ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
25 November 2010 (*)
(Legal aid)
In Case T‑277/10 AJ,
K, residing in London (United Kingdom),
applicant,
v
Eurojust, represented by M. Coninsx, acting as Agent,
defendant,
APPLICATION for legal aid under Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
makes the following
Order
1 By application lodged at the Court registry on 12 July 2010, the applicant, Mr K, applied for legal aid prior to bringing an action against three decisions of Eurojust of 2, 14 and 24 June 2010 (the ‘contested decisions’), by which Eurojust stated that it had not processed any personal data regarding Mr K, except for his letters of 7 May, 10 and 21 June 2010, by which he had requested access to his personal data from Eurojust.
2 In its observations, lodged at the registry on 11 August 2010, Eurojust maintains that the applicant’s case is manifestly unfounded and submits that his legal aid application should be refused on that basis.
3 Under Article 94(3) of the Rules of Procedure, legal aid is to be refused if the action in respect of which the application is made appears to be manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.
4 The applicant maintains, first, that, by adopting the contested decisions, Eurojust deprived him of the right to be heard before a decision was taken which would affect his legal position and, second, that it failed to state the reasons on which the decisions are based, thereby depriving him of his right to an effective judicial remedy and his right to a fair hearing.
5 In the contested decisions, Eurojust informed the applicant that it was not in possession of any personal data concerning him, except for those included in the three letters which he had sent to Eurojust.
6 It is settled case-law that a presumption of legality attaches to any statement of the institutions or bodies of the European Union relating to the existence of documents requested. Consequently, a presumption of veracity also attaches to such a statement. That is, however, a simple presumption which the applicant may rebut in any way by relevant and consistent evidence (see Case T‑380/04 Terezakis v Commission [2008] ECR II‑11, paragraph 155 and the case-law cited).
7 By analogy, in this instance, it must be held that a presumption of legality attaches to Eurojust’s statement and it is for the applicant to rebut it.
8 However, the applicant has not put forward any evidence such as to call into question Eurojust’s statement that it has not processed any of his personal data other than those contained in the letters of 7 May and 10 and 21 June 2010.
9 Furthermore, pursuant to Article 19(8) of Council Decision 2002/187/JHA of 28 February 2002 setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious crime (OJ 2002 L 63, p. 1), if an applicant is not satisfied with the reply given to his request for access to personal data, he may appeal against that decision before the joint supervisory body. The joint supervisory body is to examine whether or not the decision taken by Eurojust is in conformity with Decision 2002/187/JHA.
10 As Eurojust has pointed out, the applicant has failed to fulfil that procedural stage.
11 Finally, concerning the illegality relied on by the applicant, it must be held that, under Article 19(7) of Decision 2002/187/JHA, if access is denied or if no personal data concerning an applicant are processed by Eurojust, the latter is to notify the applicant that it has carried out checks, without giving any information which could reveal whether or not the applicant is known.
12 In the present case, it must be concluded that the contested decisions duly fulfil the requirements of that provision and even exceed them, since they provide a detailed answer to the applicant’s allegations, which remain rather vague. Indeed, it is apparent from the contested decisions, especially from the decisions of 14 and 21 June 2010, that Eurojust did not merely notify the applicant that it had carried out checks, but specified that it had never been in possession of any data concerning him. Furthermore, it affirmed that the National Member for the United Kingdom at Eurojust had never taken any decision about the applicant and that the information provided to the applicant was based on careful consideration and necessary checks.
13 Given that the applicant has not challenged the legality of the requirements to state reasons stemming from Article 19(7) of Decision 2002/187/JHA, it must be concluded that his allegations appear to be manifestly unfounded.
14 In any event, since, as mentioned above, the purpose of the contested decisions is to inform the applicant that Eurojust is not in possession of any of his personal data, they cannot, by definition, state any other reasons than those pertaining to that finding.
15 As regards, finally, the infringement of the rights of the defence alleged by the applicant, it must be stated that Decision 2002/187/JHA, the legality of which is not challenged by the applicant, does not require that, in the case of a request for access to personal data, the person making the request is to have specific procedural rights, in particular the right to be heard, before a decision is adopted on the basis of Article 19(7) of the Decision.
16 Furthermore, it must be noted that, despite Eurojust’s express reference in the contested decisions to the legal remedy provided for in Article 19(8) of Decision 2002/187/JHA, the applicant did not exercise his right under that provision to lodge an appeal before the joint supervisory body, in the context of which he could have exercised his rights of defence.
17 It follows from the foregoing that the action in respect of which legal aid is sought appears to be manifestly unfounded. In those circumstances and having regard to Article 94(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must be dismissed.
On those grounds,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT
hereby orders:
The application for legal aid in Case T‑277/10 AJ is dismissed.
Luxembourg, 25 November 2010.
Registrar | President | President |