JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
23 July 2025 (*) (1)
( Public procurement – Protection of the European Union’s financial interests – Action for annulment – Lack of direct concern – Partial inadmissibility – Criteria for exclusion from participation in public procurement procedures – Concept of ‘final judgment that the person or entity is guilty’ – Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 – Persons who have powers of representation, decision or control with regard to a person or entity who is excluded – Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046 – Obligation to state reasons – Proportionality )
In Case T‑113/24,
Lattanzio KIBS SpA, established in Milan (Italy),
CY,
CV,
CW,
represented by M. Hommé and B. O’Connor, lawyers,
applicants,
v
European Commission, represented by F. Moro and P. Rossi, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),
composed of A. Kornezov (Rapporteur), President, K. Kecsmár and S. Kingston, Judges,
Registrar: P. Cullen, Administrator,
having regard to the order of 8 May 2024, Lattanzio KIBS and Others v Commission (T‑113/24 R, not published, EU:T:2024:306),
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 15 January 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By their action pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Lattanzio KIBS SpA (‘LKIBS’), CY, CV and CW, seek the annulment of Commission Decision Ares(2023) 8545235 of 13 December 2023 relating to the proceedings for the exclusion of LKIBS from participating in award procedures for public procurements and grants governed by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 and Regulation (EU) 2018/1877 (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 By decision of 20 July 2020, bearing the reference Ares(2020) 3816259, the European Commission decided to exclude Lattanzio Advisory SpA from participating in public procurements procedures for awards of contracts financed by the general budget of the European Union and from participating in procedures for the grant of EU funds under Council Regulation (EU) 2015/323 of 2 March 2015 on the financial regulation applicable to the 11th European Development Fund (OJ 2015 L 58, p. 17) for the period from 27 July 2020 to 26 July 2024, and ordered that the exclusion be published on its internet site, on the ground that there were a number of irregularities committed by that company in the context of certain public procurement procedures for awards of contracts financed by the European Union in North Macedonia.
3 On 27 July 2020, Lattanzio Advisory informed the Commission that, on 25 June 2020, it had changed its name and legal form to LA International Cooperation Srl (‘LAIC’). On 18 August 2020, the Commission informed LAIC that the change of name and legal form did not have any effect on the exclusion decision of 20 July 2020.
4 By judgment of 13 July 2021, which became final on 8 October 2021, the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan, Italy), imposed, first, on ‘Lattanzio Advisory Spa (now LAIC)’ a fine of EUR 80 000, and, second, on CY and CV a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment for, inter alia, acts of corruption (‘the judgment of the District Court of Milan’), corresponding in essence to the irregularities that were the reason for the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above being adopted.
5 By decision of 11 October 2022, the Commission reduced the exclusion period of four years, imposed by the decision referred to in paragraph 2 above, to three years and nine months. The exclusion period therefore ended on 26 April 2024.
6 In July 2022, February 2023 and May 2023, LKIBS submitted requests to participate in three public procurement procedures for the award of contracts financed by the European Union (NEAR/TGD/2022/EA RP/0075 – Montenegro, July 2022; NEAR/TGD/2022/EA RP/0241 – Montenegro, February 2023 and NEAR/BAK/2023/EA RP/0055 – Azerbaijan, May 2023). When submitting those requests, LKIBS accredited its own experience in projects financed by the European Union by referring to earlier projects implemented by LAIC. Asked by the Commission for the reasons justifying those references, LKIBS said that it had acquired the branch of LAIC responsible for carrying out those projects. LKIBS also submitted declarations on honour stating that it was not excluded.
7 The Commission rejected those three requests on the ground that LKIBS had presented incomplete or misleading information.
8 By letter of 7 August 2023, the Commission informed LKIBS of its intention to exclude it from participating in procedures for awards financed by the general budget of the European Union and the European Development Fund until 26 April 2024 on the basis of Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 (OJ 2018 L 193, p. 1) on the ground that LKIBS had participated in the three procedures referred to in paragraph 6 above while being in a situation of exclusion referred to in that provision.
9 On 13 December 2023, the Commission adopted the contested decision by which, first, LKIBS was excluded, until 26 April 2024, from participating in award procedures for public procurements and grants governed, inter alia, by Regulation 2018/1046 or from being selected for the implementation of funds governed, inter alia, by that regulation, secondly, the information relating to the exclusion imposed on LKIBS was published on the website of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), in accordance with Article 140(1) of Regulation 2018/1046 and, thirdly, CY and CV were registered in the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) database in accordance with Article 142(3)(c) of that regulation, as persons with power of representation, decision or control over LKIBS.
Forms of order sought
10 The applicants claim that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order the Commission to pay the costs.
11 The Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as inadmissible in so far as it was brought by CW, and, in any event, as unfounded in its entirety;
– order the applicants to pay the costs.
Law
Admissibility of the action in so far as it is brought by CW
12 The Commission contends that the action is inadmissible in so far as it is brought by CW, as the contested decision is not of direct or individual concern to him. That decision does not produce direct legal effects for him and has no legal consequences, even indirectly, for his individual situation, because it does not prevent CW from participating in award procedures governed by Regulation 2018/1046. Subsidiarily, the Commission submits that CW has no interest in bringing an action against the contested decision because, in essence, its annulment would not procure any advantage for him.
13 The applicants submit that, even if the contested decision is addressed solely to LKIBS, CY and CV, CW’s application to bring the present action is admissible. They argue that CW is directly and individually concerned by the contested decision within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU since it directly identifies him and is based on findings of fact relating to him. Since CW has not had the opportunity to submit observations on those findings of fact, the contested decision infringes his rights of defence, enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’).
14 Under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may bring an action for annulment, inter alia, against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them. Since CW is not the addressee of the contested decision, he must show that that decision is of direct and individual concern to him.
15 As regards the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the decision against which the action is brought, laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law, that condition requires two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, second, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from the EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 42).
16 In the present case, it is clear from the contested decision that it imposes certain measures in respect of LKIBS, CY and CV only. Pursuant to Article 1 of that decision, LKIBS is excluded from any award procedure governed, inter alia, by Regulation 2018/1046 or from being selected for the implementation of funds covered by that regulation. Pursuant to Article 2 of that decision, the information relating to the exclusion imposed on LKIBS is published on the DG NEAR internet site. Finally, in accordance with Article 3 of that decision, CY and CV were registered in the EDES database.
17 CW is not, however, the subject of any of the measures imposed by the contested decision, with the result that it produces no direct effect on his legal situation.
18 Admittedly, CW’s name is referred to in the grounds of the contested decision. Thus, inter alia, in recital 56 of that decision, it is stated that ‘CW would have an interest to act in concert’ with CY and CV and that CY, CV and CW ‘have the possibility and the incentives to act in concert in the management of LKIBS’. However, those references are made in the context of the examination of the powers of decision and control held by CY and CV in relation to LKIBS and merely seek to describe the context within which those powers were exercised, given that CW was the [confidential] (2) of LKIBS; they are not intended to produce any direct effect whatsoever on CW’s legal situation. In addition, there is nothing in the contested decision to indicate that the acts of corruption that justified the adoption of that decision were attributable to CW; all the more so since the judgment of the District Court of Milan did not impose any fine or penalty on him and did not even refer to him.
19 Furthermore, when asked about this at the hearing, the applicants, who bear the burden of proving that the condition of direct effect with respect to CW is satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 September 2021, Front Polisario v Council, T‑279/19, EU:T:2021:639, paragraph 140), have failed to specify how the contested decision produced direct effects on the latter’s legal situation.
20 In those circumstances, it must be held that the criterion of direct effect, recalled in paragraph 15 above, is not satisfied, and that, consequently, CW does not have standing to bring the present action.
Substance
21 In support of their action, the applicants rely on eight pleas in law, alleging, in essence: (i) a manifest error of assessment in that the Commission regarded the judgment of the District Court of Milan as being a final judgment establishing that CY and CV were guilty of corruption; (ii) an infringement of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046; (iii) that the Commission took national law into account in the application of that provision; (iv) an infringement of Article 136(4) of Regulation 2018/1046; (v), a failure to state reasons; (vi) an infringement of the principle of proportionality provided for in Article 136(3) of Regulation 2018/1046 and of Article 5(4) TEU; (vii) an infringement of Article 136(6)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046; and, (viii) an infringement of the right to be heard enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter.
The first, second and third pleas, alleging, in essence, an infringement of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046
22 By their first three pleas in law, which it is appropriate to examine together, the applicants submit, in essence, that the Commission infringed Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 in that it considered that the judgment of the District Court of Milan was a final judgment which established that CY and CV were guilty of acts of corruption.
23 By the first plea, the applicants submit that the Commission wrongly classified the ‘patteggiamento’ procedure, which led to the delivery of the judgment of the District Court of Milan, provided for in Article 444 of the Codice di procedura penale (Code of Criminal Procedure) as a ‘plea bargain’ procedure and that, in the context of that procedure, CY and CV had acknowledged their guilt. That conclusion is wrong, since, by delivering a judgment on the basis of that provision, the national court did not make an assessment of the facts or of the guilt of the defendants.
24 Furthermore, it follows from Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a judgment delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code is not a judgment of conviction. That first provision provides that such a judgment may be only be considered ‘equivalent’ to a conviction, which implicitly demonstrates that a ‘patteggiamento’ judgment cannot be classified as a judgment of conviction.
25 By the second plea, the applicants submit that the Commission infringed Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 in regarding the judgment of the District Court of Milan as a valid basis for excluding LKIBS from participating in award procedures governed, inter alia, by Regulation 2018/1046. While they do not dispute that the judgment of the District Court of Milan is a final judgment, they submit that it does not establish that CY and CV are guilty of the crime of corruption.
26 By the third plea, the applicants submit that the Commission was obliged to take national law into consideration when interpreting the judgment of the District Court of Milan. In particular, it should have considered that judgment in the light of Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, from which it is clear that a judgment delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code may not be used in an administrative procedure such as that which led to the adoption of the contested decision.
27 The Commission submits that the first three pleas should be rejected.
28 Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 provides that ‘the authorising officer responsible shall exclude a person or entity referred to in Article 135(2) from participating in award procedures governed by this Regulation or from being selected for implementing Union funds where that person or entity is in one or more of the following exclusion situations: … it has been established by a final judgment that the person or entity is guilty of … corruption, as defined in Article 4(2) of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 or … as defined in other applicable laws’.
29 In the contested decision, the Commission found, in essence, that the judgment of the District Court of Milan was a final judgment and that, by requesting and consenting to the application of a reduced penalty, CY and CV had acknowledged their guilt in respect of acts of corruption within the meaning of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046.
30 In that regard, first, it must be held that it is clear from that judgment that CY and CV, in their capacity of [confidential] of the ‘Lattanzio Group’, including Lattanzio Advisory, which became LAIC, and other companies in that group, were accused by the public prosecutor’s office with conduct of the case, inter alia, of corruption within the meaning of the Italian Criminal Code. Those persons offered sums of money to officials of the Republic of North Macedonia and agreed with them on payments of sums of money and other services or benefits in order to obtain the stable reliance of those officials in the interests of Lattanzio Advisory and the ‘Lattanzio Group’ in the context of calls for tenders for contracts financed by the European Union in that State.
31 Secondly, it is clear from that judgment that the accused persons submitted a request for the special form of procedure provided for in Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be applied and that the public prosecutor’s office agreed to that request.
32 Thirdly, the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan) found, in essence, that the evidence before it demonstrated sufficiently, first, that there were incriminating facts, next, that those facts corresponded to a criminal offence, inter alia, that of corruption within the meaning of the Italian Criminal Code, and, finally, that those facts could be attributed to the accused persons. The Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan) also found that: there were no grounds for extinguishing the offence, nor defects in the procedure, as could be inferred from the investigatory measures and, in particular, the sources of evidence provided; that the parties had validly given their consent; that the facts alleged against the accused persons had been correctly classified in law; and, that the penalty negotiated was appropriate for the criminal offence at issue.
33 On the basis of those findings, the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan) imposed on CY and CV a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment and on Lattanzio Advisory, which became LAIC, a financial penalty of EUR 80 000.
34 Thus it is clear from the judgment of the District Court of Milan, as confirmed by the applicants at the hearing, in essence, that there was sufficient proof of the incriminating facts, which were classified in law as being acts of corruption within the meaning of the Italian Criminal Code; that those acts could be attributed, notably, to CY and CV; and, that a suspended sentence of imprisonment was imposed on them for those acts. In addition, a financial penalty was imposed on Lattanzio Advisory, which became LAIC, for the same acts.
35 As regards the question whether the judgment of the District Court of Milan constitutes a final judgment establishing that the persons and entities concerned were guilty of corruption, within the meaning of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046, it is common ground between the parties that that judgment is a final judgment.
36 As regards the condition that it must be established, by such a final judgment, that the person or entity in question is guilty of acts of corruption, it should be observed that the wording of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 does not specify whether a final judgment delivered in the context of a special form or criminal procedure, such as the ‘patteggiamento’ procedure provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which, without formally declaring that the accused persons are guilty of acts of corruption, established that the acts may be attributed to them and imposes, for those acts, a sentence and a financial penalty, must be regarded as satisfying that condition.
37 In those circumstances, it is necessary to give a contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 March 2020, Bank BGŻ BNP Paribas, C‑183/18, EU:C:2020:153, paragraphs 42 and 43).
38 As regards the context of that provision, it must be observed that the provisions of Regulation 2018/1046, including those in Title V, Chapter 2, Section 2 thereof, relating to the Early Detection and Exclusion System, which includes Article 136(1)(d)(ii), of that regulation, are administrative and not criminal provisions. In particular, pursuant to Article 91 of Regulation 2018/1046, which is within Title IV, under Section 1 of Chapter 5, entitled ‘liability of financial actors’, is without prejudice to any liability under criminal law which financial actors may incur as provided for in applicable national law and in the provisions in force concerning the protection of the financial interests of the European Union and the fight against corruption involving EU officials or officials of Member States.
39 Thus, as an administrative provision, Article 136(1)(d) of Regulation 2018/1046 does not seek to establish the criminal liability, in national law, of a natural or legal person, but merely defines the cases in which that person must be excluded from award procedures governed by that regulation, which includes cases of corruption, which is referred to in Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of that regulation.
40 As regards the teleological interpretation of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046, it must be noted that it is clear from both recital 64 of that regulation and in Article 135(1) thereof that the objective of the exclusion system is to ensure the protection of the financial interests of the European Union. Thus, first, Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 seeks to exclude persons and entities that, owing to their conduct, are likely to represent a risk for the financial interests of the European Union. Secondly, that provision enables the Commission to comply with the obligation of sound financial management of the EU’s resources which is imposed on it by Article 317 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgment 27 September 2023, Imdea Materiales v Commission, T‑765/21, not published, EU:T:2023:588, paragraph 81).
41 In addition, it is specifically in order to avoid the risk of harming the financial interests of the European Union that Regulation 2018/1046 lays down the cases, such as those provided for in Article 136(2) and (5), permitting the provisional exclusion of tenderers from the award procedures that it governs, even in the absence of a final judgment establishing the guilt of the persons or entities concerned.
42 Furthermore, it is settled case-law that the application of national rules must not undermine the effectiveness of an EU measure (judgment of 16 May 2024, Toplofikatsia Sofia (Concept of the defendant’s domicile), C‑222/23, EU:C:2024:405, paragraph 55). Thus, where a provision of EU law is open to several interpretations, preference must be given to the interpretation which ensures that the provision retains its effectiveness (see judgment of 23 November 2023, EVN Business Service and Others, C‑480/22, EU:C:2023:918, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
43 A strict interpretation of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046, as proposed by the applicants, would be liable to harm the effectiveness of that provision in that it would have the consequence of enabling persons and entities upon whom, by a final judgment, sentences and financial penalties have been imposed for acts of corruption nevertheless to participate in award procedures for public contracts financed by the budget of the European Union, thus posing a risk for the financial interests of the European Union and the sound financial management of its resources.
44 Therefore, it must be held that a final judgment, such as that of the judgment of the District Court of Milan, which, without giving a formal ruling on the guilt of the persons or entities accused, nevertheless establishes, in essence, that the acts of corruption that may be attributed to them and imposes on them, for those acts, a sentence and financial penalty, falls within Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046.
45 That conclusion is not called into question by the applicants’ arguments.
46 In the first place, the applicants submit that the contested decision is vitiated by several translation errors. However, even if those errors were to be established, they would have no effect on the legality of that decision, to the extent that they do not affect the interpretation of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 upheld in the present judgment, nor the essential elements of the judgment of the District Court of Milan, as summarised in paragraphs 30 to 34 above and confirmed by the parties at the hearing.
47 In the second place, the applicants alleged that the national court cannot, pursuant to Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, deliver an ‘acquittal’, within the meaning of Article 530 of that code, even if the case file includes proof of the innocence of the accused person.
48 That interpretation by the applicants of those provisions of national law, even if correct, has no effect, however, on the fact that it is clear from the judgment of the District Court of Milan, as summarised in paragraphs 30 to 34 above, inter alia, that there was sufficient proof that the acts of corruption could be attributed to CY and CV, who asked to be able to benefit from the procedure provided for in Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that, on the other hand, there was no clear proof of their innocence.
49 In the third place, the applicants submit that Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal procedure does not provide, contrary to the Commission’s finding in the contested decision, that a ‘sentenza di patteggiamento’ delivered pursuant to Article 444 of that code constitutes a criminal conviction, but only that such a judgment may be treated as equivalent to a conviction under certain conditions. In addition, they emphasise the differences between a judgment delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code and a conviction delivered on the basis of Article 533 thereof.
50 In that regard, first, it suffices to note that those arguments concern the classification in Italian law of the judgment of the District Court of Milan and the differences that may exist between the effects of such a judgment and those following a criminal conviction within the meaning of Article 533 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such difference are not capable of affecting the interpretation of Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046, which appears in paragraph 44 above.
51 Second, and in any event, it must be observed, as the Commission has done, that, in accordance with the last sentence of Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and subject to the exceptions provided for in that regard in the first two sentences of that provisions, a judgment delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code is ‘equivalent’ to a conviction.
52 Furthermore, the Court of Justice has already had occasion to hold that a judgment which has become final and delivered under the ‘patteggiamento’ procedure provided for in Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, constituted, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conditions for the application of the principle ne bis in idem enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter were met, a criminal conviction which has become final (judgment of 20 March 2018, Garlsson Real Estate and Others, C‑537/16, EU:C:2018:193, paragraphs 14, 30, 59 and 63).
53 In the fourth place, it is true, as the applicants observe, that the Commission was wrong to state, in recital 40 of the contested decision, that, in requesting and giving their consent to the application of a reduced sentence, such as that imposed on them by the Tribunale di Milano (District Court, Milan), the applicants had acknowledged their guilt. Such an explicit acknowledgement of guilt is not apparent from that judgment. However, in order to conclude that the judgment falls within Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046, the Commission did not rely solely on that acknowledgment, but it also took into account, in recitals 36 to 38 of the contested decision, the fact, recalled in paragraphs 32 and 34 above, that, according to that judgment, there was sufficient proof according to which, inter alia, the incriminating facts could be attributed to the accused persons, that Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure treats judgments delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code as being equivalent to a conviction, and that Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046 does not distinguish between final judgments according to whether or not they were delivered following an agreement made between the persons concerned and the public prosecutor’s office.
54 In the fifth place, the applicants raise an argument based on the first sentence of Article 445(1)bis of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according to which a judgment delivered on the basis of Article 444 of that code does not produce effects and cannot be used as evidence in, inter alia, administrative procedures. According to them, since the procedure which led to the adoption of the contested decision is administrative in nature, the Commission is prevented from relying on the judgment of the District Court of Milan in order to adopt it.
55 That argument must be rejected since it amounts to a submission that a provision of national law can preclude the application of a provision of EU law. That argument is therefore incompatible with the principle of the primacy of EU law, which establishes the pre-eminence of EU law over the law of the Member States. That principle therefore requires all Member State bodies to give full effect to the various EU provisions, and the law of the Member States may not undermine the effect accorded to those various provisions in the territory of those States (see judgment of 11 January 2024, Global Ink Trade, C‑537/22, EU:C:2024:6, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited), By virtue of the principle of primacy of EU law, rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of EU law (judgment of 21 December 2021, Randstad Italia, C‑497/20, EU:C:2021:1037, paragraph 52).
56 In the sixth place, the argument raised by the applicants at the hearing, based on the judgment of 18 December 2024, TP v Commission (T‑776/22, under appeal, EU:T:2024:908), must be rejected. In paragraphs 44 and 45 of that judgment, the Court held that the authorising officer responsible when adopting an exclusion measure based on Article 136(1)(b) to (d) and (f) to (h) of Regulation 2018/1046, appeared to be bound by the legal classification of the conduct in question, adopted in a final judgment or in a final administrative decision, without having the slightest margin of discretion in that regard. However, in the present case, it is not a matter of adopting a different legal classification of the conduct in question from that adopted in the judgment of the District Court of Milan, but of interpreting a provision of EU law in order to establish whether such a judgment, taking account of the legal classifications such as they are set out therein, falls within its scope.
57 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the first three pleas must be rejected as being unfounded.
The fourth plea, alleging infringement of Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046
58 The applicants submit that the Commission infringed Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046 by excluding LKIBS from participating in award procedures governed by that regulation on the ground that CY and CV effectively had powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS, within the meaning of that provision.
59 In the first place, the applicants submit that the evidence produced by the Commission is insufficient to establish that CY and CV were in a position to exercise such powers with regard to LKIBS. In addition, the Commission relied on a mere assumption that the familial relationship between CY and his daughter, [confidential], necessarily meant that he had the power of control over [confidential] voting share of LKIBS. Furthermore, the applicants dispute the Commission’s statement that CY and CV acted in concert with CW in the management of LKIBS.
60 In the second place, the applicants submit that the Commission should have taken into account the evidence showing that CV had not performed a management role within LKIBS since July 2019 and that CY has never had a representative role in LKIBS.
61 In the third place, the applicants allege that the incorrect interpretation by the Commission, namely that the judgment of the District Court of Milan constituted a conviction, also vitiated its assessment in relation to whether CY and CV had powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS.
62 The Commission submits that the fourth plea should be rejected as unfounded.
63 Pursuant to Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046 ‘the authorising officer responsible shall exclude a person or entity referred to in Article 135(2) where: … a natural or legal person who is a member of the administrative, management or supervisory body of the person or entity referred to in Article 135(2), or who has powers of representation, decision or control with regard to that person or entity, is in one or more of the situations referred to in points (c) to (h) of paragraph 1 of this Article’.
64 In the contested decision, the Commission took into account a body of evidence from which it was possible for it to conclude the CY and CV held powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS, at the time when the requests to participate in the procedures, referred to in paragraph 6, above were made by it.
65 In the first place, it is clear from the contested decision that CY and CV were the [confidential] of LKIBS. In addition, it is specified, in the contested decision, that the latter each held, directly or indirectly, [confidential] of the shares in the Lattanzio Group, which in turn held [confidential] of the capital of LKIBS, which confers on them an indirect share of [confidential] in LKIBS respectively. Together, CY and CV thus hold an indirect share of [confidential] in LKIBS, which is, as the Commission rightly indicated in the contested decision, only slightly below the threshold which would make it possible to conclude, in the absence of indications to the contrary, that they exercised joint control over LKIBS.
66 In the second place, it is clear from the information provided by LKIBS and which appears in the contested decision that the shares in the Lattanzio Group are held as follows: [confidential] (100% owned by [confidential], the daughter of CY), [confidential] by CV, [confidential] by [confidential] ([confidential] owned by CY) and [confidential] by [confidential]. LKIBS indicated, in addition, that LAIC is 100% owned by the Lattanzio Group.
67 It follows that [the daughter of CY] holds an indirect share of [confidential] in LKIBS. CY, CV and [confidential] together indirectly hold [confidential] of the shares in LKIBS.
68 It must be held that such a share suffices, in the absence of indications to the contrary, to enable those persons to exercise joint powers of decision or control with regard to that company.
69 In addition, as the Commission has observed, the connections between those persons, namely, first, the professional connection between CY and CV and, second, the familial connection between CY and [confidential], permit a finding that those persons have an interest in exercising collective powers of decision or control over LKIBS.
70 As regards, first, the professional connection between CY and CV, it must be recalled, first of all, that those persons are not merely LKIBS [confidential], but the [confidential] of the Lattanzio Group, as is clear from the judgment of the District Court of Milan. In addition, the share that they hold in LKIBS, equalling [confidential] of the vote, is only slightly lower than that which would lead to a finding that those persons exercise joint control with regard to that company. Next, as the Commission rightly observes in recitals 60 and 66 of the contested decision, it is clear from the judgment of the District Court of Milan that the acts of corruption could be attributed to both CY and CV, which is evidence of the close connections between them.
71 As regards, secondly, the familial relationship between CY and [confidential], it should be recalled, as is stated in recital 59 of the contested decision, that those persons, together with CV, indirectly hold [confidential] of the shares in LKIBS. In that regard, the Commission correctly considered, in the same recital of the contested decision, that such a joint share was sufficient to block the actions of LKIBS and that that fact, taken together with other relevant facts and circumstances examined in the contested decision, and recalled in paragraphs 65 to 67 and 70 above, made it possible to establish that those persons had an interest in exercising collective decisive influence on LKIBS, since, without their consent, LKIBS would be unable to take any operative decision.
72 In addition, it should be borne in mind that the Commission found, as it was entitled to do, that, owing to that connection, the interests of [confidential] were naturally aligned with those of her father. In order to dispute that finding, the applicants advance no specific matter capable of suggesting that [confidential] would have acted contrary to the interests of her father or that her interests diverged from his.
73 In the third place, as regards the applicants’ argument that CY and CV do not have powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS, taking into account the fact that it was CW who took all the operative decisions within LKIBS, such as participating in the award procedures in question, it must be observed that LKIBS indicated during the administrative procedure that ‘LAIC [was and had been] at the time of the three tender procedures referred to, controlled 100% by the Lattanzio Group … and that its [confidential], today and when the tenders were made, [was and had been] [CW]’. In addition, it should be noted that the applicants do not deny that CW was, at the time of participation by LKIBS in the three award procedures in question, the [confidential] both of LKIBS and of LAIC.
74 Furthermore, when submitting those requests for participation, LKIBS relied on the experience acquired by LAIC in projects financed by the European Union, specifying that LKIBS had acquired the branch of LAIC responsible for carrying out those projects. Moreover, it is clear from the contested decision that LKIBS was indebted to LAIC, which the applicants do not dispute. Those considerations support the conclusion that those companies were inter-connected.
75 Finally, as is clear from recital 56 of the contested decision, the Commission took into account a series of factors, such as the LKIBS shareholder agreement of 2 September 2022, the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings of that company and the fact that the decision of LAIC to sell that branch had been taken by CW, apparently with the consent or in execution of a decision made by CY and CV, who exercised control over that company. All of those elements tend to demonstrate, as the Commission was fully entitled to find in that recital, that CW, in his capacity of [confidential] of LKIBS, had an interest in acting in concert with CY and CV and in following their instructions in the management of that company.
76 Having regard to the elements set out in paragraphs 73 to 75 above, the Commission was fully entitled to reject the applicants’ argument that the fact that operative decisions within LKIBS were taken not by the shareholders of that company but by CW showed that CY and CV, together with [confidential], did not exercise joint control with regard to that company.
77 Furthermore, whilst they criticise that finding by the Commission, the applicants fail to advance any specific and substantiated element capable of demonstrating that, despite the evidence referred to in paragraphs 73 to 75 above, CW would have acted against the interests or instructions of those persons.
78 Having regard to the foregoing, it must be held that the Commission was fully entitled to conclude on the basis of the body of evidence set out in paragraphs 65 to 75 above, that CY and CV held powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS, within the meaning of Article 136(4)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046, at the time of the requests to participate in the award procedures in question.
79 That conclusion is not called in question by the applicants’ arguments that CY and CV were not in fact the beneficial owners of that company.
80 Admittedly, pursuant to Article 137(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1046, a participant in an award procedure governed by that regulation must declare whether the beneficial owners, as defined in Article 3(6) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ 2015 L 141, p. 73), are in one of the exclusion situations referred to in points (c) to (h) of Article 136(1). However, Article 136(4)(a) of that regulation, which is the legal basis for the exclusion of LKIBS from participating in the award procedures governed by that regulation, does not require that the ‘beneficial owners’ of the entity in question are in an exclusion situation referred to in points (c) to (h) of Article 136(1) of that same regulation, but merely requires that the natural or legal persons who have ‘powers of representation, decision or control’ with regard to that entity are in such a situation.
81 Consequently, the applicants confuse the requirements provided for in Article 137(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1046 with those set out in Article 136(4)(a) of that regulation with the result that their argument in relation to the first of those provisions can only be rejected.
82 The applicants submit, in addition, that the Commission should have carried out a more detailed examination of the management of LKIBS in order to determine the natural or legal person that held powers of representation, decision or control with regard to that company.
83 However, it suffices to observe that, in recitals 44 to 67 of the contested decision, the Commission carried out a detailed analysis of a body of evidence on the basis of which it was fully entitled to conclude that CY and CV held powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS.
84 Finally, the argument set out in paragraph 61 above must be rejected since it is founded on arguments that have been rejected in the context of three first pleas, which relate to the nature of the judgment of the District Court of Milan.
85 In the light of the foregoing, the fourth plea must be rejected as unfounded.
The fifth plea, alleging a failure to state reasons
86 First, the applicants submit that the contested decision is vitiated by a failure to state reasons as regards the finding that the judgment of the District Court of Milan is a final judgment of establishing the guilt of CY and CV within the meaning of Article 136(1)(d) of Regulation 2018/1046. Similarly, recital 3 of the contested decision, which indicates that that decision was taken in consultation with the central services of the Commission, does not contain reasons. Furthermore, the Commission has not stated its reasons for rejecting the applicants’ arguments and did not grant a meeting to CY and CV in order to explain that rejection to them. Secondly, it has not provided reasoning to the requisite legal standard for the conclusion that CY and CV exercise powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS.
87 The Commission disputes the applicants’ arguments.
88 According to established case-law, the obligation to state reasons is a general principle of EU law enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU and in Article 41(1) of the Charter, under which any legal act adopted by the EU institutions must state the reasons on which it is based. That obligation requires EU institutions to disclose clearly and unequivocally the reasons of the author of the act so as, on the one hand, to make the persons concerned aware of the reasons for the measure adopted in order to enable them to defend their rights, and, on the other, to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction (judgement of 2 October 2024, Soares v Commission, T‑606/23, not published, EU:T:2024:667, paragraph 19).
89 In addition, the requirement to state reasons must be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom that measure is of concern within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, may have in obtaining explanations. It is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 296 TFEU must be assessed with regard not only to its wording but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (judgment of 11 July 2013, Ziegler v Commission, C‑439/11 P, EU:C:2013:513, paragraph 116).
90 In the present case, it suffices to observe that, first, as regards the reasoning in the contested decision in respect of the question whether the judgment of the District Court of Milan falls within the scope of Article 136(1)(d) of Regulation 2018/1046, the Commission set out, in particular, in recitals 36 to 40 of that decision, the reasons that had led it to find that that was the case. Those recitals set out, in addition, the interpretation that the Commission had given to the relevant Italian law. In that regard, it must be held that those recitals enabled, on the one hand, the applicants to understand and challenge the contested decision on that point before the EU judicature, as is clear from the arguments raised in the first three pleas, and, on the other hand, to enable the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
91 Secondly, as regards the alleged failure to state reasons in respect of the fact that the central services of the Commission were consulted before the contested decision was adopted, it should be recalled, as is clear from the case-law set out in paragraph 89 above, that it is not necessary for the reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law. In the present case, the Commission was not required to provide additional explanations on that point, all the more so since the applicants have not explained how they could have better understood the reasons that led the Commission to adopt the contested decision if further reasons were given on that point.
92 Thirdly, as regards the reasoning in the contested decision in respect of the finding that CY and CV held powers of decision or control with regard to LKIBS, within the meaning of Article 136(4)(a) Regulation 2018/1046 at the time of the requests to participate in the award procedures in question, it suffices to note that the Commission, in recitals 44 to 63 of the contested decision, set out to the requisite legal standard its analysis of the body of evidence that led it to reach that conclusion. Those recitals make it possible, on the one hand, for the applicants to understand and challenge the contested decision on that point before the EU judicature, as is clear from the arguments raised in the fourth plea, and, on the other hand, for the Court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.
93 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the contested decision is not vitiated by a failure to state reasons and, in particular, that it enables the applicants to understand, contrary to their allegations, the reasons for the rejection of their arguments. As to the allegation that the Commission did not grant them a meeting to explain to them the rejection of their arguments, it must be held, first, that the Commission gave them an opportunity to make submissions as to their position on several occasions, as is clear from the contested decision and, secondly, that the reasons justifying the rejection of their arguments are set out with sufficient clarity in the contested decision itself.
94 Accordingly, the fifth plea must be rejected as unfounded.
The sixth plea, alleging an infringement of the principle of proportionality
95 The applicants submit that the Commission infringed the principle of proportionality when it decided, in Articles 2 and 3 of the contested decision, respectively, to publish on the DG NEAR internet site the information on the exclusion of LKIBS and to register CY and CV in the EDES database.
96 The Commission contends that the sixth plea is unfounded.
97 According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by the institutions must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary for attaining the objective pursued. The gravity of infringements has to be determined by reference to numerous factors and it is important not to confer on one or other of those factors an importance which is disproportionate in relation to other factors. The principle of proportionality requires the Commission to fix the penalty in a manner that is proportionate to the factors taken into account for the purposes of assessing the gravity of the infringement and also to apply those factors in a way which is consistent and objectively justified (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 February 2022, Companhia de Seguros Índico v Commission, T‑672/19, not published, EU:T:2022:64, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
98 Article 136(3) of Regulation 2018/1046 provides that any decision taken by the responsible authorising officer under Articles 135 to 142 is to be taken in compliance with the principle of proportionality. That provision contains a non-exhaustive list of the circumstances to be taken into account in the analysis of the proportionality of an exclusion decision, namely the seriousness of the situation, including the impact on the financial interests and image of the European Union; the time which has elapsed since the relevant conduct; the duration of the conduct and its recurrence; whether the conduct was intentional or the degree of negligence of the entity in question; whether a limited amount is at stake, as well as any mitigating circumstances, such as the degree of collaboration of the person or entity in question with the relevant competent authority and the contribution of that person or entity to the investigation.
99 First, the applicants complain that the Commission failed to take into account the time that had elapsed since the relevant conduct, within the meaning of Article 136(3)(b) of Regulation 2018/1046, and state that, in the present case, eight years had elapsed since the conduct which was the subject of the judgment of the District Court of Milan dating from 2014 and 2015.
100 That argument must be rejected since the factor relating to the time which has elapsed since the relevant conduct, within the meaning of Article 136(3)(b) of Regulation 2018/1046, must be interpreted as taking into account not only the time when the criticised conduct occurred, but also the time of the ‘finding’ of that conduct, as set out in particular by the French version of the same provision. It follows that, for the purposes of applying Article 136(1)(b) of that regulation, account must be taken of all the circumstances relating to the time elapsed since the relevant conduct, including the date when the judgment in question has become final, namely, in the present case, October 2021. Consequently, in the present case, only slightly more than two years had elapsed between that judgement and the contested decision, with the result that that fact does not involve any infringement of the principle of proportionality.
101 Secondly, the applicants allege that the Commission has not taken into account, contrary to the requirement under Article 136(3)(f)(i) of Regulation 2018/1046, the collaboration demonstrated by LKIBS, CY and CV during the administrative procedure.
102 That argument must be rejected, however, since the applicants merely state that they demonstrated ‘a high degree of collaboration’ during the administrative procedure, in referring generally to their correspondence with the Commission that appears in the annexes to the application, without however indicating the specific circumstances which permit a finding that there was such a degree of collaboration. It is settled case-law that, although the body of the application may be supported and supplemented on specific points by references to extracts from documents annexed thereto, a general reference to other documents, even those annexed to the application, cannot make up for the absence of the essential arguments in law which, in accordance with Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the General Court in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 53 of that statute, and Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, must appear in the application. The purely evidential and instrumental function of the annexes means that, provided that they contain elements of law on which certain pleas expressed in the application are based, those elements must be set out in the actual body of the application or, at the very least, be sufficiently identified in that application. Consequently, it is not for the General Court to seek and identify, in the annexes, the pleas and arguments on which it may consider the action to be based (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 March 2022, WV v EEAS, C‑162/20 P, EU:C:2022:153, paragraphs 68 to 70 and the case-law cited).
103 Thirdly, as regards the proportionality of the measure laid down in Article 2 of the contested decision, consisting of the publication of the exclusion of LKIBS on the DG NEAR internet site, the applicants submit that that publication is likely to cause serious and potentially irreparable harm to their reputation as well as serious and disproportionate financial harm.
104 In accordance with Article 140(1) of Regulation 2018/1046 ‘in order to, where necessary, reinforce the deterrent effect of the exclusion’ the Commission may publish on its internet site the name of the person or entity concerned referred to in Article 135(2) of that regulation, the exclusion situation and the duration of the exclusion and/or the amount of the financial penalty.
105 In that regard, it should be recalled that, as is clear from recitals 75 and 76 of the contested decision, the Commission took into consideration, first, the seriousness of the continued misconduct of LKIBS and of CY and CV and, secondly, the fact that publication made it possible to attain fully the effects of the exclusion of that company, referred to in Article 1 of that decision. Therefore the Commission was fully entitled to find that that publication was capable of reinforcing the deterrent effect of the exclusion by deterring not only those persons from participating again in award procedures so long as they were in an exclusion situation, but also other persons from participating in such procedures in similar circumstances. The applicants merely state that that publication ‘would not appear to materially contribute to the Commission’s goal of deterring LKIBS from participating in calls for tender’ without providing specific evidence that could substantiate that statement.
106 Likewise, the fact that such a publication may harm the applicants’ reputation and cause them financial harm is inherent in the very substance of Article 140(1) of Regulation 2018/1046, in respect of which the applicants do not plead illegality. Furthermore, the applicants have failed in any specific or substantiated way to show how that publication caused harm beyond that which is inherent in any publication contemplated pursuant to Article 140(1) of Regulation 2018/1046.
107 Fourthly, as regards the proportionality of the measure provided for in Article 3 of the contested decision, consisting of the registration of the names of CY and CV in the EDES database, the applicants submit, with reference to recitals 71 and 72 of that decision, that the Commission failed to inform them of the personal information that would be included in that database, and argue that that EU institution could have registered private and sensitive information about them there. In addition, that registration is disproportionate, since it would cause serious and potentially irreparable harm to the repudiation of CY and CV, even if it lasted for only four months. That very short duration could not materially contribute to the objective pursued.
108 In accordance with Article 142(1) of Regulation 2018/1046, ‘information exchanged within the early–detection and exclusion system referred to in Article 135 shall be centralised in a database set up by the Commission … and shall be managed in accordance with the right to privacy and other rights provided for in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001’.
109 Article 142(3)(c) of Regulation 2018/1046 provides that the information to be transmitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of that article includes, in particular, ‘information that could assist the authorising officer in carrying out the verification referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article or in taking a decision on exclusion as referred to in Article 136(1) or (2), or a decision to impose a financial penalty as referred to in Article 138’.
110 In recital 71 of the contested decision, the Commission noted that the internal EDES database should mention the names of CY and CV as persons with power of representation, decision or control with regard to LKIBS. The purpose of entering the names of those persons into the EDES database is to inform authorising officers of EU institutions and bodies that those persons are in the situation referred to in Article 136(1)(d)(ii) of Regulation 2018/1046. That same recital emphasises, in addition, that the information would be removed from the database as soon as the exclusion of LKIBS comes to an end.
111 In recital 72 of the contested decision, the Commission explained that the names of the persons concerned would not be published on its public internet site, but would only be listed in the internal EDES database which is only accessible to authorised users involved in the implementation of the EU and European Development Fund budgets.
112 In that regard, first of all, the applicants’ argument relating to the registration of CY and CV in that database infringed their right to the respect for private life, guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter, must be rejected. The applicants have not explicitly raised any plea of illegality against Article 142(3)(c) of Regulation 2018/1046. In addition, there is nothing in their arguments which permits a finding of the unlawfulness of that provision, which forms part of a coherent set of rules applicable in the field of the protection of the financial interests of the European Union (see, by analogy, judgment of 23 October 2024, Jima Projects v EUIPO – Salis Sulam (Representation of two parallel stripes on the side of a sports shoe), T‑307/23, not published, EU:T:2024:731, paragraphs 83 and 84).
113 Next, contrary to the applicants allegation, it is clear from recital 72 of the contested decision that the Commission received observations from CY and CV and took them into account with respect to the registration in question. Consequently, it cannot be held that that institution did not inform CY and CV of the intended registration.
114 Furthermore, as to the harm to the reputation of CY and CV resulting from that registration, it suffices to refer, mutatis mutandis, to paragraph 106 above.
115 Finally, contrary to the applicants’ allegations, the registration of CY and CV in the EDES database is not disproportionate, taking into account, first, the seriousness of the conduct underlying the exclusion of LKIBS provided for in Article 1 of the contested decision, as is clear from the final judgment imposing sentences on CY and CV for acts of corruption and, secondly, the short duration of that registration, of only around four months, as is clear from recitals 70 and 71 of the contested decision.
116 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the sixth plea must be rejected as unfounded.
The seventh plea, alleging an infringement of Article 136(6)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046
117 By the seventh plea, the applicants allege that the Commission infringed Article 136(6)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046 by failing to take account of the remedial measures submitted by LKIBS in its letter of 11 September 2023. In particular, they state that that provision, which states that the authorising officer is not required to take into account remedial measures where a final judgment has established that a person or entity was guilty of corruption, does not apply since CY and CV have not been found guilty of corruption.
118 The Commission submits that the seventh plea is unfounded and, in any event, ineffective.
119 Article 136(6)(a) of Regulation 2018/1046 provides that ‘the authorising officer responsible … shall not exclude a person or entity referred to in Article 135(2) from participating in an award procedure or from being selected for implementing Union funds where: (a) the person or entity has taken remedial measures as specified in paragraph 7 of this Article, to an extent that is sufficient to demonstrate its reliability. This point shall not apply in the case referred to in point (d) of paragraph 1 of this Article’.
120 Consequently, given that, as is clear from the examination, in paragraphs 28 to 57 above, of the first three pleas of the present action, the conditions for the application of Article 136(1)(d) of Regulation 2018/1046 were satisfied, Article 136(6)(a) of that regulation does not apply in the present case.
121 Therefore, the seventh plea must be rejected as unfounded.
The eighth plea, alleging an infringement of the right to be heard enshrined in Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter
122 The applicants submit that the contested decision infringes Article 41(2) of the Charter since the Commission did not hear CW before adopting that decision.
123 Since the present action is inadmissible to the extent that it has been brought by CW, the eighth plea must be held to be ineffective.
124 Since none of the applicants’ pleas has been upheld, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
125 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
126 Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Commission, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Lattanzio KIBS SpA, CY, CV and CW to pay the costs, including those relating to the interlocutory proceedings.
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 23 July 2025.