ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CIVIL SERVICE TRIBUNAL
(First Chamber)
21 April 2015
Case F‑31/11 DEP
BI
v
European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop)
(Civil service — Procedure — Taxation of costs — Representation of a European Union agency by a lawyer — Fixed remuneration — Recoverable costs — Applicant’s financial situation)
Application: for taxation of costs, brought by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop) following the order of the Civil Service Tribunal of 7 March 2012 in BI v Cedefop (F‑31/11, EU:F:2012:28).
Held: The amount of the costs which the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training may recover from BI in respect of Case F‑31/11 is fixed at EUR 5 000.
Summary
1. Judicial proceedings — Costs — Application for taxation — Time limit for submission — Obligation to submit the application for taxation within a reasonable period
(Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 92(1))
2. Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties — Concept — Fees paid by an EU institution, body, office or agency to its lawyer — Included — Infringement of the principle of equal treatment between applicants as a result of the use of a lawyer in some cases but not others — None
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, first para., and Annex I, Art. 7(1); Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 91(b))
3. Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties — Fees paid by an institution to its lawyer — Included — Elements to be taken into consideration for the purposes of taxation — Financial situation of the party ordered to pay the costs — Not included
(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, first para., and Annex I, Art. 7(1); Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Tribunal, Art. 91(b))
1. An application for taxation of costs must be made within a reasonable period, beyond which the party ordered to bear the costs would be justified in considering that the party to which costs are payable has waived its right. Moreover, the reasonableness of a period is to be appraised in the light of all the circumstances specific to each case and, in particular, the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties.
As regards the conduct of the parties, although the lodging of an appeal does not have suspensory effect, it is understandable that a party entitled to payment of his costs should be able to await the expiry of the time limit for lodging an appeal before submitting his application for reimbursement of costs.
(see paras 14, 16)
See:
Judgment in Review of Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paras 28, 30 and 33, and order in Dietz v Commission, 126/76 DEP, EU:C:1979:158, para. 1
Order in Air France v Commission, T‑2/93 DEP, EU:T:1996:48, para. 10 et seq.
Order in BI v Cedefop, F‑31/11, EU:F:2012:28
2. It is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, applicable before the Civil Service Tribunal pursuant to Article 7(1) of Annex I to that Statute, that when it comes to being represented or assisted before the Union judicature, the institutions of the European Union are free to have recourse to the assistance of a lawyer. The latter’s remuneration is covered by the concept of expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings, without the institution being required to show that such assistance is objectively warranted. For the purposes of the application of that provision of the Statute, EU bodies are to be equated with those institutions.
Moreover, the fact that an EU body instructed an agent and an external lawyer has no impact on the possible recoverability of the costs at issue, since there is nothing to preclude such recovery in principle. It may, however, have an impact on the determination of the amount of costs incurred for the purposes of the proceedings which may ultimately be recovered. There is thus no question of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment between applicants where an EU institution or body decides to have recourse to the services of a lawyer in certain cases, whereas in others it is represented by its agents.
Any other assessment which makes the right of an EU institution or body to claim all or part of the fees paid to a lawyer subject to proof of an ‘objective’ need to use that lawyer’s services would in fact constitute an indirect restriction on the freedom conferred by the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and entail for the EU judicature a duty to substitute its own assessment for that of the institutions and bodies responsible for the organisation of their departments. Such a task is compatible neither with the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, nor with the power to adopt rules for their own internal organisation enjoyed by the institutions and bodies of the European Union in relation to the management of their cases before the courts of the European Union. It follows that the fact that an EU body possesses a legal service has no impact on the recoverability of costs consisting in the body’s remuneration of a lawyer who is not a member of its staff.
(see paras 30-33)
See:
Order in Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑554/11 P-DEP, EU:C:2013:706, para. 17
Order in Longinidis v Cedefop, T‑283/08 P-DEP, EU:T:2014:1083, paras 24 to 26 and the case-law cited therein
Order in Chatzidoukakis v Commission, F‑84/10 DEP, EU:F:2014:41, para. 21
3. Concerning the determination of the amount of recoverable costs, the Union judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers but it may determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for taxation of costs, it is not obliged to take account of any national scales of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in that regard between the party concerned and his agents or advisers.
Moreover, in the absence of Union provisions laying down fee scales, the court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Union law, the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the case for the agents or advisers involved and the financial interest which the parties had in the proceedings.
In that regard, even without a statement detailing the services provided by the lawyer and the time spent in doing so, the fees being set at a fixed rate, it may be inferred from the mere fact that he drew up the defence that the lawyer did indeed produce documents and provide services necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Civil Service Tribunal. Moreover, the fixed nature of the remuneration has no effect on the Tribunal’s assessment of the amount recoverable by way of costs, since it bases its decisions on well-established criteria laid down by case-law and precise information which the parties must provide to it. Whilst the absence of such information does not preclude the Tribunal fixing the amount of the recoverable costs on the basis of an equitable assessment, it nonetheless places it in a situation where its assessment of the applicant’s claims must necessarily be strict.
Furthermore, the financial situation of the party ordered to pay the costs is not one of the criteria in the light of which the amount of recoverable costs is fixed by the EU judicature in proceedings for taxation of costs.
(see paras 35, 36, 41, 42, 48)
See:
Orders in Marcuccio v Commission, T‑278/07 P-DEP, EU:T:2013:269, para. 20, and Longinidis v Cedefop, EU:T:2014:1083, para. 67
Judgment in Blais v ECB, F‑6/08, EU:F:2008:160, paras 111 to 116; orders in Martinez Erades v EEAS, F‑64/12 DEP, EU:F:2013:111, para. 21, and Chatzidoukakis v Commission, EU:F:2014:41, paras 22 and 23 and the case-law cited therein