Case C‑268/15

Fernand Ullens de Schooten

v

État belge

(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d’appel de Bruxelles)

(Reference for a preliminary ruling — Fundamental freedoms– Articles 49, 56 and 63 TFEU — Situation confined in all respects within a single Member State — Non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused to individuals by breaches of EU law for which the national legislature and courts are to be held responsible)

Summary — Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 15 November 2016

1.        Questions referred for a preliminary ruling — Jurisdiction of the Court — Limits — Powers conferred on the EU — Question concerning the principle of the non-contractual liability of the State for infringements of EU law — Included

(Art. 267 TFEU)

2.        EU law — Rights conferred on individuals — Infringement by a Member State — Breach of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty by national legislation not producing cross-border effects — Obligation to make good damage caused to individuals — None

(Arts 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and 63 TFEU)

1.      In the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the limits of the powers conferred on it.

As regards a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the principle of the non-contractual liability of a State for damage caused to individuals by breaches of EU law for which the State can be held responsible, that principle is inherent in the EU legal order. Individuals harmed have a right to compensation on the basis of that liability where three conditions are met, namely that the rule of EU law infringed is intended to confer rights on them, that the breach of that rule is sufficiently serious, and that there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals. The non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused by a decision of a national court adjudicating at last instance which infringes a rule of EU law is governed by the same conditions. Consequently, the principle of the non-contractual liability of the State is within the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court.

(see paras 40-43)

2.      EU law must be interpreted as meaning that the system of non-contractual liability of a Member State for damage caused by a breach of that law does not apply in the case of damage allegedly caused to an individual as a result of an alleged breach of a fundamental freedom laid down in Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU by national legislation that is applicable without distinction to the State’s own nationals and those of other Member States, where, in a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, there is no link between the subject or circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings and those articles.

The Court, on a question being referred by a national court in connection with a situation confined in all respects within a single Member State, cannot, where the referring court does not indicate something other than that the national legislation in question applies without distinction to nationals of the Member State concerned and those of other Member States, consider that the request for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the fundamental freedoms is necessary to enable that court to give judgment in the case pending before it. The specific factors that allow a link to be established between the subject or circumstances of a dispute, confined in all respects within a single Member State, and Article 49, 56 or 63 TFEU must be apparent from the order for reference. Consequently, in a situation which is confined in all respects within a single Member State, it is for the referring court to indicate to the Court, in accordance with the requirements of Article 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, in what way the dispute pending before it, despite its purely domestic character, has a connecting factor with the provisions of EU law on the fundamental freedoms that makes the preliminary ruling on interpretation necessary for it to give judgment in that dispute.

(see paras 54, 55, 58, operative part)