ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
19 July 2023 (*)
(Interim relief – Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures taken in respect of Russian actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Application for interim measures – Prima facie case – Urgency – Weighing up of interests)
In Case T‑743/22 R II,
Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, residing in Moscow (Russia), represented by D. Rovetta, M. Campa, M. Moretto, V. Villante, T. Marembert and A. Bass, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by J. Rurarz and P. Mahnič, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
having regard to the order of 5 April 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published),
makes the following
Order
1 By his application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin, seeks (i) suspension of the operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1), and of the Council measure of 14 March 2023 maintaining his name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by the restrictive measures provided for by Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16), as amended, and by Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6), as amended (together, ‘the contested measures’), in so far as those measures, by maintaining his name on that list, prevent him from negotiating his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, as well as from participating in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union, and (ii) the grant of any appropriate interim measures which would enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, to be recruited as a driver by teams participating in the relevant championships as well as to exercise his rights and perform obligations under the relevant recruitment, including to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union.
Background to the dispute and forms of order sought by the parties
2 On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched a military attack on Ukraine.
3 On that day, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published a declaration on behalf of the European Union condemning in the strongest possible terms the unprovoked invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation.
4 At its special meeting on the same day, the European Council condemned the Russian Federation’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, while agreeing in principle to the adoption of restrictive measures and economic sanctions against the Russian Federation in the light of the proposals of the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
5 On 25 February 2022, in the wake of those statements, the Council of the European Union, in view of the gravity of the situation, adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1), by which it amended the criteria of designation so as to include persons and entities supporting and benefiting from the Government of the Russian Federation as well as persons and entities providing a substantial source of revenue to it, and natural or legal persons associated with listed persons and entities.
6 On the same date, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1), in order to implement the amendments made by Decision 2022/329.
7 On 9 March 2022, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/397 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 31), by which the applicant’s name was added to the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145.
8 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered were the following:
‘Nikita Mazepin is the son of Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. As Uralchem sponsors Haas F1 Team, Dmitry Mazepin is the major sponsor of his son’s activities at Haas F1 Team.
He is a natural person associated with a leading businessperson (his father) involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
9 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/396 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 80, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was added, with the same statement of reasons, to the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014.
10 By letter of 31 May 2022, the applicant asked the Council to reconsider the decision to include him on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2022/397 and Implementing Regulation 2022/396.
11 By letter of 20 June 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures imposed on him with a new statement of reasons.
12 By letter of 4 July 2022, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 20 June 2022.
13 On 14 September 2022, in view of the continuing actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149), by which it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145.
14 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered were the following:
‘Nikita Mazepin is the son of Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. He was a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, sponsored by Uralchem.
He is a natural person associated with a leading businessperson (his father) involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
15 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 implementing Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1), by which the applicant’s name was maintained, with the same statement of reasons, on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014.
16 By letter of 15 September 2022, the Council, after examining the observations submitted by the applicant in the letters of 31 May and 4 July 2022, informed him that, in its view, those observations did not call into question the assessment that restrictive measures had to be maintained against him and that, consequently, it had decided to maintain his name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures under Decision 2022/1530 and Implementing Regulation 2022/1529.
17 By letter of 1 November 2022, the applicant asked the Council to reconsider the decision to maintain his name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014.
18 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 25 November 2022, the applicant brought an action for annulment of Decision 2022/1530, Implementing Regulation 2022/1529 and the letter of 15 September 2022 (see paragraph 16 above) (‘the 2022 measures’), in so far as those measures concern him.
19 By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 December 2022, the applicant brought an application for interim measures, in which he claims, in essence, that the President of the General Court should suspend in part the operation of the 2022 measures, in so far as his name was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
20 By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures imposed on him, on the basis of document WK 17618 2022 INIT. The statement of reasons is identical to the reasons for listing set out in Decision 2022/1530 and Implementing Regulation 2022/1529 (see paragraph 14 above).
21 On 11 January 2023, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 22 December 2022.
22 On 6 February 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to renew the restrictive measures imposed on him, on the basis of documents WK 1127/2023 and WK 1127/2023 ADD 1. The statement of reasons reproduces the reasoning set out in Decision 2022/1530 and Implementing Regulation 2022/1529, with the following additional information: ‘His foundation “We compete as one” is financed with [funds] of the Uralkali company and he therefore unduly benefits from his father.’
23 On 15 February 2023, the applicant replied to the Council’s letter of 6 February 2023.
24 By order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), the President of the General Court suspended the operation of the 2022 measures in so far as the applicant’s name was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, subject to the conditions set out in that order.
25 On 7 March 2023, the applicant requested the Council to implement the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102).
26 On 13 March 2023, the Council adopted Decision 2023/572, by which it decided to maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures set out in the Annex to Decision 2014/145.
27 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered are now the following:
‘Nikita Mazepin is the son of Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem. He was a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, sponsored by Uralchem. His foundation “We compete as one” is financed with funds of the Uralkali company and he therefore unduly benefits from his father.
He is a natural person associated with a leading businessperson (his father) involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.’
28 The ‘identifying information’ for the applicant now includes, in addition to his function as ‘former Russian racing driver for Haas F1 Team in the 2022 Formula One World Championship under a neutral flag representing the Russian Automobile Federation’, his function as ‘founder of “We compete as one” foundation’.
29 On the same date, the Council adopted Implementing Regulation 2023/571, by which the applicant’s name was maintained, with the same statement of reasons and identifying information, on the list in Annex I to Regulation No 269/2014.
30 By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council, after considering the observations submitted by the applicant in the letter of 1 November 2022 and in the emails of 11 January and 15 February 2023, informed the applicant that, in its view, those observations did not cast doubt on the assessment that restrictive measures should be maintained against him and that, consequently, it had decided to maintain his name on the list of persons and entities subject to restrictive measures under Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/572, and Regulation No 269/2014, as implemented by Implementing Regulation 2023/571.
31 By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 4 April 2023, the applicant modified his application, on the basis of Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, so as to extend his claim to include the annulment of the contested measures, in so far as they concern him.
32 By separate document lodged on the same day, the applicant brought the present application for interim measures, in which he claims that the President of the General Court should:
– order suspension of the operation of the contested measures, in so far as those measures, by maintaining his name on the list of persons and entities made subject to restrictive measures, prevent him from negotiating his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, as well as from participating in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union;
– grant any other appropriate interim measures which would enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union.
– more specifically, the applicant requests the grant of any appropriate interim measures that would enable him (i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full or reserve driver in Formula 1 championships of the Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) (International Automobile Association (FIA)) or in other motor sport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions (including on a simulator), (v) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (vi) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses, benefits from his race team and financial contributions from sponsors can be paid to him, and (vii) to use the bank account and a credit card to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in those countries (for example, travel, food, medical and accommodation expenses), and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions;
– order the Council to pay the costs.
33 In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 18 April 2023, the Council contends that the President of the General Court should:
– dismiss the application for interim measures;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
General considerations
34 It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order that the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court be suspended or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order the suspension of operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12).
35 The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’.
36 The judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim relief is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
37 In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing the application for interim relief has a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
38 Having regard to the material in the file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information necessary to rule on the present application for interim measures without there being any need first to hear oral argument from the parties.
39 In the circumstances of the present case, and without there being any need to rule on whether the Council measure of 14 March 2023 maintaining the applicant’s name on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014 must be regarded as an act open to challenge for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU, it is appropriate to examine first the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case.
A prima facie case
40 According to settled case-law, the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied where at least one of the pleas in law put forward by the applicant for interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded. That is the case where one of the pleas relied on reveals the existence of a major legal or factual disagreement whose solution is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination which cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures but must be the subject of the main proceedings (see, to that effect, orders of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P-R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), not published, EU:C:2017:149, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
41 In order to determine whether the condition relating to the establishment of a prima facie case is satisfied in the present case, it is necessary to carry out a prima facie examination of the substance of the complaints raised by the applicant in support of the main action and therefore to ascertain whether at least one of them is so weighty that it cannot be ruled out in the proceedings for interim measures (see order 4 May 2020, Csordas and Others v Commission, T‑146/20 R, not published, EU:T:2020:172, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
42 In the present case, in order to demonstrate that the contested measures are, prima facie, unlawful, the applicant relies on five pleas in law.
43 It is appropriate to examine the third plea, by which the applicant claims that the Council made a manifest error of assessment, failed to discharge the burden of proof and infringed, first, the criteria for inclusion on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, set out in Article 1(1)(e) and Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, and, second, the rights of the defence.
44 In essence, the applicant claims that the Council has not shown that he unduly benefited from his father.
45 In particular, in the first place, the applicant claims that Uralkali, not Uralchem, was the sponsor of Haas F1 Team, his former employer, and that his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, whose name is also included on the list of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures, was never the General Director of Uralkali, which means that his potential involvement in the conclusion of the sponsorship agreement between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team cannot be presumed, but ought to be clearly established by the Council. The applicant states that Uralchem cannot be regarded as the sponsor of Haas F1 Team because it is the parent company of Uralkali, the latter being a separate company with its own governing bodies.
46 Furthermore, the applicant submits that the Council’s documentary basis does not establish the involvement of his father, Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, in the decision-making process which led to the signing of the sponsorship agreement. In particular, such personal involvement of his father cannot be presumed or inferred from the fact that Uralkali is owned by Uralchem, of which he was the General Director at the time.
47 In the second place, the applicant alleges that the sponsorship agreement concluded with Haas F1 Team was, for Uralkali, a commercial transaction that was entirely justified from an economic point of view and that global fertiliser companies are regularly involved in sports sponsorship. Moreover, the applicant maintains, first, that the Council’s documentary basis does not prove that such a sponsorship agreement would run counter to Uralkali’s interests and, second, that the Council cannot presume that that is the case.
48 In the third place, the applicant claims that the Council has failed to show that he would not have been able to obtain the driver’s seat within Haas F1 Team without the sponsorship agreement.
49 In the fourth place, the applicant claims, first, that the Council has failed to establish that the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation is financed by Uralkali. The Council’s documentary basis does not contain any evidence to that effect or, specifically, any evidence that that foundation actually received financial support from Uralkali, since the evidence on which the Council relied in that regard was limited to press articles predating the creation of the foundation in question. The applicant submits, second, that the evidence which he produced before the Council establishes that, although he inspired the creation of that foundation, he is not able to use the assets for his own benefit – with the result that it is not ‘his’ foundation – or to determine its decisions, and, further, that, in any event, that foundation is not financed by Uralkali or by its funds.
50 In the fifth place, the applicant claims that, in March 2023, he was included on the lists of persons, entities and bodies subject to restrictive measures solely because he is the son of Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, since all the other reasons for listing relate to past circumstances that have since changed or are incorrect. The applicant submits that, according to the case-law, the fact of being a member of the family of a sanctioned individual is not sufficient in itself to justify the inclusion of a person’s name on those lists on the basis of the criterion of association.
51 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
52 In the first place, the Council contends that it is beyond doubt that Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin, the applicant’s father, was the Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of Uralkali when the sponsorship agreement was signed and that that company was more than 80% owned by Uralchem, which was itself wholly owned by the applicant’s father. Thus, the applicant’s father was controlling both Uralchem and Uralkali. It is established that he participated in the sponsorship negotiations, and he is therefore responsible for sponsoring the activities of the applicant.
53 In the second place, the Council contends that the applicant unduly benefited from his father through the sponsorship agreement concluded between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team, and that he continues to benefit unduly from him via the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation since, first, the applicant would not have been able to obtain the seat as a driver in the team or his own charitable foundation without the financial support of his father and, second, that sponsorship and the creation of that foundation made no commercial sense for Uralkali and Uralchem. In that regard, the Council states that Uralkali’s other sponsorship activities to which the applicant refers, which concern local initiatives, differ in terms of their scale and objectives from those linked to the sponsorship of a Formula 1 team.
54 In addition, the Council submits, in particular, that the charitable foundation was created by the applicant and received funding from Uralkali, which is owned by Uralchem, whose major owner is his father. Thus, the foundation exists solely because of the financial support from a company linked to the applicant’s father, and the applicant benefits from that foundation.
55 In the third place, the Council states that the applicant’s name was included on the list because of his financial ties to his father, who was the General Director of the company Uralchem which controlled a company sponsoring his son’s career and different professional activities, and because he benefits unduly therefrom.
56 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, in particular, that the Courts of the European Union ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgment of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119).
57 It is in the light of those considerations that the present plea relied upon by the applicant must be examined.
58 In that context, it must be stated that, in the light of the wording of the reasons for maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, as set out in Decision 2023/572 and Implementing Regulation 2023/571, the terms of which are reproduced in paragraph 27 above, and of the listing criteria, the reason for including the applicant’s name on those lists, relied on by the Council under Article 1(1)(e) and Article 2(1)(g), of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329, and under Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, is his status as a natural person associated with a leading businessperson (his father) involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation.
59 In order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council produced document WK 1127/2023 INIT and document WK 1127/2023 ADD 1, containing publicly available information, namely links to websites, press articles and screenshots.
60 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the Council, prima facie, made an error of assessment in considering that, in the present case, there was a sufficiently solid factual basis, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 56 above, to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
61 To that end, irrespective of whether Uralkali or Uralchem was the sponsor of Haas F1 Team, and assuming that Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin exercised effective control over the Uralchem Group, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s argument that, in essence, the Council has not shown that he unduly benefited from his father.
62 In that regard, it is apparent, first of all, from the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue that, as a driver at Haas F1 Team until March 2022, he was sponsored by Uralchem and that his father was former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem.
63 That part of the reasons for listing relates to the fact that the applicant’s father, the former General Director of JSC UCC Uralchem and a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, which is responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine, had, through the sponsorship agreement concluded between Uralkali, a company more than 80% owned by Uralchem, and Haas F1 Team, sponsored the activities of his son.
64 Furthermore, it is apparent, in particular, from item No 6, page 684, and item No 9, page 691, set out in document WK 1127/2023 INIT, that, as the judge hearing the application for interim measures found in the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102, paragraph 46), the Council has substantiated to the requisite legal standard the fact that Uralkali concluded a sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team. Moreover, the applicant does not dispute this.
65 Nevertheless, the applicant submits, first, that the evidence provided by the Council does not establish that he would not have been able to obtain the driver’s seat within Haas F1 Team without the sponsorship agreement and, second, that that agreement was, for Uralkali, a commercial transaction which was entirely justified from an economic point of view and, in that regard, that it has not been established that that agreement runs counter to Uralkali’s interests.
66 Although it is accepted between the parties that Uralkali concluded a sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team, there are, at this stage, and in the light of the arguments put forward, reasons to doubt that the restrictive measures concerning the applicant are founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis and, in particular, that the evidence in documents WK 1127/2023 INIT and WK 1127/2023 ADD 1 is such as to substantiate the fact that the sponsorship agreement constituted an undue benefit. In other words, although the Council shows that Uralkali, a company linked to the applicant’s father, did in fact conclude that sponsorship agreement with Haas F1 Team, there are, in the light of those arguments and evidence, prima facie reasons for doubting that the applicant could not have obtained that seat as a driver on that team without that sponsorship and that the conclusion of that agreement runs counter to the financial interests of Uralkali.
67 Although some of the evidence produced by the Council suggests that the applicant would have benefited from the support of a company linked to his father in order to become a driver in the Formula 1 Team or reflects negative assessments concerning his results as a Formula 1 driver, the Court notes that item No 1, page 714, in document WK 1127/2023 ADD 1 states that he finished fifth in Formula 2 before entering Formula 1 and, as the applicant claims, item No 16, page 709, in document WK 1127/2023 INIT gives a positive assessment of his qualifications and experience to compete in Formula 1. Further, the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102, paragraph 49) refers to the applicant’s good results in GP 3 (the former name of Formula 3) and in Formula 2 before being recruited by the Formula 1 Team. Thus, in the light of that evidence, it is not clear that the applicant obtained the position of Formula 1 driver solely because of his father’s financial support. In that regard, the Council itself acknowledges, in paragraph 48 of its observations on the application for interim measures, that ‘the previous driving results of the applicant were an element that might have contributed to his recruitment’ by Haas F1 Team.
68 Furthermore, at this stage, and in the light of the arguments put forward, there are prima facie reasons for doubting that the evidence provided by the Council leads to the conclusion that the sponsorship between Uralkali and Haas F1 Team was tantamount to philanthropy or to a commercial transaction that ran counter to the economic interests of Uralkali, or that that sponsorship did not also benefit the two contracting parties to that agreement. In particular, the Council’s assertion in paragraph 49 of its observations on the application for interim measures that ‘Uralkali withdrew from the agreement as soon as the applicant was dismissed’, which helps to show that the sponsorship had no commercial interest for Uralkali, appears prima facie to contradict, in particular, item No 6 and item No 9 in document WK 1127/2023 INIT, to which the Council refers in support of that assertion, but from which it appears that it was Haas F1 team which terminated the sponsorship agreement. In that context, Uralkali’s request for reimbursement of funding from Haas following the termination of the sponsorship agreement, as evidenced by the Council’s documentary basis, does not clearly come across as a fact which contributes to ‘confirming’ that Uralkali has no commercial interest in the sponsorship at issue, as the Council appears to maintain.
69 In addition, it was noted in paragraph 50 of the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102), that both Uralchem and Uralkali were sponsoring other sporting activities; in the present case, Uralchem was a long-term partner of the Russian Swimming Federation and Uralkali was the sponsor of the organiser of the Formula 1 Russian Grand Prix. Similarly, the statement of the General Director of Uralkali reproduced by the applicant in the application for interim measures, stating that that company had a strong commercial interest in becoming a sponsor of Formula 1, makes reference to Uralkali’s other sponsorship activities. The Council’s argument that the scale and objectives of those sponsorship activities are different from those relating to the sponsorship of a Formula 1 team does not, prima facie, make it possible to rule out any relevance in the present case.
70 Having regard to the factual disagreement revealed by the applicant’s arguments, the judge hearing the application for interim measures concludes that those questions must be examined in detail in the main action.
71 It should be borne in mind that it is also stated in the reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue that ‘his foundation “We compete as one” is financed with funds of the Uralkali company’.
72 That part of the reasons for listing relates to the fact that the applicant’s father financed, through Uralkali, his son’s foundation.
73 Although the applicant acknowledges that he inspired the creation of the foundation and although it is apparent from the application for interim measures that he is a member of the board of that foundation, he denies unduly benefiting from his father through that foundation and claims that it is not ‘his foundation’ and that it is not financed by Uralkali or from its funds. He states that, in any event, he never benefited from that foundation or determined its decisions.
74 At this stage and in the light of the arguments put forward, there are reasons to doubt that the restrictive measures concerning the applicant are founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis in that regard and, in particular, that the evidence in documents WK 1127/2023 INIT and WK 1127/2023 ADD 1 is such as to substantiate the fact that the applicant benefited unduly from his father through the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation. In particular, although press articles forming part of the documentary basis present the foundation as being the applicant’s foundation (see, inter alia, item No 4, page 677, and item No 6, page 685, in document WK 1127/2023 INIT and item No 4, page 721, in document WK 1127/2023 ADD 1), there are prima facie reasons, in the light of those arguments and the evidence, to doubt that that foundation was actually financed by Uralkali or through its funds. Similarly, it is not clear that the applicant benefits from it.
75 Although item No 6, item No 8 and item No 9 in document WK 1127/2023 INIT and item No 4 and item No 5 in document WK 1127/2023 ADD 1 refer to information or statements, including those of the applicant, according to which that foundation is or would be financed by funds from Uralkali, they consist of press articles which, the applicant claims, predate the creation of that foundation, which, according to the applicant, did not receive any financial support from Uralkali. Without it being necessary at this stage to rule on their probative value, the Court notes that, in support of his line of argument that the foundation was not financed by Uralkali or through its funds, and as to the fact that he does not benefit from that foundation, the applicant reproduces in the application for interim measures the statements of the Director-General of the foundation and the General Director of Uralkali.
76 Furthermore, as regards the Council’s assertion in paragraph 52 of its observations on the application for interim measures that the creation of the foundation made no commercial sense for Uralkali and Uralchem, the Court notes that the Council does not refer in that regard, in its observations, to any evidence in particular.
77 Having regard to the factual disagreement revealed by the applicant’s arguments, the judge hearing the application for interim measures concludes that those questions must be examined in detail in the main action.
78 Lastly, in the light of the foregoing, there are, prima facie, in view of the arguments put forward and the evidence, reasons to doubt that, more generally, the applicant continues, with regard to those alleged new financial links with his father, to benefit unduly from him, as the Council maintains.
79 In that regard, item No 7, item No 12 and item No 13 in document WK 1227/2023 INIT, to which the Council refers in its observations on the application for interim measures with the main aim of demonstrating the existence of an association or a close relationship between the applicant and his father, do not appear, prima facie, to permit the inference, in themselves, that the applicant unduly benefited or continues unduly to benefit from his father, either through the sponsorship agreement or through the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation.
80 In those circumstances, the Court concludes that the applicant’s argument that the Council fails to show that he unduly benefited from his father indicates the existence of a difficult factual issue, the solution to which is not immediately obvious and which therefore merits a detailed examination, which cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures, but must be the subject of the main proceedings.
81 Consequently, the judge hearing the application for interim measures cannot, prima facie and at this stage, regard the applicant’s complaint that the Council maintained his name on the lists at issue solely on account of his family ties with his father as unfounded, since all the other reasons for listing relate to past circumstances which have changed in the meantime or are incorrect (see paragraph 50 above).
82 It follows from all the foregoing that, without prejudice to the Court’s decision on the main action, the present plea appears, prima facie, not unfounded.
83 It must therefore be found that there is a prima facie case.
The condition relating to urgency
84 In order to determine whether the interim measures sought are urgent, it should be noted that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future final decision, in order to prevent a lacuna in the legal protection afforded by the EU judicature. To attain that objective, urgency must generally be assessed in the light of the need for an interlocutory order to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the party requesting the interim measure. That party must demonstrate that it cannot await the outcome of the main proceedings without suffering serious and irreparable damage (see, to that effect, order of 14 January 2016, AGC Glass Europe and Others v Commission, C‑517/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:21, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
85 It is in the light of those criteria that it must be examined whether the applicant has succeeded in demonstrating urgency.
86 In the present case, in order to demonstrate the serious and irreparable nature of the damage alleged, the applicant submits that, as a result of the restrictive measures taken against him, he was and is unable to negotiate his recruitment, for the 2023 season, to a team as a full-time or reserve Formula 1 driver or as a driver of any other motor sport competition taking place in Europe, such as Formula 2 or the Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters.
87 In addition, in view of the potential length of the court proceedings and the fact that the Council has expressed its intention to maintain the restrictive measures adopted against him, the applicant claims that it is highly likely that he will also be deprived of the possibility of starting training for the new season and negotiating his recruitment as a full-time or reserve Formula 1 driver for the 2024 season, the negotiations for which will begin in the summer of 2023.
88 It follows, according to the applicant, that his non-participation in the second and, most likely, the third consecutive season of Formula 1 championships and other motor sport championships will make it extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to be recruited again as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships, on account of the short average career of a Formula 1 driver and the fact that he is already 24 years old, the need constantly to maintain his driving skills and the difficulties in obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence if he does not maintain his skills and cannot train in Formula 1 cars.
89 The applicant adds, in that regard, that, since the FIA decided that Russian and Belarusian drivers may participate in international competitions in an individual and neutral capacity, subject to a specific commitment and adherence to the FIA’s principles of peace and political neutrality, he is prepared to sign the ‘Driver Commitment’ document, should he be recruited by a race team.
90 Lastly, the applicant concludes that the resulting damage will be definitive and, should the Court annul the contested measures at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings, no compensation will be able to restore that non-pecuniary damage.
91 The applicant also states that the grant of interim measures would also enable him to take part in a medical and training programme at Formula Medicine in order to prepare for the 2024 season.
92 The Council does not dispute that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied.
93 In that regard, in the first place, it must be stated that the damage claimed by the applicant, namely the loss of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships, is of a non-pecuniary nature.
94 In the second place, without the requested suspension, the applicant would be deprived of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships until 15 September 2023, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2023/572.
95 However, in view of the continuing actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, it is highly likely that, on 15 September 2023, the Council will decide to extend the maintained listing of the applicant’s name for a further period of six months.
96 The resulting damage to the applicant, in the absence of the suspension sought, may be characterised as particularly serious because it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver in view of his age, the fact that he would not be able to train regularly in Formula 1 cars in the meantime and the likelihood that he would not be able to renew his Super Licence after an interruption of more than three years, should the Court annul the contested measures at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings.
97 Thus, in the absence of the suspension sought and having regard to the potential duration of the proceedings in the main action, the possibility of the applicant resuming, at the end of the main proceedings, his career as a Formula 1 driver, which very often requires his presence in the European Union, in particular in order to participate in Grand Prix, appears to be remote or, in any event, severely limited.
98 In the third place, it must be held that the damage, consisting in depriving the applicant of the possibility of negotiating his recruitment as a Formula 1 driver or as a professional driver in other motor sport championships, would be irreparable.
99 The applicant’s period of potential activity up to the date of the decision on the substance of the case would elapse irremediably. Thus, the resulting damage to the applicant would become definitive.
100 Consequently, as the applicant submits, no compensation will be able to restore that non-pecuniary damage in the present case.
101 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be held that the condition relating to urgency is satisfied in the present case, since the likelihood of serious and irreparable damage occurring has been established to the requisite legal standard.
The weighing up of interests
102 It is settled case-law that, in weighing up the different interests involved, the judge hearing the application for interim relief has to determine, in particular, whether or not the interest of the party seeking suspension of operation of the contested measure in securing that suspension outweighs the interest in the immediate application of the measure, by examining, more specifically, whether the possible annulment of the measure by the Court when ruling on the main application would allow the situation that would be brought about by its immediate implementation to be reversed and, conversely, whether suspension of operation of the measure would prevent it from being fully effective in the event of the main action being dismissed (see order of 11 March 2013, Iranian Offshore Engineering & Construction v Council, T‑110/12 R, EU:T:2013:118, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
103 As regards more particularly the condition that the legal situation created by an interim relief order must be reversible, it must be recalled that the purpose of the procedure for interim relief is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision on the main action. Consequently, that procedure is merely ancillary to the main action to which it is an adjunct, and accordingly the decision made by the court hearing an application for interim relief must be provisional in the sense that it cannot either prejudge the future decision on the substance of the case or render it illusory by depriving it of practical effect (see order of 1 September 2015, Pari Pharma v EMA, T‑235/15 R, EU:T:2015:587, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
104 It must therefore be examined whether the applicant’s interests in obtaining the immediate suspension of the contested measures outweigh the interests pursued by the Council in adopting those measures.
105 As regards the interests pursued by the applicant, he claims that the possible annulment of the contested measures by the Court at the end of the dispute in the main proceedings would not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed. The non-pecuniary damage to his professional career would become definitive in respect of the potential days of activity elapsing from the date when the restrictive measures took effect until the date of the decision in the main proceedings. Furthermore, as regards the period of activity potentially remaining after the decision in the main proceedings, it would be hardly realistic for him to return to Formula 1, and even to Formula 2 or to Deutsche Tourenwagen Masters, if he misses the opportunity to compete and/or to follow training programmes during the 2023 and 2024 seasons.
106 In addition, the applicant submits that, from the perspective of the Council’s interest, first, suspension of the operation of the contested measures would not impede the objectives which it pursues in the event that the main action is dismissed, since he is not seeking, in particular, the provisional unfreezing of all his funds or economic resources, but only the suspension of the contested measures to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the next motor sport championships and to pursue his professional career. Second, the applicant claims that the interim measures sought would not jeopardise the objectives pursued by the European Union through Decision 2023/572 and Implementing Regulation 2023/571, since he is a professional racing driver who is not involved in any Russian business, who has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, who raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and who confirms being ready to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.
107 By contrast, the Council submits that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of not suspending the operation of the contested measures, taking into account, on the one hand, the importance of the objective which those measures pursue, namely to increase the economic cost of the war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine to a point where it becomes unsustainable for the Russian Federation to pursue it, and, on the other hand, the applicant’s present situation.
108 In particular, the Council claims that the applicant is involved with a foundation he created, with funds from companies linked to his father, whose mission is to support Russian athletes excluded from international sport competitions, which is most often due to the illegal war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine even before the imposition of EU restrictive measures or independently of those. The Council infers from the above that it is ‘possible that the applicant will not be able to obtain what he is seeking through the lifting of the restrictive [measures]’.
109 In addition, to allow the applicant, who managed to enter into a specific career solely because of the financial support from his father, a leading businessperson involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation, and who continues to rely on his financial support for his professional activities, to proceed with a high-profile and visible sporting career within the European Union is certainly at odds with the objective of the restrictive measures which in essence seek to interrupt financial relations with the regime at issue, including through targeted measures against persons financially associated with listed persons.
110 In addition, a suspension of the operation of the contested measures would enable the transfer of the funds from the unblocked accounts, which would neutralise in advance the effects of the judgment to be given in the main action and therefore prejudge it.
111 Lastly, the Council claims that the applicant has secured employment as a driver in the Asian Le Mans Series, which will take place in the United Arab Emirates, and it is therefore possible for him to continue with his career and practise racing even if the measures against him are maintained.
112 As regards the weighing up of interests, it should be noted that, so far as the applicant’s interest is concerned, it follows from paragraphs 97 and 99 above that the annulment of the contested measures would not allow the situation resulting from their immediate implementation to be reversed, since the non-pecuniary damage would become definitive as regards the applicant’s period of potential activity up to the date of the decision on the substance of the case and since, on that date, it would be extremely difficult – if not impossible – for him to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver.
113 Consequently, should the applicant succeed in having the contested measures annulled in the main proceedings, any damage which he may have suffered as a result of the harm to his interests cannot subsequently be assessed and made good or compensated.
114 That conclusion is not called into question by the Council’s argument based on the applicant’s involvement in the foundation ‘We Compete As One’ (see paragraph 108 above). In that regard, it is not clear to what extent such involvement on the part of the applicant, even if it were established, would, as the Council maintains, support the conclusion that ‘it is therefore clearly possible that the applicant will not be able to obtain what he is seeking through the lifting of the restrictive [measures]’.
115 Similarly, the Council cannot reasonably rely on the fact that the applicant has secured employment as a driver in the Asian Le Mans Series, which will take place in the United Arab Emirates, and that it would thus be possible for him to pursue his career and practise racing even if the restrictive measures against him are maintained (see paragraph 111 above).
116 The Council has failed to explain how the possibility of pursuing his career as a driver in such a motor sports championship, outside the European Union, improves his prospects of returning to Formula 1 or compensates for the damage which he would suffer as a result of his being unable to resume his career as a Formula 1 driver, which is one of the most prestigious and high-profile sporting events in the world.
117 As far as the Council is concerned, the interests relied on are public interests that aim to protect European security and stability and form part of an overall strategy seeking to put an end to the aggression suffered by Ukraine as soon as possible.
118 In the light of the paramount importance of the objectives pursued by the contested measures, namely the protection of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, which fall within the wider objective of maintaining international peace and security, it is necessary to examine whether the immediate suspension of the contested measures, in so far as those measures concern the applicant, would threaten the European Union’s pursuit of the objectives, in particular peaceful objectives, which it has set for itself in accordance with Article 3(1) and (5) TEU, at the price, each day, of irreparable material and non-material damage.
119 In that regard, the Court notes that, as is apparent from paragraphs 57 to 82 above, there are, at this stage, reasons to doubt that the acts by which the restrictive measures were maintained in respect of the applicant are founded on a sufficiently solid factual basis and, in particular, that the evidence in documents WK 1127/2023 INIT and WK 1127/2023 ADD 1 is such as to substantiate the fact that the applicant has benefited unduly from his father or continues to benefit unduly from his father, either through the sponsorship agreement or the ‘We Compete As One’ foundation. In particular, it is apparent from paragraphs 57 to 82 above that there are, at this stage, reasons to doubt that, as the Council states in its observations on the application for interim measures, the applicant managed ‘to enter into a specific career solely because of the financial support by his father … and [continues] to rely on his financial support for his professional activities’.
120 Furthermore, the applicant claimed, without being challenged by the Council on that point, that he is not involved in any Russian business, has always maintained a neutral position on the war as a professional athlete, raced under a neutral flag during the 2021 season of Formula 1 and is ready to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for Russian and Belarusian drivers to continue to compete.
121 It must therefore be held that the applicant is a young sportsman who is in no way involved in the aggression suffered by Ukraine and who is not engaged in any activity in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Government of the Russian Federation. He merely asks that he be given the opportunity to pursue his career as a Formula 1 driver without the financial support of his father.
122 Lastly, since the applicant seeks suspension of the operation of the contested measures, in so far as they concern him, only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment, to participate in the next motor sport championships and to pursue his professional career, it must be acknowledged that, in those circumstances, suspension of the operation of the contested measures will not prejudge the future decision in the main proceedings or compromise the very purpose of the procedure for interim relief, which is to guarantee the full effectiveness of the future decision in the main action, or, in particular, enable ‘the transfer of the funds from the unblocked accounts’ at the risk of ‘[neutralising] in advance the effects of the judgment to be given in the main action’, contrary to the Council’s contention (see paragraph 110 above).
123 In the light of all the foregoing, it must be concluded that the weighing up of interests lies in favour of the applicant.
124 Thus, suspension of the operation of the contested measures, in so far as they concern the applicant, must be limited to what is strictly necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, the applicant is authorised only (i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of his father or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full or reserve driver in Formula 1 championships of the FIA or in other motor sport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions (including on a simulator), (v) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (vi) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses, benefits from his race team and financial contributions from the sponsors accepted by his team can be paid to him and, (vii) to use the bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union, and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions.
125 Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, the applicant must undertake to race under a neutral flag and to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for that purpose.
126 It follows from all the foregoing that the application for interim measures must be granted to that extent.
127 Accordingly, since all the necessary conditions are met, the application for suspension of the operation of the contested measures must be granted.
128 As the present order closes the proceedings for interim measures, the order of 5 April 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II, not published), adopted on the basis of Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, by which the President of the General Court ordered the suspension of the operation of the contested measures until the date of the order terminating the present proceedings for interim measures, must be cancelled in so far as the applicant’s name was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies to which the restrictive measures provided for in Decision 2014/145, as amended, and Regulation No 269/2014, as amended, apply, and subject to the same conditions as those laid down in the order of 1 March 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R, not published, EU:T:2023:102).
129 Under Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs are to be reserved.
On those grounds,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
hereby orders:
1. The operation of Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, and the Council measure of 14 March 2023 maintaining the name of Mr Nikita Dmitrievich Mazepin on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by the restrictive measures provided for by Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as amended, and by Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 of 17 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as amended, is suspended in so far as the name of Mr Mazepin was maintained on the list of persons, entities and bodies covered by those restrictive measures and only to the extent necessary to enable him to negotiate his recruitment as a professional Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, as well as to participate in Formula 1 Grand Prix, tests, training sessions and free sessions and in other motor sport championships, races, tests, training sessions and free sessions taking place in the European Union. To that end, Mr Mazepin is authorised only (i) to enter the European Union in order to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors not linked to the activities of Mr Dmitry Arkadievich Mazepin or to natural or legal persons whose names are included on the lists set out in the annexes to Decision 2014/145 and Regulation No 269/2014, (ii) to enter the European Union in order to participate as a full or reserve driver in Formula 1 championships of the Fédération internationale de l’automobile (FIA) (International Automobile Association (FIA)) or in other motor sport championships, training sessions, tests or free sessions, also with a view to obtaining the renewal of his Super Licence, (iii) to enter the European Union in order to undergo the medical examinations required by the FIA or his race team, (iv) to enter the European Union to follow programmes of medical checks and training sessions (including on a simulator), (v) to enter the European Union in order to participate in racing, sponsorship and promotion events at the request of his race team or sponsors, (vi) to open a bank account in which a salary, bonuses, benefits from his race team and financial contributions from the sponsors accepted by his team can be paid to him and, (vii) to use the bank account and a credit card only to cover those costs that enable a professional driver to travel in the European Union, to negotiate and conclude agreements with a race team or with sponsors, to participate in championships, Grand Prix, races, training sessions, tests or free sessions in the Member States of the European Union, and to follow a programme of medical checks and training sessions.
2. Should he be recruited as a Formula 1 driver or as a driver in other motor sport championships taking place also or only in the European Union, Mr Mazepin must undertake to race under a neutral flag and to sign the Driver Commitment required by the FIA for that purpose.
3. The order of 5 April 2023, Mazepin v Council (T‑743/22 R II) is cancelled.
4. The costs are reserved.
Luxembourg, 19 July 2023.
V. Di Bucci | | M. van der Woude |