ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
26 April 2016(*)
(Action for annulment — State aid — Gambling and betting — Aid envisaged by France for horse-racing companies — Parafiscal levy collected on online horse-race betting — Decision declaring the aid to be compatible with the internal market — Association — Lack of individual concern — Regulatory act entailing implementing measures — Inadmissibility)
In Case T‑238/14,
European Gaming and Betting Association (EGBA), established in Brussels (Belgium),
The Remote Gambling Association (RGA), established in London (United Kingdom),
represented by S.-P. Brankin, Solicitor, T. De Meese, E. Wijckmans and M. Mudrony, lawyers,
applicants,
v
European Commission, represented by A. Bouchagiar and P.-J. Loewenthal, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
French Republic, represented by D. Colas and J. Bousin, acting as Agents,
intervener,
APPLICATION for annulment of Commission Decision 2014/19/EU of 19 June 2013 on State aid No SA.30753 (C 34/10) (ex N 140/10) which France is planning to implement for horse-racing companies (OJ 2014 L 14, p. 17),
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),
composed of S. Papasavvas, President, E. Bieliūnas (Rapporteur) and I.S. Forrester, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Background to the dispute
1 European Gaming and Betting Association AISBL (EGBA) is a non-profit organisation whose members are European gambling and betting operators.
2 The Remote Gambling Association (RGA) is also a non-profit organisation representing most of the world’s largest online gambling and betting operators.
3 By Law 2010-476 of 12 May 2010 on the opening-up to competition and regulation of the online gambling sector, the French Republic opened up the online gambling sector to competition. Three types of gaming have been opened to competition: online horse-race betting, sports betting and poker games.
4 Prior to that opening-up to competition, the monopoly on horse-race betting conducted outside race courses was held by the Pari mutuel urbain (PMU). The PMU is an economic interest grouping established by two horse-racing parent companies, the Cheval Français and France Galop, and 49 provincial horse-racing companies (‘the horse-racing companies’) for online bets placed via the internet, and for brick-and-mortar bets placed within the PMU’s sales network and bets placed at race courses. The PMU’s entire net result was, and still is, paid to the horse-racing companies and is used to fund the equine industry.
5 In view of the importance of the PMU for the financing of the equine industry, the French authorities were concerned that the sustainability of that industry would be threatened if the opening-up of the online gambling sector to competition were to cause a significant drop in the PMU’s revenue. The French Republic accordingly decided to introduce a parafiscal levy on online horse-race betting in favour of the equine industry.
6 By letter of 13 April 2010, the French Republic notified the European Commission of a proposal for a parafiscal levy on online horse-race betting designed to fund a public-service mission entrusted to horse-racing companies.
7 By letter of 17 November 2010, the Commission informed the French Republic of its decision to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU (‘the opening decision’) in respect of the notified measure. In the opening decision, the Commission invited the interested parties to submit their comments on the notified measure.
8 On 14 February 2011, EGBA submitted its observations as an interested party opposed to the notified measure.
9 Following numerous exchanges between the Commission and the French authorities, the French Republic, on 29 April 2013, officially submitted to the Commission an amendment to the notification of 13 April 2010 containing a new measure discussed with the Commission’s services.
10 On 19 June 2013, the Commission adopted Decision 2014/19/EU on State aid SA 30753 (C 34/10) (ex N 140/10) which France is planning to implement for horse-racing companies (OJ 2014 L 14, p. 17) (‘the contested decision’).
11 By that decision, the Commission took the view, initially, that the notified measure, as amended (‘the disputed measure’), constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. It noted, inter alia, that it concerned aid to the horse-racing companies. It emphasised, first, that, in order to fund that aid, a levy was collected from all online horse-race betting stakes, including those placed on the PMU’s website, and, second, that the revenue from that levy was paid in full to the horse-racing parent companies (in proportion to the bets placed on each speciality: harness, flat and jump racing), which then distribute the corresponding amount among the various beneficiaries. That revenue is in addition to funding resulting from the bets placed in the PMU’s physical network of sales outlets. Second, the Commission declared that aid to be compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU on the ground that it constituted aid within the equine sector established on the basis of the common interest that the PMU and the competing online horse-race betting operators have in organising horse races on which bets are placed and which, consequently, benefits all online horse-race betting operators subject to the levy.
Procedure and forms of order sought
12 By application lodged at the Court Registry on 11 April 2014, the applicants brought the present action.
13 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 22 August 2014, the French Republic applied for leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by the Commission.
14 By order of 17 October 2014, the President of the Fourth Chamber of the General Court granted that application for leave to intervene.
15 By decision of the President of the General Court, the present case was assigned to a new Judge-Rapporteur sitting in the Third Chamber.
16 In the context of the measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 89 of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court, by letters of 13 November 2015, put written questions to the main parties and to the intervener, which responded to those questions on 3 December 2015.
17 The applicants claim that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order the Commission to pay the costs.
18 The Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as inadmissible or, in the alternative, as unfounded;
– order the applicants to pay the costs.
19 The French Republic contends that the Court should dismiss the action.
Law
20 Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the Court may, where the action is manifestly inadmissible, decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings.
21 In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.
22 While not formally raising an objection of inadmissibility, the Commission disputes the admissibility of the action. It submits, in essence, that the applicants have no locus standi on the ground that they are not individually concerned by the contested decision.
23 First, it claims that the disputed measure does not substantially affect the market position of the applicants’ members. Second, it maintains that the fact that EGBA submitted comments during the formal procedure cannot establish the admissibility of its action.
24 In the application, the applicants put forward arguments designed to establish their locus standi and oppose, in the reply, the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission.
25 In that regard, it should be noted that the contested decision was addressed to the French Republic, not to the applicants.
26 The fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU provides for two situations in which natural or legal persons are accorded standing to institute proceedings against an act which is not addressed to them. First, such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to them. Second, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (judgment of 27 February 2014 in Stichting Woonlinie and Others v Commission, C‑133/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2014:105, paragraph 31).
27 In the first place, it is necessary to examine whether the contested decision could be categorised as a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
28 The concept of ‘regulatory act’ within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU must be understood as covering any act of general application, with the exception of legislative acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013 in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 60 and 61).
29 In the present case, it is common ground that the contested decision does not constitute a legislative act. It is therefore necessary to determine whether it is of general application.
30 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that a measure is of general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and produces legal effects with respect to categories of persons envisaged in general and in the abstract (judgment of 17 March 2011 in AJD Tuna, C‑221/09, ECR, EU:C:2011:153, paragraph 51).
31 It should also be noted in this regard that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 288 TFEU, a decision, such as that in the present case, is binding in its entirety only on those to whom it is addressed. Consequently, the conditions under which the Commission makes compatible with the internal market, for the purposes of Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, the aid which the French Republic is planning to implement for horse-racing companies are legal consequences of the contested decision that are binding on the Member State to which that decision is addressed (see, to that effect, order of 9 September 2013 in Altadis v Commission, T‑400/11, ECR, EU:T:2013:490, paragraph 45).
32 However, according to case-law, in order to determine the scope of a measure, the Courts of the European Union should not look merely at the official name of the measure but should first take account of its purpose and its content. Accordingly, a decision which is addressed to a Member State is regarded as being of general application if it applies to objectively determined situations and entails legal effects for categories of persons envisaged generally and in the abstract (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 June 2012 in Vereniging Milieudefensie and Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v Commission, T‑396/09, ECR, EU:T:2012:301, paragraph 26).
33 In that regard, it should be noted that the beneficiaries of the aid declared compatible with the internal market by the contested decision are not envisaged generally and in the abstract. It is evident from that decision that the beneficiaries are identified with precision, namely 51 horse-racing companies (see paragraph 4 above).
34 However, it should be noted that the contested decision authorises the method of financing the aid, by means of a parafiscal levy collected on all online horse-race betting stakes, which is an integral part of the aid measure at issue.
35 That method of financing produces legal effects with regard to a category of persons envisaged generally and in the abstract, in particular online horse-race betting operators, and applies to situations determined objectively. First, that parafiscal levy affects all online horse-race betting operators which are present in France, the exact number of which may vary over time, and which accordingly constitute a group generally and in the abstract. Moreover, that parafiscal levy is collected on each online horse-race betting stake and, accordingly, it applies to situations which are determined objectively.
36 Consequently, the contested decision is a regulatory act within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
37 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the contested decision entails implementing measures. In that regard, reference should be made exclusively to the subject matter of the action (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2013 in Telefónica v Commission, C‑274/12 P, ECR, EU:C:2013:852, paragraph 31).
38 In the present case, by their action, the applicants seek the annulment of the contested decision. Article 1 of the contested decision declares that the aid at issue is compatible with the internal market and authorises its implementation. Article 2 of that decision states that the latter is addressed to the French Republic.
39 Accordingly, the operative part of the contested decision does not define the specific and concrete consequences of the declaration of compatibility, either for the beneficiaries or for any other person who may be affected in some way by the measure at issue (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 September 2014 in Royal Scandinavian Casino Århus v Commission, T‑615/11, EU:T:2014:838, paragraph 50).
40 However, in response to a written question raised by the General Court, the French Republic stated that, in order to implement the aid which was declared compatible by the Commission, it had adopted national implementing measures. First, the French authorities adopted Article 22 of Amending Finance Law No 2013-1279 of 29 December 2013 for 2013 which amends Article 1609:33 of the General Tax Code in order to establish the levy the proceeds of which have been allocated to the payment of aid for horse-racing companies. Second, under Article 1609:33 of the General Tax Code, decrees were passed to establish the annual rate of the tariff.
41 It follows that the specific, actual consequences of the contested decision for the economic operators materialised by way of national acts which, as such, are themselves implementing measures entailed by the contested decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph, in fine, of Article 263 TFEU. Those acts were to come into effect after the adoption of the contested decision in order that the aid in question would produce effects in respect of the applicants. Moreover, since those acts could be challenged before the national courts, the applicants could have access to a court without being required to infringe the law. In proceedings before the national court they could have pleaded the invalidity of the contested decision and caused the court to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (see, to that effect, Royal Scandinavian Casino Århus v Commission, cited in paragraph 39 above, EU:T:2014:838, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited).
42 Consequently, it follows that the contested decision entails implementing measures.
43 Accordingly, the contested decision cannot be categorised as a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
44 In the second place, it is thus necessary to determine whether the applicants are directly and individually concerned by the contested decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.
45 According to settled case-law, persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may claim to be individually concerned only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons and which, by virtue of those factors, distinguish them individually just as in the case of the person addressed by such a decision (judgments of 15 July 1963 in Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, ECR, EU:C:1963:17, at p. 107; of 28 April 2015 in T & L Sugars and Sidul Açúcares v Commission, C‑456/13 P, ECR, EU:C:2015:284, paragraph 63; and of 17 September 2015 in Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, ECR, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 93).
46 In the case of a Commission decision on State aid, it should be borne in mind that, in the context of the procedure for reviewing State aid provided for in Article 108 TFEU, the preliminary stage of the procedure for reviewing aid under Article 108(3) TFEU, which is intended merely to allow the Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or complete conformity of the aid in question, must be distinguished from the stage of the review under Article 108(2) TFEU. It is only at the latter stage, which is designed to enable the Commission to be fully informed of all the facts of the case, that the Treaty imposes an obligation on the Commission to give the parties concerned notice to submit their comments (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 2009 in 3F v Commission, C‑319/07 P, ECR, EU:C:2009:435, paragraph 30, and in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 94).
47 It follows that where, without initiating the formal review procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU, the Commission finds, on the basis of Article 108(3) TFEU, that aid is compatible with the common market, the persons intended to benefit from those procedural guarantees may secure compliance therewith only if they are able to challenge that decision before the EU Courts. For those reasons, an action for the annulment of such a decision brought by a person who is concerned within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU is admissible where that person seeks, by instituting proceedings, to safeguard the procedural rights available to him under the latter provision (see, to that effect, judgment in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 95).
48 It must be borne in mind that such concerned parties are any persons, undertakings or associations whose interests might be affected by the granting of aid, that is to say, in particular, undertakings competing with the recipients of the aid and trade associations (see, to that effect, judgment in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 96).
49 By contrast, if the applicant calls into question the merits of the decision appraising the aid taken on the basis of Article 108(3) TFEU or after the formal investigation procedure, the mere fact that it may be regarded as concerned within the meaning of Article 108(2) TFEU cannot suffice to render the action admissible. It must then demonstrate that it has a particular status within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 45 of the present order. That applies in particular where the applicant’s market position is substantially affected by the aid to which the decision at issue relates (see, to that effect, judgment in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 97 and the case-law cited).
50 It should also be borne in mind that, according to case-law, actions brought by associations, such as the applicants, are admissible in three situations: where they represent the interests of their members which have standing to bring proceedings; where they are distinguished individually because of the impact on their own interests as associations, in particular because their position as a negotiator has been affected by the measure which it is sought to have annulled; and where a legal provision expressly confers on them a number of rights of a procedural nature (see, to that effect, order of 3 April 2014 in ADEAS v Commission, T‑7/13, EU:T:2014:221, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
51 In the present case, the applicants’ locus standi must be examined, in the first place, in the light of the individual concern of their members and, in the second place, in the light of the impact on their own interests.
The individual concern of the applicants’ members
52 The applicants principally base their locus standi on that of their members. They submit, in essence, that the action is admissible because their members, which are active in France, have locus standi by reason of the fact that their competitive position is substantially affected by the disputed measure.
53 It is to be noted, first of all, that the Commission is incorrect in maintaining, on the basis of Article 48(1) of the Rules of Procedure of 2 May 1991, that the evidence produced by the applicants at the stage of the reply is inadmissible on the ground that the applicants did not give reasons for its late production. Under Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the main parties may produce evidence or make offers of evidence in support of their arguments in the reply and rejoinder, provided that the delay in making the offer is justified. However, according to the case-law, evidence in rebuttal and the amplification of offers of evidence, in response to evidence in rebuttal put forward by the opposing party in the defence, are not covered by the time-bar rule in Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure. That provision concerns offers of fresh evidence and must be read in the light of Article 92(7) of those rules, which expressly provides that evidence may be submitted in rebuttal and previous evidence may be amplified (see, to that effect, order of 7 March 2013 in UOP v Commission, T‑198/09, EU:T:2013:105, paragraph 32 and the case-law cited).
54 In the present case, the view must be taken that the offers of evidence provided by the applicants in the reply are designed to address the arguments concerning the inadmissibility of the action raised by the Commission in the defence and, in particular, those relating to the individual concern of certain of their members on the market concerned by the aid in dispute. Consequently, the time-bar rule laid down in Article 85(2) of the Rules of Procedure does not apply to them, with the result that the evidence at issue is admissible.
55 It is in light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether one of the members of one of the applicants is individually concerned by the contested decision.
56 The applicants contend that there are essentially three reasons why the situation of their members is substantially affected on the market for gambling in France. First, the disputed measure substantially affects the competitive position of their members. Next, their members’ commercial results develop less favourably than in the absence of the disputed measure and therefore that measure inevitably has an adverse effect on their revenues and profits. Finally, the disputed measure benefits a dominant competitor and imposes an unfair burden on their commercial activities.
57 It must in this regard be borne in mind, as regards the scope of judicial review, that it is not for the EU Courts, when considering whether the application is admissible, to make a definitive finding on the competitive relationship between the applicant’s members and the undertakings in receipt of the aid in question. It is for the applicants alone to adduce pertinent reasons to show that the aid in question may adversely affect the legitimate interests of one or more of their members by substantially affecting their position on the market in question (judgment of 26 September 2014 in Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, T‑601/11, ECR, EU:T:2014:839, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
58 It should also be borne in mind that it follows from settled case-law that the mere fact that a measure such as the contested decision may influence to some extent the competitive relationships existing on the relevant market and that the undertaking concerned was in a competitive relationship with the beneficiary of the aid cannot in any event suffice for that undertaking to be regarded as being individually concerned by that measure (see, to that effect, judgment in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
59 Therefore, an undertaking, such as a member of one of the applicants, cannot rely solely on its status as a competitor of the undertaking in receipt of aid but must additionally show that its factual circumstances distinguish it in a similar way to the undertaking in receipt of the aid (see, to that effect, judgment in Mory and Others v Commission, cited in paragraph 45 above, EU:C:2015:609, paragraph 100 and the case-law cited).
60 In the first place, and in the light of the case-law referred to in paragraphs 57 to 59 above, it must be held that the three arguments put forward by the applicants and set out in paragraph 56 are neither relevant nor sufficient to show that their members are individually concerned. In the application, the applicants refer solely to the general consequences of the disputed measure on the situation of their members. Such general consequences concern the applicants’ members in the same way as any other competitor active in online horse-race betting in France. In particular, it should first be noted that strengthening the competitive position of the PMU follows from the very existence of the aid. Next, the influence of the disputed measure on the profit margins of the applicants’ members follows from the method by which the aid is financed. Finally, the PMU is itself subject to the parafiscal levy which finances the aid.
61 In the second place, it must be noted that the applicants do not put forward concrete and sufficient evidence on the concern of their members, considered individually.
62 In the application, the applicants do not mention the names of their members, do not include specific figures and do not provide concrete evidence which would prove the substantial concern of one of their members. They merely refer to their members in the abstract and provide figures which concern the entire horse-race betting sector and sometimes even the entire online gambling sector.
63 Admittedly, in their reply, the applicants mention for the first time the names of two of their members. However, the applicants state and show solely that those two undertakings are active in the market for horse-race betting services and are subject to the parafiscal levy, which is the method of financing the disputed measure. Thus it is, for example, that in an annex to the reply the applicants merely produce a document which is intended to show, without any precise explanation, how the parafiscal levy affects the turnover of one of its members.
64 Such factors are, however, insufficient to show that one of the applicants’ members is individually concerned.
65 Consequently, it must be held that the applicants have not provided concrete and precise evidence such as to identify individually their members vis-à-vis other competitors.
66 In the third place, it should be noted that the contested decision affects the interests of all parties active in the sector of online horse-race betting in France: those which were present on that market before the contested decision was adopted, those which entered the market after the adoption of the contested decision, and those which will enter that market in the future. The applicants’ members are, accordingly, part of an indeterminate group of economic operators which might grow in number following the adoption of the contested decision. They are not part of a closed class, that is to say, a group which cannot be extended after the adoption of the contested measure (see, to that effect, order of 29 March 2012 in Asociación Española de Banca v Commission, T‑236/10, ECR, EU:T:2012:176, paragraph 39).
67 Accordingly, the applicants’ members are not affected by the contested decision by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of that decision. The applicants’ members are affected only in their objective capacity as parties subject to a parafiscal levy, in the same way as every other competitor in the sector at issue (see, to that effect, order of 27 August 2008 in Adomex v Commission, T‑315/05, EU:T:2008:300, paragraph 27, and judgment of 10 December 2008 in Kronoply and Kronotex v Commission, T‑388/02, EU:T:2008:556, paragraph 66).
68 A contrary interpretation would lead to the situation in which a new competitor, which becomes active in the sector of online horse-race betting in France after the adoption of the contested decision, could also claim to be individually affected by that decision. In other words, in a case such as the present one, in which the aid is financed through a parafiscal levy, to allow the applicants’ claims would lead to the result that every undertaking subject to such a levy, which merely alleges a financial loss linked to that levy, could claim to be individually concerned by the aid.
69 Consequently, as the applicants have not demonstrated that the contested decision affects their members for reasons other than merely their objective capacity as operators of online horse-race betting in France, nor demonstrated the extent of the potential specific impact of that decision on the economic situation of their members, they have accordingly failed to establish that the contested decision was liable to have a substantial adverse effect on the position of one or more of their members on the market concerned. The applicants’ members are therefore not individually concerned by the contested decision (see, to that effect, judgment in Dansk Automat Brancheforening v Commission, cited in paragraph 57 above, EU:T:2014:839, paragraph 52).
70 It follows that the applicants’ locus standi cannot be regarded as having been established on the basis of the locus standi of their members.
The effect on the applicants’ own interests
71 The applicants claim that at least one of them, specifically EGBA, has locus standi in view of the fact that its own interests are affected. The applicants maintain that EGBA has the status of an interested party on the ground that it submitted comments during the formal procedure before the Commission.
72 They also argue, in the reply, that at least the first plea in law, alleging infringement of the procedural guarantees provided for in Article 108(2) TFEU and the principle of sound administration and Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be declared admissible. Specifically, by their first plea in law, the applicants claim, in essence, that the Commission should have informed EGBA and requested its comments a second time when the measure initially notified was amended by the French authorities.
73 In the present case, by their action, the applicants challenge a decision adopted at the conclusion of the formal investigation procedure.
74 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, if an applicant calls into question a decision appraising the aid taken at the conclusion of the formal investigation procedure, it cannot be inferred from the mere participation of an applicant in the administrative procedure that it has locus standi (see, to that effect, the case-law cited in paragraph 49 above).
75 Accordingly, as EGBA merely submitted its comments during the formal investigation procedure, in the same way as the other interested parties, its action, and consequently the first plea in law, cannot be declared admissible on the basis of the defence of its own interests in the context of the procedure which led to the contested decision (see, to that effect, order in Asociación Española de Banca v Commission, cited in paragraph 66 above, EU:T:2012:176, paragraph 46).
76 It follows that the applicants have not established that they have locus standi in the present case and that the action must therefore be dismissed as being manifestly inadmissible.
Costs
77 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
78 Since the applicants in this case have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission.
79 Furthermore, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the French Republic is to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The action is dismissed.
2. European Gaming and Betting Association (EGBA) and The Remote Gambling Association (RGA) shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission.
3.
4. The French Republic shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 26 April 2016.