Provisional text
JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)
10 September 2025 (*)
( Law governing the institutions – Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations – Decision imposing a financial sanction on a political party – Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 – Non-contractual liability )
In Case T‑1189/23,
Patriotes.eu, formerly Identité et Démocratie Parti (ID Parti), established in Paris (France), represented by P. Prigent, lawyer,
applicant,
v
Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations, represented by P. Schonard and N. Entchev, acting as Agents,
defendant,
supported by
European Parliament, represented by S. Alves and J.-C. Puffer, acting as Agents,
by
Council of the European Union, represented by M. Bauer and L. Atzeni, acting as Agents,
and by
European Commission, represented by F. Erlbacher and S. Pardo Quintillán, acting as Agents,
interveners,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition),
composed of M.J. Costeira (Rapporteur), President, M. Kancheva, C. Mac Eochaidh, P. Zilgalvis and E. Tichy-Fisslberger, Judges,
Registrar: L. Ramette, Administrator,
having regard to the order of 5 March 2024, ID Parti v Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (T‑1189/23 R, not published, EU:T:2024:145),
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 14 May 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By its action, the applicant, Patriotes.eu, formerly Identité et Démocratie Parti (ID Parti), seeks, first, on the basis of Article 263 TFEU, the annulment of the decision of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations (‘the Authority’) of 25 October 2023, by which the Authority imposed on it a financial sanction under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations (OJ 2014 L 317, p. 1) (‘the contested decision’) and, second, on the basis of Article 268 TFEU, compensation for the damage which it claims to have suffered as a result of the adoption of that decision.
I. Background to the dispute
2 The applicant is an association under French law, registered as a European political party by decision of the Authority of 14 September 2017 to register Mouvement pour une Europe des nations et des libertés (OJ 2018 C 84, p. 5).
3 On 9 March 2022, the applicant sent the Authority a letter from its president containing, in an annex, inter alia, an updated list of its board members, which, since 16 February 2022, no longer included the name of one of its members (‘the board member in question’).
4 The information that the board member in question had, since 16 February 2022, no longer formed part of the applicant’s board was not immediately posted on the applicant’s website and social media networks, since the board member in question continued to appear on them as a board member of the applicant.
5 In that context, on 23 March 2023, the Authority sent the applicant a request for information concerning the inconsistencies between, first, the communication of 9 March 2022, and second, the posts on its website and social media networks.
6 On 14 June 2023, following several exchanges with the applicant, the Authority decided to open an investigation in respect of it for potentially inaccurate information on the composition of its board and gave the applicant the opportunity to submit observations and propose corrective measures in accordance with Article 29 of Regulation No 1141/2014.
7 By letter of 28 September 2023, the applicant, after replacing its former website with a new website which no longer contained the reference to the board member in question as being a member of its board, informed the Authority that it had been decided to maintain, on social media networks, the posts in which the board member in question was presented as a current member of its board.
8 On 25 October 2023, by the contested decision, following several further exchanges between the parties, the Authority imposed, pursuant to Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, a financial sanction on the applicant of an amount equivalent to 5% of its annual budget, namely EUR 47 020.54, on the ground that it had maintained inaccurate posts on social media networks presenting the board member in question as being a current member of its board, when this was no longer the case, which constituted an infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
II. Forms of order sought
9 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– declare Article 6 of Regulation No 1141/2014 unlawful and, ‘consequently’, annul Decision (EU, Euratom) 2021/1271 of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 26 July 2021 appointing the Director of the Authority (OJ 2021 L 277, p. 145);
– annul the contested decision;
– order the Authority to pay the sum of EUR 55 000 in respect of the damage suffered as a result of the adoption of the contested decision;
– order the Authority to pay the costs.
10 The Authority, supported by the European Commission, contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
11 The European Parliament contends that the Court should reject the pleas of illegality raised by the applicant.
12 The Council of the European Union contends that the Court should dismiss the action.
III. Law
A. The Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant’s first head of claim
13 By the first part of the first head of claim, the applicant asks the Court to declare Article 6 of Regulation No 1141/2014 unlawful.
14 In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, admittedly, in the context of a claim for annulment of an act of individual application having adverse effect, it is possible, under Article 277 TFEU, to invoke the unlawfulness of the act of general application on the basis of which that act of individual application was adopted. Only the Courts of the European Union are entitled, under the terms of Article 277 TFEU, to rule that an act of general application is unlawful and to draw the appropriate conclusions from the inapplicability which results from this with regard to the act of individual application contested before them (see judgment of 14 December 2018, GQ and Others v Commission, T‑525/16, EU:T:2018:964, paragraph 35 and the case-law cited).
15 However, the finding of illegality made by the Courts of the European Union in accordance with Article 277 TFEU does not have erga omnes effect since, while it entails the illegality of the contested act of individual application having adverse effect, it leaves the act of general application in the legal order without affecting the legality of other acts which have been adopted pursuant thereto and which were not challenged within the period for appeal (see judgment of 14 December 2018, GQ and Others v Commission, T‑525/16, EU:T:2018:964, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
16 It follows that, although in the context of a claim for annulment of an act of individual application having adverse effect, the General Court does in fact have jurisdiction to declare, incidentally, the unlawfulness of a provision of general application on which the contested act is based, it does not, however, have jurisdiction to make such declarations in the operative part of its judgments (see judgment of 14 December 2018, GQ and Others v Commission, T‑525/16, EU:T:2018:964, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited).
17 Consequently, the first part of the applicant’s first head of claim must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
18 By the second part of the first head of claim, the applicant asks the Court, ‘consequently’, to annul Decision 2021/1271.
19 In that regard, it should be noted that since the first part of the applicant’s first head of claim was rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the second part of that head of claim is conditional on the first part being upheld, that second part is devoid of purpose.
B. Substance
1. The claim for annulment
20 In support of its claim for annulment, the applicant puts forward 11 pleas in law alleging, in essence, respectively:
– infringement of the obligation to state reasons;
– infringement of the right to be heard;
– the plea of illegality in respect of Article 6 of Regulation No 1141/2014 and breach of the principle of impartiality and of the principle of sound administration;
– infringement of procedural rules and of the right to good administration;
– infringement of the right to an independent and impartial tribunal;
– infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, and of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation;
– breach of the principle of non-discrimination;
– misuse of powers;
– breach of the principle of proportionality;
– infringement of freedom of expression and freedom of association;
– breach of the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law.
21 Before examining the pleas in law put forward by the applicant, it is appropriate, as a preliminary point, to recall the regulatory framework and the system of sanctions provided for by Regulation No 1141/2014 and the sanction imposed in the contested decision.
(a) Preliminary considerations on the regulatory framework and the system of sanctions provided for in Regulation No 1141/2014
22 Regulation No 1141/2014 lays down, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, the conditions governing the statute and funding of political parties and political foundations at European level.
23 According to recitals 7, 8 and 12 of Regulation No 1141/2014, European political parties have a European legal status, which is obtained through registration and entails a series of rights and obligations.
24 In particular, in accordance with Article 9(5) of Regulation No 1141/2014, European political parties are required to notify the Authority of any amendments to the documents or statutes submitted as part of the application for registration.
25 Compliance by European political parties with the obligations laid down in Regulation No 1141/2014 is subject to control by the various authorities exercising control.
26 In particular, the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) and the first subparagraph of Article 24(4) of Regulation No 1141/2014 provide as follows:
‘2. The Authority shall control compliance by European political parties and European political foundations with their obligations under this Regulation, in particular in relation to Article 3, points (a), (b), and (d) to (f) of Article 4(1), points (a) to (e) and (g) of Article 5(1), Article 9(5) and (6), and Articles 20 [to] 22.
…
4. European political parties and European political foundations shall provide any information requested by the Authority, the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or Member States which is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the controls for which they are responsible under this Regulation.’
27 In addition, as is apparent from recital 8 and Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the Authority is also established for the purpose of imposing sanctions on European political parties and European political foundations in accordance with that regulation.
28 In that regard, according to recital 31 thereof, Regulation No 1141/2014 provides for a clear, strong and dissuasive system of sanctions in order to ensure effective, proportionate and uniform compliance with the obligations regarding the activities of European political parties and European political foundations and which respects the ne bis in idem principle, whereby sanctions cannot be imposed twice for the same offence.
29 The sanctions are provided for in Article 27 of Regulation No 1141/2014. In particular, Article 27(2), (4) and (5) of that regulation provides as follows:
‘2. The Authority shall impose financial sanctions in the following situations:
(a) non-quantifiable infringements:
…
(iv) where a European political party or a European political foundation has infringed the obligations laid down in Article 23(1) or Article 24(4);
…
(vi) where the European political party or the European political foundation concerned has at any time intentionally omitted to provide information or has intentionally provided incorrect or misleading information, or where the bodies authorised by this Regulation to audit or conduct checks on the beneficiaries of funding from the general budget of the European Union detect inaccuracies in the annual financial statements which are regarded as constituting material omissions or misstatements of items in accordance with the international accounting standards defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002;
…
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the following financial sanctions shall be imposed on a European political party or a European political foundation:
(a) in cases of non-quantifiable infringements, a fixed percentage of the annual budget of the European political party or European political foundation concerned:
– 5%, or
– 7.5% if there are concurrent infringements, or
– 20% if the infringement in question is a repeated infringement, or
– a third of the percentages set out above if the European political party or European political foundation concerned has voluntarily declared the infringement before the Authority has officially opened an investigation, even in the case of a concurrent infringement or a repeated infringement, and the party or foundation concerned has taken the appropriate corrective measures,
– 50% of the annual budget of the European political party or European political foundation concerned for the preceding year, when it has been found by a judgment having the force of res judicata to have engaged in illegal activities detrimental to the financial interests of the Union as defined in Article 106(1) of the Financial Regulation;
…
5. Whenever a European political party or a European political foundation has committed concurrent infringements of this Regulation, only the sanction laid down for the most serious infringement shall be imposed, unless otherwise provided in point (a) of paragraph 4.’
30 Article 29(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1141/2014 provides as follows:
‘1. Before taking a final decision relating to any of the sanctions referred to in Article 27, the Authority or the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament shall give the European political party or the European political foundation concerned an opportunity to introduce the measures required to remedy the situation within a reasonable period of time, which shall not normally exceed one month. In particular, the Authority or the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament shall allow the possibility of correcting clerical and arithmetical errors, providing additional documents or information where necessary or correcting minor mistakes.
2. Where a European political party or a European political foundation has failed to take corrective measures within the period of time referred to in paragraph 1, the appropriate sanctions referred to in Article 27 shall be decided.’
(b) Preliminary considerations on the sanction imposed in the contested decision
31 In the contested decision, first, the Authority found, in recitals 19 to 33, an infringement under Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, on account of the incomplete and contradictory replies in connection with the public communication which the applicant provided to it in the context of their exchanges. Second, the Authority found, in recitals 34 to 44 of the contested decision, an infringement under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation, on the ground that the applicant had maintained inaccurate posts on social media networks presenting the board member in question as being a current member of its board, when this was no longer the case. It nevertheless stated, in recital 54 of the contested decision, that the sanction for intentional conduct arising under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 was a lex specialis which, in the light of Article 27(5) of that regulation, absorbed the sanction which would, moreover, have resulted under Article 27(2)(a)(iv), read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, since the same facts relating to the same board member in question were concerned. Accordingly, in Article 1 of the contested decision, the Authority imposed a financial sanction on the applicant only for the infringement provided for in Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, with a level of sanction corresponding to 5% of the applicant’s annual budget.
32 In that regard, in the first place, it should be borne in mind that, regardless of the grounds on which a decision is based, only the operative part of that decision is capable of producing legal effects and, consequently, of adversely affecting a person’s legal interests. By contrast, the assessments made in the recitals of a decision are not in themselves capable of forming the subject of an action for annulment and can be subject to review by the European Union judicature only to the extent that, as grounds for an act adversely affecting a person’s interests, they constitute the necessary basis for the operative part of that act (see judgment of 1 February 2012, Région wallonne v Commission, T‑237/09, EU:T:2012:38, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited).
33 In the present case, since the assessments made in recitals 19 to 33 of the contested decision, relating to the infringement under Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, do not constitute the necessary basis for the operative part of the contested decision, they cannot be subject to judicial review.
34 In the second place, it should be noted that, as is apparent from paragraph 29 above, under the first and second indents of Article 27(4)(a) of Regulation No 1141/2014, in the case of non-quantifiable infringements, a financial sanction corresponding to 5% of the annual budget of the European political party must be imposed and, in the case of concurrent infringements, that sanction must correspond to 7.5% of that annual budget. In addition, under paragraph 5 of that article, in the case of concurrent infringements, only the sanctions laid down for the most serious infringements are to be imposed, unless otherwise provided in paragraph 4(a) of that article.
35 Accordingly, the sanction to be imposed on a European political party in the case of non-quantifiable infringements depends on the number of infringements committed. In cases where it is concluded that only one non-quantifiable infringement has been committed, a financial sanction corresponding to 5% of the annual budget of the European political party is to be imposed under the first indent of Article 27(4)(a) of Regulation No 1141/2014. By contrast, in cases where it is concluded that at least two non-quantifiable infringements were committed in the context of the same unlawful act, there will be concurrent infringements provided for in Article 2(12) of that regulation, and in that situation, a financial sanction corresponding to 7.5% of the annual budget of the European political party is to be imposed, pursuant to the second indent of Article 27(4)(a) of that regulation.
36 In view of the clear wording of the first indent of Article 27(4)(a) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the Authority therefore has no discretion in determining the financial sanction applicable to non-quantifiable infringements. That conclusion is not called into question by Article 27(5) of Regulation No 1141/2014, as evidenced by the words ‘unless otherwise provided in point (a) of paragraph 4’ in that provision.
37 It is in the light of those considerations that the applicant’s sixth and eleventh pleas in law must, first, be examined together.
(c) The sixth and eleventh pleas in law, alleging, in essence, infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation and of the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law
38 The applicant submits, in essence, that the Authority can sanction a European political party only if that party directly provides it with incorrect information, and further that the information communicated directly to the public is not covered by Regulation No 1141/2014.
39 Accordingly, in the context of the sixth plea in law, the applicant argues, in essence, that, by imposing a financial sanction on it, the Authority infringed Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, and Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation and made errors of assessment.
40 In the context of the eleventh plea in law, the applicant submits, in essence, that, by imposing a financial sanction on it, the Authority also infringed the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law.
41 The Authority contends that the sixth plea in law is ineffective, that the arguments based on the interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 submitted at the reply stage are inadmissible and that, in any event, that plea in law is unfounded.
42 As regards the eleventh plea in law, the Authority contends that it should be rejected as unfounded.
43 In the light of the parties’ arguments, it is first necessary to examine the effectiveness of the sixth plea in law and the admissibility of the arguments based on the interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 submitted at the reply stage.
(1) The effectiveness of the sixth plea in law
44 The Authority contends that the sixth plea in law is ineffective in so far as the applicant mixes the elements concerning the infringement under Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, which was not the subject of a sanction, and those concerning the infringement under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation, which was the subject of a sanction.
45 In response to a measure of organisation of procedure to be answered at the hearing, adopted on the basis of Article 89(2)(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the applicant submitted, in essence, that the sixth plea in law was effective in so far as it concerned the arguments alleging infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
46 In that regard, it must be borne in mind that according to settled case-law, in an action for annulment, a plea in law which, even if it were well founded, would be incapable of bringing about the annulment which the applicant seeks, is considered ineffective (order of 26 February 2013, Castiglioni v Commission, T‑591/10, not published, EU:T:2013:94, paragraph 45, and judgment of 15 January 2015, France v Commission, T‑1/12, EU:T:2015:17, paragraph 73; see also, to that effect, judgment of 21 September 2000, EFMA v Council, C‑46/98 P, EU:C:2000:474, paragraph 38).
47 In the present case, it may be inferred from the applicant’s pleadings that it alleges, in essence, infringement, first, of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, and, second, of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation.
48 In paragraphs 135 and 136 of the application, the applicant cites Article 24 and Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1141/2014. In addition, in paragraph 139 of the application, referring to those provisions, it submits that the Authority may sanction a European political party only in situations where that party has ‘voluntarily and intentionally provided incorrect information to [that authority]’ and, in paragraphs 140 to 152 of that application, it submits that, having regard to the chronology of events, that was not the case here. Furthermore, in paragraph 159 of the application, it submits, in essence, that ‘in so far as the Authority was able to exercise its control over the composition of the bodies [of the applicant], since minutes, which are presumed to be authentic in the absence of proof to the contrary, were submitted to it, and since it is clear that the (unintentional) failure to update the website had no impact on the control by the Authority’, no infringement of Articles 24 and 27 of Regulation No 1141/2014 can be found.
49 It is thus apparent from the applicant’s arguments referred to in paragraph 48 above that they seek to demonstrate, first, that the applicant sent correct information to the Authority, with the result that the Authority was able to exercise its power of control, and that, therefore, no infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, can be imputed to it and, second, that a European political party may be sanctioned only if it intentionally provides incorrect information to the Authority and that, since that was not the case here, the Authority infringed Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
50 Such an interpretation is confirmed by the fact that, in the reply, the applicant refers to the ‘infringement of Articles 24 and 27 of [Regulation No 1141/2014] and [to the] error of assessment in their application to the present case’.
51 In that context, it must be held that, as the applicant submitted in essence at the hearing, although the arguments alleging infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, are ineffective, in so far as they are directed against grounds which do not support the operative part of the contested decision, and are therefore incapable of bringing about the annulment of that decision in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 46 above, that is not the case with regard to the arguments alleging infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation.
52 Accordingly, the sixth plea in law is ineffective as regards the arguments alleging infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(iv) of Regulation No 1141/2014, read in conjunction with Article 24(4) of that regulation, and effective in so far as it concerns the arguments alleging infringement of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of that regulation.
53 It is, therefore, appropriate to continue the analysis and to examine the admissibility of the applicant’s arguments based on the interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 submitted at the reply stage.
(2) Admissibility of the arguments based on the interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 submitted at the reply stage
54 In the reply, the applicant states that two readings of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 are possible. It submits that, on a broad reading, that provision empowers the Authority to sanction any dissemination of incorrect or misleading information, irrespective of the recipient and the medium of communication, and even where it has not been misled. On a strict reading, that article authorises the Authority to sanction only the transmission to it of incorrect or misleading information. In the applicant’s view, that latter interpretation is consistent with the intention of the legislature, which is to enable the Authority to exercise its power of control, and results from the wording of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, which refers to situations where the European political party provides or should have provided information.
55 In its rejoinder, the Authority contends that those arguments should be rejected as out of time and, therefore, inadmissible. It submits that they may neither be linked to the sixth plea in law nor to the eleventh plea in law put forward in the application.
56 In response to a measure of organisation of procedure to be answered at the hearing, adopted on the basis of Article 89(2)(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the applicant submitted, in essence, that those arguments were admissible inasmuch as, in the application, it had set out arguments to that effect.
57 In that regard, it should be borne mind that, in accordance with Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure, no new plea in law may be introduced in the course of proceedings unless it is based on matters of law or fact which come to light in the course of the procedure.
58 According to the case-law, Article 84(1) of the Rules of Procedure also applies to complaints and arguments (see judgment of 14 July 2021, AQ v eu-LISA, T‑164/19, not published, EU:T:2021:456, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited).
59 However, a plea, a head of claim or an argument which amounts to amplifying a plea, a head of claim or an argument put forward previously, whether directly or by implication, in the originating application must be declared admissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 September 2019, Yanukovych v Council, T‑301/18, not published, EU:T:2019:676, paragraph 74 and the case-law cited).
60 To be considered as an amplification of a plea, a head of claim or of an argument previously advanced, a new line of argumentation must, in relation to the pleas, heads of claim or arguments initially set out in the application, present a sufficiently close connection with the pleas, the heads of claim or the arguments initially put forward in order to be considered as forming part of the normal evolution of debate in the context of proceedings before the Court (see judgment of 20 November 2017, Petrov and Others v Parliament, T‑452/15, EU:T:2017:822, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited).
61 In the present case, it should be stated that – as noted by the Authority – in the application, in the context of the sixth plea in law, the applicant did not expressly put forward arguments based on the ‘scope’ of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
62 It should nevertheless be stated that, as is apparent from paragraph 48 above, in paragraph 139 of the application the applicant argued that the Authority could sanction a European political party only in situations where that party had ‘voluntarily and intentionally provided it with incorrect information’ and, in paragraphs 140 to 152 of that application, the applicant specified that, having regard to the chronology of events, that was not the case here; it then concluded that, despite that fact, the Authority had considered, in essence, that its conduct fell ‘within the scope of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation [No 1141/2014]’. In addition, in paragraph 154 of the application, the applicant noted that the Authority itself had stated that it had been ‘clearly informed of the composition of the board’.
63 Those assessments correspond precisely to the ‘strict’ interpretation put forward by the applicant in the reply, which it supports, namely that pursuant to Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, a sanction must be imposed only where a European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the Authority.
64 In any event, it should be noted that, contrary to what the Authority maintains, in the context of the eleventh plea in law the applicant argued, in essence, by referring to Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, that it could not be inferred from that provision that the Authority could sanction a European political party for a post on social media networks.
65 Accordingly, the arguments put forward by the applicant at the stage of the reply referred to in paragraph 54 above have a sufficiently close connection with the arguments put forward in the application and are, therefore, admissible.
(3) The merits of the sixth and eleventh pleas in law
66 In recitals 34 to 44 of the contested decision, the Authority stated, as a preliminary point, that, in the light of its wording and objective, Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 had to be interpreted as meaning that it was intended to sanction disinformation to the public by a European political party concerning its structural and financial characteristics. The Authority noted that, in the present case, the applicant had mentioned, through posts on social media networks, the board member in question as being a current member of its board, whereas, at the time of those posts, that was no longer the case, and had decided, at an unknown time, to maintain those posts, in the knowledge that they were inaccurate, with the result that it had to be found that it intended to do so. The Authority concluded that by maintaining, on social media networks, posts mentioning the board member in question as being a current member of its board, in the knowledge that they were inaccurate, the applicant intentionally provided incorrect information and therefore fulfilled the constituent elements of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
67 The applicant submits, in essence, that Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that it concerns situations where the European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the Authority. The applicant submits, in essence, that, by imposing on it a financial sanction under that provision, on the ground that it had maintained, on social media networks, posts mentioning the board member in question as being a current member of its board, in the knowledge that they were inaccurate, the Authority erred in law, made errors of assessment and infringed the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law.
68 The Authority disputes the applicant’s arguments. It contends, in essence, that it is apparent from a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 that incorrect information intentionally made available to the public, when it concerns the statute or funding of European political parties, is not excluded from its scope. It thus considers that, by imposing a financial sanction on the applicant under that provision, it neither erred in law or made errors of assessment nor infringed the principle of legal certainty, since the principle that offences and penalties must be defined by law is not applicable in the present case.
69 In the light of the arguments of the parties, it is first necessary to interpret Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014.
(i) Interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014
70 As noted in paragraph 29 above, Article 27(2) of Regulation No 1141/2014 is worded as follows:
‘2. The Authority shall impose financial sanctions in the following situations:
(a) non-quantifiable infringements:
…
(vi) where the European political party or the European political foundation concerned has at any time intentionally omitted to provide information or has intentionally provided incorrect or misleading information, or where the bodies authorised by this Regulation to audit or conduct checks on the beneficiaries of funding from the general budget of the European Union detect inaccuracies in the annual financial statements which are regarded as constituting material omissions or misstatements of items in accordance with the international accounting standards defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002’.
71 It is apparent from the grounds of the contested decision, as set out in paragraph 66 above, that the Authority imposed a financial sanction on the applicant under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 on the ground that it had intentionally provided incorrect information.
72 The interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 must, accordingly, be limited to situations where the European political party concerned has, at any time, intentionally provided incorrect information.
73 In accordance with settled case-law, it is necessary to carry out a literal, contextual and teleological interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 June 2020, A and Others (Wind turbines at Aalter and Nevele), C‑24/19, EU:C:2020:503, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). In that context, it must be borne in mind that EU legislation is drafted in various languages and that the different language versions are all equally authentic, which may require a comparison of those versions (see judgment of 14 July 2016, Latvia v Commission, T‑661/14, EU:T:2016:412, paragraph 39 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 26 January 2021, Hessischer Rundfunk, C‑422/19 and C‑423/19, EU:C:2021:63, paragraph 65).
– The literal interpretation
74 In the first place, it should be noted that, as the Authority contends, Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 does not specify the addressee or the method of transmission of incorrect information.
75 It must nevertheless be found that the word ‘provided’ used in that provision refers, in particular, in the usual meaning in everyday language, to the idea of submitting, communicating or producing what is required.
76 In addition, it should be noted that the word ‘provide’, combined with the word ‘information’, is used in other provisions of Regulation No 1141/2014 to refer to the transmission by European political parties and European political foundations, to various competent authorities, of information required in a procedural context. That is the case, in particular, of Article 23(4), the first subparagraph of Article 24(4), Article 25(6) or Article 29(1) of that regulation.
77 By contrast, it should be noted that, when Regulation No 1141/2014 refers to the transmission of information to the public, it uses the expression ‘be available’, as is apparent from recital 41 thereof, and that, when it deals with information intended to be published on the internet, the words used are ‘available online’ and ‘[made] public’, as is apparent, respectively, from Article 7(1) and Article 32 thereof.
78 Furthermore, it should be noted that there are no divergences on that point between the French-language version and other language versions – in particular the English-, the German-, the Italian- and the Spanish-language versions – of Regulation No 1141/2014.
79 In that context, the expression ‘provided incorrect … information’ used in Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 militates in favour of an interpretation according to which that expression refers to the idea of submitting, communicating or producing incorrect required information.
80 In the second place, it should be noted that the adverb ‘intentionally’ refers, in the usual meaning in everyday language, to an act carried out with intention, deliberately.
81 The expression ‘intentionally provided incorrect … information’ therefore militates in favour of an interpretation according to which the European political party, when submitting, communicating or producing the required information, is aware of the inaccuracy of that information, but deliberately decides to submit, communicate or produce it.
82 In the third place, the expression ‘at any time’ indicates, in the usual meaning in everyday language, that something may occur at any time during a given period.
83 In the context of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the expression ‘at any time’ leads to an interpretation according to which the European political party decides, at any time, deliberately to submit, communicate or produce incorrect required information.
84 Contrary to the Authority’s submission, from a drafting point of view, the use of the expression ‘at any time’ is not intended to emphasise the legislature’s intention not to require any constitutive element limiting applicability to certain circumstances of transmission, but rather to add an element of timing.
85 The foregoing considerations support a literal interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, according to which that provision applies to situations where the European political party deliberately decides, at any time, to submit, communicate or produce incorrect required information, in the knowledge that it is inaccurate.
– Contextual interpretation
86 In the first place, it should be borne in mind that, as is apparent from paragraph 22 above, Regulation No 1141/2014 governs the legal and financial framework of European political parties.
87 As regards the legal framework, it is apparent from Article 8(1) and Article 9(1) and (2) of Regulation No 1141/2014 that European political parties are to file their application for registration with the Authority and that the Authority is to examine it in order to determine whether those parties satisfy the conditions for registration and comply with the governance provisions relating, in particular, to the statutes, and also that the Authority is to decide whether to register those parties. In addition, as is apparent from paragraph 24 above, in accordance with Article 9(5) of that regulation, European political parties are to notify the Authority of any amendments to the documents or statutes submitted as part of the application for registration. For its part, under Article 10(1) and the fourth subparagraph of Article 10(3) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the Authority is to regularly verify that European political parties continue to satisfy the conditions for registration and the governance provisions and, if that is no longer the case, it may decide to deregister them. Furthermore, under the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of that regulation, the Authority is to control compliance by European political parties with the obligations relating to those conditions and those provisions.
88 As regards the financial framework, European political parties, once registered, may, under certain conditions, pursuant to Article 17(1) and Article 20(1) and (7) of Regulation No 1141/2014, submit to the Parliament an application for funding from the general budget of the European Union, accept donations from natural or legal persons and receive contributions from their members. However, they are required, under Article 23(1) and Article 20(2) to (4) of that regulation, to submit to the Authority their annual financial statements and accompanying notes, an external audit report on them and the list of all their donors and contributors and of their respective donations or contributions. Compliance with the obligations relating to funding is to be ensured, pursuant to Article 24(2) of that regulation, by the Authority and the Authorising Officer of the Parliament.
89 It is apparent from the provisions referred to in paragraph 88 above that European political parties are required to provide information to the Authority, both at the time of their registration and throughout their existence, on the conditions for registration and the governance provisions linked, in particular, to the statutes, and on their financial situation, by submitting, inter alia, their annual financial statements, an external audit report and the list of their donors and contributors and of their respective donations and contributions.
90 In the second place, it should be noted, first, that, under Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the Authority is to establish and manage a register of European political parties and European political foundations.
91 It should also be noted that it is apparent from recital 2 and Article 1 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2401 of 2 October 2015 on the content and functioning of the Register of European political parties and foundations (OJ 2015 L 333, p. 50), adopted pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1141/2014, that the Register of European political parties and European political foundations is to contain data, particulars and documents submitted with applications for registration as European political parties or European political foundations as well as any subsequent data, particulars and documents.
92 According to recital 5 and Article 3(1) of Delegated Regulation 2015/2401, the Authority is to establish standard extracts from the Register of European political parties and European political foundations and provide them upon request to any natural or legal person.
93 Thus, in accordance with recital 4 of Delegated Regulation 2015/2401, the Register of European political parties and European political foundations is to provide a public service for the benefit of transparency, accountability and legal certainty, and the Authority is to operate that register in a way which provides appropriate access to, and certification of, information contained in it.
94 Second, it must be noted that it is apparent from recital 33 of Regulation No 1141/2014 that, for reasons of transparency, and in order to strengthen the scrutiny and the democratic accountability of European political parties, information concerning European political parties considered to be of substantial public interest – relating in particular to their statutes, their membership, their financial statements, their donors and donations by those donors, their contributions and grants that they received from the general budget of the European Union – should be published.
95 In accordance with Article 32(1)(a) and (d) to (f) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the Parliament is to make public, under the authority of its authorising officer or under that of the Authority, on a website created for that purpose, in particular, the statutes of all European political parties, the documents submitted as part of their application for registration and, thereafter, any amendments notified in that regard, as well as their annual financial statements and external audit reports, the names of their donors and their corresponding reported donations or their reported contributions.
96 It follows from the foregoing provisions that information concerning European political parties, in particular information considered to be of substantial public interest, is to be made available to the public by competent authorities, including the Authority, so that the public can have appropriate access to it.
97 By contrast, it should be noted that Regulation No 1141/2014 does not lay down any obligation for European political parties to make information available to the public. Indeed, the only provisions of Regulation No 1141/2014 which deal with the making available, by European political parties, of information intended for the public are, first, recital 32 and, second, Article 31, entitled ‘Provision of information to citizens’, which provide that, in the context of elections to the Parliament, European political parties may inform citizens of the Union of the affiliations between them and national political parties and their candidates. Thus, apart from the fact that those provisions limit the scope of information intended for citizens to specific circumstances, namely to the context of elections to the Parliament and to the specific subject of the affiliations between European political parties and national political parties and their candidates, they provide for the possibility, and not for an obligation, for European political parties to inform citizens.
98 In the third place, it should be noted that the types of infringement other than that referred to in paragraph 72 above, provided for in Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, entail sanctions in the event of non-compliance, by European political parties, with the requirements to communicate information to competent authorities. As regards situations where ‘the European political party or the European political foundation concerned has at any time intentionally omitted to provide information’, it is sufficient to recall, as stated in paragraph 97 above, that no provision of Regulation No 1141/2014 requires European political parties to provide information to the public, with the result that a sanction for an intentional omission to provide information can be interpreted only as referring to the information which European political parties are required to communicate to the authorities exercising control in the context of their obligations under that regulation.
99 As regards situations where ‘the bodies authorised by … Regulation [No 1141/2014] to audit or conduct checks on the beneficiaries of funding from the general budget of the European Union detect inaccuracies in the annual financial statements which are regarded as constituting material omissions or misstatements of items in accordance with the international accounting standards’, it is sufficient to note that this type of infringement sanctions European political parties where inaccuracies in their annual financial statements are detected by the bodies authorised to audit or conduct checks.
100 All the foregoing militates in favour of a contextual interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, according to which that provision applies to situations where the European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the competent authorities, including the Authority.
101 Although the Authority argues that, in accordance with Article 10(1) of Regulation No 1141/2014, it is required, by virtue of its duties of verification, to ensure the reliability of the responses which European political parties communicate directly to it, it is sufficient to note that Article 10(1) provides that the Authority is to regularly verify that registered European political parties and European political foundations continue to comply with the conditions for registration laid down in Article 3 and with the governance provisions set out in Article 4(1)(a), (b) and (d) to (f) and Article 5(1)(a) to (e) and (g) of Regulation No 1141/2014. The reference to the latter provisions confirms that registered European political parties must provide correct information to the Authority in the context of their obligations under that regulation.
– The teleological interpretation
102 In the first place, it should be noted, first, that recital 1 of Regulation No 1141/2014 refers to Article 10(4) TEU and Article 12(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of the citizens of the Union. Furthermore, in accordance with recital 23 of the same regulation, the criteria for the allocation of limited resources from the general budget of the European Union should reflect ‘the objective for European political parties to participate fully in the democratic life of the Union and to become actors in Europe’s representative democracy, in order effectively to express the views, opinions and political will of the citizens of the Union’. It follows from those considerations that the ultimate objective pursued by Regulation No 1141/2014 is to strengthen European political awareness and European representative democracy.
103 Second, it is to be noted that recital 24 of Regulation No 1141/2014 refers to the idea of increasing the transparency of European political party funding, and of avoiding potential abuse of the funding rules. The same is true of recital 34 of that regulation, which refers to the idea of a ‘legitimate public interest in transparency regarding the funding of European political parties’, and of recital 38 of that regulation, which refers to the desire to ensure transparency of the funding of European political parties and their membership. Recital 33 of that regulation, for its part, states that, ‘for reasons of transparency … information considered to be of substantial public interest … should be published’. It follows that strengthening the transparency of European political parties is another objective pursued by Regulation No 1141/2014.
104 Third, it should be observed that recital 26 of Regulation No 1141/2014 sets out the idea of strengthening ‘accountability and responsibility of European political parties’. In addition, recital 33 of that regulation refers to the ‘democratic accountability’ of European political parties. It follows that strengthening the accountability of European political parties is also one of the objectives pursued by Regulation No 1141/2014.
105 In the second place, it should be noted that, in recital 33 of Regulation No 1141/2014, the legislature states that ‘for reasons of transparency, and in order to strengthen the scrutiny and the democratic accountability of European political parties and European political foundations, information considered to be of substantial public interest, relating in particular to their statutes, membership, financial statements, donors and donations, contributions and grants received from the general budget of the European Union, as well as information relating to decisions taken by the Authority and the Authorising Officer of the European Parliament on registration, funding and sanctions, should be published.’ It also states that ‘establishing a regulatory framework to ensure that this information is publicly available is the most effective means of promoting a level playing field and fair competition between political forces, and of upholding open, transparent and democratic legislative and electoral processes, thereby strengthening the trust of citizens and voters in European representative democracy and, more broadly, preventing corruption and abuses of power.’
106 As is apparent from paragraph 95 above, under Article 32(1) of Regulation No 1141/2014, the information referred to in recital 33 is to be made public by the Parliament, under the authority of its authorising officer or under that of the Authority, on a website created for that purpose.
107 In addition, according to recital 34 of Regulation No 1141/2014, ‘the disclosure of donations exceeding EUR 3 000 per year and per donor should allow effective public scrutiny and control over the relations between donors and European political parties.’
108 It is apparent from those recitals and provisions that, by adopting Regulation No 1141/2014, the legislature wished to achieve the objectives referred to in paragraphs 102 to 104 above by establishing a regulatory framework intended to ensure that information concerning European political parties considered to be of substantial public interest is made available to the public by the competent authorities in order for the public to have appropriate access to that information and to scrutinise effectively the activities of those parties.
109 In that regard, it is sufficient to observe that, as is apparent from paragraph 105 above, in recital 33 of Regulation No 1141/2014, the legislature expressly stated that the establishment of such a regulatory framework was ‘the most effective means … of upholding open, transparent and democratic legislative and electoral processes, thereby strengthening the trust of citizens and voters in European representative democracy’.
110 The foregoing considerations allow for a teleological interpretation of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 according to which that provision applies to situations where the European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the competent authorities within the regulatory framework referred to in paragraph 108 above.
111 That is, moreover, what the Authority itself maintains, in paragraph 96 of its defence, by stating that the objective of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 is to ‘ensure the ability of the Authority to carry out its duties of control … and to publish on [the] basis of, inter alia, information obtained from European political parties, precise structural and financial information intended for the public’.
112 Contrary to what the Authority contends, such an interpretation is not contrary either to Article 10(4) TEU or to the ‘objective of integrity owed to citizens’, as referred to by that authority. In that regard, it must be found that, by providing correct information to the Authority in order for the public to have access to reliable information considered to be of substantial public interest, European political parties undoubtedly contribute to forming European political awareness and to the ‘objective of integrity owed to citizens’, as referred to by the Authority.
113 Moreover, contrary to what the Authority argues, an interpretation of that kind is such as to preserve the effectiveness of Regulation No 1141/2014. Indeed, sanctioning European political parties for intentionally providing incorrect information to the Authority is intended to encourage those parties to communicate correct information to the Authority in order for the public to have appropriate access to information considered to be of substantial public interest.
114 Although the Authority states that the information transmitted to it is invalidated if it does not correspond to that which the European political parties communicate to the public, it is sufficient to note, as the Authority itself has observed, that, under the first subparagraph of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 1141/2014, it has powers of control and that, under Article 24(4) thereof, European political parties are required to provide it with all information necessary for the purpose of carrying out the controls for which it is responsible.
115 In the same vein, in so far as the Authority submits that there is no presumption that the information transmitted to it is ‘more truthful’ than that communicated to the public, it should be noted that, by contrast with information communicated to the public, Regulation No 1141/2014 imposes obligations as regards the information provided to the Authority and that, in case of doubt, the Authority has the necessary means to ensure the accuracy of the information transmitted to it.
116 In addition, as regards the Authority’s claims that citizens would lose all confidence in it and the rationale for communications intended for it would be called into question in the event of the transmission of information of a different content from that published by European political parties, it is sufficient to recall that, as noted in paragraph 109 above, in recital 33 of Regulation No 1141/2014, the legislature expressly stated that establishing a regulatory framework to ensure that information concerning European political parties which is considered to be of substantial public interest is made available to the public by competent authorities was ‘the most effective means … of upholding open, transparent and democratic legislative and electoral processes, thereby strengthening the trust of citizens and voters in European representative democracy’. Thus, the regulatory framework provided for by Regulation No 1141/2014 already takes account of the concerns expressed by the Authority in that regard.
117 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, in so far as it covers situations where the European political party concerned has, at any time, intentionally provided incorrect information, must be interpreted as applying to situations where the European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the competent authorities, including the Authority, in the context of its obligations under that regulation.
118 It is appropriate to continue the analysis and to examine the application of that provision in the present case.
(ii) The application of Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 in the present case
119 As is apparent from paragraph 66 above, the Authority imposed a financial sanction on the applicant under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 on the ground that it had maintained, on social media networks, posts mentioning the board member in question as being a current member of its board in the knowledge that they were inaccurate.
120 First, it must be stated that, as is apparent from paragraph 117 above, Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 applies to situations where the European political party intentionally provides incorrect information to the Authority in the context of its obligations under that regulation.
121 Second, as is apparent from its wording, Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014 applies to situations where a European political party intentionally ‘provides’ incorrect information. However, the verb ‘to maintain’, which means, in the usual sense in everyday language, ‘to keep’, ‘to preserve’ or ‘not to modify’, does not have the same scope as the verb ‘to provide’, which refers, inter alia, as stated in paragraph 75 above, to the idea of submitting, communicating or producing what is required.
122 It follows that, by imposing a financial sanction on the applicant under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation No 1141/2014, on the ground that the applicant had maintained, on social media networks, posts mentioning the former board member in question as being a current member of its board in the knowledge that they were inaccurate, the Authority erred in law such as to require the contested decision to be annulled.
123 In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the contested decision must be annulled, without it being necessary to examine the other arguments raised in the context of the applicant’s sixth and eleventh pleas in law or the applicant’s other pleas in law.
2. The claim for compensation
124 The applicant claims that the Authority should be ordered to pay compensation for the damage which it has allegedly suffered. It identifies two types of damage, which it estimates at EUR 55 000.
125 The Authority disputes the applicant’s arguments.
126 As a preliminary point, it should be borne in mind that an action for damages is an autonomous form of action, which has as its end not the abolition of a particular measure, but compensation for damage caused by an institution (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 December 1971, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council, 5/71, EU:C:1971:116, paragraph 3).
127 Indeed, under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, in the case of non-contractual liability, the European Union is, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, to make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
128 According to settled case-law, the non-contractual liability of the European Union and the exercise of the right to compensation for damage suffered, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, depend on the satisfaction of a number of conditions, relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of which the institutions are accused, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage complained of (see judgment of 18 March 2010, Trubowest Handel and Makarov v Council and Commission, C‑419/08 P, EU:C:2010:147, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
129 First of all, as regards the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the alleged conduct of the EU institution or body concerned, the case-law requires that there be established a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals. As for the requirement that the breach must be sufficiently serious, the decisive test for finding that that requirement is met is whether the EU institution or body concerned manifestly and seriously disregarded the limits on its discretion. Where that institution or body has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, the mere infringement of EU law may suffice to establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 22 and the case-law cited).
130 Next, as regards the condition requiring actual damage to have been suffered, the European Union will incur liability only if the applicant has actually suffered ‘real and certain’ damage. It is for the applicant to adduce to the EU judicature evidence to establish the fact and the extent of such damage (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited).
131 Lastly, as regards the condition relating to the existence of a causal link between the conduct alleged and the damage complained of, that damage must flow in a sufficiently direct way from the alleged conduct – that conduct must be the decisive cause of the damage – although there is no obligation to make good every harmful consequence, even a remote one, of an unlawful situation. It is for the applicant to adduce evidence of a causal link between the conduct alleged and the damage complained of (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).
132 Where one of the three conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability is not satisfied, the claim for compensation must be rejected, without there being any need to examine whether the two other conditions are met. Moreover, the EU judicature is not required to examine those conditions in any particular order (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
133 It is in the light of those considerations that the applicant’s claims for compensation must be analysed.
(a) Material damage
134 The applicant states that, by having suffered a financial sanction of an amount equivalent to 5% of its annual budget, it had to make good by other means the reduction in its budget. In addition, it incurred costs, in particular lawyers’ fees and costs for the mobilisation of its staff, for tasks not initially planned, in order to ensure its defence. It assesses the material damage at EUR 25 000.
135 The Authority disputes the applicant’s arguments.
136 In the first place, in so far as the applicant submits that it had to incur lawyers’ fees, it is sufficient to recall that it is apparent from settled case-law that the costs incurred by the parties for the purpose of the judicial proceedings cannot as such be regarded as constituting damage distinct from the burden of costs (judgment of 10 June 1999, Commission v Montorio, C‑334/97, EU:C:1999:290, paragraph 54, and order of 14 September 2005, Ehcon v Commission, T‑140/04, EU:T:2005:321, paragraph 79; see also, to that effect, judgment of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641, paragraph 98). That claim must, therefore, be rejected.
137 In the second place, in so far as the applicant submits that it had to mobilise its staff on tasks not initially planned, in order to ensure, as a matter of urgency, its defence, it should be borne in mind that the Court has already held that to regard costs incurred in the course of proceedings preceding the judicial phase as a loss for which compensation may be claimed in an action for damages would be inconsistent with the fact that costs incurred during the phase before the judicial proceedings are not recoverable (see judgment of 16 June 2021, EC v Committee of the Regions, T‑355/19, EU:T:2021:369, paragraph 144 (not published) and the case-law cited). That is also the case with the expenses allegedly incurred by the applicant as a result of the mobilisation of its staff for the purposes of its defence. That claim must, therefore, also be rejected.
138 In the third place, as regards the circumstance that the applicant ‘had to make good by other means the reduction in its budget’, it must be stated that the applicant has not adduced any evidence of the fact and extent of those elements constituting the damage which it claims to have suffered. In accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 130 above, it is for the applicant to adduce evidence to the EU judicature to establish the fact and the extent of damage. Thus, such a claim cannot succeed either.
139 Accordingly, the applicant’s claim for compensation in so far as it relates to material damage must be rejected.
(b) Non-material damage
140 The applicant claims to have suffered non-material damage in that it was constrained to reduce, as a result of the reduction in its budget, its communication activities and its activist operations. In addition, that damage is aggravated by damage to image following the dissemination of the contested decision. It assesses the non-material damage at EUR 30 000.
141 The Authority disputes the applicant’s arguments.
142 In the first place, as regards the fact that the applicant was constrained to reduce, on account of the reduction in its budget, its communication activities and its activist operations, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, while adducing or offering evidence is not necessarily held to be a condition for the recognition of non-material damage, it is for the applicant at least to establish that the conduct alleged against the institution concerned was capable of causing him or her such damage (see judgment of 16 October 2014, Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T‑297/12, not published, EU:T:2014:888, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited; see also, to that effect, judgment of 28 January 1999, BAI v Commission, T‑230/95, EU:T:1999:11, paragraph 39).
143 However, in the present case, the applicant does not identify any objective circumstance capable of supporting the claim referred to in paragraph 140 above and does not adduce any evidence relating to the reduction in its communication activities and its activist operations which would make it possible to establish the existence of the alleged non-material damage.
144 In the second place, as regards the damage to image, it is to be borne in mind that, according to the case-law, non-material damage can, in principle, be compensated with regard to legal persons (see, to that effect, judgments of 28 January 1999, BAI v Commission, T‑230/95, EU:T:1999:11, paragraph 37, and of 15 October 2008, Camar v Commission, T‑457/04 and T‑223/05, not published, EU:T:2008:439, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited) and that such damage can take the form of damage to the image or to the reputation of that person (see, to that effect, judgments of 9 July 1999, New Europe Consulting and Brown v Commission, T‑231/97, EU:T:1999:146, paragraphs 53 and 69; of 8 November 2011, Idromacchine and Others v Commission, T‑88/09, EU:T:2011:641, paragraphs 70 to 76; and of 25 November 2014, Safa Nicu Sepahan v Council, T‑384/11, EU:T:2014:986, paragraphs 80 to 85).
145 It must also be borne in mind that the annulment of an unlawful measure may constitute, in itself, adequate and, in principle, sufficient compensation for any non-material damage which that measure may have caused, unless the applicant can show that he or she has suffered non-material damage which is separable from the unlawfulness which is the basis for the annulment and which is incapable of being entirely remedied by that annulment (see judgment of 14 September 2017, Bodson and Others v EIB, T‑504/16 and T‑505/16, EU:T:2017:603, paragraph 77 and the case-law cited).
146 In the present case, it must be found that the applicant merely alleges that ‘the Authority made extensive communication, on its own communications media’, of the contested decision, but does not adduce any evidence capable of establishing that that communication affected the conduct of third parties or entities towards it. It does not, therefore, appear that that communication attracted more attention than that which would be attracted by the subsequent finding that the contested decision was unlawful. Therefore, the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of non-material damage separable from the unlawfulness which is the basis for the annulment of the contested decision.
147 It follows that the applicant’s claim for compensation, in so far as it relates to non-material damage, must also be rejected.
148 In the light of all of the foregoing, the applicant’s claims for compensation must be rejected.
Costs
149 Under Article 134(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where each party succeeds on some and fails on other heads, the parties are to bear their own costs.
150 In the present case, in so far as the applicant’s head of claim seeking annulment of the contested decision has been upheld, while its head of claim seeking to have the European Union held non-contractually liable has been rejected, the applicant and the Authority must each be ordered to bear their own costs, including the costs relating to the proceedings for interim measures.
151 Additionally, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. Accordingly, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission must each bear their own costs.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Sixth Chamber, Extended Composition)
hereby:
1. Annuls the decision of the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations of 25 October 2023, by which that authority imposed a financial sanction on Patriotes.eu, formerly Identité et Démocratie Parti (ID Parti), under Article 27(2)(a)(vi) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations;
2. Dismisses the action as to the remainder;
3. Orders Patriotes.eu and the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations to bear their own costs, including those relating to the proceedings for interim measures;
4. Orders the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission each to bear their own costs.
Costeira | Kancheva | Mac Eochaidh |
Zilgalvis | | Tichy-Fisslberger |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 10 September 2025.
[Signatures]