ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIFTH CHAMBER OF THE GENERAL COURT
10 May 2011 (*)
(Legal aid)
In Case T‑190/10 AJ I,
Kathleen Egan, residing in Athboy (Ireland), represented by K. Neary, Solicitor,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by N. Lorenz, D. Moore and N. Görlitz, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION for legal aid under Article 95 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
THE PRESIDENT OF THE FIFTH CHAMBER OF THE GENERAL COURT
makes the following
Order
1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 22 April 2010, the applicant, Mrs Kathleen Egan, and Mrs Margaret Hackett brought an action for annulment of the decision of the European Parliament of 12 February 2010 refusing them access to the documents requested by means of the initial application of 16 December 2009 and the confirmatory application of 28 January 2010.
2 By separate document lodged at the Registry on 26 August 2010, the applicant applied for legal aid pursuant to Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
3 In her application, the applicant provided a copy of the receipt for the deserted wife’s benefit she received from the Irish Department of Social and Family Affairs.
4 By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 24 September 2010, the European Parliament informed the Court that it did not have any observations to make on the applicant’s application for legal aid.
5 By letter of 20 January 2011, the Court requested the applicant to produce a certificate issued by the competent Irish authority attesting to her lack of means or, failing that, a document demonstrating the absence of or reduced level of her monthly income. In addition, the applicant’s lawyer was requested by the Court to state whether an agreement on sharing the total fees in Case T‑190/10 had been made with Mrs Margaret Hackett. The Court also requested the applicant to provide an evaluation of the disbursements and fees in respect of which she is claiming legal aid.
6 By letter of 7 February 2011, Mr Neary firstly informed the Court that the applicant received EUR 9 688 per year in deserted wife’s benefit. Two additional receipts for her deserted wife’s benefit were produced. Next, Mr Neary stated that the applicant had entered into an agreement with Mrs Margaret Hackett under which each was to pay half of the total fees due in respect of the entirety of the proceedings. Finally, he gave details of the number of hours spent, up to that date, on the preparation and processing of the application for access to documents at the European Parliament and the proceedings before the Court as well as the number of hours expected to be spent on the subsequent proceedings in Case T‑190/10. The total cost of the fees was estimated at EUR 136 750.25.
7 According to Article 94(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in order to ensure effective access to justice, legal aid granted for proceedings before the Court is to cover, in whole or in part, the costs involved in legal assistance and representation by a lawyer in proceedings before the Court. The cashier of the Court is to be responsible for those costs.
8 Under Article 94(2) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the grant of legal aid is subject to the double requirement, firstly, that the applicant, because of her economic situation, be wholly or partly unable to meet the costs involved in legal assistance and representation by a lawyer in proceedings before the Court, and, secondly, that her application should not appear to be manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded.
9 Furthermore, under the first subparagraph of Article 95(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the application for legal aid must be accompanied by all information and supporting documents making it possible to assess the applicant’s economic situation, such as a certificate issued by the competent national authority attesting to her economic situation.
10 Finally, under Article 96(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the decision on the application for legal aid is to be taken by the President by way of an order, which must state the reasons on which it is based in the event of refusal. According to paragraph 6 of that article, no appeal is to lie from orders made concerning legal aid.
11 In the light of the evidence provided by the applicant, the criteria of Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure are met. It is therefore appropriate to grant the applicant legal aid.
12 It follows, however, from both the broad logic and the wording of Articles 94 and 95 of the Rules of Procedure that the benefit of legal aid must as a rule be restricted to the covering of the costs of proceedings incurred either at the same time as, or after, the making of the application for aid. By contrast, save in specific circumstances, it would not be in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of those provisions, or in the interests of the proper administration of justice, for costs incurred before that date to be covered retrospectively by legal aid. As regards such costs, it must be assumed, until the contrary is proved, that the applicant was not unable to meet those costs and that he does not, therefore, satisfy one of the conditions for the grant of legal aid (see, to that effect, Order of the President of the Second Chamber of 27 October 2006 in Case T‑318/01 AJ Othman v Council and Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 31).
13 In the present case, it must be noted that, after the application for annulment had been lodged on 22 April 2010, the applicant waited more than four months before bringing, on 26 August 2010, the present application for legal aid.
14 Yet the applicant submitted no explanation regarding the late submission of that application, although she had, in principle, already incurred the bulk of the costs related to bringing the action.
15 In those circumstances, the applicant has not adduced evidence that she was unable to meet the costs of the present proceedings during the period before the lodging of her application for legal aid.
16 The benefit of legal aid should therefore be limited to the costs incurred by the applicant for the purposes of this application for legal aid, as well as for the purposes of lodging the reply, the exchange of arguments at the hearing and, if necessary, the subsequent procedure.
17 Under the first subparagraph of Article 96(3) of the Rules of Procedure, in any order granting legal aid a lawyer is to be designated to represent the person concerned.
18 In the present case, the applicant suggested in her application for legal aid that her current lawyer, Mr K. Neary, be designated to represent her.
19 Therefore, Mr K. Neary should be designated as the lawyer to assist the applicant.
20 Furthermore, under the third subparagraph of Article 96(3) of the Rules of Procedure, an order granting legal aid may specify an amount to be paid to the lawyer instructed to represent the person concerned or fix a limit which the lawyer’s disbursements and fees may not, in principle, exceed.
21 In the present case, it is appropriate to reserve the decision on the amount of costs and fees to be covered by legal aid. Taking account, however, of the purpose and nature of the proceedings, the foreseeable difficulties presented by the case, the foreseeable amount of work generated for the agents and advisers and the financial interest which the party has in the proceedings, it should be noted at this point that, in accordance with Article 96(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the costs and fees of the designated lawyer covered by legal aid may not, in principle, exceed an amount, excluding VAT, of EUR 5 000 to defend the applicant’s interests.
On those grounds,
The President of the Fifth Chamber of the General Court hereby orders:
1. Mrs Kathleen Egan is granted legal aid.
2. Mr Kevin Neary is designated as the lawyer to assist Mrs Kathleen Egan in Case T‑190/10.
3. The decision on the amount of costs and fees covered by legal aid is reserved. The costs and fees may not, in principle, exceed an amount, excluding VAT, of EUR 5 000.
Luxembourg, 10 May 2011.