Case T‑509/10

Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft Co., Tehran

v

Council of the European Union

(Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation — Freezing of funds — Action for annulment — Admissibility — Power of the Council — Misuse of power — Entry into force — Non-retroactivity — Duty to state reasons — Rights of the defence — Right to effective judicial protection — Error of law — Concept of support for nuclear proliferation — Error of assessment)

Summary of the Judgment

1.      European Union — Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Decision to freeze funds — Judicial review of legality — Scope — Article 4 of Decision 2010/413 — Not included

(Art. 275 TFEU; Council Decision No 2010/413, Art. 4)

2.      Acts of the institutions — Choice of legal basis — Acts concerning the adoption of restrictive measures against Iran

(Art. 26(2), first para., TEU)

3.      Acts of the institutions — Statement of reasons — Obligation — Scope — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation — Minimum requirements

(Art. 296 TFEU; Council Regulations No 423/2007, Art. 15(3), and No 961/2010, Arts 16(2), and 36(3); Council Decision 2010/413, Art. 24(3) and (4))

4.      European Union — Common foreign and security policy — Restrictive measures against Iran — Freezing of funds of persons, entities or bodies engaged in or supporting nuclear proliferation — Actual conduct supporting such proliferation

(Art. 215(1) TFEU; Council Regulations No 423/2007, Art. 7(2), and No 961/2010, Art. 16(2)(a); Council Decision 2010/413, Art. 20(1))

1.      The prohibition measures laid down by Article 4 of Decision 2010/413, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140, are of a general nature, their scope being determined by reference to objective criteria and not by reference to identified natural or legal persons. Consequently, Article 4 of Decision 2010/413 is not a decision providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. Therefore, under the first paragraph of Article 275 TFEU, the Court does not have jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action seeking to assess the legality of Article 4.

(see paras 37, 39)

2.      By adopting Decision 2010/413, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140, Implementing Regulation No 668/2010 implementing Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as well as Decision 2010/644, amending Decision 2010/413, and Regulation No 961/2010, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 423/2007, in relation to an Iranian company owned by the National Iranian Oil Company and having the object of acting as the central purchasing body for certain activities of the latter, because of support given by that company to nuclear proliferation, the Council complied with the first subparagraph of Article 26(2) TEU, according to which it is deemed to act on the basis of the general guidelines and strategic lines defined by the European Council.

(see paras 50, 54)

3.      Unless there are compelling reasons touching on the security of the European Union or of its Member States or the conduct of their international relations which prevent the communication of certain information, the Council is required, under Article 24(3) of Decision 2010/413, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140, under Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007, concerning restrictive measures against Iran, and under Article 36(3) of Regulation No 961/2010, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 423/2007, to inform the entity covered by a measure adopted under, respectively, Article 24(3) of Decision 2010/413, Article 15(3) of Regulation No 423/2007 or Article 16(2) of Regulation No 961/2010 of the actual and specific reasons why it considers that that provision is applicable to the entity concerned. It must thus state the matters of fact and law which constitute the legal basis of the measure and the considerations which led it to adopt that measure. Moreover, the statement of reasons must be appropriate to the measure at issue and to the context in which it was adopted. It is not necessary for the statement of reasons to specify all the relevant matters of fact and law, since the question whether the statement of reasons is adequate must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question. In particular, the reasons given for a decision are sufficient if it was adopted in circumstances known to the party concerned which enable him to understand the scope of the measure concerning him.

Thus, a ground for Council decisions resulting in the freezing of an applicant’s funds and economic resources to the effect that the applicant maintains links with the companies taking part in Iran’s nuclear programme, is insufficient in so far as it does not explain what kind of relations it is actually alleged to have with what entities, so that it is unable to verify whether the allegation is well founded and to challenge it with the slightest degree of precision.

(see paras 73-74, 79)

4.      The wording used by the Union legislature in Article 20(1) of Decision 2010/413, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140, in Article 7(2) of Regulation No 423/2007, concerning restrictive measures against Iran, and in Article 16(2)(a) of Regulation No 961/2010, concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 423/2007, implies that the adoption of restrictive measures against an entity on account of the support which it has allegedly given to nuclear proliferation presupposes that that entity has actually done so in the past. In the absence of such actual conduct, the mere risk that the entity concerned may provide support for nuclear proliferation in the future is not sufficient.

(see paras 114-115)