ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
5 May 2014 (*)
(Intervention — Period within which an application to intervene must be filed — Excusable error — Interest in the result of the case)
In Case T‑176/12,
Bank Tejarat, established in Tehran (Iran), represented by S. Zaiwalla, P. Reddy and F. Zaiwalla, Solicitors, D. Wyatt, QC, and R. Blakeley, Barrister,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bishop and S. Cook, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION for the partial annulment, with immediate effect, of Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 22), of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 54/2012 of 23 January 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 on restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 1), of Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 709/2012 of 2 August 2012 implementing Regulation No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 208, p. 2),
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of H. Kanninen, President, I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur) and E. Buttigieg, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
1 By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 3 December 2013, Provincial Investment Companies Association, Saba Tamin Investment Company, Razavi Economic Organisation, Razavi International Capital Growth Plan Co., Omran Razavi International Co., Centre of Individual Shareholders, Sherkat Bazargani Tadarokat Karamad Pooya Abrisham, National Investment Company of Iran and Tadbirgarane Fardaye Omid applied to intervene in the present case in support of the form of order sought by the applicant.
2 By letters lodged at the Registry of the Court on 22 and 31 January 2014, respectively, the main parties indicated that they had no observations to make on the application to intervene.
3 Under the third subparagraph of Article 116(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the President is to decide on the application by order or to refer the decision to the General Court. The order must be reasoned if the application is dismissed.
4 The President of the First Chamber of the General Court has referred to the Chamber the question whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the applicants for leave to intervene may be allowed to participate in the proceedings before the General Court as interveners pursuant to Article 116 of the Rules of Procedure.
Compliance with the period prescribed for lodging an application to intervene
5 Pursuant to Article 115(1) of the Rules of Procedure, an application to intervene must be made either within six weeks of the publication of the notice referred to in Article 24(6) of those rules or, subject to Article 116(6) thereof, before the decision to open the oral procedure as provided for in Article 53 of those rules.
6 Consequently, Article 115(1), read in conjunction with Article 116(6), of the Rules of Procedure allows parties to intervene on the basis of the report for the hearing during the oral procedure, subject to their application to intervene being lodged before the opening thereof (order in Case T‑52/00 Coe Clerici Logistics v Commission [2002] ECR II‑2553, paragraph 25).
7 According to the case-law, the periods set by Articles 115 and 116 of the Rules of Procedure are mandatory and, compliance therewith being a matter of public policy, are not within the discretion of either the parties or even the Court (see, to that effect, orders of the President of the Fifth Chamber in Case T‑194/95 INTV II Area Cova and Others v Council [1996] ECR II‑343, paragraph 2, and of the President of the Fourth Chamber in Case T‑201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2005] ECR II‑1491, paragraph 42).
8 In addition, compliance with the periods prescribed for lodging an application to intervene ensures a fair balance between the fundamental right to intervene in proceedings and the proper administration of justice (see, by analogy, order of 15 July 2011 of the President of the General Court in Case T‑213/11 P(I) College of Representatives of the Staff of the EIB and Others v Bömcke, not published in the ECR, paragraph 22).
9 In the present case, the decision to open the oral procedure was taken by the First Chamber of the General Court on 24 October 2013, with the consequence that the application to intervene was not lodged within the period prescribed by Article 115(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
10 The applicants for leave to intervene nonetheless argue that the information supplied by the Court led them to believe that the period for lodging an application to intervene would not expire until later.
11 In this regard, the concept of excusable error, which allows for derogation from the periods prescribed for lodging an application to intervene, concerns exceptional circumstances in which, in particular, the conduct of the relevant Court has been, either alone or to a decisive extent, such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion in the mind of the party acting in good faith and displaying all the diligence required of a normally well-informed person (see, by analogy, judgment in Case C‑195/91 P Bayer v Commission [1994] ECR I‑5619, paragraph 26, and order in Case C‑112/09 P SGAE v Commission [2010] ECR I‑351, paragraph 20).
12 In the present case, it should be noted that, in response to a letter of 25 July 2013 by which the applicant sought information on the stage reached in the proceedings, it was informed, by letter of 21 August 2013 from the Court’s Registrar, that it was not expected that the oral procedure would be opened before the end of 2013.
13 That information was such as to give rise to a pardonable confusion on the part of the applicants for leave to intervene, which are shareholders of the applicant, as regards the date of the opening of the oral procedure and, consequently, as regards the expiry of the period prescribed for lodging an application to intervene.
14 In those circumstances, it is necessary to hold that there was an excusable error on the part of the applicants for leave to intervene and to take the view, as a result, that their application to intervene is admissible, notwithstanding the fact that it was not lodged within the period prescribed by Article 115(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
Interest in the result of the case
15 The second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which applies to the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, provides that the right to intervene in a case is open to any person establishing an interest in the result thereof.
16 It is settled case-law that the concept of an interest in the result of the case, within the meaning of that provision, must be defined in the light of the precise subject-matter of the dispute and be understood as meaning a direct, existing interest in the ruling on the form of order sought, and not as an interest in relation to the pleas in law put forward. The expression ‘result’ is to be understood as meaning the operative part of the final judgment which the parties ask the Court to deliver. It is necessary, in particular, to ascertain whether the intervener is directly affected by the contested measure and whether its interest in the result of the case is established (orders in Case 111/63 Lemmerz-Werke v High Authority [1965] ECR 716, at 717, and in Joined Cases 116/77, 124/77 and 143/77 Amylum and Others v Council and Commission [1978] ECR 893, paragraphs 7 and 9; order of the President of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C‑151/97 P(I) and C‑157/97 P(I) National Power and PowerGen [1997] ECR I‑3491, paragraphs 51 to 53 and 57; order of the President of the Second Chamber in Case T‑191/96 CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission [1998] ECR II‑573, paragraph 28, and order of the President of the First Chamber in Case T‑138/98 ACAV and Others v Council [1999] ECR II‑1797, paragraph 14).
17 In the present case, the applicants for leave to intervene have applied to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the applicant. By its form of order, the latter has asked the Court to annul the acts by which the Council adopted and maintained in force the restrictive measures against it.
18 In the first place, the applicants for leave to intervene invoke the negative impact which the restrictive measures at issue have had on their property rights as shareholders of the applicant. Those measures have, they submit, affected the applicant’s economic performance, the value of its shares and the amount of dividends that it distributes to its shareholders.
19 In this regard, it must be pointed out that the fact of having a holding, even a significant one, in the capital of a company which is a party to proceedings does not, in itself, establish the existence of an interest in the result of the case (see, to that effect, order of the Court of Justice in Case C‑245/95 P Commission v NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko [1996] ECR I‑559, paragraphs 13 and 15). Where it turns out that an application to intervene ultimately has no purpose other than to support judicial proceedings which, if successful, could have an impact on the economic well-being of the applicant party and, consequently, on the situation of the person applying to intervene, that application is to be regarded as unjustified (order of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 197/80 to 200/80, 243/80, 245/80 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle and Others v Council and Commission [1981] ECR 1041, paragraphs 8 and 9; order in Case T‑184/95 Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission [1997] ECR II‑351, paragraphs 19 and 20; and order in CAS Succhi di Frutta v Commission, cited in paragraph 16 above, paragraph 34).
20 Consequently, the fact that the applicants for leave to intervene are shareholders of the applicant cannot lead to the conclusion that they have established a direct interest in the result of the case.
21 In the second place, Provincial Investment Companies Association, Saba Tamin Investment Company, Razavi Economic Organisation, Razavi International Capital Growth Plan and Omran Razavi International (‘the first five applicants for leave to intervene’) argue that the economic consequences of the restrictive measures against the applicant have a negative impact on the public-interest activities which they carry out in Iran, both individually and within the context of their respective groups, particularly in the areas of social security, charitable work, public health, education and culture.
22 On the one hand, it should be pointed out that the first five applicants for leave to intervene have not sufficiently established, for legal purposes, either the scope of the public-interest activities which they carry out or the impact which the restrictive measures against the applicant have had on those same activities. They have merely submitted declarations from their directors, which are unsupported by precise information or evidence.
23 On the other hand, in any event, the arguments of the first five applicants for leave to intervene relating to their public-interest activities suggest, at most, an indirect interest in the result of the case, resulting from the impact of the potential annulment of the contested acts on the economic well-being of the applicant and, as a result, on their own situation.
24 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicants for leave to intervene have not established an interest in the result of the case within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 40 of the Statute. Consequently, their application to intervene must be rejected.
Costs
25 Under Article 87(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, a decision as to costs is to be given in the final judgment or in the order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order closes the proceedings as far as the applicants for leave to intervene are concerned, a decision should be made on the costs relating to their application.
26 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicants for leave to intervene have been unsuccessful in their action, they must be ordered to bear their own costs relating to the present intervention proceedings. Since the other parties have not sought a form of order in that regard, they must bear their own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The application to intervene is dismissed.
2. Each party shall bear its own costs relating to the intervention proceedings.
Luxembourg, 5 May 2014.