JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
24 September 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Application for EU figurative mark CLAIMS – Absolute ground for refusal – No distinctive character – Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Obligation to state reasons – Rights of the defence – Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑582/24,
Claims Balkans d.o.o. Beograd, established in Belgrade (Serbia), represented by I. Luzhnova, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Klee, acting as Agent,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of M.J. Costeira, President, U. Öberg (Rapporteur) and P. Zilgalvis, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Claims Balkans d.o.o. Beograd, seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 September 2024 (Case R 1833/2023-1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 On 7 December 2022, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:
3 The mark applied for covered services in, inter alia, Classes 35, 41 and 45 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 35: ‘Providing business information; Providing business information via a website; Professional business consultancy; Updating and maintenance of information in registries’;
– Class 41: ‘Academies [education]; Practical training [demonstration]; Training services provided via simulators; Arranging and conducting of workshops [training]; Arranging and conducting of seminars; Know-how transfer [training]; Educational examination; Arranging and conducting of congresses; Arranging and conducting of conferences; Arranging and conducting of in-person educational forums’;
– Class 45: ‘Regulatory compliance auditing; Legal research; Intellectual property consultancy; Monitoring intellectual property rights for legal advisory purposes; Licensing [legal services] in the framework of software publishing; Licensing of intellectual property; Licensing of computer software [legal services]; Legal conveyancing; Litigation services, including intellectual property; Representation in jurisdictional bodies; Registration of domain names [legal services]; Patent attorney services; Copyright management; Intellectual property management; Legal advocacy services; Alternative dispute resolution services; Legal document preparation services; Mediation; Legal services relating to licenses; Legal watching services; Intellectual property protection, law, taxation consultancy [legal services]; Intellectual property protection, law, taxation research [legal services]’.
4 By decision of 28 June 2023, the examiner rejected the application for registration of that mark in respect of the services referred to in paragraph 3 above, on the basis of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 7(2) of that regulation, in so far as that mark was regarded as descriptive and therefore devoid of distinctive character.
5 On 28 August 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the examiner’s decision.
6 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in so far as it did not enable the relevant public to identify the commercial origin of the services for which that mark was filed.
Forms of order sought
7 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order EUIPO to pay the costs.
8 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action in its entirety;
– order the applicant to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO in the event that a hearing is convened.
Law
9 In support of its action, the applicant relies on three pleas in law alleging, first, infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal infringed its rights of defence, the obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration, second, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation and, third, infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation.
The third plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, relating to the distinctive character of the mark applied for
10 In its third plea, which should be examined first, the applicant argues that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the mark applied for was devoid of distinctive character, in that it was not able to fulfil the essential function of a trade mark.
11 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
12 Under Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, trade marks which are devoid of any distinctive character are not to be registered.
13 For a trade mark to possess distinctive character for the purposes of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, it must serve to identify the service in respect of which registration is applied for as originating from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish that service from those of other undertakings (see judgment of 21 January 2010, Audi v OHIM, C‑398/08 P, EU:C:2010:29, paragraph 33 and the case-law cited).
14 In that regard, it should be noted that the signs devoid of distinctive character referred to in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 are regarded as incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the origin of the service, thus enabling the consumer who acquired the service designated by the trade mark to repeat the experience, if it proves to be positive, or to avoid it, if it proves to be negative, on the occasion of a subsequent acquisition (judgment of 27 February 2002, REWE-Zentral v OHIM (LITE), T‑79/00, EU:T:2002:42, paragraph 26; see, also, judgment of 13 November 2024, DDCF v EUIPO (SUSTAINABLE BY DESIGN), T‑3/24, not published, EU:T:2024:811, paragraph 12 and the case-law cited).
15 The distinctive character of a trade mark, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be assessed, first, by reference to the products or services in respect of which registration has been applied for and, second, by reference to the perception of the relevant public (see judgment of 29 April 2004, Henkel v OHIM, C‑456/01 P and C‑457/01 P, EU:C:2004:258, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
16 Moreover, according to the case-law, a minimum degree of distinctive character is sufficient to preclude the application of the absolute ground for refusal provided for in Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (judgment of 27 February 2002, Eurocool Logistik v OHIM (EUROCOOL), T‑34/00, EU:T:2002:41, paragraph 39).
17 Finally, it must be borne in mind that, if an applicant claims that a trade mark applied for is distinctive, despite EUIPO’s analysis, it is for that applicant to provide specific and substantiated information to show that the trade mark applied for has either intrinsic distinctive character or distinctive character acquired through use (judgments of 25 October 2007, Develey v OHIM, C‑238/06 P, EU:C:2007:635, paragraphs 49 and 50, and of 3 July 2013, Airbus v OHIM (NEO), T‑236/12, EU:T:2013:343, paragraph 62).
18 It is in the light of the principles set out above that it is necessary to examine whether the mark applied for is devoid of distinctive character, as was concluded by the Board of Appeal.
19 In the present case, in the first place, the Board of Appeal considered, in paragraph 15 of the contested decision, that the services covered by the mark applied for, as set out in paragraph 3 above, were mainly aimed at professionals conducting business activities and seeking advice in relation to their business and that those professionals had a higher-than-average level of attention.
20 Moreover, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraph 17 of the contested decision, that the relevant public was English-speaking consumers in the European Union, as the trade mark applied for was composed of the English word ‘claims’.
21 Those findings of the Board of Appeal are not disputed by the applicant and there is nothing in the file capable of calling them into question.
22 In the second place, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 18 to 20 of the contested decision, that the English word ‘claims’ meant ‘a demand or an assertion of right’, in other words an ‘asserted right’, that it was a generic legal term broadly used in the legal business field and that it had a meaning very similar to that of ‘right’.
23 That assessment is not disputed by the applicant and there is nothing in the file capable of calling it into question.
24 By contrast, the applicant argues that, in the context of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal should have taken into account the fact that the sign applied for has a number of meanings. It points out that the Board of Appeal based its decision on only one meaning of the term ‘claims’. Therefore, according to the applicant, it cannot be accepted that the trade mark applied for is devoid of distinctive character.
25 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s argument.
26 First, the fact that the mark applied for has a number of meanings is in itself, as the parties themselves acknowledge, a relevant factor which must be taken into consideration in the context of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 (judgment of 16 June 2021, Magnetec v EUIPO (CoolTUBE), T‑481/20, not published, EU:T:2021:373, paragraph 37).
27 The Court notes that the case-law according to which a sign is classified as descriptive for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation if at least one of its possible meanings designates a characteristic of the goods concerned cannot be transposed by analogy to the application of Article 7(1)(b) of that regulation, where the distinctive character of the mark applied for, within the meaning of the latter provision, is called into question for reasons other than its descriptive character (judgments of 3 September 2020, achtung! v EUIPO, C‑214/19 P, not published, EU:C:2020:632, paragraph 36, and of 16 June 2021, CoolTUBE, T‑481/20, not published, EU:T:2021:373, paragraph 37).
28 In the present case, the descriptive character of the mark applied for was not examined by the Board of Appeal. Accordingly, the applicant may properly rely on a line of argument based on the fact that the mark applied for has a number of meanings in order to establish its distinctive character.
29 That said, the Court notes that the applicant merely asserts in its application that the Board of Appeal could not conclude with certainty that the mark applied for was devoid of distinctive character, since the Board of Appeal had based its decision on only one meaning of the term ‘claims’, but does not put forward any other meanings which the relevant public might associate with the sign in question in relation to the services concerned.
30 Moreover, the applicant does not establish that another meaning of the word ‘claims’ is capable of conferring on the mark applied for sufficient distinctive character to allow it to be registered, that is to say, to indicate to the relevant public the commercial origin of the services concerned. Accordingly, the applicant fails to demonstrate either that the mark applied for contains any ambiguity capable of causing the relevant public to give it a meaning other than that which is immediately apparent, in relation to the services in question, as was found by the Board of Appeal, or that one of the other meanings of the term in question would make that mark easy to remember and thus enable it to fulfil the essential function of an EU trade mark.
31 In those circumstances, the applicant cannot rely on the fact that the word ‘claims’ has a number of meanings to challenge the Board of Appeal’s finding as to the lack of distinctive character of the mark applied for, since the applicant has not substantiated its argument by putting forward other meanings of that word.
32 In the third place, the Board of Appeal found, in paragraphs 21 to 27 of the contested decision, that, in the light of the meaning of the term ‘claims’, on the one hand, and of the services concerned, namely legal services in Class 45, education and training services in Class 41 and ancillary services, inter alia information services, provided, in particular during the pre-litigation or post-litigation stages in Class 35, on the other hand, the relevant public would perceive the mark applied for not as an indication of the commercial origin of the services in question but as a generic legal term broadly used in the field covered by those services.
33 Moreover, as regards the stylisation of the sign in question, the Board of Appeal noted that the font in which the mark applied for was represented is fairly standard and did not significantly differ from fonts proposed in broadly used word processing applications. Accordingly, it considered that the mark applied for did not contain any additional element which could divert the consumers’ attention away from the non-distinctive message conveyed by that mark.
34 The applicant disputes those findings of the Board of Appeal.
35 First, it argues that most of the services in question do not concern claims, in other words ‘asserted rights’, because they are not related to legal proceedings, and that, consequently, the mark applied for is distinctive for those services. Second, it states that the stylisation of the sign in question allows it to be immediately identified as a trade mark, on account of its stylish font, which is different from others, and as a result of its large, spaced capital letters.
36 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
37 In that regard, the Court notes that the applicant has not provided any evidence to substantiate its argument that the majority of the services in question are not related to ‘asserted rights’, because they do not concern court proceedings.
38 In any event, it should be noted that the meaning of ‘claims’, which is not disputed by the applicant, is not limited to the field of court proceedings, but is a generic term widely used in the legal business sector and therefore refers to a characteristic of the services concerned. As the Board of Appeal rightly pointed out in paragraphs 21 to 23 and 27 of the contested decision, the services in Class 45 are legal services, which are aimed at assisting clients to defend their rights and claims in various ways and in various fields. The services in Class 35 are ancillary services, typically provided by legal professionals, in the pre-litigation or post-litigation stages, which consist, inter alia, in carrying out research or informing clients of their rights, and the services in Class 41 are related education and training services, aimed at teaching clients how to defend their claims and rights.
39 Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that ‘claims’ is a legal term broadly used in the legal business field which means an ‘asserted right’ and that the relevant public, consisting of professionals having a higher-than-average level of attention, would not perceive that sign as an indication of the commercial origin of the legal and related services concerned.
40 Consequently, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the mark applied for was incapable of distinguishing the applicant’s services from those of other undertakings.
41 That finding cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument concerning the stylisation of the mark applied for.
42 The Court finds, as did the Board of Appeal in paragraph 28 of the contested decision, that the font is fairly standard and is not particularly stylish or different from others. It therefore does not serve to divert the relevant public’s attention away from the non-distinctive message conveyed by the verbal element, with the result that that mark is, as a whole, devoid of distinctive character.
43 Moreover, contrary to what the applicant claims, the fact that the letters are large and spaced does not, for that reason, support the conclusion that they are a visually eye-catching element or one that is likely to be remembered by the relevant public.
44 It follows from the foregoing that the mark applied for does not enable the relevant public to identify the origin of the services concerned or to distinguish them from those of other undertakings.
45 The Board of Appeal was therefore right in finding that the mark applied for was caught by the absolute ground for refusal, based on Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, on the ground of its lack of distinctive character.
46 It follows that the applicant’s third plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, must be rejected as unfounded.
The second plea, alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001, relating to the descriptive character of the mark applied for
47 In its second plea, the applicant submits that the examiner made an error of assessment in finding that the mark applied for was descriptive for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.
48 It argues that the services covered by the application for registration did not have a direct and specific link to the sign in question.
49 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
50 It should be noted that the Board of Appeal did not rule on the absolute ground for refusal based on Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001. Therefore, it is not for the Court, in its review of the legality of the contested decision, to rule on that issue which was not examined by the Board of Appeal (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 July 1999, Procter & Gamble v OHIM (BABY-DRY), T‑163/98, EU:T:1999:145, paragraph 51, and of 29 March 2012, You-Q v OHIM – Apple Corps (BEATLE), T‑369/10, not published, EU:T:2012:177, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited).
51 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant’s second plea must be rejected as inadmissible.
The first plea, alleging infringement of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal infringed the applicant’s rights of defence, the obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration
52 The first plea raised by the applicant is divided into two complaints, the first alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the second alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration.
The first complaint, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence
53 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal infringed its rights of defence under the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, in so far as it was unable to acquaint itself with the meanings of the term ‘claims’, with the exception of that reproduced in the examiner’s letter of objection, due to the inaccessibility of the internet link containing the definitions of that term. It also criticises the Board of Appeal for expanding the meaning of the word ‘claims’, by considering that it was similar to the concept of ‘right’, and emphasises that the absence of a response by the applicant to the Board of Appeal’s communication does not mean that it did not dispute that meaning.
54 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
55 Under the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, EUIPO’s decisions are to be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity to present their comments. That provision constitutes a specific application of the general principle of respect for the rights of the defence, which is guaranteed, furthermore, by Article 41(2)(a) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which a person whose interests are affected by a decision of a public authority must be given the opportunity effectively to make his or her point of view known. The right to be heard extends to all the factual and legal material which forms the basis for the decision, but not to the final position which the public authority intends to adopt (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 September 2021, Collibra v EUIPO – Dietrich (COLLIBRA and collibra), T‑128/20 and T‑129/20, EU:T:2021:603, paragraph 137 and the case-law cited).
56 Moreover, under Article 72(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, actions before the EU judicature may be brought only against decisions of the Boards of Appeal. Accordingly, it is only pleas directed against the decision of the Board of Appeal itself which are admissible in such an action (see judgments of 23 May 2019, Sintokogio v EUIPO (ProAssist), T‑439/18, not published, EU:T:2019:359, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited, and of 1 September 2021, Gruppe Nymphenburg Consult v EUIPO (Limbic® Types), T‑96/20, EU:T:2021:527, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
57 In the present case, it must be noted, as EUIPO submits, that the applicant’s argument that it was unable to acquaint itself with the other meanings of the term ‘claims’, since the link to the online dictionary was not accessible without a subscription, is in fact directed against the examiner’s decision and not against the contested decision.
58 In paragraphs 8 and 9 of its application, the applicant refers to the letter of objection and to the examiner’s decision.
59 Furthermore, it is true that the Board of Appeal reproduced the link to the online dictionary, referred to by the applicant, in paragraph 2 of the contested decision, when summarising the facts, but it carried out its own assessment of the meaning of the term ‘claims’, in paragraphs 18 to 20 of that decision.
60 Therefore, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 56 above, the applicant’s argument that it was unable to acquaint itself with the other meanings of the term ‘claims’ must be rejected as inadmissible.
61 In any event, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal is not required to prove that the sign in respect of which registration as an EU trade mark is sought is included in a dictionary. The registrability of a sign as an EU trade mark must be assessed only on the basis of the relevant EU legislation as interpreted by the Courts of the European Union. Therefore, it is sufficient that the Board of Appeal applied the lack of distinctive character test, as interpreted by the case-law, in order to reach a decision and it was not obliged to justify its action by the production of evidence (see, to that effect, judgments of 8 July 2004, Telepharmacy Solutions v OHIM (TELEPHARMACY SOLUTIONS), T‑289/02, EU:T:2004:227, paragraph 54, and of 22 June 2005, Metso Paper Automation v OHIM (PAPERLAB), T‑19/04, EU:T:2005:247, paragraph 34).
62 Accordingly, even if the link to the online dictionary in question was not accessible and all the meanings of the term ‘claims’ included in that online dictionary were not reproduced in the EUIPO decisions, it cannot be held that the applicant’s rights of defence were infringed.
63 The applicant’s other arguments cannot call into question that assessment.
64 As regards the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal wrongly extended the meaning of the term ‘claims’, by considering that that term had a meaning very similar to that of ‘right’, the Court notes that the decisive question under the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001 is whether the applicant was given the opportunity to acquaint itself with and submit its comments on the meaning of the word at issue, and, as EUIPO argues, not whether or not the applicant disputed the meaning of that word.
65 In the present case, the Court notes that, prior to the adoption of the contested decision, in a communication from the rapporteur of 10 June 2024, the Board of Appeal, while recalling the meaning of the term in question, emphasised that that meaning was very similar to that of ‘right’ and invited the applicant to submit its comments within one month. Accordingly, EUIPO did not infringe the applicant’s rights of defence in that respect, since the applicant was aware of that element and had the opportunity to submit its comments.
66 Moreover, it should be noted that the question whether the Board of Appeal was right to consider that the word ‘claims’ had a meaning similar to that of ‘right’ relates not to respect for the rights of the defence or to the statement of reasons for the contested decision, but to the merits of that decision.
67 In those circumstances, no infringement of the applicant’s rights of defence can be found in the present case.
68 It follows that the first complaint of the first plea raised by the applicant must be rejected as partly inadmissible and partly unfounded.
The second complaint, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration
69 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal failed to fulfil its obligation to state reasons in not responding to its arguments relating to the lack of descriptive character of the mark applied for, for the purposes of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation 2017/1001.
70 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s argument.
71 Under the first sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, decisions of EUIPO must state the reasons on which they are based. That obligation has the same scope as that which derives from the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU which requires that the statement of reasons must disclose in a clear and unequivocal manner the reasoning followed by the institution which adopted the measure in question, without it being necessary for that reasoning to go into all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the statement of reasons meets those requirements must, nonetheless, be assessed with regard not only to its wording, but also to its context and to all the legal rules governing the matter in question (see judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma, C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited).
72 The right to sound administration, in accordance with Article 41(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, includes the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its decisions. That obligation, which also stems from Article 94 of Regulation 2017/1001, has the dual purpose of enabling interested parties to know the purported justification for the measure taken so as to be able to defend their rights and of enabling the Courts of the European Union to exercise their jurisdiction to review the legality of the decision in question (see judgment of 28 June 2018, EUIPO v Puma, C‑564/16 P, EU:C:2018:509, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited).
73 However, the adjudicating bodies of EUIPO are not obliged to take a view on every argument put forward by the parties. It is sufficient for them to set out the facts and legal considerations having decisive importance in the context of the decision (see judgment of 12 November 2008, Shaker v OHIM – Limiñana y Botella (Limoncello della Costiera Amalfitana shaker), T‑7/04, EU:T:2008:481, paragraph 81 and the case-law cited).
74 In the present case, it is true that the Board of Appeal did not rule on the applicant’s plea based on the lack of descriptive character of the mark applied for.
75 However, in contrast to the examiner, the Board of Appeal based its decision solely on Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the mark applied for was devoid of distinctive character and was therefore incapable of performing the essential function of a trade mark, namely that of identifying the commercial origin of the goods or services in question.
76 As is clear from Article 7(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, it is sufficient that one of the absolute grounds for refusal applies for the sign at issue not to be registrable as an EU trade mark (see judgment of 22 June 2017, Biogena Naturprodukte v EUIPO (ZUM wohl), T‑236/16, EU:T:2017:416, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited).
77 Therefore, since the Board of Appeal found that the mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and that that ground alone justified the refusal to register the mark applied for, there was no need, in any event, to examine and provide a reasoned response to the plea alleging infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of that regulation, relating to the descriptive character of the sign applied for.
78 It follows from the foregoing that the Board of Appeal did not infringe the obligation to state reasons and the principle of sound administration by not ruling on the applicant’s plea based on the lack of descriptive character of the trade mark applied for.
79 Accordingly, the applicant’s first plea must be rejected in its entirety and, therefore, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
80 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
81 Even though the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO contended that it should be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that a hearing is convened. Since no hearing was held, each party must be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Claims Balkans d.o.o. Beograd and the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) each to bear their own costs.
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 24 September 2025.
V. Di Bucci | | S. Papasavvas |