Case C‑90/22
‘Gjensidige’ ADB
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas)
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 21 March 2024
(Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 – Article 45 – Refusal to recognise a judgment – Article 71 – Relationship between that regulation and conventions governing particular matters – Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) – Article 31(3) – Lis pendens – Agreement conferring jurisdiction – Concept of ‘public policy’)
1. Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Regulation No 1215/2012 – Relationship with conventions on particular matters – Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road – Judgment relating to an action brought pursuant to that contract – Whether recognition of that judgment may be refused as a result of disregard of an agreement conferring jurisdiction – Applicability of the regulation
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Art. 71(1) and (2)(b))
(see paragraphs 41, 44-47)
2. Judicial cooperation in civil matters – Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters – Regulation No 1215/2012 – Recognition and enforcement of judgments – Grounds for refusing enforcement – Disregard of exclusive jurisdiction – Scope – Judgment given by a Member State court in disregard of an agreement conferring jurisdiction – Precluded – Infringement of the public policy of the Member State in which recognition is sought – No infringement
(European Parliament and Council Regulation No 1215/2012, Arts 25 and 45(1)(a) and (e)(ii) and (3))
(see paragraphs 52, 53, 56-59, 72-76, operative part)
Résumé
In the context of a reference for a preliminary ruling, the Court of Justice clarifies the scope of the grounds, provided for by the Brussels Ia Regulation, (1) for refusing to recognise judgments given in the Member States, where the court of origin has declared itself to have jurisdiction in disregard of an agreement conferring jurisdiction contained in a contract of international carriage.
ACC Distribution UAB had concluded a contract with Rhenus Logistics UAB, a transport company, for the carriage of goods from the Netherlands to Lithuania. Some of the goods having been stolen during carriage, Gjensidige ADB, an insurance company, indemnified ACC Distribution.
In February 2017, Rhenus Logistics brought an action before a Netherlands court, seeking a declaration that its liability was limited. That court declared itself to have jurisdiction and found the agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Lithuanian courts, contained in the contract concluded between ACC Distribution and Rhenus Logistics, to be null and void, because it had the effect of limiting the ability to choose among the courts having jurisdiction, provided for by the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (‘the CMR’). (2)
In September 2017, Gjensidige brought proceedings before a Lithuanian court seeking an order that Rhenus Logistics reimburse the indemnity paid to ACC Distribution. That court stayed the proceedings until, in 2019, the Netherlands court gave a final decision on the limitation of the liability of Rhenus Logistics. Subsequently, the Lithuanian court dismissed the action brought by Gjensidige on the basis of the authority of a final judgment attaching to the Netherlands court judgment. That dismissal was upheld on appeal.
Hearing an appeal lodged by Gjensidige, the Lietuvos Aukščiausiasis Teismas (Supreme Court of Lithuania, Lithuania) is uncertain whether the CMR is compatible with the Brussels Ia Regulation, in so far as that convention allows choice-of-court agreements, which, according to that regulation, are as a rule exclusive, to be disregarded. (3) Furthermore, even though it finds that that regulation does not expressly lay down any grounds for refusing to recognise a judgment issued in breach of a choice-of-court agreement, the referring court wonders whether the protection given to those agreements should be extended to the recognition and enforcement of such a judgment. Consequently, it has decided to refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
Findings of the Court
As a preliminary point, since the contract of international carriage at issue in the main proceedings falls within the scope of application of both the Brussels Ia Regulation and the CMR, the Court examines whether any refusal to recognise a judgment handed down notwithstanding the existence of an agreement conferring jurisdiction on the courts of another Member State must be assessed in the light of the Brussels Ia Regulation or of the CMR.
In that respect, first, the Brussels Ia Regulation (4) provides that judgments given in a Member State by a court in the exercise of jurisdiction provided for in a convention on a particular matter must be recognised and enforced in the other Member States in accordance with that regulation, whose provisions may in any event be applied even where the convention in question lays down conditions for the recognition or enforcement of those judgments. As regards the CMR, (5) it merely provides that the enforcement of a judgment is subject to compliance with the formalities required in the country concerned, which may not however permit the merits of the case to be re-opened.
Secondly, the application of that convention cannot compromise the principles that underlie judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters in the European Union. As regards specifically the principle of mutual trust, the court of the State addressed is never in a better position than the court of the State of origin to determine whether the latter has jurisdiction, and therefore the Brussels Ia Regulation does not as a general rule authorise a court in a Member State to review the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State.
In those circumstances, any refusal to recognise a judgment must be assessed in the light of the Brussels Ia Regulation.
That clarification having been made, in the first place, the Court infers from the wording of Article 45(1)(a) (6) and (e)(ii) (7) of the Brussels Ia Regulation that a Member State court cannot refuse to recognise the judgment of a court of another Member State on the ground that the latter declared itself to have jurisdiction in disregard of an agreement conferring jurisdiction.
In the second place, that literal interpretation is borne out by the context of those provisions and by the objectives and purpose pursued by the Brussels Ia Regulation. The Court notes that, in the system established by that regulation, mutual recognition is the rule, whereas the grounds on which recognition may be refused are listed exhaustively. The EU legislature chose not to include the existence of a conflict with the provisions of the regulation on prorogation of jurisdiction as one of those grounds. Accordingly, the protection of agreements conferring jurisdiction, which is an aim of that regulation, (8) therefore does not result in a breach of such an agreement being, in itself, a ground for refusing recognition.
In the third place, the Court observes that, in the present case, nothing in the documents before it suggests that recognition of the decision of the Netherlands court would be at variance with the Lithuanian legal order to an unacceptable degree inasmuch as it would breach a fundamental principle. In particular, the mere fact that an action is not heard by the court designated in an agreement conferring jurisdiction and that, as a result, it is not ruled upon under the law of the Member State to which that court belongs cannot be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach of the right to a fair trial to render recognition of the judgment in that action manifestly at odds with the public policy of the Member State addressed.