JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
9 December 2020 (*)
(EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark Almea – Earlier national word mark MEA – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001))
In Case T‑190/20,
Almea Ltd, established in London (United Kingdom), represented by R. Furneaux and E. Humphreys, Solicitors,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by J. Mrozowski, J. Crespo Carrillo and V. Ruzek, acting as Agents,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Sanacorp Pharmahandel GmbH, established in Planegg (Germany), represented by I.‑M. Helbig, S. Rengshausen and S. Cobet-Nüse, lawyers,
ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 15 January 2020 (Case R 246/2019‑2), relating to opposition proceedings between Sanacorp Pharmahandel and Almea,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed of A. Marcoulli, President, S. Frimodt Nielsen (Rapporteur) and J. Schwarcz, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
having regard to the application lodged at the Court Registry on 7 April 2020,
having regard to the response of EUIPO lodged at the Court Registry on 23 July 2020,
having regard to the response of the intervener lodged at the Court Registry on 3 August 2020,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks following service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
Background to the dispute
1 On 5 May 2015, Almea Ltd, UK Filial, Sweden, of which Almea Ltd is the successor, filed an application for the registration of an EU trade mark at the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2009 L 78, p. 1), as amended (replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1)).
2 Registration as a mark was sought for the following figurative sign:
3 The goods and services in respect of which registration was sought fall, inter alia, following the restriction made during the proceedings before EUIPO, within Classes 3 and 5 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.
4 The trade mark application was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 2015/143 of 3 August 2015.
5 On 3 November 2015, the intervener, Sanacorp Pharmahandel GmbH, filed a notice of opposition pursuant to Article 41 of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 46 of Regulation 2017/1001) to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
6 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the earlier German word mark MEA, registered on 19 October 2011 under No 30 2011 029 584, for goods in, inter alia, Classes 3 and 5.
7 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 (now Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001).
8 On 29 November 2018, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the ground that there was no likelihood of confusion.
9 On 28 January 2019, the intervener filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO, pursuant to Articles 66 to 71 of Regulation 2017/1001, against the decision of the Opposition Division.
10 By decision of 15 January 2020 (‘the contested decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO annulled the decision of the Opposition Division and rejected the EU trade mark application on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion.
11 In essence, the Board of Appeal found that, in view of the identity or strong similarity of the goods at issue, the fact that the earlier sign was completely included in the sign applied for and makes up three fifths of the sign, the at least low degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue, the average level of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the principle that consumers must rely on an imperfect mental image of the marks, there was such a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, even if the level of attention of that public was deemed to be higher than average in relation to some of the goods at issue.
Forms of order sought
12 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– make an award of costs in its favour.
13 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
14 The intervener contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
15 The applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009. It claims that the Board of Appeal made a number of errors in assessing whether there was a likelihood of confusion.
16 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
Determination of the applicable substantive law
17 In view of the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 5 May 2015, which is decisive for the purpose of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the case are governed by the substantive provisions of Regulation No 207/2009 (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2014, Bimbo v OHIM, C‑591/12 P, EU:C:2014:305, paragraph 12, and of 18 June 2020, Primart v EUIPO, C‑702/18 P, EU:C:2020:489, paragraph 2 and the case-law cited). Consequently, in the present case, as regards the substantive rules, the references made by the Board of Appeal in the contested decision and by EUIPO to Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 must be understood as referring to Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, which is identical in content.
18 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if because of its identity with, or similarity to, an earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
19 In accordance with settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. In accordance with the same case-law, the likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 33 and the case-law cited).
20 For the purposes of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
21 However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
The relevant public and comparison of the goods
22 First of all, the Board of Appeal found that the relevant territory for the purposes of assessing the likelihood of confusion was Germany and that the goods at issue were essentially aimed at the general public. It also noted that certain goods in Class 5 were also aimed at professional consumers with specific knowledge and expertise. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that the level of attention of the relevant public varied from average to high according to the goods concerned (see paragraphs 19 and 20 of the contested decision).
23 Next, for the reasons set out in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal stated that the goods at issue, whether in Class 3 or Class 5, were all identical or very similar (see paragraphs 22 to 31 of the contested decision).
24 There are no grounds to call into question those assessments, which, moreover, are not disputed by the applicant.
The comparison of the signs
25 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
26 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgments of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41, and of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 42). That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgment of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
The visual comparison and the phonetic comparison
27 Visually, the Board of Appeal noted, first of all, that the sign applied for was green in colour and composed of the word element ‘almea’, the letter ‘l’ of which was represented with a graphical stylisation that was nevertheless recognisable, namely a bamboo shoot with two small leaves on the top left. The Board of Appeal found that the stylisation of the letter ‘l’ was minor and that it did not preclude the legibility of the word ‘almea’, which had no meaning in relation to the goods at issue and was the most distinctive element of the sign applied for. The Board of Appeal then stated that the earlier sign consisted of the word element ‘mea’, a word which had no meaning in relation to the goods at issue and which therefore had an average distinctive character (see paragraphs 33 and 34 of the contested decision).
28 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue coincided in the letters ‘mea’, that the earlier sign was completely included in the sign applied for and that those signs differed in the initial letters ‘al’ of the sign applied for and its graphical stylisation, which had no counterpart in the earlier mark. It also noted that the figurative elements of the sign applied for were perceived as secondary in relation to its word elements. Consequently, the Board of Appeal found that the signs at issue had at least a low degree of visual similarity. In that regard, first, it noted that the fact that the sign applied for was longer than the earlier sign and that it contained the additional letters ‘al’ at its beginning did not prevent the relevant public from perceiving the common element ‘mea’. Second, the Board of Appeal stated that the principle that the first element of a word may be more likely to catch the consumer’s attention than the rest of the word was not applicable in the present case, given that the element ‘al’ of the sign applied for would not attract more attention in the present instance than the element ‘mea’ that followed it (see paragraph 35 of the contested decision).
29 Phonetically, the Board of Appeal found that there was at least a low degree of similarity between the signs at issue given that two of the three syllables of the sign applied for, those of the common element ‘mea’, were phonetically identical to the earlier sign and that the only phonetic difference lay in the sound of the first syllable ‘al’ of the sign applied for, which had no counterpart in the earlier sign (see paragraph 36 of the contested decision).
30 The applicant argues that those findings are erroneous. In essence, it submits that the Board of Appeal did not take sufficient account of the importance of the beginning of the sign applied for and of the length of the signs at issue and that it gave undue weight to the common ending of the signs in its overall assessment of the signs at issue.
31 EUIPO and the intervener dispute those arguments.
32 In the present case, the findings by the Board of Appeal must be upheld.
33 While it is true that the relevant public will perceive that the signs at issue differ visually due to the figurative elements, the greater number of letters and the group of letters ‘al’ in the sign applied for, that public will also perceive that the said signs share the element ‘mea’. On account of that common element, that public will perceive a certain visual similarity between the marks at issue, which may be described as low as noted by the Board of Appeal. Likewise, the signs at issue have a certain phonetic similarity due to the fact that the earlier sign contains the group of letters ‘mea’ which is entirely contained within the sign applied for. The relevant public will pronounce the sign applied for as a whole and the group of letters ‘mea’ in the sign applied for will be pronounced in the same way as in the earlier sign. The fact that the sign applied for begins with the letters ‘a’ and ‘l’ and that it is therefore longer to pronounce does not lead to the conclusion that there is no phonetic similarity at all between the signs at issue. The relevant public will perceive a low phonetic similarity due to the group of letters ‘mea’ common to those signs.
34 First, those findings are not called into question by the applicant’s assertion that consumers generally take more note of the beginning of a sign than of its end (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 March 2005, L’Oréal v OHIM – Revlon (FLEXI AIR), T‑112/03, EU:T:2005:102, paragraphs 64 and 65).
35 In that regard, although it is indeed true, as the judgment cited by the Board of Appeal on that point correctly states, that the first component of word marks may be more likely to catch the consumer’s attention than the components which follow, that does not apply in all cases (see judgment of 23 October 2015, Vimeo v OHIM – PT Comunicações (VIMEO), T‑96/14, not published, EU:T:2015:799, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). In the present case, as stated in the contested decision, the additional letters ‘a’ and ‘l’ in the first part of the sign applied for do not prevent consumers from perceiving the common element ‘mea’ contained in the signs at issue and the element ‘al’ contained in the mark applied for does not attract the attention of the relevant public more than the element ‘mea’ which follows it.
36 Furthermore, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, it cannot be held that the Board of Appeal did not explain why the element ‘al’ of the sign applied for did not attract the attention of the relevant public more than the element ‘mea’ which followed it. In addition to the reference to the judgment of 23 October 2015, VIMEO (T‑96/14, not published, EU:T:2015:799), which concerned a very similar situation, it is thus apparent from paragraph 35, but also from paragraph 46, of the contested decision, that, although the Board of Appeal duly noted that the element ‘al’ characterised the sign applied for, of which it was the first part, it also correctly considered that the element ‘mea’, common to both signs, represented three fifths of it. That equivalence between the various parts of the sign applied for from the point of view of the relevant public is also reinforced by the fact that, phonetically, the initial element ‘al’ is the first syllable, with the other two being in the following element ‘mea’, which is common to the signs at issue.
37 The judgment of 25 March 2009, Kaul v OHIM – Bayer (ARCOL) (T‑402/07, EU:T:2009:85, paragraphs 83 to 85), relied on by the applicant to refute the analysis carried out by the Board of Appeal, concerns factual circumstances that differ from those of the present case. Neither of the signs at issue in that case (ARCOL and CAPOL) completely included the other, those signs only had the last two letters in common (‘o’ and ‘l’) and they differed in their respective first parts, which each contained three letters (‘arc’ and ‘cap’). By contrast, in the present case, the earlier sign is completely included in the sign applied for, the signs at issue have three letters in common (‘m’, ‘e’ and ‘a’) and differ only in the two initial letters ‘a’ and ‘l’ of the sign applied for.
38 The Board of Appeal was therefore correct to conclude that the element ‘al’ of the sign applied for did not attract the attention of the relevant public more than the element ‘mea’ which follows.
39 Second, as regards the assertion that the shorter a sign is, the more easily the public is able to perceive all of its single elements, it must be noted that the Board of Appeal stated in that regard, citing the judgment referred to by the applicant (judgment of 23 September 2009, Arcandor v OHIM – dm drogerie markt (S-HE), T‑391/06, not published, EU:T:2009:348, paragraph 69) that, while it is true that the signs at issue are short signs and that, as a result, consumers will perceive the differences between them more easily, such a rule is not always applicable. The applicant acknowledges that in its application. In the present case, while acknowledging the existence of differences between the signs, which are duly noted in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that it was also relevant to take account of the fact that the earlier sign was completely included in the word element of the sign applied for (see paragraph 47 of the contested decision).
40 The Board of Appeal cannot be criticised for having reasoned in that way. Even though the signs at issue are short, that element is not decisive here, given that the earlier sign is completely included in the sign applied for, of which it represents the major part, namely three out of five letters, reproduced in the same order, or two consecutive syllables out of three.
41 Accordingly, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, the group of letters ‘al’ at the beginning of the sign applied for, which makes the sign longer than the earlier sign, does not prevent the relevant public from perceiving a certain degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue on account of their common element ‘mea’.
42 Third, as regards the applicant’s claim that excessive importance was given by the Board of Appeal to the common ending of the signs in its overall assessment of the signs at issue, it must be noted first of all that, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that, ‘even though the element “mea” does not have an independent distinctive role within [the sign applied for], it still contributes in a significant way to the overall impression produced by [that sign] in so far as it makes up three fifths of the sign’ (see paragraph 46 of the contested decision). It is therefore not disputed that the common element ‘mea’ does not form an independent and distinctive part of the sign applied for. Likewise, it cannot be disputed that the Board of Appeal also noted that the words ‘mea’ and ‘almea’ had no meaning in relation to the goods at issue (see paragraphs 33 and 34 of the contested decision).
43 However, the applicant is wrong to claim, citing assessments made by the General Court regarding the comparison of the signs on a conceptual level (judgments of 12 November 2008, ecoblue v OHIM – Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (Ecoblue), T‑281/07, not published, EU:T:2008:489, paragraph 35, and of 6 October 2015, Monster Energy v OHIM – Balaguer (icexpresso + energy coffee), T‑61/14, not published, EU:T:2015:750, paragraph 62), that consumers tend to break a sign down into word elements only when that word element suggests a concrete meaning or resembles words known to them, with the result that, in the present case, there is no reason for the relevant public to break down the word ‘almea’ into ‘al’ and ‘mea’ or to perceive the overlap between the end of the sign applied for and the earlier sign.
44 The Board of Appeal did not suggest that the public would understand the sign applied for. It simply concluded that the additional letters ‘al’ would not prevent consumers from noticing the common element ‘mea’ and that the public will therefore perceive a certain visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue. As the Board of Appeal correctly pointed out, in the present case, the element ‘mea’ contributes significantly to the overall impression created by the sign applied for in so far as it consists of the greater part of that sign. The applicant does not explain, in that regard, why the relevant public would focus on the initial letters ‘a’ and ‘l’ of the sign applied for and disregard the common sequence ‘mea’ which follows.
45 The Board of Appeal’s assessment of the significant contribution of the group of letters ‘mea’ to the overall impression created by the sign is, moreover, borne out by the judgment of 23 October 2015, VIMEO (T‑96/14, not published, EU:T:2015:799, paragraph 68), which is cited in the contested decision and gives similar reasoning. That case, which compared the sign applied for VIMEO to the earlier sign MEO, is more relevant for the assessment of the present case than the judgment of 4 July 2014, Advance Magazine Publishers v OHIM – Watches Tudor (GLAMOUR) (T‑1/13, not published, EU:T:2014:615, paragraph 31), which is referred to by the applicant and which compared the sign applied for GLAMOUR to the earlier sign TUDOR GLAMOUR. The signs at issue in the VIMEO case consisted of three and five letters (two and three syllables), they differed in the first two letters (one syllable), they had the three final letters in common (two syllables) and the earlier sign was completely included in the later sign.
46 Moreover, as noted by EUIPO, there is no basis for the proposition that the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect will systematically disregard the second part of the word element of a sign to the point of remembering only the first part (judgment of 18 December 2008, Torres v OHIM – Bodegas Peñalba López (Torre Albéniz), T‑287/06, EU:T:2008:602, paragraph 56).
47 In addition, and contrary to the applicant’s submissions, there are many cases in which the similarity of the signs and the likelihood of confusion have been confirmed despite the identical part of the signs at issue lacking meaning and despite the fact that the start of the signs were different (see, for example, judgments of 15 June 2011, Graf-Syteco v OHIM – Teco Electric & Machinery (SYTECO), T‑229/10, not published, EU:T:2011:273, which compared the signs SYTECO and TECO; of 22 May 2012, Nordmilch v OHIM – Lactimilk (MILRAM), T‑546/10, not published, EU:T:2012:249, which compared the signs MILRAM and RAM; or of 23 October 2015, VIMEO, T‑96/14, not published, EU:T:2015:799, paragraph 68, which compared the signs VIMEO and MEO).
48 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, as a general rule, two marks are similar when, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least partially identical as regards one or more relevant aspects, namely the visual, phonetic and conceptual aspects (see judgment of 10 December 2008, MIP Metro v OHIM – Metronia (METRONIA), T‑290/07, not published, EU:T:2008:562, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is therefore not necessary that the signs at issue be conceptually similar in order to establish that there is an overall similarity between them.
49 Furthermore, the assessment of the Board of Appeal is not called into question by the fact that the sign applied for contains figurative elements. As the Board of Appeal correctly stated, the figurative elements of the sign applied for will be perceived by the relevant public as secondary vis-à-vis the verbal elements of that sign. They therefore do not prevent the relevant public from perceiving a certain visual and phonetic similarity due to the common element ‘mea’.
50 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there was at least a low degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs at issue (see paragraphs 35, 36 and 46 of the contested decision).
Conceptual comparison
51 The Board of Appeal noted that it was not possible to compare the signs conceptually, since neither the word ‘almea’ nor the word ‘mea’ had any meaning for the relevant German consumers (see paragraph 37 of the contested decision).
52 There is no reason to call into question that assessment, which, moreover, is not disputed by the applicant.
The likelihood of confusion
53 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services concerned. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
54 In the present case, following a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that, in view of the degree of similarity between the goods and signs, the average level of inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark and the principle that consumers must rely on an imperfect mental image of the marks, there was such a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, even for the goods at issue in respect of which consumers had a high level of attention (see paragraphs 44 to 47 of the contested decision).
55 Having regard to all the considerations set out above, and given that, as regards the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal was correct to find that it was average, given that the earlier mark had no meaning in relation to the goods at issue (see paragraph 39 of the contested decision), which is, moreover, not disputed by the applicant, it must be held that the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion. In reaching that conclusion, the Board of Appeal duly took into consideration, as part of an overall assessment taking into account the level of attention of the relevant public, the identity or strong similarity between the goods at issue and the at least low degree of visual and phonetic similarity between the signs.
56 In that regard, the applicant does not succeed in establishing its claims by repeating, at this stage of the analysis, the criticisms previously made of the assessment of the comparison of the signs. As has been stated, the Board of Appeal did not give undue weight to the common ending of the signs at issue. The Board of Appeal was also correct in finding that the group of letters ‘al’ placed at the beginning of the sign applied for, which made that sign longer than the earlier sign, did not preclude the relevant public perceiving a certain visual or phonetic similarity between the signs at issue due to their common element, ‘mea’.
57 Consequently, the single plea in law put forward in the application must be rejected and the action must be dismissed in its entirety, without it being necessary to rule on the arguments submitted by EUIPO for the purposes of challenging the validity of the power of attorney submitted by the applicant, assuming that those arguments were maintained following the clarifications provided by the applicant, first of all, on 19 May 2020 in respect of the rectification of the application, and, subsequently, on 24 August 2020 following the questions submitted in EUIPO’s response regarding the date of entry into force of that power of attorney and the functions and powers of the person who signed it.
Costs
58 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the forms of order sought by EUIPO and the intervener.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Almea Ltd to pay the costs.
Marcoulli | Frimodt Nielsen | Schwarcz |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 9 December 2020.