Case T‑278/07 P-DEP

Luigi Marcuccio

v

European Commission

(Procedure — Taxation of costs — Lawyers’ fees — Representation of an institution by a lawyer — Recoverable costs)

Summary — Order of the General Court (Appeal Chamber), 28 May 2013

1.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Concept — Elements to be taken into consideration — Costs in relation to taxation proceedings — Included

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 91(b))

2.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Recoverable costs — Expenses necessarily incurred by the parties — Concept — Fees paid by an institution to its lawyer — Included

(Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 19, first para.; Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 91(b))

3.      Judicial proceedings — Costs — Taxation — Taxation on the basis of precise information provided by the applicant or, in default, on the basis of an equitable assessment by the EU judicature — Flat-rate character of a lawyer’s remuneration — Not relevant to the court’s discretion

(Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Art. 91(b))

1.      Recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Civil Service Tribunal and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose. The Court must freely assess the details of the case, taking account of the subject-matter and the nature of the dispute, its importance from the point of view of EU law and the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the contentious proceedings for the agents or counsel involved and the economic interests represented by the dispute for the parties. In fixing the recoverable costs, the Court takes account of all the circumstances of the case up to the making of the order on taxation of costs, including the expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation of costs proceedings.

(see paras 11-13)

2.      Where an institution uses its freedom under the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court, applicable before the General Court pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute to have recourse to the assistance of a lawyer, the latter’s remuneration is covered by the concept of expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings, without the institution being required to show that such assistance is objectively warranted. There is no question of an infringement of the principle of equal treatment between applicants in the event that the defending institution decides to have recourse to the services of a lawyer in certain cases, whereas in others it is represented by its agents.

Any other assessment would constitute an indirect restriction on the freedom conferred by the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and entail for the EU judicature a duty to substitute its own assessment for that of the institutions and bodies responsible for the organisation of their departments. Such a task is compatible neither with the first paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice, nor with the power to adopt rules for their own internal organisation enjoyed by the institutions and bodies of the European Union in relation to the management of their cases before the courts of the European Union.

(see paras 14, 15)

3.      The Union judicature is empowered not to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but to determine the amount of those fees which may be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. Similarly, the fixed nature of the remuneration has no effect on the Court’s assessment of the amount recoverable by way of costs, since it bases its decisions on well-established criteria laid down by case-law and precise information which the parties must provide to it. Whilst the absence of such information does not preclude the Court fixing the amount of the recoverable costs on the basis of an equitable assessment, it nonetheless places it in a situation where its assessment of the appellant’s claims must necessarily be strict.

(see paras 16, 20)