Language of document :

Appeal brought on 22 July 2021 by Engie Global LNG Holding Sàrl, Engie Invest International SA and Engie SA against the judgment of the General Court (Second Chamber, Extended Composition) delivered on 12 May 2021 in Joined Cases T-516/18 and T-525/18, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Others v Commission

(Case C-454/21 P)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Appellants: Engie Global LNG Holding Sàrl, Engie Invest International SA and Engie SA (represented by: C. Rydzynski, B Le Bret, M. Struys and F. Pili, avocats)

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission

Form of order sought

The appellants claim that the Court should:

declare the present appeal admissible and well founded;

annul the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 12 May 2021 in Joined Cases T-516/18 and T-525/18, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and Others v Commission;

give a final ruling on the substance in accordance with Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and, primarily, grant the form of order sought by Engie at first instance or, in the alternative, annul Article 2 of Commission Decision (EU) 2019/421 of 20 June 2018 on State aid SA.44888 (2016/C) (ex 2016/NN) implemented by Luxembourg in favour of ENGIE (OJ 2019 L 78, p. 1), in so far as it orders the recovery of the aid;

in the further alternative, refer the case back to the General Court;

order the Commission to pay all the costs.

Grounds of appeal and main arguments

In support of the appeal, Engie Global LNG Holding, Engie Invest International and Engie rely on three grounds of appeal.

According to the appellants, the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts in its definition of the narrow reference framework by (i) excluding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive when defining that reference framework, (ii) creating a link between Articles 164 and 166 of the Law on income tax in Luxembourg, (iii) finding that the ZORA accretions constituted profit distributions, and (iv) considering that the tax rulings at issue granted a selective advantage.

Furthermore, the General Court erred in law and distorted the facts in its demonstration of the existence of a selective advantage in the light of the Luxembourgish provision on abuse of law (i) in respect of the reference framework used, (ii) when identifying a selective advantage, and (iii) when interpreting the Luxembourgish law.

Following on the first and second grounds of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by rejecting the arguments that they set out in the action for annulment in respect of the Commission’s limited competence under Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 TFEU on the division of powers between the European Union and the Member States, read in conjunction with Articles 113 to 117 TFEU.

Lastly, the recovery of the aid ordered by the General Court was contrary to the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expectations.

____________