Case T‑614/13

Romonta GmbH

v

European Commission

(Environment — Directive 2003/87/EC — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances from 2013 — Decision 2011/278/EU — National implementing measures submitted by Germany — Hardship clause — Freedom to choose an occupation and to conduct a business — Right to property — Proportionality)

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber), 26 September 2014

1.      Actions for annulment — Natural or legal persons — Measures of direct and individual concern to them — Whether directly concerned — Commission decision addressed to Member States concerning the free allocation of greenhouse gas emission allowances — Definitive determination of all the factors to be taken into account for national implementing measures — Implementation purely automatic — No discretion of the Member States

(Art. 263, fourth para., TFEU; European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Art. 11; Commission Decision 2013/448)

2.      Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional system of allocating free allowances — Exhaustive character of the harmonised allocation rules — No discretion of the Commission — Commission decision refusing allocation of allowances on the basis of a hardship clause — No infringement of the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Arts 10a and 11; Commission Decisions 2011/278, Arts 10 and 15(3), and 2013/448)

3.      EU law — Principles — Force majeure — Concept — Circumstances outside the control of the person relying on it, abnormal an unforeseeable, with inevitable consequences despite all diligence used — Undertaking subject to a greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system — Risk of insolvency — No force majeure

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87; Commission Decision 2013/448)

4.      Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional system for free allocation of allowances — No hardship clause — No infringement of fundamental rights

(Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Arts 15 to 17; European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Arts 10a and 11; Commission Decision 2011/278)

5.      Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional system for free allocation of allowances — No hardship clause — No breach of principle of proportionality

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Arts 10a and 11; Commission Decision 2011/278)

6.      Environment — Atmospheric pollution — Directive 2003/87 — Scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading — Transitional system for free allocation of allowances — Exhaustive character of the harmonised allocation rules — Allocation of the basis of a national rule going beyond the harmonised rules — Not compatible — Commission decision refusing allocation of allowances on the basis of a hardship clause — No infringement of the principle of subsidiarity

(European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87, Arts 10a and 11; Commission Decision 2011/278)

1.      See the text of the decision.

(see paras 29-37)

2.      Under the system for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances, the free allocation of allowances is subject to exhaustive rules laid down by governing free allocation of emission allowances system of Decision 2011/278/EU determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87.

Therefore, the Commission’s decision whether or not to refuse free allocation of allowances to an installation depends solely on whether the allowances allocated to the installation by the Member State in question were calculated in accordance with those rules. The Commission has no discretion in that regard, and in particular may not authorise free allocation of emission allowances on the basis of a hardship clause. Consequently, by refusing allocation in such a case, the Commission does not infringe the principle of proportionality or the fundamental rights of the operator of the installation concerned.

(see paras 44, 46, 47)

3.      See the text of the decision.

(see paras 48, 49)

4.      Decision 2011/278 does not permit the free allocation of allowances on the basis of a hardship clause. The absence of such a clause constitutes interference in the freedom to conduct a business and the right to property, laid down by Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, of undertakings in such difficulties.

However, restrictions imposed on those fundamental rights do not affect their essential content. Moreover, the system established by Decision 2011/278 effectively meets the public interest objective of environmental protection and takes account of the level of emissions reductions considered scientifically necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. Consequently, in so far as that decision is not, through absence of a hardship clause, manifestly inappropriate in relation to the goals to be attained, interference with fundamental rights does not constitute an infringement of those rights.

(see paras 58, 59, 61, 67, 73)

5.      Decision 2011/278 is not, by refusing free allocation of allowances on the basis of a hardship clause, manifestly disproportionate in the strict sense. In that regard, in the absence of any evidence that, apart from the risk in a market economy, the existence of operators of installations subject to the system of greenhouse gas emission exchange allowances is typically threatened by the application of the allocation rules laid down in Decision 2011/278, the fact that that decision does not provide a clause to avoid situations in which the existence of an undertaking is threatened by reason of economic and financial difficulties resulting from its individual management does not permit the conclusion that it is manifestly disproportionate in the strict sense.

The introduction of such a clause would be difficult to reconcile with the principle that the polluter should pay, which is established in the field of the environment in Article 191(2) TFEU. Moreover, even in the absence of such a clause, the transitional system established by the EU legislature is capable, in certain circumstances, of preventing economic difficulties for installations forming part of a sector exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. By contrast, it is not for the Commission to guarantee to each individual undertaking a minimum of production by reference to its own profitability and development criteria.

Moreover, the final advantage for the environment depends on the rigour with which the total quantity of allowances granted is established, which constitutes the overall limit of emissions authorised by the allowance trading system. If there were a hardship clause, the operators would have less of an incentive to reduce their emissions through measures of economic or technical adaptation.

(see paras 79, 81, 83, 89, 91-93)

6.      Decision 2011/278 exhaustively defines the rules concerning the issuing of free allowances. Such a total harmonisation for the whole Union presupposes that those rules necessarily preclude any free allocation of allowances under national rules.

Since it is inherent in such general rules that they have a greater impact on some installations than on others, those rules apply to all situations, including atypical situations. A derogation from the harmonised Union rules cannot be granted unilaterally by a Member State.

Since the harmonised rules fall within the exclusive competence of the Union, the subsidiarity principle cannot be invoked against a Commission decision rejecting an allocation of allowances based on a national provision concerning cases of excessive hardship.

(see paras 101, 103-105)