ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
15 February 2016(*)
(Action for annulment — Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Egypt — Measures taken against persons responsible for misappropriation of State funds and against associated persons and entities — Freezing of funds — Inclusion of the applicants on the list of persons targeted — Legal basis — Failure to fulfil the criteria for listing — Error of law — Error of fact — Right to property — Damage to reputation — Rights of the defence — Right to effective judicial protection — Obligation to state reasons — Amendment of the claims and pleas in law — Lis pendens — Action in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law)
In Case T‑279/13,
Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz, residing in Giza (Egypt),
Abla Mohammed Fawzi Ali Ahmed Salama, residing in Cairo (Egypt),
Khadiga Ahmed Ahmed Kamel Yassin, residing in Giza,
Shahinaz Abdel Azizabdel Wahab Al Naggar, residing in Giza (Egypt),
represented by J. Binns, Solicitor, J. Lewis QC, B. Kennelly, J. Pobjoy, Barristers, S. Rowe and J.-F. Bellis, lawyers,
applicants,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by I. Gurov and M. Bishop, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION for annulment, first, of Council Decision 2011/172/CFSP of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 63), as amended by Council Decision 2013/144/CFSP of 21 March 2013 (OJ 2013 L 82, p. 54), and, second, of Council Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’ concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 4), in so far as those acts concern the applicants,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),
composed of D. Gratsias (Rapporteur), President, M. Kancheva and C. Wetter, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Background to the dispute and factual framework
1 In the wake of the political events which took place in Egypt as from January 2011, the Council of the European Union adopted, on 21 March 2011, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 63). That decision provides, in Article 1(1), for the freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies as listed in the annex to that decision. The applicants, Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz and his wives, Abla Mohammed Fawzi Ali Ahmed Salama, Khadiga Ahmed Ahmed Kamel Yassin and Shahinaz Abdel Azizabdel Wahab Al Naggar are referred to in the sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth lines of that annex respectively.
2 On the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU and Decision 2011/172, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 270/2011 of 21 March 2011 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt (OJ 2011 L 76, p. 4). That regulation reproduces, in essence, the provisions of Decision 2011/172 and the content of Annex 1 thereto is identical to Annex 1 of Decision 2011/172.
3 Subsequently, Decision 2011/172 was successively extended by Council Decision 2012/159/CFSP of 19 March 2012 (OJ 2012 L 80, p. 18), by Council Decision 2013/144/CFSP of 21 March 2013 (OJ 2013 L 82, p. 54), by Council Decision 2014/153/CFSP of 20 March 2014 (OJ L 85, p. 9) and by Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/486 of 20 March 2015 (OJ 2015 L 77, p. 16). The applicants’ names have been maintained in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and in Annex 1 to Regulation No 270/2011 in those successive extensions. Likewise, the ground for including their names has not been amended.
4 By an action brought on 20 May 2011, the applicants requested that Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011 be annulled, in so far as they relate to them.
5 The action referred to in paragraph 4 above was dismissed by the judgment of 27 February 2014 in Ezz and Others v Council (T‑256/11, ECR, EU:T:2014:93).
6 On 5 May 2014, the applicants brought an appeal against the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93).
7 In parallel, on 30 May 2014, each of the applicants brought a separate action against Decision 2014/153 (pending Cases T‑375/14, Al Naggar v Council, T‑376/14, Yassin v Council, T‑377/14, Ezz v Council and T‑378/14, Salama v Council).
8 The applicants’ appeal referred to in paragraph 6 above was dismissed by the judgment of 5 March 2015 in Ezz and Others v Council (C‑220/14 P, ECR, EU:C:2015:147), so that the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93) has become definitive.
Procedure and forms of order sought
9 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 24 May 2013, the applicants brought the present action. In their application, the applicants claim that the Court should:
– annul Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, in so far as that act applies to them;
– annul Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’, in so far as that act applies to them;
– order the Council to pay the costs.
10 On 23 July 2013, the Council lodged its defence. It claims that the Court should:
– dismiss the action and, in any event, declare that there is no need to rule on the present case;
– order the applicants to pay the costs.
11 The reply and the rejoinder were lodged at the Court Registry, respectively, by the applicants on 19 September 2013, and, by the Council on 17 December 2013.
12 By letter of 17 June 2014, the Registrar of the Court requested the parties to submit their observations on the Court’s proposition to suspend proceedings until delivery of a final decision on the appeal brought against the judgment Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93) in Case C‑220/14 P, Ezz and Others v Council, in so far as the questions to resolve in the present action are similar to those raised in the case giving rise to the judgment mentioned above.
13 By letter of 23 June 2014, the Council stated that it had no objection to the suspension of proceedings. By letter of 3 July 2014, the applicants stated that they did not oppose the suspension of the proceedings, without prejudice, in the event of the appeal being dismissed, to a review by the Court of the present action and an immediate resumption of the proceedings leading to a hearing as soon as possible. By order of 18 July 2014, the proceedings were suspended until the Court of Justice ruled definitively in Case C‑220/14 P, Ezz and Others v Council. The proceedings resumed on the day of delivery of the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), that is, 5 March 2015.
14 On 23 March 2015, the parties were requested to submit their observations on the inferences which should be drawn, for the present case, from the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147). By letter of 27 March 2015, the Council stated that, in its view, the dismissal by the Court of Justice of the appeal against the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), which examined the same pleas as those raised in the present action, ought to lead the General Court to dismiss the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law on the basis of Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of 2 May 1991. By letter of 9 April 2015, the applicants stated, first of all, that they accepted that the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), provided a complete response the second, third, fourth and sixth pleas raised in the context of the present action. They then stated that, in contrast, as regards the first plea, the present action raises a new argument on an issue not addressed by the Court of Justice in the judgment cited above concerning whether Article 215(2) TFEU constituted the legal basis for measures taken against individuals who did not have a sufficient connection with the government of a third country. Moreover, the applicants stated that in the judgment cited above the Court of Justice had also not addressed the social and legal developments which occurred between the date of adoption of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011 and the date of adoption of Decision 2013/144 which, in their view, should be taken into account by the General Court in the context of the review of the first and fifth pleas in law.
15 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 29 May 2015, the applicants brought a new action, registered under Case number T‑288/15, which seeks, according to the first page of that application and paragraph 1 thereof, the annulment of ‘Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/485 of 20 March 2015 amending Decision 2011/172/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Egypt’. The applicants lodged that application, using the e-curia application, at 17.42.
16 On the same day, at 17.55, again using the e-curia application, the applicants lodged a statement of modification intended to extend the initial form of order sought in the present action to the same decision as that contested by their action in Case T‑288/15, which is referred to in paragraph 15 above.
17 By letter of 24 August 2015, the applicants submitted a corrigendum to their application in Case T‑288/15 and to their statement of modification in the present action, referred to in paragraph 16 above, stating that those two procedural documents must be read as referring to Decision 2015/486 and not to Decision 2015/485, which they had stated as a result of a typographical error.
18 In their statement of modification in the context of the present action, the applicants claim that the Court should:
– annul Decision 2015/486, in so far as that measure applies to them;
– order the Council to pay the costs.
19 On 4 August 2015, the Council submitted observations on the applicants’ statement of modification by which it again contends that the Court should dismiss the action as manifestly lacking any foundation in law and order the applicants to pay the costs.
Law
20 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, the Court may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
21 In this instance, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
The claim for annulment of Decision 2015/486
22 According to settled case-law, an action brought subsequently to another, which is between the same parties, is brought on the basis of the same submissions and seeks annulment of the same legal measure, must be dismissed as inadmissible on the ground of lis pendens (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 September 1988 in France v Parliament, 358/85 and 51/86, ECR, EU:C:1988:431, paragraph 12, and of 16 September 2013 in De Nicola v EIB, T‑618/11 P, ECR-SC, EU:T:2013:479, paragraph 98).
23 Also according to settled case-law, where the measure originally challenged is, during the proceedings, replaced by another measure with the same subject-matter, that other measure is to be considered a new factor allowing the applicant to adapt its claims and pleas in law. It would not be in the interests of a sound administration of justice and would be contrary to the requirement of procedural economy to oblige an applicant who has contested such a measure to make a fresh application to the Court. Moreover, it cannot be accepted that an EU institution or body were able, in order to counter complaints contained in an application brought against one of its measures, to amend that measure or to substitute another for it and to rely in the proceedings on such an amendment or substitution in order to deprive the other party of the opportunity of extending the original form of order sought and pleas to the later measure or of submitting a supplementary form of order and pleas directed against that measure (judgment of 3 March 1982, Alpha Steel v Commission, 14/81, ECR, EU:C:1982:76, paragraph 8). However, for the purposes of examining a situation of lis pendens, the lodging, by a procedural document at the Court Registry, of a request to modify the form of order sought and pleas of the application in relation to a measure modifying or replacing the measure originally challenged is equivalent to bringing a new action (see, to that effect, judgment of 18 September 2014 in Central Bank of Iran v Council, T- 262/12, EU:T:2014:777, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
24 In the present case, it should first of all be noted that, as stated in paragraphs 15 and 16 above, on 29 May 2015, the applicants lodged, first at 17.42, their appeal against Decision 2015/486 in Case T‑288/15, then, on the same day at 17.55, their statement of modification in the context of the present action, seeking to extend their form of order and pleas to that decision.
25 Next, the subject-matter of the forms of order sought in those two procedural documents is identical, in so far as it concerns, in both cases, the annulment of Decision 2015/486.
26 Finally, in support of their action in Case T‑288/15, the applicants submit five pleas in law alleging, first, a lack of appropriate legal basis, second, infringement of their rights under Article 6 TEU in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 TEU and Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1) resulting from the fact that the Council assumed that the legal proceedings in Egypt complied with fundamental rights, third, the non-fulfilment of the criterion for inclusion in the annex to the restrictive measures, fourth, infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection and, fifth, the unjustified and disproportionate restriction on their right to property and damage to their reputation.
27 In support of their application for amendment made in the context of the present action, the applicants raise the same pleas as those stated in paragraph 26 above.
28 Admittedly, in the context of the present action, the applicants raise two other pleas alleging breach of the obligation to state reasons and a ‘manifest error of assessment’. However, first, in their statement of modification, the applicants state, in essence, that, following the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), they are withdrawing the plea alleging an inadequate statement of reasons. Second, although, in that statement of modification, the applicants maintain the plea alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’, the line of argument presented in support of that plea is identical to that claimed in support of the plea alleging non-fulfilment of the criterion for inclusion in the annex to the restrictive measures (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 235 to 238). However, as stated in paragraph 26 above, that plea is also raised in support of the action in Case T‑288/15, in which it is the third plea. Consequently, as follows from the case-law, the plea alleging the manifest error of assessment raised in the statement of modification of the present action cannot be regarded as a plea which is distinct from the third plea in the action in Case T‑288/15, and, therefore, cannot, by itself, be an obstacle to the finding, in the present case, of the existence of a situation of lis pendens (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment in France v Parliament, cited in paragraph 22 above, EU:C:1988:431, paragraphs 8 to 12).
29 In those circumstances, it should be noted that the statement of modification lodged in the context of the present action and the action in Case T‑288/15 are between the same parties and are based on the same pleas and seek annulment of the same legal measure.
30 Accordingly, in the light of the situation of lis pendens determined in paragraph 29 above, and account being taken of the fact that the request to modify the form of order sought and the pleas in the present action was lodged after the application in Case T‑288/15, that request for modification must be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible (see, to that effect, Central Bank of Iran v Council, cited in paragraph 23 above, EU:T:2014:777, paragraph 44).
The claim for the annulment of Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and of Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’
The Council’s claim that there is no need to adjudicate
31 In its defence, the Council, having raised a plea of inadmissibility, maintains that the applicants do not have, in any event, an interest in bringing the present action. In that regard, it contends, first, that the contested measures in the present action have already been challenged by the applicants in Case T‑256/11 and, second, that they dispute the legality of Decision 2013/144 only in connection with the measures contested in that case, and by relying on the same pleas as in that case. The Council concludes that there is no need to adjudicate in the present case.
32 Following settled case-law, an applicant’s interest in bringing proceedings must, in the light of the purpose of the action, exist at the stage of lodging the action, failing which the action will be inadmissible. That purpose must, like the interest in bringing proceedings, continue until the final decision, failing which there will be no need to adjudicate, which presupposes that the action must be liable, if successful, to procure an advantage for the party bringing it (see judgment of 28 May 2013 in Abdulrahim v Council and Commission, C‑239/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:331, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited).
33 In the present case, it is clear that, as has been noted in paragraph 5 above, the applicants’ action in Case T‑256/11 was dismissed by the General Court in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93). Next, as has been noted in paragraph 8 above, their appeal against that judgment in Case C‑220/14 P was itself dismissed by the Court of Justice in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147). Consequently, as those cases have not led to the annulment of Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011, the applicants’ interest in bringing proceedings against, first, Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and, second, Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’ has not disappeared in the course of the proceedings.
34 It follows from the foregoing that it is appropriate to rule on the claims in the present action seeking the annulment of Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and of Regulation No 270/2011 ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’.
The merits of the claims for annulment of Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and of Regulation No 270/2011 ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’
35 At the outset, it should be noted that it is clear from the application, and in particular paragraph 9 thereof, that the claims presented in that application relate, in essence, to the maintenance of the listing of the applicants’ names, first, in the annex to Decision 2011/172 pursuant to Decision 2013/144, and, second, in the annex to Regulation No 270/2011 pursuant to a Council ‘decision’ to extend that regulation, which was notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013.
36 The Council raises two pleas of inadmissibility against the claims directed against the ‘renewal’ of the measures taken against the applicants in the context of Regulation No 270/2011. First, it contends, in essence, that the applicants are not entitled to challenge the legality of that regulation by relying on a limitation in time to its application. Second, it states that, on the date of bringing the present action, the Court had not yet ruled on the applicants’ action in Case T‑256/11, with the result that the present action ought to be dismissed on grounds of lis pendens. In reply, the applicants claim, in essence, that the letter of 22 March 2013 specifically refers to a decision to maintain their listing in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and to Regulation No 270/2011 and that, by that decision, the Council formally rejected their application for the repeal of that regulation, in so far as it concerns them.
37 In that respect, as regards the claims relating to the maintenance of the applicants’ names in the annex to Regulation No 270/2011, it should be noted, as the Council submits, that that regulation does not require that the Council adopt a particular legal measure in order to ‘renew’ its application. In fact, as the Council further maintains, unlike Decision 2011/172, Regulation No 270/2011 does not lay down any limitation in time to its application.
38 However, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, it is for the Court to assess whether in the circumstances of the case the good administration of justice justifies the dismissal of the action on the merits without ruling on its admissibility, a course of action which cannot be regarded as adversely affecting the Council (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 February 2002 in Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, ECR, EU:C:2002:118, paragraph 52, and of 22 November 2007 in Cofradía de pescadores ‘San Pedro’ de Bermeo and Others v Council, C‑6/06 P, EU:C:2007:702, paragraph 21).
39 In the present case, it is appropriate to examine both the substance of the claims relating to the maintenance of the listing of the applicants’ names in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and the claims relating to the maintenance of that listing in the annex to Regulation No 270/2011, without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of those claims.
40 In support of their claims, the applicants rely on six pleas in law, raised both against the maintenance of the listing of their names in the annex to Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and against the maintenance of that listing in the annex to Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’. The first plea alleges a lack of an appropriate legal basis of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011, the second, non-fulfilment of the criterion for inclusion of the applicants’ names in the annex to the contested measures, the third, infringement of their rights of defence and their right to effective judicial protection, the fourth, infringement of the obligation to state reasons, the fifth, an unjustified and disproportionate restriction on their right to property and damage to their reputation, and the sixth, ‘a manifest error of assessment’.
41 In that regard, it must be noted that, as is clear from the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, (EU:T:2014:93), those pleas have already been raised in Case T‑256/11. In addition, Decision 2013/144 has the sole aim of extending Decision 2011/172. Moreover, prior to the adoption of Decision 2013/144, Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011 were only subject to minor amendments which have no effect on the pleas raised by the applicants. Finally, the grounds on which the applicants’ names are included in the annex to the measures cited above have not been amended. Therefore, where the elements of fact and of law submitted by the applicants in support of those pleas do not differ from those which were examined by the General Court in Case T‑256/11, under the review of the Court of Justice, the pleas or claims concerned cannot be but dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law within the meaning of Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect and by analogy, orders of 22 December 2014 in Al Assad v Council, T‑407/13, EU:T:2014:1119, paragraphs 88, 102, 121 and 146, and of 1 September 2015 in Makhlouf v Council in T‑441/13, EU:T:2015:591, paragraphs 52, 68, 81 and 97).
42 Moreover, it should also be noted that, in their observations dated 9 April 2015, the applicants stated that they accepted that the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), provided a complete answer to the second, third, fourth and sixth pleas raised in the context of the present action. Accordingly, the applicants acknowledge, implicitly, but necessarily, that those pleas are capable of being rejected on the basis of the grounds of the abovementioned judgment. Nevertheless, in so far as the applicants have not expressly withdrawn those pleas, they must be examined.
– The first plea in law, alleging lack of an appropriate legal basis
43 Primarily, the applicants claim that the reasons for their inclusion on the list in the annex to Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, which indicate that they are the subject of legal proceedings brought by the Egyptian authorities for misappropriation of State funds, do not fall within the principles and objectives of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which include, in particular, consolidation and support of democracy and support for sustainable development on an economic and social level. In particular, the applicants claim that the Egyptian authorities have never stated that the applicants have compromised the democratic development of Egypt or its economic and social development. Moreover, the Egyptian authorities’ request, which was based on charges of fraud against the first applicant, cannot be addressed by the Council in the context of the CFSP, but should be addressed by the national judicial authorities within their sphere of competence in relation to mutual legal assistance. Thus, according to the applicants, Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, cannot be based on Article 29 TEU and, consequently, in the absence of a valid decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU, Regulation No 270/2011 ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ notified on 22 March 2013 also cannot be based on Article 215(2) TEU.
44 It is clear that the line of argument set out in paragraph 43 above does not differ, in essence, from that presented by the applicants in the context of the first plea in their action in Case T‑256/11 (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T: 2014:93, paragraphs 29 and 30).
45 However, in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), the Court rejected that line of argument. In fact, the Court found that Decision 2011/172 satisfied the three conditions identified in paragraph 41 of that judgment to constitute an EU position within the meaning of Article 29 TEU and, in particular, that it satisfied the CFSP objectives which are defined in Article 21(2)(b) and (d) TEU (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 41 to 47). Moreover, in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), the Court of Justice held that none of the arguments presented by the applicants in the context of the first ground of their appeal was capable of establishing that the General Court’s reasoning mentioned above is vitiated by an error of law (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 41 to 48).
46 In those circumstances, the applicants are manifestly incorrect in claiming, in the context of the present action, that Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, could not be based on Article 29 TEU and that, consequently, Regulation No 270/2011 ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ notified on 22 March 2013, also could not be based on Article 215(2) TFEU. That claim must therefore be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
47 That conclusion is, clearly, not capable of being called into question by the social and legal developments which, according to the applicants, have occurred in Egypt between the date of adoption of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011 and the date of adoption of Decision 2013/144 and which were not considered by the Court of Justice in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147). Indeed, according to settled case-law, review of the legal basis for an act enables the powers of the author of the act to be verified and the procedure for the adoption of that measure to be checked as to whether it is vitiated by any irregularity. Moreover, the choice of legal basis for an EU measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, factors which include the purpose and content of the measure (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). Therefore facts such as the social and legal developments referred to above can, in any event, only influence the merits of the grounds of the contested measures, but not the merits of the choice of the legal basis for those measures. Consequently, even if the General Court were in a position to examine the social and legal developments in question, they could not, in any event, be examined in the context of the review of the choice of the legal basis for the contested measures.
48 In the alternative, the applicants claim that Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ notified on 22 March 2013, could not be adopted on the basis of Article 215(2) TFEU, since it did not establish a sufficient connection between each of the applicants and the government of a third country, here Egypt. According to the applicants, Article 215(2) TFEU does not constitute a legal basis distinct from Article 215(1) TFEU, which should be interpreted strictly, like the former Article 60 EC and Article 301 EC, in that it allows only the adoption of measures aimed at the interruption or reduction of economic and financial relations with third countries.
49 In that regard, it is clear that the Court has already ruled on the question raised by that claim in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93). In fact, the General Court stated in that judgment that the legal basis for Regulation No 270/2011 was Article 215(2) TFEU, in so far as that provision permits the adoption of restrictive measures against any person, irrespective of status, provided that those measures have been provided for by a decision taken under the CFSP (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 48 to 53). Moreover, those considerations of the Court have not been challenged by the applicants as part of their appeal (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 30 to 33). Consequently that claim must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
50 The applicants submit, in the further alternative, that, assuming that Article 215(2) TFEU is the appropriate legal basis for adopting measures against individuals not having a sufficient connection with the government of a third country, the Council should not have relied, in the present case, on that provision, but on Article 215(1) TFEU. Indeed, in the applicants’ view, the objectives of Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ on 22 March 2013, the grounds for including the applicants’ names in the annex and the facts stated in the Egyptian application for legal assistance are based on alleged connections between the first applicant and the former Egyptian government.
51 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that that claim is based on the incorrect premiss that Article 215(2) TFEU could serve as a legal basis only for measures taken against individuals not having a sufficient connection with the government of a third country. However, as pointed out in paragraph 49 above, the Court held in paragraphs 48 to 53 of the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), that Article 215(2) TFEU permitted the adoption of restrictive measures against any person, irrespective of status, on condition that those measures have been provided for by a decision taken under the CFSP. Moreover, as the applicants have themselves stated in the context of their claim referred to in paragraph 48 above, the Council did not adopt against them the disputed restrictive measures on the basis of the first applicant’s connections with the former Egyptian government. It is common ground that those restrictive measures were adopted on the basis of judicial proceedings in connection with investigations relating to misappropriation of State funds. That claim is therefore clearly devoid of any foundation.
52 Finally, for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 47 above, the social and legal developments which occurred in Egypt between the date of adoption of Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011 and the date of adoption of Decision 2013/144 cannot have had any influence on the choice of the legal basis of Regulation No 270/2011.
53 It follows from paragraphs 44 to 52 above that the first plea is manifestly unfounded and must be rejected.
– The second plea, alleging failure to fulfil the criterion for inclusion of the applicants’ names in the annex to Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and to Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ notified on 22 March 2013
54 As regards the second plea, the applicants claim, first of all, that the reason for the inclusion of their names in the annex to Decision 2011/172, as amended by Decision 2013/144, and to Regulation No 270/2011, ‘renewed’ by a ‘decision’ notified on 22 March 2013, according to which they are subject to legal proceedings in connection with investigations into misappropriation of State funds, is too vague and not specific to each of the applicants.
55 However, a similar claim was examined by the Court in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), in the context of the third plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons. In particular, the Court held that the factual considerations on which the Council relied were sufficiently detailed and that, although those considerations were not specific to each of the applicants, they were not stereotypical in nature and sought to describe the applicants’ particular situation (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 112 to 115). Furthermore, the Court of Justice considered that, in the abovementioned paragraphs of that judgment, the General Court had carried out an appropriate review of the reasoning of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011, so that its conclusion was free of any error of law (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 91 to 94).
56 It follows from the above that the General Court and the Court of Justice considered that the ground stated by the Council for including the applicants’ names in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and to Regulation No 270/2011 was sufficiently clear and specific to enable the General Court to exercise its review, in particular to enable it to determine whether that ground was consistent with the criteria set out in Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172 and in Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011.
57 Moreover, and in any event, that was the case. Indeed, in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), the Court held that the ground based on the fact that the applicants were the subject of legal proceedings in Egypt, which was connected with the investigations into the misappropriation of State funds, referred to three of the five cases envisaged by Article 1(1) of Decision 2011/172, as interpreted in paragraph 67 of that judgment, as well as Article 2(1) of Regulation No 270/2011, which mention the persons responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian State funds and their associates (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 94, 95, 98 and 103). Furthermore, the Court of Justice considered that that conclusion of the General Court was free of any error of law (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 73).
58 As has been stated in paragraphs 3 and 41 above, the ground for listing the applicants in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and to Regulation No 270/2011 has remained the same in the successive extensions of that decision, in particular in its extension by Decision 2013/144 which is at issue in the present case.
59 Consequently, for those reasons, the claim alleging that the ground on which the Council relied was too vague and insufficiently specific must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
60 Next, the applicants claim that the ground stated by the Council does not fulfil the criteria for including them in the annex to the contested measures as it does not accuse them of being responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian State funds, nor of depriving the Egyptian people of economic and social benefits or of democracy.
61 First, it follows from paragraph 57 above that the claim alleging that the ground adopted by the Council does not amount to accusing the applicants of being responsible for misappropriation of State funds is manifestly unfounded. Second, in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), the Court held that the indication in the second recital of Decision 2011/172, that people referred to in that decision ‘are thus depriving the Egyptian people of the benefits of the sustainable development of their economy and society and undermining the development of democracy in the country’ did not constitute an additional condition to be met when a person’s name is listed in the annex to Decision 2011/172. According to the Court, that is only a clarification of the ultimate objectives of that decision (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 143). For that reason, the second claim referred to in paragraph 60 above must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
62 Finally, the applicants claim that (i) the second, third and fourth applicants are not the subject of any legal proceedings and their names are not included in the list on the ground that they are associated with the first applicant and (ii) that the legal proceedings which the applicant is subject to in Egypt do not relate to misappropriation of State funds under the United Nations Convention against Corruption.
63 In its examination of the first part of the fourth plea in law in Case T‑256/11, the Court found that the applicants had not submitted documents of such a kind as to cast doubt on the accuracy of the factual information contained in the request for legal assistance from the Egyptian authorities and according to which, pursuant to a decision of the Egyptian judicial authorities of 24 February 2011, all of the applicants were subject to their assets being seized in connection with investigations into misappropriation of State funds (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 122 to 135). Furthermore, in its second part of that plea, the Court stated that it followed from one of the documents attached to the request for legal assistance from the Egyptian authorities that the first applicant was subject to criminal proceedings in Egypt for acts categorised as usurpation of public assets, a categorisation which corresponded in essence to misappropriation of State funds (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 136 to 141). Moreover, in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), the Court of Justice rejected the arguments seeking to challenge the fact that the evidence presented by the Council enabled it to be established that the applicants were the subject of legal proceedings in connection with investigations into the misappropriation of State funds (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 74 to 85). Consequently, in the absence of factors which have not already been considered in the judgments mentioned above, the claim referred to in paragraph 62 above must, for the same reasons, be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
64 It follows from paragraphs 55 to 63 above that the second plea in law must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
– The third plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection
65 The third plea is divided into three parts. First of all, according to the applicants, the Council did not provide any evidence or serious or credible information to justify the restrictive measures taken against the applicants on the ground that they were responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian State funds so as to undermine the democratic development or the sustainable development of Egypt. In particular, no details have been provided to the applicants on the alleged judicial proceedings against them. Moreover, no new evidence has been provided when Decision 2013/144 was adopted. Next, the only complaint against them is a vague and general assertion that they are subject to such proceedings under a United Nations Convention. Finally, Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011 were adopted without procedural safeguards for the communication to the applicants of the evidence against them and their right to be heard and such safeguards are not covered by that decision.
66 In that regard, it follows from the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, (EU:T:2014:93) that the fifth plea relied on by the applicants in Case T‑256/11 has three parts which are, in essence, identical to those of the third plea set out in paragraph 65 above and which the Court successively rejected (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 159 to 184). In fact, first, as regards the first part alleging a failure to communicate evidence, the Court found that the Council had, at the applicants’ request, provided the documents in its possession which came from the Egyptian authorities and on which the inclusion of the applicants’ names in the annex to Decision 2011/172 and to Regulation No 270/2011 was based (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 159 to 166). Second, as regards the second part of that plea, alleging that the ground on which their assets were frozen was too vague and had been revealed only at the stage of the defence, the Court found, as it had done in the context of the third plea, that the contested measures in that case were sufficiently reasoned (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 167 to 170). Third, as regards the third part of that plea, alleging, in essence, infringement of the applicants’ right to be heard, the Court held that in respect of an initial decision to freeze funds, which must be able to take advantage of a surprise effect, the Council cannot be required, prior to the adoption of that measure, to communicate the grounds for it or to inform the applicants of its imminent adoption. Moreover, the Court considered that there was no obligation to include, in an act defining the scheme of individual asset-freezing measures, rules establishing a procedure for communicating evidence and providing for consideration of the observations of applicants and the determination of evidence on which these measures are based. Finally, the applicants were able to learn in sufficient time of such evidence and grounds and, moreover, in the absence of their own request for a hearing, the Council was not obliged to grant them such a possibility of its own motion (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 171 to 184).
67 Furthermore, the Court of Justice rejected the fourth plea — alleging that the General Court had committed an error of law in finding that the applicants’ rights of the defence and the right to judicial protection had not been infringed — first, as being inadmissible in part and, second, as being unfounded in part (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 100 to 107).
68 Consequently, in so far as the three parts of the present plea refer to the applicants’ rights of defence and the right to effective judicial protection in connection with the adoption of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011, they must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded. Furthermore, in so far as those parts relate to the rights mentioned above in connection with the adoption of Decision 2013/144, the applicants do not rely on any fact such as to call into question the considerations of the General Court and of the Court of Justice referred to in paragraphs 66 and 67 above. In fact, they merely claim, in that regard, that no new evidence had been provided when Decision 2013/144 was adopted. Decision 2013/144 merely extended Decision 2011/172 and did not amend its content. Therefore, the Council was not obliged to provide, on its adoption, evidence other than that which it had already communicated after Decision 2011/172, which, as noted in paragraph 66 above, was found by the General Court to be sufficient to enable the applicants to exercise their rights of defence. The third plea must therefore be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
– The fourth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons
69 It should be noted at the outset that the arguments made by the applicants in support of the fourth plea, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons are, in essence, identical to those which the Court examined in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), in the context of the third plea. In that regard, as has been reiterated in paragraph 55 above, the Court noted that the factual considerations on which the Council had relied were sufficiently detailed and that, although those considerations were not specific to each of the applicants, they were not of a stereotypical nature and sought to describe the applicants’ actual situation (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 112 to 115). Furthermore, as also pointed out in paragraph 55 above, the Court of Justice considered that that reasoning was free of any error of law (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 91 to 94). Although, in the context of the present action, the applicants have, in addition, argued in support of the present plea that the Council had neither specified the extent to which the proceedings referred to in the grounds of the contested measures implied that the applicants had misappropriated Egyptian State funds nor how those proceedings prove that the applicants undermine the democratic development and sustainable development of Egypt, it follows from paragraphs 61 and 63 above that those arguments can only be rejected as being manifestly unfounded. For those reasons, the fourth plea is therefore manifestly unfounded.
– The fifth plea, alleging an unjustified and disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ right to property and damage to their reputation
70 In support of their fifth plea, the applicants make four arguments. First, they submit that Decision 2011/172 and Regulation No 270/2011 were imposed on them without adequate safeguards enabling them to present their case effectively to the Council. Second, the inclusion of their names on the list is not based on grounds which correspond to the criteria laid down in the contested measures. Third, the Council had not demonstrated that a total freeze of their assets was the least onerous way to attain the objective of the contested acts, or that the considerable damage caused to them was justified and proportionate. In addition, the applicants support the efforts of the Egyptian people to establish democracy and respect for human rights, which is the purpose of the restrictive measures at issue. Fourth, the applicants refer to the line of argument made in the context of the ‘first to fifth pleas in law’.
71 It should be noted, at the outset, that the applicants neither substantiate nor specify the arguments referred to in paragraph 70 above, which are, in the application, limited to their title. In those circumstances, it must be considered that the first of those arguments refers to the claims raised in the context of the third and fourth pleas, which have been rejected on the grounds set out in paragraphs 65 to 69 above. The second of those arguments refers to the claims made in the context of the second plea, which was rejected on the grounds set out in paragraphs 55 to 63 above. Finally, the fourth argument can, necessarily, be understood only as referring to the first to fourth pleas, which were rejected on the grounds set out in paragraphs 43 to 69 above. Those arguments must therefore be rejected at the outset.
72 As regards the third argument, it follows from the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), that it reiterates part of the first series of arguments relied on by the applicants in support of their sixth plea in Case T‑256/11, alleging, like the present plea, an infringement of the right to property (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraph 187). It is sufficient to note that, in response to that first series of arguments, the Court, in particular, found, first, that the asset-freezing measures relating to the applicants were appropriate to achieve the objectives sought, in that they aided the finding of misappropriation of Egyptian State funds and the restitution of the proceeds of that misappropriation, and, second, that the applicants had not established the possibility for the Council to adopt less restrictive measures in the absence of knowledge by the latter of the nature and amount misappropriated which was attributed to the applicants. Furthermore, the Court also held that, account being taken of the temporary and reversible nature of the disputed asset-freezing measures and the possibility of derogating from them to cover certain expenses of the applicants, the disadvantages caused by those measures, which did not affect the substance of the applicants’ right to property, were not excessive (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 204 to 209). In addition, in the context of the examination of the fifth plea of the applicants’ appeal, the Court of Justice held that the applicants had made no legal argument to demonstrate the existence of an error of law committed by the General Court in paragraphs 205 to 209 of the judgment under appeal (judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraph 112). Finally, the fact, even if established, that the applicants support the efforts of the Egyptian people to establish democracy and respect for human rights clearly has no bearing on the justified and proportionate nature of the harm to their right to property constituted by the disputed freezing of their assets. For those reasons, the third argument must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
73 Admittedly, as has been noted in paragraph 14 above, in their observations of 9 April 2015 on the inferences which it appropriate to draw in the present case from the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147), the applicants stated that the social and legal developments which occurred between the date of adoption of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011 and the date of adoption of Decision 2013/144 had not been addressed by the Court of Justice in that judgment and should be taken into account by the General Court, in particular in the context of the examination of the fifth plea in law.
74 However, it is clear that in those observations the applicants do not specify the social and legal developments to which they refer and why they should be taken into account by the Court in the context of the fifth plea in law. The applicants also do not specify whether information on those social and legal developments may be found in the procedural documents in the present case and, in particular, in the application and the pleadings exchanged during the written procedure or in the annexes to those pleadings. Moreover, it is only at the stage of their observations of 9 April 2015 that the applicants referred, for the first time, to those social and legal developments for the purpose of the examination of the substance of their action. It is therefore impossible for the Court to take them into account and to assess them even if they were relevant for the examination of the fifth plea. It is true that the applicants attached to their reply the letter to the Council of 6 February 2013, whereby they requested that institution to repeal Regulation No 270/2011, and the documents attached to that letter on which they based that request. It is apparent from the list of the annexes to the reply that those documents, mostly, date from the period between the adoption of Decision 2011/172 and of Regulation No 270/2011 and the adoption of Decision 2013/144, that is to say the period between 21 March 2011 and 21 March 2013, and that they refer to political and social developments in Egypt during that period, in particular to changes to the Egyptian judicial system. Furthermore, the title of one of those documents refers to the legal proceedings concerning the first applicant. However, as is apparent from paragraph 4 of the reply, the applicants attached to those pleadings their letter of 6 February 2013 and the documents annexed to it only in order to support their response to the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Council in its defence against their claims seeking the annulment of Regulation No 270/2011. In particular, in that paragraph of the reply, the applicants sought to establish that they had submitted a substantiated application seeking the repeal of Regulation No 270/2011 and that the Council Decision of 22 March 2013 was intended to reject that application. The applicants therefore did not rely on those annexes to their letter of 6 February 2013 to support the substance of their action. Accordingly, even assuming that the information contained in those annexes, presented for the first time at the stage of the reply, were admissible, the Court would not be in a position to use it to assess the relevance of the social and legal developments to which the applicants refer for the examination of the fifth plea in law. According to settled case-law, the summary of the applicants’ pleas in law must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare his defence and for the competent court to rule on the action. Accordingly, it is not for the Court to seek and identify in the annexes the arguments on which it may consider the action to be based. Similar requirements apply where an argument is made in support of a plea in law raised before the Court (see judgment of 11 September 2014 in MasterCard and Others v Commission, C‑382/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2014:2201, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
75 It follows from the foregoing that the fifth plea in law must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.
– The sixth plea in law alleging a ‘manifest error of assessment’
76 The applicants claim, in essence, that the arguments made in the request for legal assistance from the Egyptian authorities, on which the Council relied without seeking to verify their veracity, were not substantiated. In that regard, the applicants put forward six arguments. First, the request for legal assistance is not based on any judgment or any order, nor any ‘legal claim or criminal charge’ to establish that the first applicant is responsible for misappropriation of Egyptian State funds. Second, that request for legal assistance only refers to formal investigations registered against the first applicant on the basis of a complaint lodged by an unnamed chairman of newspapers. Third, none of the evidence gathered by the Egyptian public prosecutor was presented in that request for judicial assistance. Fourth, that request for legal assistance makes clear that the amounts in question were not public funds within the meaning of EU law, the Egyptian State holding only a minority stake in the company Ezz El-Dekheila. Fifth, the request for legal assistance does not state that Mr Ezz acted as a public official for the purposes of the ‘UN Convention’ in committing the alleged infringement. Sixth, that request for legal assistance does not state that the second, third or fourth applicants are subject to a conviction, indictment or a complaint for misappropriating State funds.
77 In that regard, suffice it to note that that line of argument must be rejected in the light of the Court of Justice’s response in the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above (EU:C:2015:147) to the applicants’ second ground of appeal. After considering the General Court’s examination of the abovementioned request for legal assistance in paragraphs 128 to 137 of the judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above (EU:T:2014:93), the Court of Justice added that as the applicants did not dispute the fact of the Egyptian authorities’ request for legal assistance and the documents annexed to that application, nor of the order for seisure of their assets, the General Court could not be criticised for not having carried out a comprehensive and rigorous review of the evidence presented by the Council. In that regard, the Court of Justice stated that, in the circumstances, the Council or the General Court had to determine not the merits of the investigations of which the applicants were the subject, but only the merits of the decision to freeze funds under the request for legal assistance (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 75 to 77). The arguments set out in paragraph 76 above, which substantially reproduce the arguments examined by the General Court as part of the fourth plea in Case T‑256/11, do not call into question the fact of the Egyptian authorities’ request for legal assistance nor the existence of legal proceedings against the applicants in connection with the investigations into the misappropriation of State funds.
78 In any event, as has been noted in paragraph 63 above, the Court found that the applicants had not adduced evidence of such a kind as to cast doubt on the accuracy of the factual information given in the Egyptian authorities’ request for assistance and according to which, pursuant to a decision of the Egyptian judicial authorities of 24 February 2011, all of the applicants were subject to a seizure of their assets in connection with investigations into the misappropriation of State funds. Furthermore, as was also noted in that same paragraph, the Court found that it followed from one of the documents attached to the Egyptian authorities’ request for legal assistance that the characterisation of the facts for which the first applicant was the subject of criminal proceedings in Egypt corresponded in essence to that of misappropriation of State funds (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 5 above, EU:T:2014:93, paragraphs 122 to 141). Those findings of the Court were not called into question by the Court of Justice (see judgment in Ezz and Others v Council, cited in paragraph 8 above, EU:C:2015:147, paragraphs 77 to 85). In the context of the present plea in law, the applicants have not adduced any new evidence capable of calling into question the fact of the abovementioned request for legal assistance and the documents attached to that request.
79 Consequently, the sixth plea must be dismissed as being manifestly unfounded and, as a consequence, the claim seeking annulment of Decision 2011/172, as amended by Commission Decision 2013/144, and of Regulation No 270/2011 ‘renewed by decision of the Council notified to the applicants by letter dated 22 March 2013’.
80 It follows from all of the above considerations that the action must be dismissed in its entirety as being in part manifestly inadmissible and in part manifestly lacking any foundation in law.
Costs
81 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
82 Since the Council has applied for costs and the applicants have been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The action is dismissed.
2. Ahmed Abdelaziz Ezz, Abla Mohammed Fawzi Ali Ahmed Salama, Khadiga Ahmed Ahmed Kamel Yassin and Shahinaz Abdel Azizabdel Wahab Al Naggar shall bear their own costs and, in addition, pay the costs incurred by the Council of the European Union.
Luxembourg, 15 February 2016.