Language of document : ECLI:EU:T:2011:503

Case T-141/05 RENV

Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV

v

European Commission

(Access to documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Documents relating to contract LIEN 97-2011 – Refusal of access – Fresh examination in the course of proceedings – Bringing of a separate action – Disappearance of the interest in bringing proceedings – No need to adjudicate)

Summary of the Order

1.      Actions for annulment – Interest in bringing proceedings – Disappearance of such an interest on account of an event occurring after the application was lodged

(Art. 263 TFEU; European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1049/2001)

2.      Procedure – Decision replacing the contested decision during the proceedings – New factor – Extension of the initial pleadings

1.      The conditions governing the admissibility of an action must be judged, subject to the separate question of the loss of an interest in bringing proceedings, at the time when the application is lodged. However, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, that consideration relating to the time when the admissibility of the action is assessed cannot prevent the Court from finding that there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the action in the event that an applicant who initially had an interest in bringing proceedings has lost all personal interest in having the contested decision annulled on account of an event occurring after that application was lodged. For an applicant to be entitled to pursue an action seeking the annulment of a decision, he must retain a personal interest in the annulment of the contested decision. If he does not have such an interest, a decision of the Court on the merits cannot bring him any benefit.

That is the case where the Commission, while not expressly deciding to withdraw the contested decision, adopts a new decision with the same subject-matter, by which it updates or even disregards the grounds which it had accepted as the basis of the earlier decision, so that that new decision replaces the contested decision, and the applicant chooses, not to update its pleas in law and claims for relief in the first action in order to take account of that new decision, but to bring a new action against that decision.

In such circumstances it must be held, in accordance with the requirements of the proper administration of justice and procedural economy, that the applicant loses all personal interest in having the first contested decision annulled. The first action therefore becomes devoid of purpose.

(see paras 24, 28, 35, 38)

2.      When, during the proceedings, one decision is replaced by another having the same subject-matter, this must be considered a new factor allowing the applicant to adapt its pleas in law and claims for relief. Thus, such an adaptation allows the applicant to retain its interest in bringing legal proceedings in the action brought prior to the new event having taken place. It would indeed be contrary to the proper administration of justice and the requirements of procedural economy to oblige the applicant to make a fresh application. Moreover, it would be inequitable if the defendant institution were able, in order to counter criticisms of a decision contained in an application made to the Community judicature, to amend the contested decision or to substitute another for it and to rely in the proceedings on such an amendment or substitution in order to deprive the other party of the opportunity of extending his original pleadings to the later decision or of submitting supplementary pleadings directed against that decision.

(see para. 34)