Language of document : ECLI:EU:T:2013:348

Case T‑234/11 P-RENV-RX

Oscar Orlando Arango Jaramillo and Others

v

European Investment Bank (EIB)

(Appeal — Civil service — Staff of the EIB — Review of the judgment of the General Court — Action at first instance dismissed as inadmissible — Pensions — Increase in the contribution to the pension scheme — Time-limit for bringing proceedings — Reasonable period)

Summary — Judgment of the General Court (Appeal Chamber), 9 July 2013

1.      Appeals — Grounds — Mistaken assessment of the facts — Inadmissibility — Rejection — Legal classification of the facts — Admissibility

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 11(1))

2.      Actions brought by officials — Staff of the European Investment Bank — Time-limits — Requirement that action be brought within a reasonable time — Application by analogy of Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations — Not permissible — Assessment by reference to the circumstances of the case

(Art. 270 TFEU; Staff Regulations, Art. 91)

3.      Appeals — Appeal held to be well-founded — Judgment to be given on the substance by the appeal court — Condition — Whether the state of the proceedings permits final judgment to be given

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Annex I, Art. 13(1))

1.      The court at first instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to establish the facts except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it and, second, to assess those facts. Where the court at first instance has found or assessed the facts, the appeal court has jurisdiction to review the legal characterisation of those facts and the legal inferences drawn by the court at first instance.

In that respect, the question whether the court at first instance is entitled in law to conclude, from the facts of the case, that the action has not been brought within a reasonable period is a point of law that is subject to review by the appeal court.

(see paras 27, 28)

2.      Neither the TFEU nor the Staff Regulations of the EIB, adopted by its Board of Directors, in accordance with Article 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the EIB, contain any indications as to the time-limit for bringing proceedings applicable to disputes between the EIB and its members of staff. The reconciliation of the right to effective judicial protection, which is a general principle of EU law and requires that an individual should have a sufficient period of time to assess the lawfulness of the measure adversely affecting him and, if necessary, to prepare his case, and the need for legal certainty, which requires that, after a certain time, measures taken by European Union bodies should become definitive, requires, none the less, that those disputes be brought before the European Union Courts within a reasonable period.

The ‘reasonableness’ of a period, whether relating to the duration of administrative or legal proceedings or to the question of a period, which has a direct bearing on the admissibility of an action, must always be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, of the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and the conduct of the parties to the case. It follows, generally, that the concept of a reasonable period cannot be regarded as a specific limitation period and, in particular, that the period of three months laid down in Article 91(3) of the Staff Regulations cannot be applied by analogy as a limitation period to members of staff of the EIB when they bring an action for annulment of a measure adopted by that bank which adversely affects them.

Consequently, the mere fact that a member of staff of the EIB has brought an action for annulment of a measure adopted by that bank which adversely affects him within a period that exceeds three months and ten days is not sufficient to support the conclusion that that action has been brought out of time, since the European Union Courts must, in any event, determine the reasonableness of the period in the light of the circumstances of the particular case.

(see paras 30-32)

3.      See the text of the decision.

(see para. 37)