ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
13 January 2017 (*)
(Procedure — Taxation of costs)
In Case T‑88/09 DEP,
Idromacchine Srl, established in Porto Marghera (Italy),
Alessandro Capuzzo, residing in Mirano (Italy),
Roberto Capuzzo, residing in Spinea (Italy),
represented by W. Viscardini and G. Donà, lawyers,
applicants,
v
European Commission, represented by É. Gippini Fournier and D. Grespan, acting as Agents,
defendant,
APPLICATION for taxation of costs further to the judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641),
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
composed of I. Pelikánová (Rapporteur), President, V. Valančius and U. Öberg, Judges,
Registrar: E. Coulon,
makes the following
Order
Facts, procedure and forms of order sought by the parties
1 By application lodged with the Court Registry on 27 February 2009, the applicants, Idromacchine Srl and Alessandro Capuzzo and Roberto Capuzzo, each of whom holds 50% of the company capital of Idromacchine, brought an action for damages seeking an order that the European Commission pay compensation in respect of the material and non-material damage alleged to have been suffered by reason of the publication in Commission Decision C(2004) 5426 final, of 30 December 2004, ‘State aid — Italy — State Aid N 586/2003, N 587/2003, N 589/2003 and C 48/2004 (ex N 595/2003) — Extension of the 3-year delivery limit for a chemical tanker — Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 88(2) [EC]’, (OJ 2005 C 42, p. 15), of the statement according to which the provision, by Idromacchine, of tanks that did not meet quality and safety standards led to a delay in delivery of the vessels in which those tanks were to be installed.
2 By judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641), the Court dismissed as unfounded the application for damages as regards all of the alleged material damage and upheld the applicants’ application for compensation in respect of the non-material damage suffered by Idromacchine. The Court also ordered the Commission to bear its own costs and to pay two thirds of the applicants’ costs, the remaining third to be borne by the applicants.
3 By a statement of appeal lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 24 January 2012, the applicants brought an appeal against the judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641), which was dismissed by order of 3 September 2013, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (C‑34/12 P, not published, EU:C:2013:552). The Court of Justice also ordered the applicants to pay the costs relating to the appeal proceedings.
4 By email of 13 February 2014, the applicants informed the Commission that the amount that it was required to pay to them by way of ‘recoverable costs’ in the case amounted to EUR 98 598.33.
5 Following various exchanges between the parties, the Commission proposed, by letter of 9 March 2015, to pay a sum of EUR 25 000, and later, in a telephone communication of 19 May 2015 with the applicants’ lawyers, proposed to pay a sum of EUR 29 000.
6 By email dated 9 June 2015, the applicants rejected the Commission’s offer.
7 By document lodged at the Court Registry on 26 November 2015, the applicants brought the present application for taxation of costs, by which they submit that the Court should:
– fix the amount of recoverable costs in Case T‑88/09, including the present proceedings for the taxation of costs, at EUR 102 264.99;
– apply to that sum, or to the amount determined by the Court, interest for late payment, with effect from the date on which the order is delivered or, at the latest, from the date on which it is notified, until the date of actual recovery, calculated on the basis of the rate applied by the European Central Bank (ECB) to its principal refinancing operations, in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the due date falls, increased by three and a half percentage points, or, in the alternative, increased by two percentage points.
8 In its observations, lodged at the Court Registry on 19 January 2016, the Commission contends that the Court should:
– fix the costs necessarily incurred by the applicants for Case T‑88/09 at a total amount not exceeding EUR 36 000.
– hold it liable for two thirds of the total amount of the recoverable costs.
Law
9 In accordance with Article 170(3) of its Rules of Procedure, if there is a dispute concerning the costs to be recovered, the General Court is required, on application by the party concerned and after giving the party concerned by the application an opportunity to submit its observations, to make an order, from which no appeal may lie.
The recoverability of the costs incurred by the applicants
10 Under Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, expenses necessarily incurred by the parties for the purposes of the proceedings, in particular the travel and subsistence expenses and the remuneration of agents, advisers or lawyers, are regarded as recoverable costs.
11 According to the settled case-law on Article 91(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, the content of which is identical to that of Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, it follows from that provision that recoverable costs are limited, first, to those incurred for the purpose of the proceedings before the General Court and, second, to those which were necessary for that purpose (see order of 25 March 2014, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑126/11 P‑DEP, not published, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
12 In fixing the recoverable costs, the Court is required to take account of all the circumstances of the case up to the making of the order on taxation of costs, including expenses necessarily incurred in relation to the taxation of costs proceedings (order of 25 March 2014, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑126/11 P‑DEP, not published, EU:T:2014:171, paragraph 27).
13 In the present case, the applicants invoke various costs and fees, namely lawyers’ fees, charged in accordance with hourly and non-hourly rates, costs of telephone notifications and conferences, emails and faxes, letters and photocopies, costs relating to a technical-accounting expert’s report (‘the expert’s report’), travel costs and allowances relating to the hearing of 8 February 2011, and a flat-rate amount of 5% of the fees by way of ‘reimbursement of general expenses’.
14 The Commission disputes the recoverability of the costs relating to the expert’s report, the fees for communications and the flat-rate amount for general expenses.
15 In the first place, as regards the lawyers’ fees, it is not disputed that fees in respect of work properly described as legal work are recoverable. In the present case, however, the applicants also seek to recover lawyers’ fees in respect of specific services, billed by the item, namely telephone notifications and conferences, emails, faxes and letters.
16 It must be held, in this regard, that, to the extent to which certain of the specific services set out in paragraph 15 above concern actual legal work, the fees relating to them are already included in the amount of fees charged by the hour and cannot be the subject of an additional invoice without permitting the duplication of fees, as the Commission rightly contends. Furthermore, to the extent to which other services amongst those cited in paragraph 15 above concern ancillary work of an administrative nature, which cannot therefore be remunerated by fees, those costs constitute general expenses, which are in principle recoverable. However, as the Commission correctly emphasises, in so far as the applicants also request a flat-rate reimbursement of general expenses, it is necessary to ensure that there is no double recovery in respect of those expenses.
17 Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the Court must primarily take into account the total number of hours of work which may appear to be objectively necessary for the purpose of the proceedings before the Court, irrespective of the number of lawyers who may have provided the services in question (orders of 30 October 1998, Kaysersberg v Commission, T‑290/94 (92), EU:T:1998:255, paragraph 20; of 15 March 2000, Enso-Gutzeit v Commission, T‑337/94 (92), EU:T:2000:76, paragraph 20; and of 28 June 2004, Airtours v Commission, T‑342/99 DEP, EU:T:2004:192, paragraph 30). It must be observed, in this regard, that the number of hours billed in parallel by the applicants’ two representatives, in particular for conferences at their law offices with the clients, the examination of the file, the examination of the defence and the rejoinder, the examination of the report for the hearing, the preparation for the hearing and participation in the hearing, is manifestly excessive and cannot be regarded, overall, as necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the General Court.
18 In the second place, as regards the costs relating to the expert’s report, it is clear from the case-law that, in cases involving findings of an essentially economic nature, the involvement of economic advisers or experts in addition to the work of legal advisers may sometimes prove necessary and thus give rise to costs that are recoverable under Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure (see, to that effect, order of 19 December 2006, WestLB v Commission, T‑228/99 DEP, not published, EU:T:2006:405, paragraph 78 and the case-law cited).
19 In order for that to be the case, such involvement must be objectively necessary for the purposes of the proceedings. That may be the case, inter alia, where the expert evidence is crucial for the outcome of the case, such that its production by one party has spared the Court the need to commission an expert’s report in the context of its powers pursuant to Article 25 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure (order of 19 December 2006, WestLB v Commission, T‑228/99 DEP, not published, EU:T:2006:405, paragraph 79).
20 That, however, is not the case here. The expert’s report sought, according to the applicants, through the use of a qualified, independent external person, to give greater reliability to the commercial and economic data taken into consideration by the applicants to prove the damage and the causal link with the conduct alleged against the Commission. It must be observed, in this regard, that, first, the expert’s report in fact consisted, according to the description of its subject matter by the expert itself, a firm of auditors, in a mere verification of the compatibility of the figures contained in sections 1, 2 and 3 of a ‘technical-accounting’ report on the steam generators sector, prepared by the applicants, with the written accounts, annual reviews, figures and information contained in commercial correspondence and other sources cited in that report. The report was in reality, therefore, a certificate of accuracy rather than an expert’s report.
21 Second, the certified report concerned, above all, the particulars of the material damage that the applicants claimed before the Court. By contrast, as regards the non-material loss, it merely proposed that an amount should be determined on an equitable basis at between 30% and 50% of the material damage claimed, itself calculated at EUR 5 459 641.28, without setting out the arguments and evidence on which it relied to justify that range. Given that the Court, first, rejected as unfounded all of the applicants’ claims in regard to material damage and, second, expressly rejected the method of calculation and amount of non-material loss claimed by the applicants in order, ultimately, to fix the latter at EUR 20 000 (judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641, paragraphs 74 and 76), it must be held that the certified report was neither necessary nor useful for the purposes of the proceedings.
22 It is true that the lack of necessity and usefulness, for the purposes of the proceedings, of evidence produced before the Court cannot be deduced merely from the fact that an applicant did not succeed on a certain point or that the Court did not uphold the facts that that evidence was intended to prove, on pain of penalising a party for having attempted to comply fully with its obligation to prove the facts on which it relies. However, in the present case, the certification of the ‘technical accounting’ report produced by the applicants did not spare the Court, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 19 above, from the need to commission an expert’s report in accordance with its powers under Article 25 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 91 of the Rules of Procedure. It follows from paragraphs 104 to 115 of the judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641) that the Court’s rejection of the applicants’ arguments as regards the material damage, claimed to be demonstrated by the certified report, was due to the fact that the applicants had not established that there was a causal link between the Commission’s unlawful conduct and the harm alleged. The Court therefore had no need, failing the certificate produced by the applicants, to order an expert’s report in order to verify the data presented by the applicants.
23 Consequently, the costs relating to the expert’s report are not recoverable.
24 Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ argument that the Court itself, before which they had claimed recovery of the costs of the expert’s report by way of compensation for material damage suffered, confirmed that such costs incurred by the parties for the purposes of the judicial proceedings could not be regarded as constituting damage distinct from the burden of the costs of the proceedings (judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641, paragraph 98), suffice it to observe that, while the Court thus indicated that the costs of the expert’s report were part of the costs of the proceedings, it did not make any finding whatsoever as to whether they were recoverable, within the meaning of Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure.
25 In the third place, the communications costs are in principle recoverable, with the exception of those relating to the internal communications between the applicants’ lawyers from their offices in Brussels (Belgium) and Padua (Italy). It should be recalled that the costs of communications between two lawyers representing the same party cannot be justified as expenses that have been necessarily incurred (see, to that effect, order of 20 November 2012, Al Shanfari v Council and Commission, T‑121/09 DEP, not published, EU:T:2012:607, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). To the extent to which those communications are not identified amongst the entirety of the communications claimed by the applicants, it seems preferable to order the reimbursement of communications costs on the basis of a flat rate, under the heading of general expenses.
26 In the fourth place, the photocopying costs claimed by the applicants in the present case are recoverable costs, this not being disputed by the Commission.
27 In the fifth place, as regards the costs relating to the hearing, it must be observed that, first, a ‘travel allowance’ does not appear to be necessary, given that remuneration for attendance at the hearing is included in the fees claimed. Second, contrary to the Commission’s view, the presence of two lawyers at the hearing does not appear to be excessive, having regard to the matters at issue in the case, with the result that the costs of travel and accommodation connected with their participation in the hearing are recoverable.
28 In the sixth place, while general expenses are, admittedly, recoverable costs, under Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, the proportion of 5% of the fees of the applicants’ lawyers’ is, in the present case, excessive. In the circumstances of the present case, a rate of 2% of those fees seems appropriate in order to determine the amount of general expenses other than the costs of photocopies, which are recoverable.
The amount of the recoverable costs
29 As regards the amount of the recoverable costs, it must be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in the absence of any provisions of EU law laying down tariffs, the Court must freely assess the details of the case, taking account of the subject matter and the nature of the dispute, its importance from the point of view of EU law, and the difficulties presented by the case, the amount of work which the contentious proceedings generated for the agents or counsel involved, and the economic interests which the dispute presented for the parties (order of 19 December 2006, WestLB v Commission, T‑228/99 DEP, not published, EU:T:2006:405, paragraph 61).
30 In the first place, the importance of the economics interests at issue cannot be determined by the total amount of damages claimed in the main proceedings by the applicants, in the context of a claim for compensation such as that made in the present case. As the Commission submits, such an approach would be likely to encourage applicants to lodge exorbitant claims. In the present case, having regard to the facts of the case, the economic interests at issue must be regarded as having been of limited importance.
31 In the second place, as regards the importance of the dispute assessed from the point of view of EU law and the difficulties presented by the case, it must be observed that the dispute concerned an action for compensation in respect of damage alleged to have been caused by unlawful conduct on the part of the Commission, a matter which is the subject of extensive case-law as to the conditions to be satisfied for non-contractual liability of the European Union to be incurred and the quantification of damage. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Commission’s conduct was not contested as regards the facts and, consequently, the dispute was limited to the legal classification of that conduct, establishment of a causal link and the quantification of damage. In those circumstances, the importance and difficulty of the dispute must be regarded as average.
32 In the third place, as regards the extent of the work provided, the limited importance of the economic interests at issue and the average level of legal importance and difficulty of the dispute do not justify the 486 hours of work which the applicants’ lawyers state that they devoted to the case in the main proceedings and do not allow the Court to regard as objectively necessary, within the meaning of Article 140(b) of the Rules of Procedure, the full amount of EUR 118 700 fees billed in accordance with the hourly rates which they put forward, in particular as the costs of coordinating the work of the applicants’ various advisors cannot be regarded as necessary costs to be taken into account in calculating the amount of recoverable costs (see, to that effect, order of 20 November 2012, Al Shanfari v Council and Commission, T‑121/09 DEP, not published, EU:T:2012:607, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
33 It must be held, first, that a total of 241 hours of work to study the case in the main proceedings, draft the mandate and draft the application appears excessive. Having regard to the findings set out in paragraphs 30 and 31 above, a total of 85 hours of work appear to be an appropriate estimate of the time necessary for an experienced lawyer in that field to provide those services.
34 Secondly, the applicants claim for four hours of work for the drafting of an application for a review of the Court’s decision on the request for anonymity and not to publish certain data. Given that that application, which was rejected by the Court, merely reproduced evidence and arguments already contained in the initial request for anonymity submitted in the application and rejected by the Court, the hours of work involved cannot be regarded as necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
35 Thirdly, the 148 hours of work recorded by the applicants for examination of the defence and drafting of the reply appear excessive. Having regard to the findings set out in paragraphs 30 and 31 above and the amount of time regarded as appropriate for the study of the case in the main proceedings and the drafting of the mandate and the application, referred to in paragraph 33 above, a total of 35 hours of work appears appropriate as an estimate of the time necessary for a lawyer with experience of that area of law to provide those services.
36 Fourthly, the applicants claim 20 hours of work for the examination of the rejoinder, six hours of work for discussion with the clients, two hours of work for drafting the request for additional speaking time at the hearing, 14 hours of work to examine the report for the hearing and draft observations thereon, and 47 hours of work to prepare for the hearing. As the Commission correctly points out, that working time – a total of 89 hours – appears greatly excessive. In particular, the examination of the rejoinder and the report for the hearing are integral parts of preparation for the hearing; the report for the hearing comprised only 13 pages, and set out a summary of the parties’ grounds and arguments which were already well known to the applicants’ lawyers; the hearing itself was straightforward and lasted only two hours, without additional speaking time having been granted to the parties. In those circumstances, a total of 24 hours of work seems appropriate as an estimation of the time necessary for an experienced lawyer to provide those services. Similarly, four hours of work must be regarded as necessary for participation in the hearing itself (two hours of work for each of the applicants’ two lawyers)
37 Fifthly, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the Court is not empowered to tax the fees payable by the parties to their own lawyers, but may determine the amount of those fees to be recovered from the party ordered to pay the costs. When ruling on an application for the taxation of costs, the Court is therefore not obliged to take account of any national scales of lawyers’ fees or any agreement concluded in relation to fees between the party concerned and its agents or advisors (orders of 8 November 1996, Stahlwerke Peine-Salzgitter v Commission, T‑120/89 (92), EU:T:1996:161, paragraph 27, and of 10 January 2002, Starway v Council, T‑80/97 DEP, EU:T:2002:1, paragraph 26).
38 In the present case, the fees charged by the applicants’ lawyers appear to be consistent with the degree of complexity of the dispute. Thus, a rate such as that billed for the work done by Ms W. Viscardini, namely EUR 300 per hour, is indeed consistent with that of a professional having substantial experience in the area in question. The fees billed for the work of Ms G. Donà, namely EUR 200 per hour, are also consistent with fees generally charged for an assistant lawyer, but one who also has a certain degree of experience. Having regard to the case-law referred to in paragraph 17 above, it is necessary therefore to apply a single rate in the case of EUR 250 per hour to the hours of work recognised as being necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
39 It follows that the costs recoverable by the applicants from the Commission, in respect of lawyers’ fees, come to a total amount of EUR 37 000, that is to say, EUR 21 250 for studying the case in the main proceedings and drafting the mandate and the application, EUR 8 750 for examining the defence and drafting the reply, EUR 6 000 for preparing for the hearing and EUR 1 000 for taking part in the hearing itself.
40 In the fourth place, photocopying costs in the amount of EUR 411 do not seem excessive and, moreover, are not contested by the Commission, with the result that they must be accepted as necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court.
41 In the fifth place, concerning the costs relating to the hearing, as the Commission observes, having regard to the fact that the general expenses other than photocopying costs are the subject of a flat-rate reimbursement calculated by applying a percentage to the fees of the applicants’ lawyers, it is not necessary to make an additional reimbursement for ‘expenses ancillary to the hearing’, as the applicants have claimed, without providing any detail as to the nature of those expenses. Taking those facts into account, it is appropriate to fix an amount of EUR 1 082 as recoverable costs in respect of the costs relating to the hearing, which covers the travel and accommodation costs of the applicants’ two lawyers.
42 In the sixth place, as regards the general expenses other than the photocopying costs, as is set out in paragraph 28 above, it is appropriate to reimburse those expenses on the basis of a flat rate, of EUR 740, which represents 2% of the fees of the applicants’ lawyers held to be necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, as stated in paragraph 39 above.
43 In the seventh place, as regards the costs incurred in relation to the present proceedings for the taxation of costs, which the applicants estimate at EUR 5 000 (20 hours of work, charged at a rate of EUR 250 per hour), suffice it to observe that those costs were not necessary for the purposes of the proceedings before the Court, since the Commission had proposed, at the pre-litigation stage, to pay a sum exceeding that which the Court considers to be necessary (see paragraph 5 above).
44 In the light of all of the foregoing considerations, all of the costs recoverable by the applicants with regard to the main proceedings before the Court will be fairly assessed by fixing their amount at EUR 39 233, that is to say, EUR 37 000 in respect of the fees of their lawyers in the main proceedings, EUR 411 in respect of photocopying costs, EUR 1 082 in respect of costs relating to the hearing and EUR 740 in respect of general expenses other than photocopying costs.
45 Of that total amount of EUR 39 233, a sum of EUR 26 155, that is to say, two thirds, is to be borne by the Commission, in accordance with the judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission (T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641).
The argument alleging a breach of the right of access to justice
46 The applicants submit that, if the Court does not accept that the costs which they claim to have actually incurred are recoverable, this would result in a breach of the right of access to justice protected by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’). According to the applicants, if, in the present case, the sum of EUR 20 000 awarded to them by the Court as compensation for non-material damage were ‘neutralised’ by the costs that remained to be borne by them, this would amount to a denial of justice.
47 The Commission disputes those arguments.
48 It should be recalled, first of all, that the principle of effective judicial protection is a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which provides, under its first paragraph, that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that article and, under its second paragraph, which corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR, that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law (judgment of 28 February 2013, review of the judgment in Arango Jaramillo and Others v EIB, C‑334/12 RX-II, EU:C:2013:134, paragraphs 40 to 42).
49 The applicants do not claim, in the present case, that the exercise of their right of access to justice has been restricted, but submit, in essence, that that right would be deprived of its substance if the portion of their costs in Case T‑88/09 that remained to be borne by them were to exceed the amount of compensation awarded to them by the Court in this case, because that would have the effect of depriving them of that compensation.
50 It should be observed, in this regard, that, except in the case of legal aid, which is not relevant in the present case, the costs of representation by a lawyer are incurred by anyone bringing an action before a court requiring such representation, in the same way as other costs relating to the enforcement of that person’s rights, such as the costs occasioned in obtaining certificates or experts’ reports intended to demonstrate that that person’s legal claims are well founded. The fact that, in the event of merely partial success of the claim, a portion of those costs may remain to be borne by the applicant is inherent in the general rule as to the allocation of the costs incurred, in particular in Article 87(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, according to which, in such cases, the costs could be shared. Similarly, the fact that certain costs incurred by a party may be held to be non-recoverable and thus remain to be borne by that party is inherent in Article 170 of the Rules of Procedure, according to which the Court is to determine the costs to be recovered if there is a dispute between the parties. The application of those provisions cannot constitute a breach of the right of access to justice, including in a case where, as in the present case, the amount of costs that remains to be borne by the applicant exceeds the amount awarded to him in the main proceedings by the Court. The question as to the amount of costs that remain to be borne by the applicant is different from and independent of the question as to the amount that the defendant institution is to be ordered to pay in the main action.
51 That conclusion is not undermined by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights relied on by the applicants, in which it was held, in essence, that the application of rules relating to legal costs that have the effect of depriving the applicant of almost all the compensation that the State had been ordered to pay to him for his un-justified pre-trial detention amounted to a breach of his right of access to a court. Suffice it to point out, in this regard, that the issue in that case related to court fees collected by the State, which had been ordered to pay compensation to the applicant, which might have created the impression that the State was taking back with one hand what it had paid with the other by way of compensation for a breach of the ECHR (ECtHR, 12 July 2007, Stankov v. Bulgaria, CE:ECHR:2007:0712JUD006849001, §§ 51 to 67). In the present case, however, since the proceedings before the European Union Courts are in principle free of charge, applicants are merely required to bear a portion of the fees and costs of their own lawyers, which are amounts that, by their nature, cannot be influenced by the Commission.
52 Consequently, the argument alleging a breach of the right of access to justice must be rejected.
The claim for default interest
53 The applicants request that default interest be added to the amount of recoverable costs with effect from the date of the order or, at the latest, from the date of its notification, until the date of actual recovery of those costs.
54 In this regard, it should be borne in mind that a finding, where appropriate, that there is an obligation to pay default interest and the setting of the applicable rate is within the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 170(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure (order of 23 May 2014, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑286/11 P-DEP, not published, EU:T:2014:312, paragraph 25).
55 According to settled case-law, an application, made in the course of proceedings for taxation of costs, for default interest to be added to the amount due must be allowed for the period between the date of notification of the order of taxation of costs and the date of actual recovery of the costs (see order of 24 October 2011, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑176/04 DEP II, not published, EU:T:2011:616, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited).
56 Having regard to the facts of the case, the Court considers it appropriate to calculate the rate of interest applicable on the basis of the rate applied by the ECB for its main refinancing operations and in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline for payment falls, increased by three and a half points.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The total amount of the costs to be reimbursed by the European Commission to Idromacchine Srl, Alessandro Capuzzo and Roberto Capuzzo is fixed at EUR 26 155.
2. Late payment interest shall be due on that amount from the date of notification of the present order until the date of payment of the total amount due, at the rate applied by the European Central Bank for its main refinancing operations and in force on the first calendar day of the month in which the deadline for payment falls, increased by three and a half points.
Luxembourg, 13 January 2017.