JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
1 October 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for EU figurative mark LUX 1991 – Earlier EU figurative mark LUX TOOLS – Relative ground for refusal – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 )
In Case T‑566/24,
Group Pack sp. z o.o., established in Żukowo (Poland), represented by K. Czub, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by T. Klee, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Obi Group Sourcing GmbH, established in Wermelskirchen (Germany), represented by A. Theis, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk (Rapporteur), President, G. Hesse and I. Dimitrakopoulos, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Group Pack sp. z o.o., seeks the annulment of the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 30 August 2024 (Case R 494/2024-1) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 On 18 August 2021, the applicant filed an application for registration of an EU trade mark with EUIPO in respect of the following figurative sign:
3 The mark applied for covers goods in Classes 6, 16 and 21 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, corresponding, for each of those classes, to the following description:
– Class 6: ‘Aluminium foil’;
– Class 16: ‘Plastic food storage bags for household use; Rubbish bags; Parchment paper; Plastic oven cooking bags’;
– Class 21: ‘Cleaning articles; Household utensils for cleaning, brushes and brush-making materials; Cloths for cleaning; Scouring pads; Kitchen sponges; Cosmetic sponges; Mopping brushes; Saucepan scourers of metal; Tableware, cookware and containers; Baking utensils; Baking tins’.
4 On 18 November 2021, Emil Lux GmbH & Co. KG, the predecessor in law of the intervener, Obi Group Sourcing GmbH, filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods referred to in paragraph 3 above.
5 The opposition was based, inter alia, on the following earlier EU figurative mark:
covering goods in Classes 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25 and 26 corresponding, as regards specifically the goods in Classes 6, 16 and 21, in particular to the following description:
– Class 6: ‘Unprocessed and semi-processed materials of metal, not specified for use; none of the aforementioned goods being blinds, shutters, windows, skylights, roof windows or accessories hereto’;
– Class 16: ‘Bags and articles for packaging, wrapping and storage of paper, cardboard or plastics; Paper and cardboard’;
– Class 21: ‘Household cleaning articles, Brushes and brush making materials; Tableware, cookware and containers; Combs and sponges’.
6 The ground relied on in support of the opposition was that set out in Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1).
7 On 10 January 2024, the Opposition Division upheld the opposition based on the earlier mark and rejected the application for registration of the mark applied for.
8 On 6 March 2024, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the Opposition Division’s decision.
9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. In that regard, the Board of Appeal found, inter alia, that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical to the goods in Classes 6, 16 and 21 covered by the earlier mark and listed in paragraph 5 above, that its assessment related to the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public, that the marks at issue were visually similar to an average degree and phonetically similar to at least an average degree and that their conceptual comparison remained neutral.
Forms of order sought
10 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– annul the contested decision;
– order EUIPO and the intervener to pay the costs.
11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action in its entirety;
– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12 The intervener contends, in essence, that the action should be dismissed.
Law
13 The applicant relies, in essence, on a single plea in law, alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, in that the Board of Appeal erred in finding in the present case that there was a likelihood of confusion. According to the applicant, the existence of a likelihood of confusion must be ruled out, in essence, on account of the lack of distinctive character of the elements of the marks at issue and the visual and phonetic differences between those marks.
14 Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 provides that, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied for must not be registered if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.
15 According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
16 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
17 Furthermore, where the protection of the earlier trade mark extends to the entirety of the European Union, it is necessary to take into account the perception of the marks at issue by the consumer of the goods in question in that territory. However, it must be borne in mind that, for an EU trade mark to be refused registration, it is sufficient that a relative ground for refusal for the purposes of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 exists in part of the European Union (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited).
18 In the present case, as regards the definition of the relevant public, in paragraphs 17 to 22 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal, first, found that in relation to the goods covered by the marks at issue, the relevant public consisted of the general public with an average level of attention. Secondly, after finding that the relevant public was that of the European Union, the Board of Appeal decided, as the Opposition Division had done and relying on the case-law, to assess whether there was a likelihood of confusion with regard to only the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public.
19 As regards the comparison of the goods at issue, in paragraph 23 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal confirmed the Opposition Division’s finding that the goods covered by the mark applied for were identical to the goods in Classes 6, 16 and 21 covered by the earlier mark and listed in paragraph 5 above.
20 The applicant does not put forward any arguments disputing the Board of Appeal’s assessments relating to the definition of the relevant public and the comparison of the goods at issue.
Comparison of the marks at issue
21 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
22 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited). It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element. That could be the case, in particular, where that component is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that all the other components are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgments of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 42, and of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43).
23 In the present case, before examining the similarity of the marks at issue, the applicant’s arguments concerning the distinctive and dominant elements of those marks must be assessed.
The distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue
24 It should be stated that, for the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element of a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods and services covered by that mark as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods and services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment, it is necessary to take into account, in particular, the inherent characteristics of that element and to ask whether it is at all descriptive of the goods and services covered by that mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 September 2010, Companhia Muller de Bebidas v OHIM – Missiato Industria e Comercio (61 A NOSSA ALEGRIA), T‑472/08, EU:T:2010:347, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited).
25 In the present case, in its assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements in paragraphs 27 to 36 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found, first, that at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public would perceive the word element ‘lux’, common to the marks at issue, as meaningless and therefore as distinctive. It found that it could not assume, without supporting evidence, that the average Italian- or Spanish-speaking consumer would perceive that element as the abbreviation of the English word ‘luxury’ and, consequently, as laudatory with regard to the goods at issue. Such a finding is all the more valid since those goods are household goods which are not associated with luxury. Secondly, as regards the element ‘1991’ of the mark applied for, the Board of Appeal found that it was ‘weak’ and, in essence, that it plays a secondary role in the overall impression created by the mark applied for on account, respectively, of the fact that the relevant public would associate it with the year of the applicant’s establishment or of the beginning of the marketing of the applicant’s goods and of the position of that element within that mark, as well as its size in relation to the element ‘lux’. Thirdly, as regards the element ‘tools’ of the earlier mark, that element possesses normal distinctive character in so far as it has no meaning for a significant part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public. However, that element is less visible within the earlier mark than the element ‘lux’. Lastly, as regards the figurative elements of the marks at issue, although the Board of Appeal found that they were not negligible owing to their size and their position, it found that they would merely be perceived as reinforcing the word elements of the marks at issue.
26 The applicant disputes that assessment, claiming, first, that the word element ‘lux’ has a specific meaning for the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public, which would associate it with the goods at issue. First, those parts of the relevant public would perceive that word, in the light of its use in trade and the Europeanisation of the linguistic elements, as an abbreviation of the word ‘luxury’ in English. Secondly, those parts of the relevant public may also perceive that term, which has become firmly established in everyday language, as an international unit of measurement of illumination. The applicant also notes that in the contested decision the Board of Appeal ignored that meaning and the evidence to that effect, which constitutes a procedural infringement.
27 Next, the applicant submits that the word element ‘tools’ in the earlier mark does have a meaning for the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public.
28 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
29 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, with the exception of certain terms forming part of basic English vocabulary, it cannot be assumed that English terms are widely known in the European Union (judgment of 29 April 2020, Kerry Luxembourg v EUIPO – Döhler (TasteSense), T‑109/19, not published, EU:T:2020:162, paragraph 65). According to the case-law, although it is true that an understanding of a foreign language may not, in general, be presumed, the fact remains that if the English terms have an equivalent in the language of the non-English-speaking public and a link may be established by that public between those terms and their translation into the language concerned, then that public must be held to understand their meaning (judgment of 29 April 2020, TasteSense, T‑109/19, not published, EU:T:2020:162, paragraphs 62 and 68).
30 Furthermore, descriptive signs or indications are those which may serve in normal usage from the target public’s point of view to designate, either directly or by reference to one of their essential characteristics, goods or services such as those covered by a mark (see, to that effect, judgment of 20 September 2001, Procter & Gamble v OHIM, C‑383/99 P, EU:C:2001:461, paragraph 39). Consequently, for a sign to be descriptive, it must suggest a sufficiently direct and concrete link to the goods or services in question to enable the public concerned immediately, and without further thought, to perceive a description of the category of goods and services in question or of one of their characteristics (see judgment of 12 January 2005, Deutsche Post EURO EXPRESS v OHIM (EUROPREMIUM), T‑334/03, EU:T:2005:4, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
31 In the present case, in the first place, it is necessary to examine the applicant’s arguments relating to the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the element ‘lux’, common to the marks at issue, had no meaning and had distinctive character in respect of at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public.
32 First, as regards the applicant’s argument that the element ‘lux’ will be understood by those parts of the relevant public at issue as the abbreviation of the English word ‘luxury’, it must be observed, as the Board of Appeal did in paragraph 30 of the contested decision, that the Italian and Spanish equivalents of the English word ‘luxury’, ‘lusso’ and ‘lujo’ respectively, are far removed from that word, with the result that it cannot be assumed that the Italian- or Spanish-speaking consumer would establish a link between ‘lux’ and the English word ‘luxury’. Nor, furthermore, does the word ‘luxury’ appear to be established as part of the basic English vocabulary, with the result that it could be assumed that the consumer mentioned above would know that word and its meaning. It follows that it has not been demonstrated that the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public would perceive the element ‘lux’ as an abbreviation of the English word ‘luxury’. It should be added in that regard that the applicant does not put forward any argument calling into question the findings of the Board of Appeal in that respect, since its argument regarding the internationalisation of words in English is too general.
33 In addition, it is unlikely, given the nature of the goods at issue, that the element ‘lux’, as an abbreviation of the English word ‘luxury’, would be perceived, in the mind of at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public, as a description or as one of the characteristics of those goods, with the result that that element lacks distinctive character. As the Board of Appeal found in paragraph 33 of the contested decision, the goods at issue are household goods which are not associated with luxury, unlike clothing or cosmetic products, and the applicant does not put forward any substantiated argument capable of calling that finding into question.
34 Secondly, as regards the applicant’s argument that the element ‘lux’ will be understood by the relevant public as an international unit of measurement of illumination, that argument, even if well founded, is not capable of demonstrating the lack of distinctive character of that element. In view of the nature of the goods at issue, which are far removed from the field of electricity and light, it is unlikely, as EUIPO submits, that the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public would establish a sufficiently direct and specific link between the word ‘lux’, as the international unit of measurement of illumination, and those goods.
35 Furthermore, although the applicant claims that there was an infringement of ‘procedural rules’, in that the Board of Appeal did not expressly examine in the contested decision the potential meaning of the word ‘lux’ as the international unit of measurement of illumination, it does not explain the nature of the infringement made by the Board of Appeal, with the result that its claim must be rejected. In any event, it must be stated that the Board of Appeal confirmed in its entirety the finding of the Opposition Division that the element ‘lux’ had no meaning in respect of at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public and that the Opposition Division had indeed examined, in its decision, the possible meaning of that element as an international unit of measurement of illumination. In such circumstances, the decision of the Opposition Division and its statement of reasons form part of the context in which the contested decision was adopted, a context which is known to the parties and which enables the Court to carry out in full its judicial review as to whether the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the distinctive character of the element ‘lux’ was well founded (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2008, Reber v OHIM – Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli (Mozart), T‑304/06, EU:T:2008:268, paragraph 47; see, also, to that effect, judgment of 11 September 2014, Galileo International Technology v OHIM – ESA and Commission (GALILEO), T‑450/11, not published, EU:T:2014:771, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited). Consequently, no infringement of ‘procedural rules’ by the Board of Appeal has been demonstrated by the applicant.
36 It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Board of Appeal was entitled to conclude that the element ‘lux’, common to the marks at issue, has no meaning in respect of at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public and that, therefore, contrary to what the applicant claims, it has distinctive character, at least for that part of the relevant public.
37 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the element ‘tools’ of the earlier mark is not without meaning for the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public and that it is not distinctive, it must be held that the word ‘tools’ cannot be regarded as forming part of basic English vocabulary and that, therefore, it cannot be assumed, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 29 above, that that word has meaning for the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public. It should also be stated that the applicant does not put forward any substantiated argument or evidence to claim that that word would be understood by the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public and that it lacks distinctive character in respect of the goods at issue.
38 In the third place, it should be noted that the applicant does not put forward any argument disputing the Board of Appeal’s other findings regarding the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue. More specifically, first, it does not criticise the assessment, in paragraph 34 of the contested decision, that the element ‘1991’ of the mark applied for is weakly distinctive and, in view of its position and size within that mark, secondary in relation to the element ‘lux’ in the overall impression created by that mark. Secondly, it also does not dispute the assessment, in paragraph 35 of the contested decision, that the element ‘tools’ in the earlier mark is less visible than the element ‘lux’ in that mark. Thirdly, the applicant does not criticise the assessment either, in paragraph 36 of the contested decision, that the figurative elements of the marks at issue merely enhance the importance of the word elements in those marks.
39 Therefore, it follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in its examination of the distinctive and dominant elements of the marks at issue.
The visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity of the marks at issue
40 It should be borne in mind that two marks are similar when, from the point of view of the relevant public, they are at least identical in part as regards one or more relevant aspects. According to the case-law, the relevant aspects are the visual, phonetic and conceptual aspects (see judgment of 23 October 2002, Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN), T‑6/01, EU:T:2002:261, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited).
41 In the present case, in paragraphs 37 to 41 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal assessed the similarity between the marks at issue. From a visual standpoint, the Board of Appeal found that those marks were similar to an average degree. In that regard, the Board of Appeal stated that the marks at issue coincided in the distinctive element ‘lux’, even though that element was represented twice in the earlier mark, and that the elements ‘1991’ and ‘tools’ were secondary from a visual standpoint on account of their respective position and size. From a phonetic standpoint, the marks at issue have at least an average degree of similarity. The marks at issue coincide in the pronunciation of the distinctive element ‘lux’. The element ‘tools’ of the earlier mark is not necessarily pronounced on account of its size and position within that mark and the element ‘1991’ of the mark applied for is not pronounced in view of its weak distinctive character. Lastly, from a conceptual standpoint, the Board of Appeal found that the comparison between the marks at issue remained neutral for the parts of the relevant public concerned, in respect of which the element ‘lux’ had no meaning, and that the element ‘1991’ in the mark applied for conveyed a concept of very limited relevance.
42 The applicant disputes that assessment, claiming that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that the element ‘lux’, common to the marks at issue, had distinctive character. The Board of Appeal should therefore have taken account of the other distinctive elements of the marks at issue, in particular the element ‘tools’ of the earlier mark, and their figurative elements to conclude that those marks were different from a visual and phonetic point of view.
43 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
44 In that regard, first, it should be stated that the applicant’s argument concerning the similarity of the marks at issue is based primarily on the premiss that the element ‘lux’, common to those marks, does not have distinctive character. However, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 31 to 36 above, that premiss is incorrect in respect of at least a non-negligible part of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking relevant public, which means that the applicant’s argument in that regard must be rejected.
45 Secondly, even though the applicant also refers to the importance of ‘additional distinctive elements’ of the marks at issue, and in particular the element ‘tools’, in the visual and phonetic comparison of those marks, it should be observed, first of all, that the applicant has failed to specify which are the distinctive elements of the marks at issue other than the element ‘tools’ to which the applicant refers.
46 Next, as regards specifically the element ‘tools’ of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal did take account of that element in the comparison of the marks at issue, as is apparent from the summary of its assessment of the similarity of the marks in paragraph 41 above. It follows from the Board of Appeal’s reasoning in the contested decision that the presence of that element explains in part why it concluded that there was an average degree of visual similarity and at least an average degree of phonetic similarity, and not that there was a high degree of visual and phonetic similarity despite the common element ‘lux’. In addition, the applicant does not specify whether and, as the case may be, why the presence of the element ‘tools’ in the earlier mark means that the marks at issue are visually and phonetically different despite, first, the common element ‘lux’, which is, moreover, distinctive in respect of at least a non-negligible part of the public at issue, and, secondly, the size and position of ‘tools’ in the earlier mark, which make the latter less visible than the element ‘lux’ within that mark.
47 Thirdly, as regards the figurative elements, the Board of Appeal took account of those elements as a point of difference between the marks at issue from a visual standpoint. In view of their limited role in the overall impressions created by those marks, which was found by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 36 of the contested decision and which is not disputed by the applicant, and of the fact that those elements cannot be pronounced, it must be held that the Board of Appeal took sufficient account of the figurative elements of the marks at issue in the context of the visual and phonetic comparison of those marks.
48 Fourthly, the applicant does not put forward any argument disputing the Board of Appeal’s assessment, in paragraph 40 of the contested decision, that the conceptual comparison was neutral for the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public in respect of which the element ‘lux’ has no meaning.
49 It follows from the foregoing that the applicant has not demonstrated that the Board of Appeal made an error of assessment in its examination of the visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity between the marks at issue.
Global assessment of the likelihood of confusion
50 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, VENADO with frame and others, T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
51 In the present case, in paragraphs 45 and 46 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that there was a likelihood of confusion in respect of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public, in view of the goods at issue being identical, the average degree of visual similarity between the marks at issue and the at least average degree of phonetic similarity, and the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark. According to the Board of Appeal, at least a non-negligible part of the Italian and Spanish-speaking public will therefore be likely to believe that the goods covered by the marks at issue come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings.
52 The applicant disputes that finding of the Board of Appeal, claiming that, in view of the incorrect methodology for assessing the similarity of the signs and the incorrect findings that ensue from that methodology as to the existence of a likelihood of confusion, the Board of Appeal did not correctly apply Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and infringed the procedural rules by failing to take into account some of its arguments and some of the assessments of the Opposition Division.
53 EUIPO disputes the applicant’s arguments.
54 It must be stated, first, that, as is apparent from paragraph 20 above, the applicant does not dispute that the goods covered by the mark applied for and those in Classes 6, 16 and 21 covered by the earlier mark and listed in paragraph 5 above are identical. Secondly, the arguments of the applicant concerning the similarity of the marks at issue in respect of the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public and the distinctive character of the elements of which those marks consist in respect of those parts of the relevant public were rejected, as is apparent from the analysis in paragraphs 21 to 49 above. Furthermore, the applicant does not put forward any additional argument disputing the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion as regards the Italian- and Spanish-speaking parts of the relevant public carried out by the Board of Appeal.
55 It follows that the applicant has not established that the Board of Appeal erred in finding that there was a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
56 Consequently, the applicant’s single plea in law must be rejected and the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
57 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
58 Although the applicant has been unsuccessful, EUIPO has contended that the applicant should be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that an oral hearing is convened and the intervener did not make any application to that effect. Since no hearing was held, it is appropriate to decide to order each party to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Seventh Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders Group Pack sp. z o.o., the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and Obi Group Sourcing GmbH each to bear their own costs.
Kowalik-Bańczyk | Hesse | Dimitrakopoulos |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 October 2025.
V. Di Bucci | | M. van der Woude |