ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
11 May 2012 (1)
(Actions for annulment – Period allowed for commencing proceedings – Manifest inadmissibility)
In Case T-130/12,
Changshu Walsin Speciality Steel Co. Ltd, established in Changshu (China), represented by V. Akritidis and Y. Melin, lawyers,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union,
defendant,
APPLICATION for annulment of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1331/2011 of 14 December 2011 imposing a definitive anti‑dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of stainless steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2011 L 336, p. 6),
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber),
composed of I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur), President, K. Jürimäe and M. van der Woude, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Procedure and form of order sought by the applicant
1 By application lodged at the Registry of the Court on 15 March 2012, the applicant brought the present action.
2 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1331/2011 of 14 December 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain seamless pipes and tubes of stainless steel originating in the People’s Republic of China (OJ 2011 L 336, p. 6);
– order the defendant, and any intervener who may be allowed to support the defendant in the course of the proceedings, to bear the costs of these proceedings.
Law
3 Under Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure, where the action is manifestly inadmissible the Court may, without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action by reasoned order.
4 In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
5 Under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, proceedings for annulment must be instituted within two months of the publication of the contested measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter. Under Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure, where the period of time allowed for commencing proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication of that measure, that period shall run from the end of the 14th day after publication thereof in the Official Journal of the European Union. In accordance with Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure, that time-limit is to be extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days.
6 According to settled case law, that period of time is a matter of public policy, since it was established in order to ensure that legal positions are clear and certain and to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice, and the Court must ascertain of its own motion whether that time-limit was observed (Case C‑246/95 Coen [1997] ECR I‑403, paragraph 21, and Joined Cases T‑121/96 and T‑151/96 Mutual Aid Administration Services v Commission [1997] ECR II‑1355, paragraphs 38 and 39).
7 In the present case, it is apparent from the documents in the file that the disputed measure was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 20 December 2011. Therefore, under the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and Article 102(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the application for annulment fell to be brought no later than 13 March 2012. It follows that the application, lodged on 15 March 2012, thus after the expiry of the applicable time limit, is manifestly out of time.
8 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that, in accordance with Article 101(2) of the Rules of Procedure, if the period would otherwise end on a Saturday, Sunday or official holiday, it shall be extended until the end of the first following working day. This provision, however, is applicable only where the entire period, including the extension on account of distance, ends on a Saturday, Sunday or official holiday (see, to that effect, order of 20 November 1997 in Case T‑85/97 Horeca-Wallonie v Commission [1997] ECR II‑2113, paragraph 25, as well as the case-law cited). It follows that, since in the present case, the entire period, including the extension on account of distance, ended on a Tuesday, Article 101(2) of the Rules of Procedure is not applicable.
9 In addition, the applicant has not established or even pleaded the existence of unforeseeable circumstances or of force majeure which would allow the Court to vary the time-limit in question on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which applies to the procedure before the General Court by virtue of Article 53 of that Statute.
10 It follows from all of the above considerations that the action must be dismissed as manifestly inadmissible and there is no need for it to be served on the defendant.
Costs
11 As the present order was adopted prior to service of the application on the defendant and before the latter could have incurred costs, it is sufficient to decide that the applicant must bear its own costs pursuant to Article 87(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The action is dismissed.
2. The applicant shall pay its own costs.
Luxembourg, 11 May 2012.