lavagnoli v Commission, not published in the ECR, para. 20; C‑413/08 P Lafarge v Commission [2010] ECR I‑5361, para. 17 and the case-law cited

Judgment of 2 March 2010 in T‑248/08 P Doktor v Council, paras 39 and 42 and the case-law cited