JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
10 September 2025 (*)
( Common foreign and security policy – Restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine – Freezing of funds – Restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources and subject to restrictions on entry into the territories of the Member States – Inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the list – Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP – Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 – Error of assessment )
In Case T‑643/22,
Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, residing in Rostov-on-Don (Russia), represented by B. Kennelly SC,
applicant,
v
Council of the European Union, represented by A. Boggio-Tomasaz and J. Rurarz, acting as Agents, and by B. Maingain and S. Remy, lawyers,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber),
composed of R. Mastroianni (Rapporteur), acting as President, M. Brkan and S.L. Kalėda, Judges,
Registrar: I. Kurme, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 17 September 2024,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By his action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Mr Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych, seeks annulment of (i) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1355 of 4 August 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 204I, p. 4), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1354 of 4 August 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 204I, p. 1; together, ‘the initial acts’), (ii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1530 of 14 September 2022 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 149), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2022/1529 of 14 September 2022 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2022 L 239, p. 1; together, ‘the September 2022 maintaining acts’), (iii) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/572 of 13 March 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 134), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/571 of 13 March 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 75I, p. 1; together, ‘the March 2023 maintaining acts’), (iv) Council Decision (CFSP) 2023/1767 of 13 September 2023 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 104), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2023/1765 of 13 September 2023 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2023 L 226, p. 3; together, ‘the September 2023 maintaining acts’), and (v) Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/847 of 12 March 2024 amending Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/847), and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/849 of 12 March 2024 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ L 2024/849; together, ‘the March 2024 maintaining acts’), in so far as the initial acts, the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts (together, ‘the contested acts’) concern the applicant.
Background to the dispute
2 The applicant is the former President of Ukraine.
3 The present case has arisen in the context of restrictive measures adopted by the European Union in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
4 On 17 March 2014, the Council of the European Union adopted, on the basis of Article 29 TEU, Decision 2014/145/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 16).
5 On the same date, the Council adopted, on the basis of Article 215 TFEU, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 78, p. 6).
6 On 25 February 2022, in view of the seriousness of the situation in Ukraine, the Council adopted (i) Decision (CFSP) 2022/329 amending Decision 2014/145 (OJ 2022 L 50, p. 1), and (ii) Regulation (EU) 2022/330 amending Regulation No 269/2014 (OJ 2022 L 51, p. 1) in order, inter alia, to amend the criteria by which natural or legal persons, entities or bodies could be made subject to the restrictive measures at issue.
7 Article 2(1) and (2) of Decision 2014/145, as amended by Decision 2022/329 (‘amended Decision 2014/145’), is worded as follows:
‘1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned, held or controlled by:
(a) natural persons responsible for, supporting or implementing actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, or which obstruct the work of international organisations in Ukraine;
…
2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies listed in the Annex’.
8 The detailed rules for the freezing of those funds are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of that article.
9 Article 1(1)(a) of amended Decision 2014/145 prohibits the entry into, or transit through, the territories of the Member States of natural persons who satisfy essentially the same criteria as those set out in Article 2(1)(a) of that decision.
10 Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, requires the adoption of measures to freeze funds and lays down the detailed rules governing the freezing of those funds in terms that are, in essence, identical to those of amended Decision 2014/145. Article 3(1)(a) to (g) of that regulation essentially reproduces Article 2(1)(a) to (g) of that decision.
11 By letters of 25 February and 13 April 2022, the Council informed the applicant of its intention to add his name to the lists annexed to Regulation No 269/2014, as amended by Regulation 2022/330, and to amended Decision 2014/145 (‘the lists at issue’), and sent the files bearing the references WK 1271/2022 and WK 1271/2022 ADD 1 (‘the first WK files’).
12 On 4 August 2022, the Council adopted the initial acts.
13 The reasons for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue are as follows:
‘From 2010 until 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine. He pursued a pro-Russian policy when in office. A Ukrainian court found Viktor Yanukovych guilty of treason for having invited the Russian Federation to invade Ukraine. After being removed from power, he relocated to Russia, from where he has continued his activities aimed at destabilising Ukraine.
He assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014. Viktor Yanukovych supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea. In 2021, a new pre-trial investigation in Ukraine was opened according to which Mr Viktor Yanukovych, together with two former Ministers of Defence, has purposefully reduced the defence capacity of Ukraine, particularly in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Mr Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of the unprovoked illegal military aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya[,] Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.
Therefore, Viktor Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’
14 On 14 September 2022, the Council adopted the September 2022 maintaining acts, which extended the measures taken against the applicant until 15 March 2023 without making any changes to the reasons for including his name on the lists at issue as compared with those set out in the initial acts.
Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action
15 By letter of 22 December 2022, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him for the same reasons as those in the initial acts and sent him the file bearing the reference WK 17599/2022 (‘the second WK file’).
16 By letter of 11 January 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.
17 By the March 2023 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2023. By letter of 14 March 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
18 By letter of 19 June 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him and sent the file bearing the reference WK 7868/2023 (‘the third WK file’).
19 By letter of 30 June 2023, the applicant submitted his observations.
20 By the September 2023 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 March 2024. By letter of 15 September 2023, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
21 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:
‘From 2010 until 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine. He pursued a pro-Russian policy when in office. A Ukrainian court found Viktor Yanukovych guilty of treason for having invited the Russian Federation to invade Ukraine. After being removed from power, he relocated to Russia, from where he has continued his activities aimed at destabilising Ukraine.
He assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014. Viktor Yanukovych supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea. In 2021, a new pre-trial investigation in Ukraine was opened according to which Viktor Yanukovych, together with two former Ministers of Defence, had purposefully reduced the defence capacity of Ukraine, particularly in the Autonomous “Republic of Crimea”.
On 21 April 2010, then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and then President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, according to which the term of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol was extended from 2017 to 2042. By signing the agreements, Yanukovych created favourable conditions for increasing Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and the re-equipment and modernisation of the weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Crimea. Subsequently, Russian weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine were used to annex the Autonomous “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol in 2014.
He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya[,] Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.
Therefore, Viktor Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’
22 By letter of 21 December 2023, the Council informed the applicant that it intended to extend the restrictive measures against him and sent the file bearing the reference WK 16833/2023 (‘the fourth WK file’).
23 By letter of 10 January 2024, the applicant submitted his observations.
24 By the March 2024 maintaining acts, the restrictive measures taken against the applicant were extended until 15 September 2024. By letter of 13 March 2024, the Council informed the applicant of its decision.
25 The reasons for including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue were amended as follows:
‘From 2010 until 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was President of Ukraine. He pursued a pro-Russian policy when in office. A Ukrainian court found Viktor Yanukovych guilty of treason for having invited the Russian Federation to invade Ukraine. After being removed from power, he relocated to Russia, from where he has continued his activities aimed at destabilising Ukraine.
He assisted in the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014. Viktor Yanukovych supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea. In 2021, a new pre-trial investigation in Ukraine was opened according to which Viktor Yanukovych, together with two former Ministers of Defence, had purposefully reduced the defence capacity of Ukraine, particularly in the autonomous so-called ‘Republic of Crimea’.
On 21 April 2010, then President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and then President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev signed an agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, according to which the term of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol was extended from 2017 to 2042. By signing the agreements, Yanukovych created favourable conditions for increasing Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and for the re-equipment and modernisation of the weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Crimea. Subsequently, Russian weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine were used to annex the autonomous so-called “Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol in 2014.
In 2023, Ukraine’s State Bureau of Investigation submitted an indictment against Viktor Yanukovych on charges of treason and aiding Russia in carrying out subversive activities in Ukraine.
He considers himself as the legitimate President of Ukraine and has consistently presented a pro-Russian stance in his public interventions. According to different sources, Viktor Yanukovych has been part of a Russian special operation, aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President with him, during the first phases of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Furthermore, the President of the Republic of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, has requested the President of Ukraine to transfer all his powers to Viktor Yanukovych.
Therefore, Viktor Yanukovych is responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the state’s stability and security.’
Forms of order sought
26 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested acts in so far as they concern him;
– order the Council to pay the costs.
27 The Council contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
Annexes B.1 to B.7
28 The applicant submits that documents B.1 to B.7 annexed to the defence were in no way part of the Council’s decision-making process, are irrelevant and must be rejected as inadmissible.
29 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
30 In that regard, it must be noted that the review of substantive legality which is incumbent on the General Court must be carried out, in particular as regards disputes concerning restrictive measures, in the light not only of the material set out in the statements of reasons of the acts at issue, but also in the light of the material provided by the Council, in the event of challenge, to the General Court in order to establish that the facts alleged in those statements are made out (judgment of 22 April 2021, Council v PKK, C‑46/19 P, EU:C:2021:316, paragraph 64).
31 In its review of the merits of acts imposing restrictive measures, the Court may take into account additional evidence that was not contained in the evidence file and which is produced in order to confirm that the facts alleged in the grounds for listing are made out where (i) that evidence supports material that the Council had at its disposal and (ii) that evidence relates to events prior to the adoption of the contested acts in question.
32 In the present case, it should be noted that the Council lodged press articles, namely Annexes B.1 to B.7 to the defence, as contextual material.
33 While it is true that, for the annexes to the defence, which predate the adoption of the initial acts, the Council does not claim that it had that material at its disposal when those acts were adopted, it must be noted that, in the present case, the Council produced Annexes B.1 to B.7 to the defence in order to support evidence in the first WK files.
34 Accordingly, Annexes B.1 to B.7 can be taken into account by the Court in order to review the merits of the contested acts.
The substance
35 The applicant relies on a single plea in law in support of his action. He submits that, in the contested acts, the Council made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that the conditions laid down in the designation criteria were met.
36 The applicant claims that the reasons for his inclusion on the lists at issue are materially incorrect and that the Council does not have a sufficiently solid basis to justify the adoption of those acts. In his view, the elements on which the Council based its decision are unverified historical statements, allegations and opinions from media outlets, the reliability of which he disputes.
37 The Council disputes the merits of that plea.
Preliminary observations
38 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that the present plea must be regarded as alleging an error of assessment, not a manifest error of assessment. While it is true that the Council has a degree of discretion to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the legal criteria on which the restrictive measures at issue are based are met, the fact remains that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited).
39 Next, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the judicial review guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union requires, inter alia, that the Courts of the European Union are to ensure that the decision by which restrictive measures were adopted or maintained, which affects the person or entity concerned individually, is taken on a sufficiently solid factual basis. That entails a verification of the factual allegations in the summary of reasons underpinning that decision, with the consequence that judicial review cannot be restricted to an assessment of the cogency in the abstract of the reasons relied on, but must concern whether those reasons, or, at the very least, one of those reasons, deemed sufficient in itself to support that decision, is substantiated (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraph 119, and of 5 November 2014, Mayaleh v Council, T‑307/12 and T‑408/13, EU:T:2014:926, paragraph 128).
40 Such an assessment must be carried out by examining the evidence and information not in isolation but in its context. The Council discharges the burden of proof borne by it if it presents to the Courts of the European Union a set of indicia sufficiently specific, precise and consistent to establish that there is a sufficient link between the entity subject to a measure freezing its funds and the regime or, in general, the situations, being combated (see judgment of 20 July 2017, Badica and Kardiam v Council, T‑619/15, EU:T:2017:532, paragraph 99 and the case-law cited).
41 It is the task of the competent European Union authority to establish, in the event of challenge, that the reasons relied on against the person concerned are well founded, and not the task of that person to adduce evidence of the negative, that those reasons are not well founded. It is however necessary that the information or evidence produced should support the reasons relied on against the person concerned (judgments of 18 July 2013, Commission and Others v Kadi, C‑584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P, EU:C:2013:518, paragraphs 121 and 122, and of 3 July 2014, National Iranian Tanker Company v Council, T‑565/12, EU:T:2014:608, paragraph 57).
42 It must also be noted that the Council may take into account, in order to assess whether a person satisfies a listing criterion such as the criterion laid down in Article 2(1)(a) of amended Decision 2014/145 (‘criterion (a)’), information or evidence relating to circumstances prior to the date of adoption of the act imposing or maintaining restrictive measures, provided that that information or evidence supports the reasons for that act and contributes to establishing that, despite the passage of time and in view of all the relevant circumstances specific to each case, the person concerned satisfies the listing criterion at issue (see, by analogy, judgment of 20 June 2019, K.P., C‑458/15, EU:C:2019:522, paragraph 57). In particular, it cannot be ruled out that such information and evidence may be taken into account in order to establish, in the light of the listing criterion concerned, that there is continuity between, on the one hand, the previous situation of the person concerned and, on the other hand, his or her current situation.
43 Furthermore, it should be noted that restrictive measures are of a precautionary and, by definition, provisional nature, and their validity always depends on whether the factual and legal circumstances which led to their adoption continue to apply and on the need to persist with them in order to achieve their objective. It is thus for the Council, in the course of its periodic review of those restrictive measures, to conduct an updated assessment of the situation and to appraise the impact of such measures, in order to determine whether they have made it possible to attain the objectives pursued by the initial inclusion of the names of the persons and entities concerned on the list at issue or whether the same conclusion in respect of those persons and entities can still be drawn (see judgment of 27 April 2022, Ilunga Luyoyo v Council, T‑108/21, EU:T:2022:253, paragraph 55 and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 67).
44 In order to justify retaining a person’s name on the list in question, the Council is not prohibited from basing its decision on the same evidence justifying the initial inclusion, re-inclusion or previous retention of the name of the person concerned on that list, provided that (i) the grounds for inclusion remain unchanged and (ii) the context has not changed in such a way that that evidence is now out of date (judgment of 23 September 2020, Kaddour v Council, T‑510/18, EU:T:2020:436, paragraph 99). That context includes not only the situation of the country in respect of which the system of restrictive measures was established, but also the particular situation of the person concerned (see judgment of 9 June 2021, Borborudi v Council, T‑580/19, EU:T:2021:330, paragraph 60 (not published) and the case-law cited; judgment of 26 October 2022, Ovsyannikov v Council, T‑714/20, not published, EU:T:2022:674, paragraph 78).
45 The present plea must be examined in the light of those considerations.
The evidence produced by the Council
46 In the present case, in order to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, the Council provided the documents contained in the first WK files, which include the following material:
– a press article published in February 2022 on the website of Unian (Evidence No 1);
– a statement by the applicant, set out in a document of the United Nations Secretary-General of March 2014 (Evidence No 2);
– a press article published in January 2018 on the website of NV (Evidence No 3);
– a press article published in March 2016 on the website of Tass (Evidence No 4);
– a press article published in January 2019 on the website of The New York Times (Evidence No 5);
– a press article published in June 2020 on the website of Unian (Evidence No 6);
– an extract from a page on the website of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine published in 2020 (Evidence No 7);
– a press article published in September 2020 on the website of Novaya Gazeta (Evidence No 8);
– a press article published in November 2020 on the website of ForPost (Evidence No 9);
– a press article published in July 2020 on the website of Novaya Gazeta (Evidence No 10);
– a press article published in December 2021 on the website of Gordon (Evidence No 11);
– another press article published in December 2021 on the website of Gordon (Evidence No 12);
– a press article published in December 2021 on the website of The Guardian (Evidence No 13);
– a press article published in January 2020 on the website of Radio Svoboda (Evidence No 14);
– a press article published in August 2021 on the website of Vedomosti (Evidence No 15);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of KP.UA (Evidence No 16);
– another press article published in March 2022 on the website of KP.UA (Evidence No 17);
– a press article published in March 2020 on the website of Pravda (Evidence No 18);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Obozrevatel (Evidence No 19);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Fortune (Evidence No 20);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (Evidence No 21);
– another press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (Evidence No 22);
– a press article published in January 2022 on the website of RBC (Evidence No 23);
– a press article published in August 2021 on the website of RBC (Evidence No 24);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Telesur (Evidence No 25);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website R.Republicworld.com (Evidence No 26);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of RBC (Evidence No 27);
– a press article published in March 2022 on the website of Pravda (Evidence No 28).
47 In order to justify the adoption of the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files.
48 In order to justify the adoption of the March 2023 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the second WK file, which contains the following material:
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website Gazeta.ru (Evidence No 1);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Ria Novosti (Evidence No 2);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website Yur-gazeta.ru (Evidence No 3);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of The Odessa Journal (Evidence No 4);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Republic World (Evidence No 5);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Belsat (Evidence No 6);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of The Washington Post (Evidence No 7);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Politeka (Evidence No 8);
– a press article published in November 2022 on the website of Pravda (Evidence No 9).
49 In order to justify the adoption of the September 2023 maintaining acts, the Council took account of the third WK file, which contains a press article published in December 2022 on the website of Unian.
50 In order to adopt the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the fourth WK file, which contains a press release of 15 September 2023 by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation and an article published in September 2023 on the website of Kyiv Post.
The reliability and credibility of the evidence
51 The applicant calls into question, in essence, the reliability and relevance of the sources used by the Council to justify the inclusion and retention of his name on the lists at issue.
52 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
53 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the activity of the Courts of the European Union is governed by the principle of the unfettered assessment of the evidence, and it is only the reliability of the evidence before the Court which is decisive when it comes to the assessment of its value. In order to assess the probative value of a document, regard must be had to the credibility of the account it contains and, in particular, to the person from whom the document originates, the circumstances in which it came into being, the person to whom it was addressed and whether, on its face, the document appears to be sound and reliable (see judgments of 31 May 2018, Kaddour v Council, T‑461/16, EU:T:2018:316, paragraph 107 and the case-law cited, and of 12 February 2020, Amisi Kumba v Council, T‑163/18, EU:T:2020:57, paragraph 95 (not published) and the case-law cited).
54 In the absence of investigative powers in third countries, the assessment of the EU authorities must rely on publicly available sources of information, reports, articles in the press, intelligence reports or other similar sources of information (judgments of 14 March 2018, Kim and Others v Council and Commission, T‑533/15 and T‑264/16, EU:T:2018:138, paragraph 107, and of 1 June 2022, Prigozhin v Council, T‑723/20, not published, EU:T:2022:317, paragraph 59).
55 Furthermore, it must be observed that the conflict situation involving the Russian Federation and Ukraine makes it particularly difficult in practice to access certain sources, to specify the primary source of some information and, where appropriate, to collect testimonies from persons who agree to be identified. The ensuing investigation difficulties can thus be a factor in preventing specific evidence and objective information being provided (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 November 2023, OT v Council, T‑193/22, EU:T:2023:716, paragraph 116).
56 In the present case, the applicant cannot dispute the reliability and credibility of the documents which make up the WK files by merely submitting, in an abstract manner, that they consist mainly of press articles. In view of the situation referred to in paragraph 55 above, the Council cannot be criticised for relying mainly on press articles.
57 As regards the arguments raised by the applicant in respect of the items of information contained in certain documents in the WK files on the ground that they are, in his view, irrelevant or incorrect, it should be noted that those arguments are not capable of calling into question the probative value of those documents. Such arguments fall within the scope of the examination of whether the Council’s factual basis is sufficient to justify the inclusion and maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
58 In the light of the foregoing, in view of the context of the war and in the absence of investigative powers of the Council in third countries (see paragraph 54 above), and in the absence of other arguments raised by the applicant capable of calling into question the reliability and credibility of the sources used by the Council, those sources must be regarded as sound and reliable, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 53 above.
The application of criterion (a) to the applicant
– The initial acts
59 In the absence of an express reference, in the contested acts, to the legal provisions which served as the basis for the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue, it must be noted that the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a). It is apparent from the reasons for the initial acts in relation to him, referred to in paragraph 13 above, that the Council considered him responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the stability and security of that State.
60 In that regard, it should be noted that that criterion, which is linked, inter alia, to the support or implementation of actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine, requires that a direct or indirect link be established between the activities or actions of the person or entity concerned and the situation in Ukraine, giving rise to the adoption of the restrictive measures at issue. In other words, those persons must, through their conduct, have been responsible for actions or policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or for supporting those actions or policies.
61 The applicant submits, in essence, that the evidence on which the Council relies is not capable of demonstrating to the requisite legal standard that the conditions laid down by criterion (a) are satisfied. In particular, the applicant’s line of argument seeks specifically to challenge each of the findings of fact set out in the statement of reasons.
62 It is therefore necessary to examine whether the Council had a sufficiently specific, precise and consistent set of indicia to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a). In that regard, it is necessary to examine, first of all, the grounds alleging, in the first place, that the applicant contributed to the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014; in the second place, that he supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea; in the third place, that he voluntarily reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; and, in the fourth place, that he participated in a Russian operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President.
– The finding that the applicant contributed to the Russian military interference in Ukraine by calling on the President of the Russian Federation to send Russian troops to Ukraine in March 2014
63 In the first place, the applicant submits that Russia already had a military presence in Crimea before 2014 and that that presence increased at the beginning of 2014 not following a request from the applicant, but in response to a request from the local authorities in Crimea. In the second place, he submits that the letter of 1 March 2014 which he sent to President Putin (see Evidence Nos 1 and 2 of the first WK files) requested only short-term assistance from the President of the Russian Federation and not the sending of Russian troops. In the third place, he states that he also requested, in similar terms, assistance from other countries, namely France, Germany and Poland.
64 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
65 In the present case, in the first place, the applicant does not deny having sent a letter to the President of the Russian Federation on 1 March 2014. That letter is worded as follows:
‘The events at Maidan Square and the illegal seizure of power in Kyiv have brought Ukraine to the brink of civil war. Chaos and anarchy reign the country, and citizens’ lives, security and human rights are under threat, especially in the southeast and in Crimea. Under the influence of Western countries, acts of terror and violence are openly carried out and people are persecuted for political and linguistic reasons.
I therefore call on the President of Russia, V. Putin, to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to restore law and order, peace and stability and to protect the Ukrainian people.’
66 It should be noted that the applicant’s letter shows unequivocally that, following the events which led to his removal from office as President of Ukraine, he requested the military intervention of the Russian Federation in order to put an end to the public disorder which he attributed to Western countries. It must be held that such a request for the Russian Federation’s military intervention in Ukraine was clearly an action capable of contributing to the destabilisation of Ukraine.
67 In the second place, it must be noted that, even if it were accepted, as the applicant claims, that the Russian Federation’s military intervention in Crimea predated his invitation, the fact remains that his letter could be understood as a request to intensify the Russian Federation’s military intervention or, at the very least, confirmed the applicant’s support for that military intervention.
68 In the third place, as the Council submits, the wording used in the letters sent to France, Germany and Poland is not exactly the same as that used in the letter sent by the applicant to President Putin. It should be noted that the letters sent to France, Germany and Poland state as follows: ‘I believe that you, as a guarantor of the Agreement, should use your influence and opportunities to restore constitutional order, up to consideration of using a military or police peacekeeping mission to ensure the rule of law, peace, public order and protection of citizens of Ukraine from abuse of power, violence, open terror and political persecution.’ It should be noted that, although, in those letters, recourse to a military or police peacekeeping mission is one of the options envisaged, in the letter sent by the applicant to President Putin the request for the Russian Federation’s military intervention in Ukraine does not set out alternatives.
69 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the finding that he had requested military intervention by the Russian Federation must be rejected.
– The finding that the applicant supported pro-Russian politicians who held public offices in occupied Crimea
70 The applicant claims that he did not consent to a certain politician exercising political responsibilities in Crimea. He disputes that politician’s statement that the applicant had approved that politician’s candidacy for the Head of the Council of Ministers of the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea and argues that that statement is not credible since he had left Ukraine before the approval of that politician’s candidacy. He also complains that the Council failed to check the veracity of the statement by the politician in question.
71 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
72 In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the information in Evidence No 4 of the first WK files, on 27 February 2014, the applicant approved the candidacy of a certain politician for the position of Head of the Council of Ministers of the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea. That comes from an article of March 2016 from the website of Tass, which also states that a decree of April 2014 by President Putin had appointed that politician as Acting Head of the Republic of Crimea. It is sufficient to note that the applicant merely denies the content of that article without in any way substantiating his position. Furthermore, it must be noted that documents B.4 and B.5, which are annexed to the Council’s defence, support the content of Evidence No 4 of the first WK files.
73 Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s claim that it was not possible for him to give his consent to the candidacy of that politician on 27 February 2014 on the ground that the applicant had left Ukraine on 24 February 2014, it is sufficient to note, as the Council has submitted, that the applicant has not demonstrated that it was impossible to give his consent from outside Ukraine.
74 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Council’s finding that he supported pro-Russian politicians must be rejected.
– The finding that the applicant voluntarily reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea
75 The applicant submits that the content of the two articles which state that he had organised a targeted reduction in Ukraine’s defence capabilities is incorrect and that the Council should have verified the credibility of those politically motivated accusations.
76 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
77 In that regard, it must be noted that, in order to substantiate the finding that the applicant and two of his former Defence ministers had voluntarily reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, more specifically in the ‘Autonomous Republic’ of Crimea, the Council relied on Evidence Nos 6 and 7 of the first WK files, namely two different media sources which the applicant has not demonstrated were unreliable sources. It is apparent from those documents that an investigation carried out by the Main Investigation Department of the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation had shown that the applicant, together with two former Defence ministers, had organised a targeted reduction in Ukraine’s defence capabilities, for example by disbanding military units, by reducing them and by changing the location of those units during the period from 2012 to 2014. According to that investigation, such actions were carried out in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which then facilitated its annexation by the Russian Federation.
78 The applicant does not dispute the existence of that investigation, but submits that the Council should have satisfied itself that his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected by the Ukrainian authorities in the context of that investigation. However, it must be noted that the applicant cannot rely, in that regard, on the grounds of the judgment of 30 March 2022, Yanukovych v Council (T‑291/20, not published, EU:T:2022:187), given that that judgment concerned another designation criterion, namely that covering, inter alia, persons who have been identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine, laid down in Article 1 of Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP of 5 March 2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2014 L 66, p. 26), on the basis of which the applicant’s name had been included on the list of persons subject to restrictive measures that was annexed to that decision.
79 By contrast, in the present case, the applicant’s name was included on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a) in so far as he was considered to be responsible for supporting or implementing actions or policies which threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, as well as the security and stability of that State. It must be noted that the investigation by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation establishing that the applicant had voluntarily reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity constitutes relevant evidence to justify the adoption of restrictive measures against him on the basis of criterion (a).
80 Consequently, the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the Council’s finding that he had voluntarily reduced Ukraine’s defence capacity, in particular in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, must be rejected.
– The finding that the applicant participated in a Russian operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President
81 The applicant denies having been involved in a Russian special operation aimed at replacing Ukrainian President Zelensky. According to the applicant, the evidence produced by the Council is inconsistent. In addition, he relies on a statement by the former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine according to which the applicant was not involved in that operation aimed at replacing the Ukrainian President.
82 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
83 In the present case, it should be noted that several press articles indicate that, according to information from the Ukrainian intelligence services, the applicant was in Minsk (Belarus) at the beginning of March 2022 and that the Russian authorities were planning to install him as President of Ukraine (Evidence Nos 16 to 20, 27 and 28 of the first WK files). It follows that the Council had several consistent sources of information to support the finding set out in the grounds for listing.
84 As regards the argument that the information contained in the press articles on which the Council relied came from only one source, in addition to the considerations already set out in paragraphs 53 to 58 above, it must be noted that that the source in question was the Ukrainian intelligence services. Information originating from one country’s intelligence services cannot be required also to come from other sources in order to be regarded as credible.
85 In addition, as regards the alleged inconsistencies, in the documents, as to the precise date on which the applicant was in Minsk, it must be noted that, according to Evidence No 28 of the first WK files, the applicant was in Minsk on 2 March 2022 and that it is apparent from the same document that the applicant’s aircraft operated a flight between Moscow and Minsk on 7 March 2022. Contrary to what the applicant submits, those two assertions are not incompatible, in that it is entirely possible that the applicant travelled to Minsk by other means and that his plane arrived in the city of Minsk only after 2 March 2022. Consequently, no inconsistency between the documents can be found in that regard. In any event, even if the precise date on which the applicant was in Minsk is incorrect, all the relevant documents indicate that the applicant was in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022 with a view to the Russian authorities installing him as President of Ukraine.
86 As regards the statement by the former Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine that the applicant was not among the candidates considered by the Kremlin to become President of Ukraine, it should be noted, as the Council has submitted, that that statement does not call into question the fact that the Ukrainian intelligence services had discovered that the applicant was in Minsk at the beginning of March 2022 in order to discuss the possibility of becoming President of Ukraine again. It must be noted that the statement on which the applicant relies was made on 14 April 2022 and he has not demonstrated that that statement concerned the operation in which he had taken part at the beginning of March 2022, aimed at replacing the serving President of Ukraine.
87 In addition, it should be noted, as the Council has submitted, that the applicant has not provided any other evidence to demonstrate that the information reported by the numerous media sources regarding his involvement in a plan to replace the Ukrainian President at the beginning of March 2022 is inaccurate. The applicant’s arguments cannot therefore succeed.
88 Furthermore, it should be noted that the statements of the President of Chechnya, Mr Ramzan Kadyrov, requesting Ukrainian President Zelensky to do everything that Russia was asking him to do and to transfer his powers to the applicant, support the argument that there was a Russian operation involving the applicant aimed at replacing the serving President of Ukraine.
89 In that regard, the applicant claims that Mr Kadyrov’s statements reflect only the latter’s personal point of view and do not justify the adoption of restrictive measures against the applicant. He considers that the Council cannot regard Mr Kadyrov as a reliable witness in the light of the material in his file.
90 In the present case, it should be noted that Evidence Nos 21 and 22 of the first WK files indicate that the President of Chechnya, Mr Kadyrov, contacted Ukrainian President Zelensky to request him to do everything that Russia was asking Mr Zelensky to do and to transfer the latter’s powers to the applicant. It is true that Mr Kadyrov’s statements cannot, in themselves, form the basis for restrictive measures against the applicant. However, given that, as is apparent from those statements, the applicant was supported by a political leader approving the actions of the President of the Russian Federation, the Council was entitled to consider that those statements constituted additional evidence capable of demonstrating that the applicant is supporting actions and policies which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, or stability or security in Ukraine.
91 In those circumstances, the applicant’s arguments must be rejected.
92 In the light of the foregoing, it must be held that, in view of the particular seriousness of the applicant’s actions during the period from 2012 to 2014, namely the request for military intervention by Russia in Ukraine, the support for pro-Russian politicians holding public offices in Crimea, and the voluntary reduction of Ukraine’s defence capacity, those actions having clearly contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine, as well as his more recent involvement in a plan by the Russian authorities to replace the serving President of Ukraine at the beginning of March 2022, which also demonstrates continuity between the applicant’s previous situation and his situation at the time when his name was included on the lists at issue, the Council was entitled, without making an error of assessment, to include the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (a).
93 According to the case-law, with regard to the review of the lawfulness of a decision adopting restrictive measures, and having regard to their preventive nature, if the Courts of the European Union consider that, at the very least, one of the reasons mentioned is sufficiently detailed and specific, that it is substantiated and that it constitutes in itself sufficient basis to support that decision, the fact that the same cannot be said of other such reasons cannot justify the annulment of that decision (see judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
94 It follows that the applicant’s arguments seeking to call into question the other findings of fact set out in the statement of reasons are ineffective, in that the Council’s findings that have been examined in paragraphs 63 to 91 above are sufficient to justify the inclusion of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue under criterion (a).
The maintaining acts
95 As a preliminary point, it must be noted that the reasons underlying the September 2022 and March 2023 maintaining acts are the same as those underlying the initial acts. By contrast, a paragraph was added to the reasons set out in the September 2023 maintaining acts, relating to the applicant’s signing of an agreement in 2010 between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (‘the 2010 Agreement’) which extended the term of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Sevastopol until 2042. Furthermore, another paragraph was also added to the reasons set out in the March 2024 maintaining acts, relating to an indictment issued by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation against the applicant, accusing him of treason and of assisting Russia in carrying out subversive activities in Ukraine.
96 In addition, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by adopting the September 2022 maintaining acts, the Council relied on the same evidence as that which justified the adoption of the initial acts, namely the evidence set out in the first WK files (see paragraph 46 above). As regards the March 2023 maintaining acts, the Council relied on nine additional items of evidence, consisting of press articles set out in the second WK file (see paragraph 48 above). As regards the September 2023 maintaining acts, the Council also relied on additional evidence, consisting of a press article set out in the third WK file (see paragraph 49 above). As regards, lastly, the March 2024 maintaining acts, the Council also relied on two additional items of evidence, consisting of a press release from the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation and a press article set out in the fourth WK file (see paragraph 50 above).
97 It is necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 44 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives pursued by the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a).
98 In the applicant’s first request for modification, seeking to extend his claims to the September 2022 maintaining acts, he raises, in essence, two arguments. First, he reiterates the line of argument that the reasons for listing are both incorrect and unsubstantiated. In particular, he considers that the Council wrongly relied on information from the media without having verified its origin, veracity and reliability. Second, he claims that the Council relied on evidence that is too historic and that it did not carry out an updated assessment of the situation, contrary to the case-law of the General Court.
99 As regards the second request for modification, concerning the March 2023 maintaining acts, the applicant puts forward three arguments. First, he claims that the Council made an error of assessment in finding that the conditions for the inclusion of his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a) were satisfied in March 2023. Second, he reiterates his line of argument that the reasons underlying those acts are both incorrect and unsubstantiated. In particular, he considers that the additional evidence, namely press articles, is not capable of substantiating the maintenance of the inclusion of his name on the basis of criterion (a) by way of the March 2023 maintaining acts. Third, he submits that the Council wrongly relied on information from the media without verifying its origin, veracity and reliability.
100 As regards the third request for modification, relating to the September 2023 maintaining acts, in respect of the additional finding of fact set out in the reasons for those acts, concerning the signing of the 2010 Agreement, in the first place, the applicant claims that that agreement merely extended, beyond 2017, the date of expiry of three existing bilateral agreements signed by the then Ukrainian Prime Minister in 1997. According to the applicant, the 2010 Agreement maintained the limits on the number of Russian military personnel, ships, vessels, arms and hardware previously agreed. It did not increase those limits or provide for ‘re-equipment’ or ‘modernisation’ of Russian weaponry. In addition, the applicant states that the 2010 Agreement was ratified by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine in April 2010. There is, therefore, in the applicant’s view, no causal link between the extension which he signed and the Council’s assertion that ‘Russian weapons that were on the territory of Ukraine were used to annex the “Autonomous Republic of Crimea” and the city of Sevastopol in 2014.’ According to the applicant, those Russian weapons were present on Ukrainian territory, irrespective of any extension of agreements which he concluded with the Russian Federation.
101 In the second place, the applicant submits that the only reason for concluding the 2010 Agreement was the desire to obtain economic benefits for Ukraine, including the reduction of gas prices. He states that that motivation was shared by his political rival, President Poroshenko. The applicant considers that the 2010 Agreement provided for annual rent payments and a discount on gas prices, which gave rise to a tangible economic advantage for Ukraine. The applicant also places emphasis on the economic and energy situation which preceded the 2010 Agreement, in particular the gas dispute with Russia in January 2009, which led to significant reductions in supply and had serious economic and humanitarian repercussions for Ukraine and other European countries. According to the applicant, the agreements signed in order to settle that dispute could not be maintained in the long term, which required the urgent renegotiation of gas agreements, hence the conclusion of the 2010 Agreement.
102 As regards his fourth statement of modification, the applicant reiterates, in essence, the same complaints as those already raised previously. In particular, he submits that the Council made an error of assessment in finding that the conditions laid down in the listing criterion were satisfied. Furthermore, the reasons given in those acts are, in his view, incorrect and unsubstantiated by the evidence relied on by the Council.
103 As regards the new paragraph added in the reasons set out in the March 2024 maintaining acts and the additional evidence concerning the indictment issued against the applicant by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation, accusing him of treason and of assisting Russia in carrying out subversive activities in Ukraine, the applicant submits that they cannot support any listing decision, in particular because they concern the signing of an agreement approximately fourteen years ago. The applicant recalls, in essence, his arguments already put forward in his pleadings and in his third statement of modification concerning the 2010 Agreement. He adds that the Council did not verify whether his rights of defence and his right to effective judicial protection were respected in the proceedings referred to in the new paragraph set out in the statement of reasons. Furthermore, in his view, the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation and the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office did not properly examine whether he was entitled to immunity under Ukrainian law.
104 The Council disputes the applicant’s arguments.
105 It follows from Article 6 of Decision 2014/145 that the latter is to be kept under constant review and is to be renewed, or amended as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met. Article 14(4) of Regulation No 269/2014 provides that the list in the annex to that regulation is to be reviewed at regular intervals and at least every 12 months.
106 It is necessary, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 44 above, to ascertain whether the context, the objectives of the restrictive measures and the applicant’s individual situation made it possible to maintain his name on the lists at issue.
107 As regards the general context linked to the situation in Ukraine, it must be stated that, at the time when the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, that context in terms of the threats to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of that State had remained unchanged since the adoption of the initial acts.
108 Similarly, at the time when the September 2022 maintaining acts, the March 2023 maintaining acts, the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts were adopted, the restrictive measures were still justified in the light of the objective pursued, namely to exert maximum pressure on the Russian authorities so that they end their actions and policies destabilising Ukraine and end the military aggression towards that country, and to increase the costs of the Russian Federation’s actions undermining the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.
109 In respect of the applicant’s individual situation, in the first place, it must be held that he has not demonstrated that his individual situation had changed by the time the September 2022 maintaining acts were adopted; those acts were adopted only one month after the initial acts, based on the same listing grounds as those underlying the initial acts and based on the same evidence as that set out in the first WK files. It should be recalled that the Council did not make an error of assessment in including the applicant’s name on the lists at issue that were annexed to the initial acts under criterion (a) (see paragraph 97 above). Consequently, the applicant’s arguments raised in the first statement of modification, which are, in essence, similar to those challenging the legality of the initial acts, must be rejected.
110 In the second place, as regards the arguments raised by the applicant in the second statement of modification, it should be recalled that the Council, in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name by way of the March 2023 maintaining acts, relied on the nine additional items of evidence referred to in paragraph 48 above.
111 In particular, it must be noted that Evidence Nos 6, 7 and 9 of the second WK file confirm the information on the applicant’s involvement in the Russian operation intended to replace the Ukrainian Government. That is confirmed by a source from the Washington Post newspaper, which relied on the results of a review of intercepted communications involving Russian intelligence officers, and relied on interviews with senior Ukrainian, US and European officials. According to that evidence, the applicant was part of a group which met in Belarus at the beginning of March 2022, in order to take over power at the time when the city of Kyiv was controlled by Russian forces.
112 Thus, the new evidence adduced by the Council confirms the applicant’s involvement in a plan aimed at replacing, with the support of the Russian authorities, the serving President of Ukraine at the beginning of March 2022. Such an action by the applicant, in view of its particular seriousness for the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine and which attests to the applicant’s continued proximity to the Russian authorities and the policy which they pursue in Ukraine, justified, in the absence of the applicant’s effective distancing from those authorities, the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue on the basis of criterion (a) when the March 2023 maintaining acts were adopted.
113 In the third place, as regards the arguments raised by the applicant in the third and fourth statements of modification, it should be recalled that the Council, in order to justify the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts, added to the grounds for listing, respectively, an additional paragraph referring to the applicant’s signing of the 2010 Agreement and a paragraph concerning an indictment issued in 2023 by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation against the applicant, accusing him of treason and of assisting Russia in carrying out subversive activities in Ukraine. According to the Council, the 2010 Agreement created favourable conditions for increasing Russia’s military presence in Ukraine and for the re-equipment and modernisation of the weapons of the Black Sea Fleet in the territory of Crimea.
114 It must be noted that the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue that was decided in the September 2023 maintaining acts and in the March 2024 maintaining acts is not based decisively on the paragraphs referred to in paragraph 113 of the present judgment, which were added in the statement of reasons for those acts, and on the additional evidence concerning the 2010 Agreement and the indictment issued by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation against the applicant.
115 It is true, as the Council submits, that the 2010 Agreement and the indictment issued in 2023 by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation demonstrate the impact which, according to the Ukrainian authorities, the actions taken by applicant when he was in power have had on the current situation. Consequently, that evidence is in addition to the evidence on which the Council relied in order to justify maintaining the applicant’s name on the lists at issue.
116 However, it must be noted that, in the context of the September 2023 maintaining acts and the March 2024 maintaining acts, it is the reasons relating to the applicant’s particularly serious actions that remain decisive and sufficient to justify the maintenance of his name on the lists at issue, namely, during the period from 2012 to 2014, the request for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, the support for pro-Russian politicians holding public offices in Crimea and the voluntary reduction of Ukraine’s defence capacity, all of which clearly contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine, as well as his more recent involvement in a plan to replace the serving President of Ukraine at the beginning of March 2022.
117 In view of the particular seriousness of those actions, which contributed to the destabilisation of Ukraine, and in the absence of any position taken by the applicant to distance himself effectively from the Russian authorities and from their policy in Ukraine, the Council was entitled, at the time of the adoption of the September 2023 maintaining acts and of the March 2024 maintaining acts, to justify the maintenance of the applicant’s name on the lists at issue by reference to those actions alone.
118 It follows that the applicant’s arguments raised in the third and fourth statements of modification, seeking to call into question the merits of the grounds relating to the 2010 Agreement and to the indictment issued by the Ukrainian State Bureau of Investigation in 2023, must be rejected as ineffective (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 November 2013, Council v Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala Naft, C‑348/12 P, EU:C:2013:776, paragraph 72 and the case-law cited).
119 Accordingly, the single plea in law raised by the applicant must be rejected.
120 In the light of all of the foregoing, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
121 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
122 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (First Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Mr Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 September 2025.
V. Di Bucci | | R. Mastroianni |