Appeal brought on 22 March 2024 by Oil company ‘Lukoil’ PAO against the order of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 25 January 2024 in Case T-280/23, Lukoil v Parliament and Others
(Case C-223/24 P)
Language of the case: French
Parties
Appellant: Oil company ‘Lukoil’ PAO (represented by: B. Lebrun, C. Alter, lawyers)
Other parties to the proceedings: Transparency Register, European Parliament, Council of the European Union, European Commission
Form of order sought
The appellant claims that the Court should:
set aside, on the basis of the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the order of the General Court of the European Union of 25 January 2024, Oil company ‘Lukoil’ PAO v Parliament and Others, T-280/23 (ECLI:EU:T:2024:41), in which it was held that the action for annulment brought by the appellant on 17 May 2023 – seeking the annulment of Decision Ares(2023) 1618717 of the Secretariat of the Transparency Register of 6 March 2023 finding that the appellant no longer satisfies the eligibility requirements for the Transparency Register due to the non-observance of point (e) of the Transparency Register code of conduct and removing the appellant from the Transparency Register (‘the Decision’) – is dismissed as inadmissible; and
order the defendants to pay the costs in their entirety.
Grounds of appeal and main arguments
In support of the appeal, the appellant relies on three grounds.
1. First ground of appeal, alleging an error of law
The first ground complains that the General Court of the European Union (‘the General Court’) erred in law in finding that the Decision to remove the appellant from the Transparency Register had been duly notified.
First, the Decision as notified by the Secretariat of the Transparency Register (‘the Secretariat’) does not specify the relevant remedies, as expressly required by point 7.1 (final sentence) of Annex III to the Interinstitutional Agreement.
In addition, the Decision was not notified to the party concerned (PJSC Lukoil, established in Moscow) or to a person legally authorised to receive decisions which are legally binding, and impose penalties, on that entity.
Consequently, the Decision was not validly notified to its addressee and the period for challenging it did not, therefore, start to run.
Second, if it were to be found that the Decision had been notified to its addressee (quod non), the General Court erred in law in confusing the concept of receipt of the Decision with the concept of being able to gain effective knowledge of the Decision (applicable in the present case). That conclusion results from a confusion between two different bodies of rules. The General Court used a fact in the procedure for review before the Secretariat in order to draw a conclusion in the action before the General Court and to find, wrongly, that the addressee was in a position to gain effective knowledge of the Decision on the day it was notified, namely 6 March 2023.
Third, the General Court erred in law in finding that a statement of the appellant's advisers constituted an acknowledgment that the Decision had indeed been notified for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU, whereas those advisers were not authorised to make such an acknowledgement on behalf of the appellant and the statement concerned a fact that was not capable of having any consequence in law.
2. Second ground of appeal, alleging failure to comply with the obligation to state reasons
The second ground complains that the General Court failed to comply with the obligation to state reasons by following the arguments of the defendants, whereas none of the assertions put forward by the defendants, on whom the burden of proof rests, was substantiated by concrete evidence produced by the defendants, but are based solely on a deliberate confusion of the rules applicable to the calculation of time limits, namely, on the one hand, those that apply to the request to the Secretariat for a review of the Decision and, on the other, those that apply to actions under Article 263 TFEU.
3. Third ground of appeal, alleging failure to observe the principle of legal certainty
The third ground complains that the General Court erred in law in failing to observe the principle of legal certainty and in infringing the appellant's rights of defence, more specifically its right to an effective remedy and to an impartial tribunal (Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights) and its right to a fair trial (Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights).
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