ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
22 March 2024 (*)
(Appeal – Intervention – Economic and monetary policy – Single resolution mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms – Decision not to adopt a resolution scheme – Parent company – Interest in the result of the case)
In Case C‑676/23 P(I),
APPEAL under the first paragraph of Article 57 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 13 November 2023,
Sberbank of Russia PAO, established in Moscow (Russia), represented by M. Campa, M. Moretto, M. Pirovano, D. Rovetta and V. Villante, avvocati,
appellant,
the other parties to the proceedings being:
MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sber Vermögensverwaltungs AG, initially Sberbank Europe AG, established in Vienna (Austria),
applicant at first instance,
Single Resolution Board (SRB), represented by H. Ehlers, L. Forestier and J. Rius Riu, acting as Agents,
defendant at first instance,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT,
after hearing the Advocate General, M. Szpunar,
makes the following
Order
1 By its appeal, Sberbank of Russia PAO seeks to have set aside the order of the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court of the European Union of 19 October 2023, MeSoFa v SRB (T‑450/22, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2023:692), by which she dismissed its application to intervene in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sber Vermögensverwaltungs AG, formerly Sberbank Europe AG (‘MeSoFa’), the applicant at first instance in Case T‑450/22.
Background to the dispute
2 The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 of the order under appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, it may be summarised as follows.
3 At the material time, MeSoFa was a credit institution established in Austria under the company name ‘Sberbank Europe AG’. Sberbank Europe had subsidiaries established in Member States of the European Union and in third countries and formed a group with them (‘the Sberbank Europe group’).
4 Following a deterioration in the liquidity situation of Sberbank Europe, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) adopted Decision SRB/EES/2022/19 of 1 March 2022 not to adopt a resolution scheme in respect of the credit institution Sberbank Europe AG, within the meaning of Article 18(1), of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1; ‘the decision at issue’).
The procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal
5 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 July 2022, MeSoFa brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue.
6 By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 18 November 2022, Sberbank of Russia applied to intervene in Case T‑450/22 in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa.
7 By the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court dismissed that application to intervene on the ground that Sberbank of Russia had not established that it had a direct interest in the result of the case before the General Court.
8 In paragraph 26 of that order, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court held that the decision at issue did not directly affect Sberbank of Russia, since its right, as sole shareholder of Sberbank Europe, to receive dividends and to participate in the management of that credit institution had not been affected by that decision.
9 She pointed out in that regard, in paragraph 27 of that order, that the negative effect for shareholders of a credit institution of the withdrawal of that institution’s authorisation is not legal but economic, even if that withdrawal prevents the credit institution from continuing its activity. Furthermore, in paragraph 28 of the order, she observed that that was all the more so in the present case, since the decision at issue had neither the object nor the effect of withdrawing its licence from Sberbank Europe.
10 The President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court concluded, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that Sberbank of Russia was not justified in claiming that its property rights and its freedom to conduct a business were affected by the decision at issue. She also stated, in paragraph 29, that it had not been shown that the adoption of this decision made it impossible to sell all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.
11 Furthermore, in paragraph 31 of that order, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court noted that Sberbank of Russia merely relied on its status as shareholder of Sberbank Europe and held that the interests of Sberbank of Russia, in that capacity, merged with those of Sberbank Europe, so that they were only indirectly affected by the decision at issue.
Forms of order sought
12 Sberbank of Russia claims that the Court should:
– set aside the order under appeal;
– grant its application to intervene in Case T‑450/22 in support of the form of order sought by MeSoFa, and
– order the SRB to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.
13 The SRB contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the appeal and
– order Sberbank of Russia to pay the costs.
The appeal
14 In support of its appeal, Sberbank of Russia puts forward two grounds of appeal alleging, first, errors of law in the application of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and, secondly, errors of law and distortion of the facts as regards the assessment of the direct nature of the effects of the decision at issue on the legal position of Sberbank of Russia.
The first ground of appeal
Arguments
15 By the first part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court misinterpreted the concept of ‘interest in the result of the case’ within the meaning of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
16 First, according to Sberbank of Russia, she wrongly equated that concept with the first of the two conditions relating to standing laid down in Article 263 TFEU, by making the admission of the intervention conditional on the existence of a direct interest in the result of the case. Secondly, she added a condition to those set out in Article 40, by requiring that the outcome of the case be such as to alter the legal position of the applicant for leave to intervene.
17 Sberbank of Russia asserts that although that interpretation of Article 40 corresponds to that adopted by the Court of Justice in its settled case-law, it entails an excessive restriction of the right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and is not faithful to the intention of the authors of the Treaties.
18 By the second part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia maintains that the decision at issue directly affects its position in so far as, in accordance with a resolution plan adopted by the SRB in 2021 (‘the 2021 plan’), Sberbank of Russia should have decided to sell the Sberbank Europe group as a whole, which is now ruled out.
19 By the third part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly failed to take account of the arguments put forward in the application to intervene as regards the 2021 plan and its participation in the management of Sberbank Europe’s activities.
20 By the fourth part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court infringed Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, by failing to consider the consequences of its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group and by ruling therefore solely on its interests as a direct shareholder of Sberbank Europe.
21 By the fifth part of its first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia asserts, in the alternative, that, should the Court of Justice uphold the interpretation of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted in the order under appeal, that provision should be set aside as unlawful, in so far as it affords insufficient protection to persons with an interest in the outcome of a case and deprives the intervention mechanism provided for by that provision of its effectiveness. Most of the legal systems of the Member States provide, moreover, for an intervention mechanism available to all persons having a substantial interest in the outcome of a case.
22 The SRB contends that the first ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.
Assessment
23 As regards, in the first place, the first part of the first ground of appeal, it should be noted that, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, any person may intervene before the Courts of the European Union if such a person can establish an interest in the result of the case submitted to one of those courts.
24 As the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court observed in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, the concept of ‘interest in the result of the case’, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, must be defined with regard to the subject matter of the case and be understood as being a direct and existing interest in the ruling on the forms of order sought, and not as an interest in relation to the pleas in law or the arguments raised. The words ‘result of the case’ refer to the final decision sought, as set out in the operative part of the future judgment (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
25 As is apparent from paragraphs 19 to 21 of the order under appeal, it is necessary in particular to verify that the applicant for leave to intervene is directly affected by the contested act and that its interest in the result of the case is certain. In principle, an interest in the result of the case can be considered to be sufficiently direct only in so far as that result is capable of altering the legal position of the applicant for leave to intervene. Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between applicants for leave to intervene who can establish a direct interest in the ruling on the forms of order sought by the parties to the dispute in which they wish to intervene and those who can establish only an indirect interest in the result of the case by reason of similarities between their situation and that of one of the parties (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraphs 36 and 37 and the case-law cited).
26 While it is not disputed that the interpretation of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union adopted by the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court in the order under appeal is consistent with the settled case-law referred to in paragraphs 24 and 25 of this order, Sberbank of Russia nevertheless invites the Court of Justice to depart from that interpretation.
27 In this regard, first, it should be noted that the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union is intended to ensure that a decision of a Court of the European Union affecting the interests of a third party cannot be given without that party having been given the opportunity to state its position on that decision.
28 However, in the interests of the proper administration of justice, that provision must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid multiple individual interventions which would compromise the effectiveness and proper course of the procedure (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Court of Justice of 17 June 1997, National Power and PowerGen, C‑151/97 P(I) and C‑157/97 P(I), EU:C:1997:307, paragraph 66, and of 6 April 2006, An Post v Deutsche Post and Others, C‑130/06 P(I), EU:C:2006:248, paragraph 11).
29 The distinction between applicants to intervene who have a direct interest in the outcome of a case and those who have only an indirect interest in that outcome ensures that the objective pursued by that provision is achieved, while preventing the admission to intervene of third parties who have, at most, a tenuous connection with the proceedings in question from prejudicing the proper course of that procedure (see, to that effect, order of 15 November 1993, Scaramuzza v Commission, C‑76/93 P, EU:C:1993:881, paragraphs 10 and 11).
30 Accordingly, the fact, relied on by Sberbank of Russia, that the admissibility of an action for annulment is subject to the existence of a direct interest in the annulment of the contested decision is not such as to call into question the interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union set out in paragraphs 24 and 25 of this order.
31 Second, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 25 of this order, the requirement that the admission of an application to intervene presupposes that the result of the case at issue is such as to alter the legal position of the applicant for leave to intervene is not an additional condition to that laid down in the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, but merely an aspect of the definition of the concept of ‘interest in the result of a case’ within the meaning of that provision.
32 Moreover, in so far as Sberbank of Russia relies on Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in support of its proposed interpretation of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, it is important to bear in mind that recognition of the right to an effective remedy under Article 47 in a given case presupposes that the person invoking that right is relying on rights or freedoms guaranteed by EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 34 and the case-law cited).
33 Consequently, Article 47 cannot mean that a person who is not a party to a dispute which is the subject of proceedings before a Court of the European Union is necessarily entitled to intervene in those proceedings where the outcome of that case is not, as such, capable of having consequences for that person’s rights and obligations.
34 It follows that Sberbank of Russia has not established that paragraphs 18 to 21 of the order under appeal are vitiated by an error of law. The first part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
35 In the second place, it must be pointed out that the second part of the first ground of appeal alleges that the outcome of the case before the General Court is such as to alter the legal position of Sberbank of Russia, in so far as, as a result of the effects of the decision at issue, it would no longer be able to adopt the measures provided for in the 2021 plan.
36 However, it is clear from the Court of Justice’s case-law that to allow a party to put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised before the General Court would be to allow it to bring before the Court of Justice, whose jurisdiction in appeals is limited, a case of wider ambit than that which came before the General Court. In an appeal, the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction is thus confined to review of the findings of law on the pleas argued at first instance before the General Court (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraph 30).
37 In the present case, the application to intervene before the General Court contained no reference to the 2021 plan, to the measures which should have been adopted by Sberbank of Russia pursuant to that plan, or to the relationship between that plan and the decision at issue.
38 It is thus apparent that the second part of the first ground of appeal in fact invites the Court of Justice to rule on a plea which was not raised before the General Court by Sberbank of Russia, namely that the application to intervene should have been allowed in so far as the decision at issue entailed a deterioration in its legal position compared with the position it would have been in under the 2021 plan.
39 The second part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.
40 In the third place, since, by the third part of the first ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia complains that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court failed to reply to its arguments concerning the 2021 plan or its participation in the management of Sberbank Europe, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of the appeal, the purpose of the Court of Justice’s review is, in particular, to ascertain whether the General Court has replied to the requisite legal standard to all the arguments put forward by the appellant and, secondly, that the ground of appeal alleging failure to respond to arguments relied on at first instance amounts, essentially, to pleading a breach of the obligation to state reasons which derives from Article 36 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and from Article 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 17 August 2022, SJM Coordination Center v Magnetrol International and Commission, C‑4/22 P(I), EU:C:2022:626, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
41 In the present case, as Sberbank of Russia asserts, the grounds of the order under appeal do not include an assessment of the consequences of the outcome of the dispute in Case T‑450/22 concerning the application of the 2021 plan or concerning the participation of Sberbank of Russia in the management of Sberbank Europe’s activities.
42 However, it is apparent from Sberbank of Russia’s application to intervene that it did not explicitly rely, at first instance, on any such consequences of the decision at issue.
43 Accordingly, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court cannot legitimately be criticised for failing to take a position on those consequences in the order under appeal.
44 It follows that the third part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
45 In the fourth place, it is true that it must be noted that, as is apparent from paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court examined, in that order, Sberbank of Russia’s interest in intervening solely on the basis of its status as shareholder of Sberbank Europe.
46 While Sberbank of Russia argues that she thereby committed an error of legal characterisation of the facts in failing to consider that that interest arose from the fact that Sberbank of Russia was the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group, it must be observed that Sberbank of Russia has not in any way explained how that latter status would confer on it specific rights which differ from those which it derives from its capacity as shareholder of Sberbank Europe.
47 Accordingly, Sberbank of Russia has failed to show that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in her legal characterisation of the facts by not inferring its interest in intervening from its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group.
48 The fourth part of the first ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as unfounded.
49 As regards, in the fifth place, the plea of illegality raised in the alternative by Sberbank of Russia, it must, in any event, be borne in mind that, in accordance with Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment or order which the appellant seeks to have set aside and the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 24 May 2022, Puigdemont i Casamajó and Others v Parliament and Spain, C‑629/21 P(R), EU:C:2022:413, paragraph 106).
50 However, the appeal does not specify the provisions of EU law on which the plea of illegality, which constitutes the fifth part of the first ground of appeal, is based.
51 It follows that the fifth part of the first ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible and, consequently, that the first ground of appeal must be rejected in its entirety.
The second ground of appeal
Arguments
52 By the first part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the decision at issue directly affects its legal position, in particular its right to participate in the management of Sberbank Europe and to decide on the strategy to be followed at the level of the Sberbank Europe group.
53 Thus, the decision at issue deprived Sberbank of Russia of its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group, since it ruled out the adoption of a resolution scheme at the level of that group, even though such adoption was envisaged in the 2021 plan. The reasons set out in that decision also refer to that plan and indicate that the adoption of a resolution plan for Sberbank Europe is not necessary in view of the possibility of implementing separate resolution measures at the level of its subsidiaries.
54 By the second part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia asserts that the grounds set out in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal are vitiated by an error of law and a distortion of the facts. First, by preventing Sberbank of Russia from disposing of all the assets of Sberbank Europe and its subsidiaries, the decision at issue adversely affects its right to define the strategy of the Sberbank Europe group, which is an expression of Sberbank of Russia’s property rights and freedom to conduct a business. Secondly, since that effect of the decision at issue follows directly from the wording of that decision, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly held that it was for Sberbank of Russia to show that that decision had such an effect.
55 By the third part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia submits that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in law in applying by analogy, in paragraphs 26 to 28 of that order, the judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923). While the decision at issue changed the legal position of Sberbank of Russia, the decision in question in that judgment did not have such an effect on the legal position of the shareholders of the undertaking referred to in that judgment.
56 By the fourth part of its second ground of appeal, Sberbank of Russia challenges the validity of paragraph 31 of the order under appeal.
57 First, Sberbank of Russia maintains that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly considered that Sberbank of Russia had relied solely on its status as shareholder of Sberbank Europe, whereas it had relied primarily on its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group. That error, moreover, led to the misapplication, by analogy, of case-law of the Court of Justice concerning applicants for leave to intervene who relied exclusively on their status as shareholders of a particular company.
58 Secondly, according to Sberbank of Russia, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court distorted the facts in finding that the interests of Sberbank of Russia merged with those of Sberbank Europe, without taking account of the fact that the latter was in liquidation.
59 The SRB maintains that the second ground of appeal should be rejected as unfounded.
Assessment
60 As regards, in the first place, the first two parts of the second ground of appeal, it is apparent from paragraph 15 of the order under appeal that Sberbank of Russia had in fact argued before the General Court that the decision at issue had the effect of calling into question its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.
61 In paragraph 29 of that order, however, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court rejected that argument on the ground that it had not been shown that the adoption of the decision at issue, which concerned only Sberbank Europe, made it impossible to sell all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.
62 First of all, however, it is important to emphasise that, by that ground, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court ultimately considered that points of fact and law put forward by Sberbank Europe were not sufficient to justify its claim relating to that impossibility.
63 Accordingly, in order to establish that that ground is vitiated by an error of law, Sberbank of Russia must necessarily refer to points of fact or law put forward at first instance which it considers were not properly taken into account by the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court.
64 Sberbank of Russia therefore cannot, in particular, reasonably claim that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court failed to take account of alleged effects of the decision at issue on the operation of the Sberbank Europe group which are not apparent from the operative part of that decision and which had not been expressly relied on in the application to intervene.
65 Similarly, given that it is apparent from the considerations set out in paragraph 37 of the present order that the 2021 plan was not referred to in that application, it cannot be inferred from the supposed effects of the decision at issue on the application of that plan that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly considered that Sberbank of Russia had not shown that that decision made it impossible to sell all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.
66 Next, in so far as Sberbank of Russia submits that paragraph 29 of the order under appeal is vitiated by a distortion of the facts, it should be noted that, according to the settled case-law of the Court of Justice, in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU and the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, appeals are limited to questions of law, to the exclusion of any assessment of the facts. The General Court therefore has sole jurisdiction to assess the evidence. The assessment of that evidence does not therefore constitute, except in the case of its distortion, a question of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice in the context of an appeal (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 22 February 2022, Fastweb v Commission, C‑649/21 P(I), EU:C:2022:171, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited).
67 There is such distortion where, without recourse to new evidence, the assessment of the existing evidence is clearly incorrect. However, such distortion must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without its being necessary to undertake a fresh assessment of the facts and the evidence. Furthermore, where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, that person must indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in that person’s view, led to such distortion (order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 11 January 2024, BonSens.org v Commission, C‑634/23 P(I), EU:C:2024:43, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited).
68 Although Sberbank of Russia calls into question the assessment of the evidence set out in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, it does not indicate what evidence it considers to have been distorted by the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court.
69 Finally, it is settled case-law of the Court of Justice that it is for the applicant for leave to intervene to adduce the evidence necessary to prove that he or she satisfies the conditions arising from the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, without being subject to a lighter burden of proof (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2023, Euranimi v Commission, C‑140/23 P(I), EU:C:2023:446, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
70 Consequently, contrary to Sberbank of Russia’s contention, the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court did not err in law in finding on the basis, implicitly but necessarily, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, of the principle that it was for the applicant for leave to intervene to demonstrate the actual harm to its interests on which it relied in its application.
71 It follows that the first two parts of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.
72 In the second place, it is important to point out that the third part of the second ground of appeal is based on the premiss that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court should have considered that the decision at issue altered the legal position of Sberbank of Russia.
73 In order to demonstrate the existence of this change in its legal position, Sberbank of Russia claims merely, in that third part, that the decision at issue deprives it of its right to dispose of all the assets of the Sberbank Europe group.
74 However, Sberbank of Russia does not put forward any argument in support of that claim in addition to those which have already been rejected, in paragraphs 62 to 70 of this order, during the examination of the first two parts of the second ground of appeal. Those arguments are therefore insufficient to show that that decision has the effect relied on by Sberbank of Russia.
75 Moreover, even supposing that Sberbank of Russia intends to rely on the alleged negative economic consequences of that decision for shareholders of Sberbank Europe, it is clear from the case-law of the Court of Justice that an adverse effect, even if significant, on the economic and financial interests of the shareholders of a company which is one of the main parties to proceedings pending before the General Court cannot be regarded as a direct, adverse effect on the interests of those shareholders, in so far as it does not alter their legal circumstances (see, to that effect, order of the Vice-President of the Court of Justice of 6 October 2015, Cap Actions SNCM v Commission, C‑418/15 P(I), EU:C:2015:671, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited).
76 In those circumstances, it is not apparent that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 26 to 28 of the order under appeal, in finding, with reference in particular to the judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923), that the decision at issue was such as to have effects of an economic rather than a legal nature on Sberbank of Russia as the sole shareholder of Sberbank Europe, in so far as it did not affect Sberbank of Russia’s right to receive dividends and to participate in the management of Sberbank Europe.
77 In the third place, with regard to the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, it should be noted that it follows from paragraph 46 of this order that Sberbank of Russia has not established that its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group confers on it specific rights which differ from those which it derives from its status as a direct shareholder of Sberbank Europe.
78 Therefore, even if it is conceded that the President of the Seventh Chamber of the General Court wrongly took the view, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, that Sberbank of Russia relied exclusively on that latter status, the fact remains that Sberbank of Russia has not shown how taking into account its status as the ultimate parent company of the Sberbank Europe group should have led to a different assessment of its interest in intervening.
79 On the other hand, the ground, also set out in paragraph 31, that the interests of Sberbank of Russia merge with those of Sberbank Europe is superfluous, since, even if the interests of those two companies were in fact distinct, that circumstance would not, in itself, be such as to establish that the outcome of the dispute in Case T‑450/22 is likely directly to change the legal position of Sberbank of Russia.
80 Accordingly, the fourth part of the second ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.
81 In the light of the foregoing, the second ground of appeal must be rejected and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
82 In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to the costs.
83 Under Article 138(1) of those rules of procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal by reason of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
84 Since the SRB has applied for costs and Sberbank of Russia has been unsuccessful, Sberbank of Russia must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to the present proceedings and to pay those incurred by the SRB.
On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court hereby orders:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. Sberbank of Russia PAO shall bear its own costs relating to the appeal proceedings and pay those incurred by the Single Resolution Board (SRB).
Luxembourg, 22 March 2024.
A. Calot Escobar | | L. Bay Larsen |