JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
26 November 2025 (*)
( EU trade mark – Invalidity proceedings – EU figurative mark Si Log International – Earlier national word mark SILOG – Relative ground for invalidity – Likelihood of confusion – Article 8(1)(b) and Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 – Evidence submitted for the first time before the Board of Appeal – Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 – Right to be heard )
In Case T‑572/24,
SiLog GmbH, established in Meudt (Germany), represented by D. Lindloff, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by E. Markakis, acting as Agent,
defendant,
the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being
Silog SAS, established in Bruges (France), represented by N. Castagnon, lawyer,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of G. De Baere (Rapporteur), acting as President, K. Kecsmár and S. Kingston, Judges,
Registrar: V. Di Bucci,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
having regard to the fact that no request for a hearing was submitted by the parties within three weeks after service of notification of the close of the written part of the procedure, and having decided to rule on the action without an oral part of the procedure, pursuant to Article 106(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, SiLog GmbH, seeks the annulment and alteration of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 26 August 2024 (Case R 343/2023‑5) (‘the contested decision’).
Background to the dispute
2 On 15 September 2021, the intervener, Silog SAS, filed with EUIPO an application for a declaration of invalidity of the EU trade mark which had been registered following an application filed by the applicant on 21 May 2019 in respect of the following figurative sign:
3 The services that were covered by the contested mark and in respect of which a declaration of invalidity was sought were in Class 39 of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended, and corresponded to the following description: ‘Transport of goods’.
4 The application for a declaration of invalidity was based on the earlier French word mark SILOG, registered on 27 November 2015 and renewed until 27 July 2025, covering, inter alia, services in Class 36 corresponding, in particular, to the following description: ‘Leasing of utility vehicles’.
5 The ground relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity was that set out in Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.
6 Following a request made by the applicant, EUIPO invited the intervener to furnish proof of genuine use of the earlier mark which had been relied on in support of the application for a declaration of invalidity. The intervener complied with that request within the time limit set.
7 On 19 December 2022, the Cancellation Division granted the application for a declaration of invalidity on the basis of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) thereof.
8 On 9 February 2023, the applicant filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against the decision of the Cancellation Division.
9 By the contested decision, the Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In the first place, it found, in essence, that the evidence provided by the intervener as a whole demonstrated the use of the earlier mark for ‘leasing of utility vehicles’ services in Class 36. In the second place, it found that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
Forms of order sought
10 The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should:
– annul and alter the contested decision;
– order EUIPO to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings before the Court and order the intervener to pay the costs incurred in the proceedings before EUIPO.
11 EUIPO contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs in the event that a hearing is convened.
12 The intervener contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
Law
The applicable law ratione temporis
13 Given the date on which the application for registration at issue was filed, namely 21 May 2019, which is decisive for the purpose of identifying the applicable substantive law, the facts of the case are governed by the substantive provisions of Regulation 2017/1001 (see, to that effect, order of 5 October 2004, Alcon v OHIM, C‑192/03 P, EU:C:2004:587, paragraphs 39 and 40, and judgment of 23 April 2020, Gugler France v Gugler and EUIPO, C‑736/18 P, not published, EU:C:2020:308, paragraph 3 and the case-law cited).
14 Furthermore, since, according to settled case-law, procedural rules are generally held to apply on the date on which they enter into force (see judgment of 11 December 2012, Commission v Spain, C‑610/10, EU:C:2012:781, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited), the case is governed by the procedural provisions of Regulation 2017/1001 and by the provisions of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/625 of 5 March 2018 supplementing Regulation 2017/1001, and repealing Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 (OJ 2018 L 104, p. 1).
15 Consequently, so far as concerns the procedural rules, the references made by the applicant to Article 16(1)(b) and the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 of 18 May 2017 supplementing Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the European Union trade mark and repealing Commission Regulations (EC) No 2868/95 and (EC) No 216/96 (OJ 2017 L 205, p. 1) must be understood as referring to Article 16(1)(b) and the first sentence of Article 7(2) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, the wording of which is substantively identical.
Substance
16 In support of its action, the applicant puts forward five pleas in law, alleging, first, infringement of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation, secondly, infringement of Article 95(2) of that regulation, thirdly, in essence, infringement of Article 16(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, fourthly, infringement of Article 64(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001 and, fifthly, breach of the right to be heard.
First plea, alleging infringement of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation
17 The applicant submits that the Board of Appeal’s assessment of the likelihood of confusion is flawed. First, the applicant challenges the Board of Appeal’s finding that the services in question are similar. Secondly, the applicant asserts that the Board of Appeal committed errors in the assessment of the distinctive and dominant elements of the contested mark and in the assessment of the similarity of the signs at issue. Thirdly, the applicant submits that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark is low. Fourthly, the applicant challenges the Board of Appeal’s finding relating to the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
18 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
19 Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) thereof, provides that, on application by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, a mark is to be declared invalid where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, an earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark. Furthermore, under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation 2017/1001, ‘earlier trade marks’ means trade marks registered in a Member State with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application for registration of the EU trade mark.
20 According to settled case-law, the risk that the public may believe that the goods or services in question come from the same undertaking or from economically linked undertakings constitutes a likelihood of confusion. The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, according to the relevant public’s perception of the signs and goods or services in question and taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, in particular the interdependence between the similarity of the signs and that of the goods or services covered (see judgment of 9 July 2003, Laboratorios RTB v OHIM – Giorgio Beverly Hills (GIORGIO BEVERLY HILLS), T‑162/01, EU:T:2003:199, paragraphs 30 to 32 and the case-law cited).
21 For the purpose of applying Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, a likelihood of confusion presupposes both that the marks at issue are identical or similar and that the goods or services which they cover are identical or similar. Those conditions are cumulative (see judgment of 22 January 2009, Commercy v OHIM – easyGroup IP Licensing (easyHotel), T‑316/07, EU:T:2009:14, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
22 From the outset, it should be stated that the applicant does not dispute the definition of the relevant public adopted by the Board of Appeal. The Board of Appeal found that the services at issue were directed at a professional public with a high level of attention. Nor does the applicant call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the relevant territory for the purposes of the assessment of the likelihood of confusion is France.
– Comparison of the services at issue
23 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that there was, at the very least, a low degree of similarity between the ‘leasing of utility vehicles’ services in Class 36 covered by the earlier mark, and the ‘transport of goods’ services in Class 39 covered by the contested mark.
24 In the first place, the applicant submits that the services at issue are different inasmuch as they come from different classes. Furthermore, the finding of similarity cannot be based on the fact that both of the services involve a vehicle. There are also clear differences between the services at issue concerning, in essence, the acquisition or non-acquisition of the right to use the utility vehicle by the recipient of the services, the duration of the agreements, the providers’ know-how and the manner in which those providers advertise those services. Consequently, these are neither complementary nor competing services.
25 In the second place, the applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having employed reasoning that is contradictory, or at least insufficient, in the comparison of the services at issue.
26 In the third place, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal failed to take into account its previous decision-making practice, infringing Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principles of equal treatment and sound administration.
27 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
28 According to settled case-law, in assessing the similarity of the goods or services at issue, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose, their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary. Other factors may also be taken into account such as the distribution channels of the goods concerned (see judgment of 14 May 2013, Sanco v OHIM – Marsalman (Representation of a chicken), T‑249/11, EU:T:2013:238, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited).
29 In the first place, as regards the applicant’s arguments drawing on the fact that the services at issue are different, first of all, it should be noted that the applicant cannot usefully rely on the fact that the services covered by the marks at issue are not from the same class. In that regard, it should be noted that the Nice Classification is purely administrative. While reference should be made to that classification in order to determine, where necessary, the range or the meaning of the goods in respect of which a mark has been registered (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 July 2025, Bouwbenodigdheden Hoogeveen v EUIPO – Pürschel (BIENENBEISSER), T‑144/24, EU:T:2025:700, paragraph 27), the services cannot be found to be dissimilar only because they do not belong to the same class under the Nice Classification (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 January 2025, Desimo v EUIPO – Dulces y conservas Helios (ELIOS), T‑607/23, not published, EU:T:2025:112, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
30 Next, contrary to the suggestion made by the applicant, the Board of Appeal, while correctly noting that both of the services at issue could involve vehicles, did not indicate that that fact was particularly important.
31 Lastly, the applicant’s arguments calling into question the Board of Appeal’s findings that the ‘services at issue [were] alternatives and in competition with each other’ and that the targeted public at whom those services were directed could coincide cannot succeed.
32 Admittedly, as the Board of Appeal acknowledged in the contested decision, when leasing a utility vehicle, the consumer acquires the right to use that vehicle, unlike in a situation where he or she uses a ‘transport of goods’ service provider. Furthermore, the duration of the leasing agreements and agreements for the transport of goods, the providers’ know-how and the manner of promoting those services may differ.
33 However, as the Board of Appeal correctly noted, it must be stated that the services at issue can target the same public, made up of professionals, and can have the same purpose and meet the same needs, with the result that those services may be in competition with each other. Consumers wishing to transport goods can either acquire a utility vehicle under a leasing agreement or use a ‘transport of goods’ service.
34 It is irrelevant in that regard to state that the services of ‘leasing of utility vehicles’ covered by the earlier mark can also be used in fields other than that of the transport of goods.
35 In the light of the above, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that there was, at the very least, a low degree of similarity between the services at issue.
36 In the second place, as regards the applicant’s argument that the contested decision contains contradictory and insufficient reasoning, it should be borne in mind that the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement, which must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue. The reasoning of a decision consists in a formal statement of the grounds on which that decision is based. If those grounds are vitiated by errors, those errors will vitiate the substantive legality of the decision, but not the statement of reasons in it, which may be adequate even though it sets out reasons which are incorrect. It follows that objections and arguments intended to establish that a measure is not well founded are irrelevant in the context of a plea in law alleging an insufficient statement of reasons or a lack of such a statement (see judgment of 30 May 2017, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, C‑45/15 P, EU:C:2017:402, paragraph 85 and the case-law cited; judgment of 28 June 2023, CEDC International v EUIPO – Underberg (Shape of a blade of grass in a bottle), T‑145/22, EU:T:2023:365, paragraph 36).
37 The applicant submits that the reasoning for the contested decision relating to the comparison of services should not have allowed the Board of Appeal to reach the conclusion that there was a low degree of similarity between the services at issue. By that argument, the applicant seeks, in reality, to dispute the merits of the Board of Appeal’s assessment relating to that degree of similarity between the services at issue. Accordingly, that argument is not capable of demonstrating that the reasoning is contradictory or insufficient. In any case, as is apparent, in particular from paragraphs 29 to 35 above, no contradiction is evident in the reasoning for the contested decision relating to the comparison of the services at issue.
38 In the third place, as regards the complaint alleging infringement of Article 41(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration, it should be borne in mind that decisions concerning the registration of a sign as an EU trade mark which the Boards of Appeal of EUIPO take under Regulation 2017/1001 are adopted in the exercise of circumscribed powers and are not a matter of discretion. Accordingly, the legality of decisions of the Boards of Appeal must be assessed solely on the basis of that regulation, as interpreted by the EU judicature, and not on the basis of a previous decision-making practice (judgment of 26 April 2007, Alcon v OHIM, C‑412/05 P, EU:C:2007:252, paragraph 65).
39 The fact remains that, in the light of the principles of equal treatment and sound administration, EUIPO must, when examining an application for registration of an EU trade mark, take into account the decisions already taken in respect of similar applications and consider with especial care whether it should decide in the same way or not. That said, the way in which the principles of equal treatment and sound administration are applied must be consistent with respect for legality. Consequently, a person who files an application for registration of a sign as a trade mark cannot rely, to his or her advantage and in order to secure an identical decision, on a possibly unlawful act committed for the benefit of someone else. Moreover, for reasons of legal certainty and, indeed, of sound administration, the examination of any trade mark application must be stringent and full, in order to prevent trade marks from being improperly registered. That examination must be undertaken in each individual case. The registration of a sign as a mark depends on specific criteria, which are applicable in the factual circumstances of the particular case and the purpose of which is to ascertain whether the sign at issue is caught by a ground for refusal (judgment of 10 March 2011, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol v OHIM, C‑51/10 P, EU:C:2011:139, paragraphs 74 to 77).
40 In that regard, the applicant submits, relying on earlier decisions of EUIPO, that transport services are not interchangeable with leasing services. The Board of Appeal should have come to the same conclusion in the present case. However, as EUIPO correctly stated, the earlier decisions cited by the applicant are not transposable to the case at hand. Those earlier decisions concerned either services in Class 39 other than ‘transport of goods’, or goods in Class 12. Moreover, it is apparent from paragraph 150 of the contested decision that the Board of Appeal duly stated the reason for its finding that those decisions were irrelevant. The applicant’s argument cannot therefore succeed.
– Overall impression given by the contested mark and comparison of the signs
41 The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion must, so far as concerns the visual, phonetic or conceptual similarity of the signs at issue, be based on the overall impression given by the signs, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant elements. The perception of the marks by the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive role in the global assessment of that likelihood of confusion. In that regard, the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not engage in an analysis of its various details (see judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
42 Assessment of the similarity between two marks means more than taking just one component of a composite trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, the comparison must be made by examining each of the marks in question as a whole, which does not mean that the overall impression conveyed to the relevant public by a composite trade mark may not, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components. It is only if all the other components of the mark are negligible that the assessment of the similarity can be carried out solely on the basis of the dominant element (judgment of 12 June 2007, OHIM v Shaker, C‑334/05 P, EU:C:2007:333, paragraphs 41 and 42). That could be the case, in particular, where a component of a composite trade mark is capable on its own of dominating the image of that mark which members of the relevant public retain, with the result that the other component(s) is or are negligible in the overall impression created by that mark (judgments of 20 September 2007, Nestlé v OHIM, C‑193/06 P, not published, EU:C:2007:539, paragraph 43, and of 24 October 2019, ZPC Flis v EUIPO – Aldi Einkauf (Happy Moreno choco), T‑498/18, EU:T:2019:763, paragraph 71).
43 In the contested decision, as regards the distinctive and dominant elements of the contested mark, the Board of Appeal noted that that mark was composed, at the top, of the word element ‘si log’, written in a red font with a black outline, that the word elements ‘si’ and ‘log’ were separated by a space and that the letter ‘o’ of the word element ‘log’, of a relatively small size, was surrounded by 12 small stars. The Board of Appeal also stated that the lower part of the contested mark was composed of the word element ‘international’ written in a white, inclined font, in a red rectangular background with a black outline, and that the lower stroke of the letter ‘g’ was shown alongside that word element, with the same depth as the rectangular background.
44 The Board of Appeal found that the word element ‘si log’ was both the dominant and the most distinctive element of the contested mark. In that regard, the Board of Appeal noted that the figurative elements were not so ‘striking’ as to draw the attention of the consumer. As for the word element ‘international’, the Board of Appeal stated that it was in a secondary position within the sign and that it would, in relation to the services covered by the contested mark, be perceived as meaning that the applicant was able to transport goods internationally. Furthermore, the Board of Appeal stated that the element ‘si’ would not be understood by the relevant public as designating a conjunction, given that numerous words beginning with the syllable ‘si’ exist in French.
45 As regards the visual comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found that there was an average degree of similarity between those signs, given that the earlier mark was composed of a single word element, namely the element ‘silog’, which was almost identical to the dominant and most distinctive element of the contested mark, namely the word element ‘si log’. According to the Board of Appeal, those word elements contain the same letters in the same order. The Board of Appeal added that the space separating the elements ‘si’ and ‘log’ in the contested mark and the figurative elements of that mark, while creating a certain visual difference, were nevertheless insufficient to counterbalance the visual similarity between the earlier mark and the word element ‘si log’ of the contested mark. As for the word element ‘international’ of the contested mark, the Board of Appeal found that it was non-distinctive and did not have a ‘highly relevant visual impact’.
46 As regards the phonetic comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found that those signs were identical for a significant part of the relevant public who would most likely not enunciate the word element ‘international’, given that that element was not distinctive, and that they were highly similar for the non-significant part of that public that would enunciate that word element. The Board of Appeal also found that the space between the word elements ‘si’ and ‘log’ had no impact in that the pronunciation of the word elements was identical.
47 As regards the conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, the Board of Appeal found that the comparison was neutral, given that the earlier mark and the dominant element of the contested mark, namely ‘si log’, had no meaning in French. The Board of Appeal added that the word element ‘international’ of the contested mark did not play a decisive differentiating role.
48 The applicant maintains, in essence, that the Board of Appeal failed to take into consideration the overall impression conveyed by the contested mark and that it, incorrectly, took into consideration only the word element ‘si log’ of that mark.
49 In that regard, the applicant submits that the contested mark lacks a single dominant or distinctive element given that it is based on a combination of word and figurative elements.
50 According to the applicant, the contested mark acts as a unit, since the word elements are accompanied by other ‘graphic symbols’, namely 12 stars and the element ‘international’, which are characteristic of the field of logistics. Furthermore, the applicant claims that the figurative elements of the contested mark are not decorative.
51 As regards the word elements, the applicant argues that the contested mark is composed of three separate word elements, namely ‘si’, ‘log’ and ‘international’, with the result that the Board of Appeal could not legitimately isolate the elements ‘si’ and ‘log’. The applicant also criticises the Board of Appeal for having disregarded the fact that the relevant public could perceive the syllable ‘si’ of the contested mark as corresponding to the French term si, and the syllable ‘log’ as being associated with the field of ‘logistics’. According to the applicant, the combination of the word elements ‘si’ and ‘log’ is descriptive of ‘transport of goods’ services.
52 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
53 In the first place, it should be noted, as observed by EUIPO and the intervener, that, contrary to what is argued by the applicant, the Board of Appeal conducted a detailed assessment of all the elements of which the contested mark is composed. In particular, the Board of Appeal duly took into consideration the figurative elements of the contested mark and the word element ‘international’. However, it found those elements to be non-distinctive or of secondary importance in relation to the word element ‘si log’.
54 In the second place, the applicant’s arguments do not call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element ‘si log’ is dominant within the contested mark. As the intervener correctly submits, that element occupies an important position within the contested mark. Furthermore, it is represented in a much larger font than that of the word element ‘international’ below it.
55 In the third place, the Board of Appeal could legitimately consider the word element ‘si log’ to be more distinctive than the other elements of the contested mark.
56 In that regard, concerning the figurative elements, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, where a mark is composed of word elements and figurative elements, the former are, as a rule, more distinctive than the latter, because the average consumer will more easily refer to the goods in question by citing the name of the trade mark rather than by describing its figurative element (see judgment of 29 June 2022, Hijos de Moisés Rodríguez González v EUIPO – Ireland and Ornua (La Irlandesa 1943), T‑306/20, EU:T:2022:404, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited).
57 Furthermore, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding that the figurative elements of the contested mark were not, in themselves, so ‘striking’ as to draw the attention of the consumer. It should be noted, as observed by the Board of Appeal, that the 12 stars suggest only that the origin of the contested services may be associated with the European Union. As for the font and colours used, they are not particularly original.
58 As regards the word element ‘international’, as the Board of Appeal correctly found, it will be perceived by the relevant public as meaning that the applicant is able to transport goods internationally; therefore, it is not distinctive.
59 By contrast, inasmuch as the word element ‘si log’ has no meaning in French, the Board of Appeal could legitimately find that that element was distinctive.
60 In that regard, the applicant has not demonstrated that the combination of the elements ‘si’ and ‘log’ was descriptive of ‘transport of goods’ services. So far as concerns the word element ‘log’, the applicant has not properly established that the relevant public would immediately and without further thought perceive it as making reference to the field of logistics. As for the word element ‘si’, it should be noted that, even if that element were understood by the relevant public as a reference to the French term si, the applicant does not explain how that term is descriptive of the services at issue.
61 Therefore, the Board of Appeal did not make an error of assessment in finding that the word element ‘si log’ was the most distinctive element of the contested mark.
62 Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the word element ‘si log’ cannot establish a high degree of similarity since it is descriptive cannot succeed. Furthermore, it must be noted that the applicant does not advance any other argument to challenge the Board of Appeal’s findings relating to the average degree of visual similarity, the high degree of phonetic similarity and the neutral conceptual comparison of the signs at issue, with the result that those findings cannot be called into question.
– Distinctiveness of the earlier mark
63 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the earlier mark had a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness since it did not have any meaning in relation to the services in Class 36.
64 The applicant submits that the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark is low on the ground that the first syllable ‘si’ could be perceived by the relevant public as the French term si and that the second syllable ‘log’ could be perceived by the relevant public as an abbreviation of the French word location. According to the applicant, the earlier mark invites the relevant public to use vehicle rental services and is therefore descriptive of the services it covers.
65 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
66 As noted in paragraph 60 above, the applicant has not explained how the element ‘si’ is descriptive of the services at issue. As regards the element ‘log’, the applicant cannot argue that that element has a descriptive meaning in that the relevant public will understand it as an abbreviation of the word location. The final letter of that element will be readily perceived by the relevant public as the letter ‘g’ and not as the letter ‘c’. Furthermore, given that the earlier mark consists of the single word element ‘silog’ without a space separating the two syllables of that element, it is unlikely that the relevant public would break it down into two terms, namely the French term si and the term ‘log’. The Board of Appeal was therefore correct in finding that the word element ‘silog’ did not have any meaning in French and that, consequently, its inherent distinctive character was normal.
– Global assessment of the likelihood of confusion
67 A global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the factors taken into account and, in particular, between the similarity of the trade marks and that of the goods or services covered. Accordingly, a low degree of similarity between those goods or services may be offset by a high degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (judgments of 29 September 1998, Canon, C‑39/97, EU:C:1998:442, paragraph 17, and of 14 December 2006, Mast-Jägermeister v OHIM – Licorera Zacapaneca (VENADO with frame and others), T‑81/03, T‑82/03 and T‑103/03, EU:T:2006:397, paragraph 74).
68 The Board of Appeal found in that regard that a likelihood of confusion could exist in France, even for the professional public who displays a high level of attention.
69 The applicant submits that, given the errors made by the Board of Appeal during its assessment of the similarity of the services and signs at issue and of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the assessment of the likelihood of confusion is flawed.
70 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
71 It must be noted that the applicant’s arguments are based on the premiss that the Board of Appeal erred in its assessment of the similarity of the services and signs at issue and of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark. However, as follows, in particular, from paragraphs 35, 62 and 66 above, the Board of Appeal correctly found, first, a similarity, at least to a low degree, between the services at issue; secondly, an average degree of visual similarity and a phonetic identity or high degree of similarity, whereas their conceptual comparison remained neutral; and, thirdly, a normal degree of distinctiveness of the earlier mark. Accordingly, the applicant’s arguments that there is no likelihood of confusion must be rejected.
72 Therefore, the first plea in law must be rejected.
Second plea, alleging infringement of Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001
73 The applicant criticises the Board of Appeal for having admitted two pieces of evidence produced before it for the first time by the intervener in order to demonstrate that the intervener was the proprietor of the earlier mark.
74 According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal did not exercise its discretion properly, exhaustively and in a reasoned manner. The Board of Appeal disregarded the lateness of that evidence. Furthermore, the translations of that evidence were also submitted late.
75 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
76 According to Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001, EUIPO ‘may disregard facts or evidence which are not submitted in due time by the parties concerned’.
77 It follows from the wording of Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 that, as a general rule and unless otherwise specified, the submission of facts and evidence by the parties remains possible after the expiry of the time limits to which such submission is subject under the provisions of Regulation 2017/1001, and that EUIPO is in no way prohibited from taking account of facts and evidence which are submitted or produced late (judgments of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul, C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 42, and of 2 June 2021, Franz Schröder v EUIPO – RDS Design (MONTANA), T‑854/19, EU:T:2021:309, paragraph 24).
78 However, it is equally apparent from the wording of Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 that a party has no unconditional right to have facts and evidence submitted out of time taken into consideration by EUIPO. In stating that EUIPO ‘may’ decide to disregard such evidence, Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 grants EUIPO a broad discretion to decide, while giving reasons for its decision in that regard, whether or not to take it into account (judgments of 13 March 2007, OHIM v Kaul, C‑29/05 P, EU:C:2007:162, paragraph 43, and of 2 June 2021, MONTANA, T‑854/19, EU:T:2021:309, paragraph 25).
79 The exercise of EUIPO’s discretionary power provided for in Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 is circumscribed by Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, which states:
‘In accordance with Article 95(2) of Regulation … 2017/1001, the Board of Appeal may accept facts or evidence submitted for the first time before it only where those facts or evidence meet the following requirements:
(a) they are, on the face of it, likely to be relevant for the outcome of the case; and
(b) they have not been produced in due time for valid reasons, in particular where they are merely supplementing relevant facts and evidence which had already been submitted in due time, or are filed to contest findings made or examined by the first instance of its own motion in the decision subject to appeal.’
80 The two pieces of disputed evidence, filed by the intervener for the first time before the Board of Appeal, correspond to Item 9, consisting of an extract from the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) database concerning the earlier mark (available from the TMview database), and to Item 10, consisting of an INPI certificate, a statement of entries in the national register concerning the earlier mark dated 4 April 2023 and details of the entries in that register, accompanied by supporting documents.
81 With regard to Item 9, it should be noted that it is apparent from the application for a declaration of invalidity filed by the intervener with EUIPO that the intervener had ticked the box provided for in that application allowing for information relating to the earlier mark to be imported from the TMview online database as evidence for the purposes of Article 7(2) and (4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625.
82 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that the TMview database is a computerised tool managed by EUIPO in which third-party trade mark offices participate. The tool gathers together trade mark applications and registrations from the participating trade mark offices and allows them to be accessed. The information is provided by the trade mark offices, which maintain the content and the responsibility for daily updating. The TMview database allows information to be consulted about trade marks registered by the trade mark offices participating in the database as it appears in their respective trade mark registers. An extract from the TMview database reflects the state of the register of the competent authority at the time that the database is consulted by the user (judgment of 6 December 2018, Deichmann v EUIPO – Vans (V), T‑848/16, EU:T:2018:884, paragraph 60).
83 Therefore, the Board of Appeal was correct in finding, in essence, that Item 9 was already available in the TMview database and was therefore not a piece of evidence produced for the first time before it. Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not have to exercise its discretion to decide whether that evidence should be admitted.
84 As regards Item 10, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal considered it to be evidence submitted for the first time before it. Accordingly, it was obliged to exercise its discretion in respect of that item.
85 In that regard, the Board of Appeal found that the applicant had produced a piece of evidence for the first time before it, consisting of an extract from the website ‘infogreffe.fr’, aimed at demonstrating that the intervener was not the owner of the earlier mark.
86 The Board of Appeal noted that Item 10, consisting of the documents referred to in paragraph 80 above, had been produced by the intervener for the first time before it in order to respond to the applicant’s claim.
87 The Board of Appeal also noted that the applicant had already invoked, before the Cancellation Division, the fact that the intervener was not the proprietor of the earlier mark and that the Cancellation Division had rejected that claim.
88 The Board of Appeal thus decided to admit the evidence produced by the applicant and by the intervener for the first time before it, describing it as ‘additional’ evidence.
89 It must be stated, as was observed by EUIPO, that the Board of Appeal found, in essence, that Item 10 was a piece of evidence submitted in addition to that previously produced before the Cancellation Division – namely, in particular, the documents accessible in the TMview database – in order to demonstrate, inter alia, that the intervener was the proprietor of the earlier mark.
90 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that additional evidence is evidence characterised by a link with other evidence which has previously been submitted in due time, and which supplements that other evidence (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 May 2019, Guiral Broto v EUIPO – Gastro & Soul (Café del Sol and CAFE DEL SOL), T‑89/18 and T‑90/18, not published, EU:T:2019:331, paragraph 42, and of 9 September 2020, Kludi v EUIPO – Adlon Brand (ADLON), T‑144/19, not published, EU:T:2020:404, paragraph 56).
91 Furthermore, it should be noted that the Board of Appeal rejected the applicant’s claim on the basis of Item 10. It therefore found that that item was relevant for the outcome of the case.
92 Consequently, in accordance with Article 95(2) of Regulation 2017/1001 and Article 27(4) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, the Board of Appeal exercised its discretion in the light of the requirements laid down by those provisions when it admitted Item 10 and duly gave reasons for its decision in that regard.
93 Furthermore, the applicant’s claim that the translations of Items 9 and 10 were submitted late must be rejected.
94 First, it follows from paragraph 29 of the contested decision that, as the applicant had indicated that it could not understand that evidence since it was written in French, the Board of Appeal invited the intervener on 16 January 2024 to provide translations of the relevant parts of that evidence within two months. Secondly, it must be noted that the intervener provided full translations of that evidence within the time limit set by the Board of Appeal.
95 Accordingly, the second plea must be rejected.
Third and fourth pleas, alleging infringement of Article 16(1)(b) of Delegated Regulation 2018/625, read in conjunction with the first sentence of Article 7(2) of that regulation, and infringement of Article 64(2) and (3) of Regulation 2017/1001
96 In the context of the third plea, the applicant submits that the Board of Appeal incorrectly found that the intervener was the proprietor of the earlier mark inasmuch as the intervener’s right of action was not proved in due time.
97 In the context of the fourth plea, the applicant complains, in essence, that the Board of Appeal found that the intervener had proved the use of the earlier mark on the basis of evidence submitted late.
98 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
99 In the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the intervener had produced the necessary evidence to prove its entitlement to file an application for a declaration of invalidity and to demonstrate the genuine use of the earlier mark in respect of the services for which it was registered. To reach that conclusion, the Board of Appeal relied in particular on Items 9 and 10.
100 It suffices to note that, as follows from the examination of the second plea, the Board of Appeal was correct in deciding, in the exercise of its discretion, to admit the items submitted for the first time before it.
101 The applicant cannot therefore legitimately maintain that the intervener had not produced in due time the necessary evidence to prove its entitlement to file the application for a declaration of invalidity and to demonstrate the genuine use of its earlier mark.
102 Moreover, it should be noted that the applicant does not call into question the merits of the Board of Appeal’s findings in that regard.
103 The third and fourth pleas in law must therefore be rejected.
Fifth plea, alleging breach of the right to be heard
104 In the applicant’s submission, given that the Board of Appeal did not know what was encompassed by the German-law concept of ‘denial with no knowledge’, a response which the applicant had employed in objecting to the evidence of use of the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal should have given the applicant the opportunity to provide clarification in that regard. The applicant argues that by deciding the merits of the case without giving the applicant that opportunity, the Board of Appeal infringed the applicant’s right to be heard.
105 EUIPO and the intervener dispute the applicant’s arguments.
106 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that, under the second sentence of Article 94(1) of Regulation 2017/1001, EUIPO’s decisions are to be based only on reasons or evidence on which the parties concerned have had an opportunity to present their comments. That provision sets out the right to be heard in proceedings before EUIPO.
107 That right extends to all the factual and legal material which forms the basis of the decision, but not to the final position which the authority intends to adopt. That right does not require that, before taking a final position on the assessment of the evidence submitted by a party, the Board of Appeal of EUIPO must offer that party a further opportunity to comment on that evidence. In addition, a party which itself submitted the facts and evidence at issue was by definition in a position to state their possible relevance to the resolution of the dispute at the time when it submitted them (see judgment of 4 March 2020, Tulliallan Burlington v EUIPO, C‑155/18 P to C‑158/18 P, EU:C:2020:151, paragraph 94 and the case-law cited).
108 Furthermore, according to settled case-law, a procedural irregularity will entail the annulment of a decision in whole or in part only if it is shown that in the absence of such irregularity the contested decision might have been substantively different (see judgment of 2 June 2021, MONTANA, T‑854/19, EU:T:2021:309, paragraph 29 (not published) and the case-law cited).
109 In paragraph 184 of the contested decision, the Board of Appeal found that the applicant had submitted a number of unfounded claims, including a claim that most of the evidence submitted by the intervener had been ‘denied with no knowledge (without it being clear what this may mean)’.
110 In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 107 above, the Board of Appeal was not obliged to give the applicant a further opportunity to explain the exact meaning of its claim before taking a final position on all the facts and evidence submitted by the parties in its decision.
111 In any case, the applicant has not demonstrated that, if it had been able to explain that claim before the Board of Appeal, the contested decision might have been substantively different.
112 Consequently, the fifth plea must be rejected.
113 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, since none of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant in support of its claims can be upheld, the action must be dismissed in its entirety.
Costs
114 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.
115 Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the intervener, in accordance with the form of order sought by the intervener.
116 By contrast, since EUIPO has applied for the applicant to be ordered to pay the costs only in the event that the parties are summoned to attend a hearing, EUIPO must, in the absence of a hearing, be ordered to bear its own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber)
hereby:
1. Dismisses the action;
2. Orders SiLog GmbH to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by Silog SAS;
3. Orders the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) to bear its own costs.
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 26 November 2025.
V. Di Bucci | | S. Papasavvas |