ORDER OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
25 November 2009 (*)
(Procedure – Taxation of costs)
In Case T‑383/03 DEP,
Hynix Semiconductor Inc., established in Icheon-si (South Korea), represented by J.-F. Bellis, lawyer,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bishop, acting as Agent and G. Berrisch, lawyer,
defendant,
APPLICATION for taxation of the costs to be recovered from the applicant by the Council following the order of the Court of First Instance of 17 November 2008 in Case T‑383/03 Hynix Semiconductor v Council, not published in the ECR,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Sixth Chamber),
composed of A.W.H. Meij, President, T. Tchipev and L. Truchot (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Facts, procedure and forms of order sought
1 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 14 November 2003, Hynix Semiconductor Inc. (‘Hynix’), a company incorporated under Korean law, established in Icheon-si (South Korea), brought an action seeking the annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 1480/2003 of 11 August 2003 imposing a definitive countervailing duty and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea (OJ 2003 L 212, p. 1) (‘the contested regulation’).
2 By letters received at the Court Registry on 28 January, 16 February and 11 March 2004 respectively, Micron Europe Ltd, a company incorporated under the law of England and Wales established in Berkshire (United Kingdom), Micron Technology Italia Srl, a company incorporated under Italian law established in Avezzano (Italy) (collectively ‘Micron’), the Commission and Infineon Technologies AG, a company incorporated under German law established in Munich (Germany) applied for leave to intervene in the dispute in support of the form of order sought by the Council.
3 By letters received at the Court Registry on 11 March 2004, Citibank N.A., Seoul Branch and Korea Exchange Bank, companies incorporated under Korean law established in Seoul (South Korea) applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by Hynix.
4 By orders of 14 July 2004, the President of the Fourth Chamber granted leave to intervene to the Commission, Infineon Technologies AG and Micron.
5 By order of 29 October 2004, the President of the Fourth Chamber granted Citibank and Korea Exchange Bank leave to intervene.
6 By letter lodged at the Court Registry on 2 September 2008, the applicant informed the Court that it was discontinuing its action.
7 By order of 17 November 2008, the President of the Sixth Chamber removed the case from the register and ordered the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council and the two intervening parties, the Commission and Infineon Technologies AG.
8 On 5 February 2009, the Council sent Hynix’s counsel a request for payment of costs which it claimed amounted to EUR 293 758.96. That amount consisted of legal fees of EUR 291 945.35 and other expenses amounting to EUR 632.58, which the Council had paid to its lawyers, and also the Council’s own postage and photocopying expenses of EUR 1 181.03.
9 By letters of 6 February and 27 March 2009, Hynix expressed its disagreement with the amount of costs proposed by the Council.
10 In the absence of agreement between the parties as to the amount of recoverable costs, the Council, by application lodged at the Court Registry on 30 July 2009, lodged an application for taxation of costs pursuant to Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
11 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 28 September 2009 Hynix submitted its observations on that application.
12 The Council claims that the Court should fix the amount of recoverable costs at EUR 293 758.96 and set the costs relating to the present application for taxation of costs at EUR 8 000 to be paid by Hynix, bringing the total amount of recoverable costs payable to the Council to EUR 301 758.96.
13 Hynix contends that the Court should fix the amount of recoverable costs at EUR 28 063.61.
Law
Arguments of the parties
14 The Council claims that the fees for the lawyers it used amount to EUR 291 945.35 and represent costs necessarily incurred for the purpose of the proceedings, which are therefore recoverable.
15 The Council highlights the complexity of the dispute. It takes the view that the anti-subsidy investigations and the resulting Court proceedings often raise complex economic and technical issues. It notes that Hynix itself acknowledged, in a letter of 12 February 2004 addressed to the Court concerning the abbreviated version of its application, the exceptional complexity of the questions of fact and law raised by its application. The application included 17 pleas raising, the Council submits, complex issues of law and fact, including issues concerning the concept of State direction and the definition of a benefit conferred under Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 1997 L 288, p. 1), for which there was no precedent in Community law. Those issues required an analysis of the functioning of the entire Korean banking system and the five financial programmes designed by the Korean banks to support Hynix following the 1997 financial crisis in Korea.
16 As regards the importance of the dispute from the point of view of Community law, the Council explains that the dispute would have provided important guidance concerning the two issues mentioned in the previous paragraph, and on the issue of the rights of defence in connection with the rejection of evidence of the parties concerned to which full access had been denied to the institutions. The challenge by the applicant of the institutions’ findings on injury and causation, by referring to factors such as output, salaries, the volume and market share of subsidised imports, undercutting, the impact of the economic downturn on the personal computer and telecommunications market and the time chosen for the investigation period, also raise issues of considerable importance for Community law.
17 As far as concerns the difficulties of the case and the scale of the work required, the Council mentions, first, that the length of the application (129 pages and 3 945 pages of annexes) and the reply (153 pages and 225 pages of annexes) required a considerable amount of work by its lawyers. Second, there were six interveners, whose statements in intervention including annexes alone comprised 634 pages. In addition, the intervention of five private parties gave rise to applications for confidential treatment. Third, it was necessary to formulate very detailed arguments based on an examination of similar principles with respect to the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and Community law on State aid. Fourth, the case required an in-depth analysis of complex facts relating, in particular to the export-credit guarantee granted to Hynix and the Debenture Programme of the Korea Development Bank and to the financial instruments devised for the plan to recapitalise Hynix in 2001. Fifth, the fact that Hynix frequently misinterpreted the facts, played down their importance, or twisted the Council’s words required additional work by the Council’s lawyers in order to correct those misrepresentations. Sixth, the case raised important questions regarding the relationship between the Community and WTO law, parallel proceedings having led to the adoption of a report by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body about which the parties were requested by the Court to submit their written observations. Seventh, Hynix’s offer to discontinue the proceedings if the Council agreed that each would bear its own costs required a detailed assessment of Hynix’s chances of success with respect to the 17 pleas it relied on.
18 The Council takes the view that the number of hours worked by its lawyers is reasonable. The division of work between the three lawyers concerned, a partner and two associates, avoided any risk of duplicating work. A substantial number of hours worked were not invoiced to the Council as a gesture of good will. The Council sets out the number of hours devoted to each of the most important elements of its defence: 589.35 hours for drafting its defence, plus a further 199 hours which were not invoiced to the Council; 48.25 hours for applications for confidential treatment and the preparation of non-confidential versions of the defence and annexes; 435.5 hours for the rejoinder, which required a fairly substantial number of hours on account, in particular, of the length of the reply that Hynix refused to abridge; 137.5 additional hours which have also not been invoiced and a discount of 5% was deducted from the total amount; 23 hours for the negotiations carried out for the purpose of resolving the dispute; 10 hours in respect of assistance to the Council following the application to discontinue, principally in order to draft observations on the issue of costs.
19 The Council submits that Hynix’s criticisms concerning the number of hours worked by its lawyers are irrelevant. Any criticism concerning the length of its pleadings can only be directed towards Hynix, whose application and reply were particularly lengthy. It submits that the 10.5 hours devoted to abridging the rejoinder cannot be regarded as irrecoverable on the ground that the Council was unable to abide by the limits of the number of pages set in the Practice Directions. The length of the original version of the rejoinder (146 pages) results from the length of Hynix’s reply (153 pages), which had been accepted by the Court and which left the Council no other option but to exceed the 25-page limit itself in order to be able to defend itself adequately.
20 The Council also contests Hynix’s criticisms regarding the use of knowledge acquired during the anti-subsidy investigation. It states, first, that it is the Commission which carries out the investigation and not the Council, and that the knowledge acquired by the Commission in the course of the investigation is not intended to respond to every potential legal allegation which might be made against the Council in the future. Second, it is the Council’s Legal Service, and not the Commission, which is responsible for preparing the Council’s defence in the pre-litigation phase. Third, the Council’s lawyers regularly consulted the Commission Directorate-General TRADE with which three meetings, in particular, were organised.
21 The Council challenges Hynix’s allegation that the expenses incurred as a result of the discontinuance of proceedings are irrecoverable. It submits that the settlement negotiations were initiated by Hynix and not the Council. The costs relating to those negotiations are necessary expenses because negotiations aimed at settling a dispute are an integral part of the proceedings. Hynix’s offer to settle made it necessary to assess and determine Hynix’s chances of success. The expenses relating to the Council’s observations on Hynix’s application to discontinue proceedings, following the failure of the settlement negotiations, are also necessary expenses since Hynix sought an order that the Council should pay the costs or, in the alternative, that each party should bear its own costs.
22 As regards the hourly rate charged by the Council’s lawyers, the Council explains that that rate was substantially reduced, by 15% at the beginning of the proceedings, then 20% having regard to the significance of the matter. It submits that the average weighted rates of EUR 363.43 for the partner in charge of the case, EUR 226.33 for one of his associates and EUR 200.95 for the other, that is to say, an overall average weighted hourly rate of EUR 259.51, are reasonable. The rate increases applied during the proceedings, which lasted four and a half years, are normal in commercial practice and reflect factors such as seniority and inflation. The Court held, in its order of 29 October 2004 in Case T‑77/02 DEP Schneider Electric v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraphs 62 to 64, that the hourly rate of EUR 400 was recoverable in respect of merger proceedings. In this case a complex economic analysis was also required. The legal issues raised and the significance of the case for Community law also justifies fees at the upper end of the spectrum.
23 The Council underlines the financial importance of the dispute for the parties. The contested regulation introduced a countervailing duty of 34.8% on imports whose value, before that duty was imposed, was more than EUR 1 billion.
24 The Council observes that Hynix has not expressed any objection with respect to its own expenses or those incurred by its external lawyers.
25 The Council states that its offer, made during the settlement negotiations to limit its application for costs to EUR 120 000 if Hynix withdrew the case, was subject to the condition that Hynix should refrain from seeking a costs order against the Council in its application to discontinue proceedings. That offer cannot be treated as an admission that the recoverable costs do not exceed that amount.
26 Hynix submits that the amount applied for by the Council as recoverable costs is excessive in absolute terms and is also extremely high when compared to the awards for costs granted in other proceedings concerning trade protection measures or those granted to the institutions in any type of proceedings. As regards proceedings concerning trade protection measures, the highest recoverable costs ever awarded by the Community Courts amounted to EUR 58 031. The highest amount awarded to an institution in any case was EUR 22 290, and the costs usually requested by the institutions are in the region of EUR 15 000 to 20 000. Moreover, the Council itself, during the negotiations with Hynix preceding the discontinuance of the proceedings, stated that it would be prepared to limit its request for costs to EUR 120 000.
27 The time spent by the Council’s external lawyers familiarising themselves with the file, that is approximately 300 hours, is not recoverable. The Council was represented during the proceedings by an experienced member of its Legal Service. Hynix submits that the Council’s Legal Service was already familiar with the file in view of its involvement in the procedure which led to the adoption of the contested regulation. The Commission officials in charge of the administrative procedure were also familiar with the file. The Court held, in the order in Case T‑337/94 DEP Enso-Gutzeit v Commission [2000] ECR II‑479, paragraph 21, that the time spent by a lawyer in familiarising himself with a file is not recoverable.
28 Hynix submits that the case is not particularly important from the point of view of Community law. The issues raised in the 17 pleas concerned only factual and technical analysis of the financial measures granted to Hynix in the context of an anti-subsidy investigation. Their scope is limited to the proceedings and the case and does not raise any important issue for Community law. In any event, no judgment having been delivered by the Court of First Instance in the main proceedings, no concrete assessment of the significance of the case from the point of view of Community law can be made. Additionally, the Council eventually admitted that the pleas concerning the measures adopted in May 2001 were well founded, since it expressly recognised that the contested regulation was partially unlawful, by adopting Council Regulation (EC) No 584/2006 of 10 April 2006 (OJ 2006 L 103, p. 1) amending the contested regulation and reducing the definitive countervailing duty to 32.9%.
29 The financial interest of the dispute for the parties is relatively limited. The amount in question is EUR 4 748 238 and GBP 678 253, that is the net amount of the countervailing duties paid by Hynix which would have been reimbursed if the contested regulation had been annulled. The net amount is obtained by subtracting the amounts refunded by the Commission as a result of refund applications made by Hynix pursuant to Article 21 of Regulation No 2026/97 from the amount of duty initially paid. That amount is more relevant than the assessment put forward by the Council, for the financial interest of the dispute is limited to the countervailing duty actually paid since the contested measures have been abolished.
30 The number of hours invoiced by the Council’s outside lawyers, 1 127.30 hours or 140 8-hour working days, is, in Hynix’s view, manifestly excessive. First, the Council’s external lawyers should have relied on the knowledge of the case acquired by the Council and Commission officials during the administrative procedure. The case-law recognises that the in-depth knowledge of the file acquired during the administrative procedure is capable of facilitating the work of the lawyers during the pre-litigation procedure and reducing the time spent on the preparation of the application. Second, the 300 hours spent by the lawyers in familiarising themselves with the documents in the file are not recoverable. Third, the defence reproduces to a large extent elements already set out in the contested regulation. Fourth, the length of the defence is not indicative of the work it required, taking account of the fact that a significant part of that document is devoted to the description of the facts of the case as set out in the contested regulation. Fifth, the rejoinder primarily repeats arguments already set out in the defence, which makes the 435 hours spent on it excessive. Sixth, the case was removed from the register before an oral hearing was fixed which reduces the costs. Hynix refers to the order in Case T‑80/97 DEP Starway v Council [2002] ECR II‑1 which also concerned trade protection measures, and points out that the Court, after finding that the dispute was relatively complex both in law and in fact, fixed the number of recoverable hours at 200. Hynix takes the view that in the absence of a hearing the number of hours recoverable in this case should not exceed 150.
31 Hynix submits that the hourly rate charged by the Council’s external lawyers is manifestly excessive. The hourly rate for the partner was progressively increased from EUR 335.75 for the period from June 2004 to February 2005, to EUR 382.50 between February and December 2005, then to EUR 475 in December 2005, and finally to EUR 523 in December 2008, that is an average hourly rate of EUR 375. The average hourly rate for the associates is EUR 218. In recent cases, the Court considered an hourly rate of EUR 150 to be appropriate and held that in principle the hourly rate normally applied by the Court does not exceed EUR 250. An hourly rate of EUR 300 was considered appropriate only for the services of a professional with a particularly large amount of experience, able to work very efficiently and fast (order of 18 February 2008 in case T‑310/00 DEP Verizon Business Global LLC v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 44). In another case, the Court held that hourly rates ranging from EUR 80 to EUR 350 were appropriate (order of 4 November 2008 in Case T‑303/04 DEP Evropaïki Dynamiki v Council, not published in the ECR, paragraph 41). Hynix submits that the average weighted hourly rate of EUR 259 claimed is excessive and should be reduced to EUR 175.
32 Some of the costs claimed by the Council are not recoverable. First, the time spent by the Council’s lawyers in abridging the rejoinder is not recoverable, for that was the consequence of those lawyers exceeding the 25-page limit set by the Practice Directions. Second, the hours spent negotiating with Hynix before the discontinuance of proceedings and the drafting of a memorandum of assessment of Hynix’s chances of winning the case cannot be regarded as necessary to the proceedings. Third, the EUR 8 000 claimed for costs relating to the present proceedings is excessive and that claim is not supported by any evidence. Moreover, since the recoverable costs for the main proceedings should be lower than the amount claimed by the Council, the costs relating to the present proceedings are not recoverable.
33 Hynix does not raise any objection to the expenses of the Council’s lawyers or the Council’s own expenses.
Findings of the Court
34 Under Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure:
‘If there is a dispute concerning the costs to be recovered, the Court of First Instance hearing the case shall, on application by the party concerned and after hearing the opposite party, make an order, from which no appeal shall lie.’
35 According to Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure recoverable costs are regarded as ‘expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purpose of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers’. It follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court of First Instance and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (order in Case T‑342/99 DEP Airtours v Commission [2004] ECR II‑1785, paragraph 13 and the case-law cited).
36 According to settled case-law, the Community judicature is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but may determine the amount of those fees to be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for taxation of costs, the Court of First Instance is not obliged to take account of any national scale of lawyers’ fees or any agreement in that regard between the party concerned and his agents or advisers (see, order in Airtours v Commission, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited).
37 It has also been consistently held that, in the absence of Community provisions laying down fee-scales, the Court must make an unfettered assessment of the facts of the case, taking into account the purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law as well as the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work generated by the proceedings for the agents and advisers involved and the financial interests which the parties had in the proceedings (see, order in Airtours v Commission, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited).
38 It is in accordance with those factors that the amount of recoverable costs is to be assessed in this case.
The purpose and nature of the proceedings, their significance from the point of view of Community law and the difficulties presented by the case
39 The Court, although it did not give a ruling on the case in the main proceedings on account of the applicant’s discontinuance of proceedings, considers that the dispute was relatively complex both in law and in fact. The applicant itself also acknowledged that complexity in its letters to the Court of 12 February 2004 and 29 June 2005 and in its application to discontinue proceedings of 3 September 2008. The case raised a number of issues of relative complexity concerning, in particular, the concept of State direction, the definition of benefit conferred under Regulation No 2026/97, and the relationship between the Community rules and those of the WTO, which either had not yet been decided by the Community judicature, or presented, in this case, particular features with regard to the applicable provisions. The dispute therefore presented a number of difficulties from the point of view of Community law.
The financial interest that the dispute represented for the parties
40 It should be recalled that the contested regulation introduced a definitive countervailing duty of 34.8% on imports of certain types of electronic microcircuits called DRAM (dynamic random access memories) originating in the Republic of Korea and manufactured by all companies except Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. The rate of that duty was lowered to 32.9% by Regulation No 584/2006. The countervailing duty was abolished from 31 December 2007 by Council Regulation (EC) No 320/2008 of 7 April 2008 repealing the countervailing duty imposed on imports of certain electronic microcircuits known as DRAMs (Dynamic Random Access Memories) originating in the Republic of Korea and terminating the proceeding (OJ 2008 L 96, p. 1).
41 In the light of those circumstances, the financial interest that the dispute represented for the parties must be assessed by taking account of the countervailing duties actually paid by Hynix, which would have been refunded to it if the regulation had been annulled. The net amount of those duties is, according to the file, EUR 4 748 238 and GBP 678 253. The financial importance of the case cannot therefore be denied.
The amount of work done
42 As regards the assessment of the amount of work that the contentious proceedings may have generated, it should be recalled that while, in principle, the remuneration of only one lawyer is recoverable, it is possible that, depending on the individual circumstances, and most importantly, the complexity of each case, the fees of a number of lawyers may be considered necessary expenses (order of the Court of 6 January 2004 in Case C-104/89 DEP Mulder and Others v Council and Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 62, and order of 15 September 2004 in Case T‑178/98 DEP Fresh Marine v Commission [2004] ECR II‑3127, paragraph 35).
43 However, the primary consideration is the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court, irrespective of the number of lawyers who have provided the services in question (order of 30 October 1998 in Case T‑290/94 DEP Kaysersberg v Commission [1998] ECR II‑4105, paragraph 20).
44 It is clear from the detailed breakdown of costs annexed to the Council’s application for taxation of costs that the total number of hours of work for which payment is sought, at the overall average weighted hourly rate of EUR 259, is approximately 1 127 hours.
45 Although those hours of work appear duly justified from an accounting point of view, the Community judicature must, however take account primarily of the criteria set out in paragraph 43.
46 First, as regards the time spent by the Council’s lawyers shortening the rejoinder, it must be observed that the fact that the Council exceeded the maximum number of pages laid down by the Practice Directions, which was then regularised, is a consequence of the applicant exceeding that 25-page limit since its reply was 153 pages. The length of the reply, which was not abridged by the applicant, in spite of an application for regularisation from the Court, on the ground that its length was necessary in order to exercise its rights of defence, led the Council to exceed the maximum number of pages laid down in order to respond to the arguments raised by the applicant in the reply. In those circumstances, the extra costs arising from the time spent shortening the rejoinder is imputable to the applicant and is part of the recoverable costs in this case.
47 Second, as regards the time devoted to the negotiations with Hynix which preceded the discontinuance of proceedings and the assessment of the chances that Hynix’s action would lead to an annulment, it must be recalled that lawyers’ fees relating to negotiations in order to arrive at an extra-judicial settlement cannot be considered to be expenses necessarily incurred for the purposes of the proceedings, within the meaning of Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure (orders of 16 December 1999 in Case C-137/92 DEP Hüls v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 19, and 6 January 2004 in Case C-104/89 DEP Mulder and Others v Council and Commission [2004] ECR I‑1, paragraph 48). The time invoiced by the Council’s lawyers under that heading is not therefore part of the recoverable costs.
48 Third, account should be taken of the fact that the Council’s lawyers were able to benefit, in the same way as members of its Legal Service, from the support of officials in charge of the administrative procedure, experts in the field, and that those lawyers have been assisted by an experienced member of the Legal Service who also signed the Council’s pleadings (see, to that effect, orders of 6 May 2008 in Case T‑318/00 Freistaat Thüringen v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 45, and 8 October 2008 in Case T‑324/00 DEP CDA Datenträger Albrechts v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 86).
49 Fourth, although the complexity of the dispute justified the high fees and the representation of the applicant by a number of lawyers (order of 10 January 2002 in case T‑80/97 DEP Starway v Council [2002] ECR II‑1, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited), the division of the work of preparing the pleadings between three lawyers necessarily implies some duplication (order in CDA Datenträger Albrechts v Commission, paragraph 91), so that the Court cannot take cognizance of all the hours of work claimed.
50 Fifth, the Court does not consider the average weighted hourly rate claimed of EUR 259 to be inappropriate, given that it is remuneration for the services of professionals who are particularly experienced and able to work very effectively and fast. However, the counterpart to taking into account remuneration at such a level is a necessarily strict assessment of the total number of working hours essential for the purposes of the proceedings (order of 17 October 2008 in Case T‑33/01 DEP Infront WM v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited.
51 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court sets the total of the working time of the Council’s lawyers which is objectively necessary for the purposes of representing it during the judicial phase at 600 hours.
52 In those circumstances, the amount in respect of fees recoverable by the Council must be set at EUR 155 400.
53 Incidental expenses and disbursements which amount, according to the detailed statement provided by the Council, to EUR 632.58, for expenses incurred by the Council’s external lawyers, and EUR 1 181.03 for the Council’s own expenses, must be added to that amount.
54 The Court considers that all photocopying, internet research, transport, fax, scanning, postage and telephone expenses should be accepted as recoverable costs since they appear duly justified by the statements provided and calculated in a reasonable manner.
55 Therefore, the amount of incidental expenses and disbursements recoverable is EUR 1 813.61.
56 As to the EUR 8 000 claimed for the conduct of the present proceedings for taxation, it must be held that the Council has not indicated either the hours of work devoted to that or the hourly rate applicable.
57 Taking account of all of the foregoing considerations, it would be an equitable assessment of the costs recoverable by the Council to fix the amount at EUR 157 213.61.
58 Since that amount takes account of all of the circumstances of the case to date, it is not necessary to rule separately on the costs incurred by the parties for the purposes of the present proceedings concerning taxation of costs (see order in Fresh Marine v Commission, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited).
On those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Sixth Chamber)
hereby orders:
The total amount of costs payable by Hynix Semiconductor Inc to the Council of the European Union is fixed at EUR 157 213.61.
Luxembourg, 25 November 2009.