JUDGMENT OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
1 October 2025 (*)
( Non-contractual liability – OLAF investigation – Press release – Processing of personal data – Presumption of innocence – Principle of good administration – Duty to act diligently – Confidentiality of OLAF investigations – Sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law conferring rights on individuals – Causal link – Damage )
In Case T‑384/20 RENV,
OC, represented by I. Ktenidis and P. Yatagantzidis, lawyers,
applicant,
v
European Commission, represented by T. Adamopoulos, J. Baquero Cruz, F. Blanc and A. Bouchagiar, acting as Agents,
defendant,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber),
composed, at the time of the deliberations, of P. Škvařilová-Pelzl, President, I. Nõmm and R. Meyer (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: S. Spyropoulos, Administrator,
having regard to the written part of the procedure,
further to the hearing on 10 March 2025,
gives the following
Judgment
1 By her action under Article 268 TFEU, the applicant, OC, seeks compensation for the damage she allegedly suffered following the publication, on 5 May 2020, of a press release from the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (‘the press release at issue’) in that it unlawfully processed her personal data and conveyed false information about her.
I. Background to the dispute
A. Facts prior to the action
2 The applicant, a Greek national, is an academic researcher in the fields of nanotechnology applications, energy storage and biomedicine.
3 In 2007, she submitted to the European Research Council a research proposal.
4 On 30 September 2008, the Commission of the European Communities and a Greek university (‘the Greek university concerned’) signed a grant agreement (‘the agreement’) relating to the project.
5 The agreement provided for a maximum grant of EUR 1 128 400 for the implementation of the project, which was awarded to the Greek university concerned as the main beneficiary, to the applicant as lead researcher and to another research institution. The project was carried out in a laboratory at the Greek university concerned, which was headed by the applicant’s father.
6 Once the project was completed, the Greek university concerned declared to the European Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA), which had replaced the Commission as the other party to the agreement, expenditure totalling EUR 1 116 189.21, including staff costs in the amount of EUR 255 219.37 and an amount of EUR 15 020.54 in respect of travel expenses. It sought payment of that sum under the agreement.
7 Following an ex post financial audit, ERCEA concluded that staff costs were ineligible up to an amount of EUR 245 525.43 and decided to recover that sum from the Greek university concerned, issuing a debit note to that end.
8 ERCEA having also informed OLAF of the results of its audit, the Director-General of OLAF decided, on 29 May 2015, in accordance with Article 5 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 (OJ 2013 L 248, p. 1), to open an investigation into possible irregularities or fraud in carrying out the project.
9 In the context of that investigation, OLAF sent, inter alia, on 6 and 7 March 2019 questionnaires to 18 foreign researchers, only 10 of whom replied, in order to obtain further details on their contribution and remuneration in respect of the project.
10 In its final report on that investigation, dated 11 November 2019, OLAF set out a number of findings. On the basis of those findings, first, OLAF recommended that ERCEA take appropriate steps to recover from the Greek university concerned the sums deemed overpaid. Second, OLAF sent that report to the national judicial authorities and recommended that they initiate proceedings for fraud and forgery against the applicant, her father and a number of staff members of the Greek university concerned.
11 On 5 May 2020, OLAF published on its website the press release at issue.
B. The annulled judgment
12 By an application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 16 June 2020, the applicant brought an action under Article 268 TFEU, seeking an order that the Commission pay compensation for the non-material damage allegedly caused by the press release at issue.
13 In support of her action, the applicant submits that, by publishing that press release, OLAF blatantly infringed the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2018 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC (OJ 2018 L 295, p. 39), the principle of the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 48(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013, the obligation to respect the confidentiality of investigations referred to in Article 10(5) of that regulation, the right to good administration referred to Article 41 of the Charter and the principle of proportionality.
14 By judgment of 4 May 2022, OC v Commission (T‑384/20, not published, ‘the annulled judgment’, EU:T:2022:273), the Court found, inter alia, that the applicant had not been able to establish that OLAF had committed a sufficiently serious breach of Article 9(1) and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013. It held, inter alia, that demonstrating a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence presupposed that the person who relied on that breach was identified or identifiable by the public as being guilty of an offence before his or her guilt was definitively established by a court or tribunal. The applicant had not been able to establish that the press release at issue alone, or through means reasonably likely to be used by one of the readers of the press release, had made it possible for her to be identified, in accordance with point 1 of Article 3 of Regulation 2018/1725.
15 In addition, the Court found that OLAF could not be criticised for failure to exercise care and caution, since the press release at issue reproduced faithfully and in general, neutral and impartial terms the conclusions reached by OLAF during its investigation, while ensuring that it did not reveal too many details in that regard. In order to reach that conclusion, the Court held, inter alia, that by using the words ‘none of them were aware’ in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue to designate ‘a number of the researchers’, OLAF had not disclosed inaccurate information distorting the conclusions of its final report.
16 The Court concluded that, since the applicant was not able to demonstrate the existence of unlawful conduct by OLAF, her action must be dismissed in its entirety, without there being any need to examine whether the other conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability had been satisfied.
C. The judgment on appeal
17 On 14 July 2022, the applicant brought an appeal under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, seeking to have the annulled judgment set aside. She put forward three grounds of appeal in support thereof. The first ground of appeal alleged misinterpretation of the concept of ‘identifiable natural person’ within the meaning of point 1 of Article 3 of Regulation 2018/1725; the second alleged misinterpretation of Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and of Article 48(1) of the Charter, read in conjunction with Article 6(2) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’), as regards the scope of the presumption of innocence, and the third alleged a distortion of the clear sense of the evidence relating to the infringement of Article 41 of the Charter on the right to good administration.
18 By judgment of 7 March 2024, OC v Commission (C‑479/22 P, ‘the judgment on appeal’, EU:C:2024:215), the Court of Justice upheld the first two grounds of appeal and part of the third ground. It held, inter alia, that the General Court had erred in law in its classification for legal purposes of the facts before it when it ruled that the identifiers in the press release at issue did not reasonably make it possible for the applicant to be identified. It also took the view that the General Court was wrong to find that the information contained in the press release at issue fell outside the concept of ‘personal data’, referred to in point 1 of Article 3 of Regulation 2018/1725, and that that regulation did not apply in that case. The Court of Justice inferred from this that the General Court had also erred in law by ruling that since the applicant was not identified or identifiable in that press release, she had been unable, by the same token, to show that her presumption of innocence had been compromised. The Court of Justice, moreover, upheld the third ground of appeal only to the extent that the General Court had dismissed the applicant’s claim based on the infringement of the right to good administration in respect of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue.
19 Accordingly, the Court of Justice, first, set aside the annulled judgment, in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court had rejected the form of order of the action seeking an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage resulting from the infringement by OLAF of its obligations under Regulation 2018/1725, of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the right to good administration, and, second, referred the case back to the General Court.
II. Forms of order sought
20 The applicant claims that the Court should:
– order the Commission to pay her the sum of EUR 1.1 million by way of compensation for the non-material damage she has suffered to date;
– order the Commission to pay the costs.
21 The Commission contends that the Court should:
– dismiss the action as unfounded;
– order the applicant to pay the costs.
III. Law
22 The second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU provides that the Union must, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. It follows that the non-contractual liability of the European Union and the exercise of the right to compensation for damage suffered depend on the satisfaction of three conditions, namely the unlawfulness of the conduct of which the EU institutions are accused, the fact of damage and the existence of a causal link between that conduct and the damage complained of (see judgment of 9 September 2008, FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission, C‑120/06 P and C‑121/06 P, EU:C:2008:476, paragraph 106 and the case-law cited).
23 The conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, are cumulative. It follows that, where one of those conditions is not fulfilled, the action must be dismissed in its entirety without it being necessary to examine the other conditions (see judgment of 17 February 2017, Novar v EUIPO, T‑726/14, EU:T:2017:99, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited).
24 The applicant claims, in the present case, that the three conditions for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, as required by the case-law cited in paragraph 22 above, are fulfilled.
25 The Court will start by examining the condition relating to the unlawfulness of the conduct of which OLAF is accused.
A. The alleged infringements of EU law
1. Preliminary observations
26 That first condition for the European Union to incur non-contractual liability is met when the conduct complained of concerns a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals and the breach of that rule of law is sufficiently serious (see judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited).
27 Thus, a rule of law confers rights on individuals where it creates for them an advantage which could be defined as a vested right, it is designed for the protection of their interests or it entails the grant of rights to those individuals, the content of those rights being sufficiently identifiable (see judgment of 9 February 2022, QI and Others v Commission and ECB, T‑868/16, EU:T:2022:58, paragraph 90 and the case-law cited).
28 In addition, in order to determine whether a breach is sufficiently serious, it is necessary to determine whether the EU body concerned manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its discretion (see judgment of 4 July 2000, Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission, C‑352/98 P, EU:C:2000:361, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). It is therefore necessary to take account of the discretion available to that body. Thus, where that body has considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, a mere breach of EU law may be regarded as a sufficiently serious breach (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited).
29 To that end, it is for the EU Courts to take into consideration the complexity of the situation, any difficulties of assessment or interpretation of the legislation to be applied, the degree of clarity and precision of the rule of law infringed, and whether the error made was intentional or inexcusable (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 April 2017, Ombudsman v Staelen, C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited, and of 23 November 2011, Sison v Council, T‑341/07, EU:T:2011:687, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).
30 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the various claims put forward by the applicant.
31 The applicant submits, in essence, that OLAF, by publishing the press release at issue, blatantly infringed its obligations under Regulation 2018/1725 and Regulation No 883/2013, as well as under the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to good administration. The Commission contends that those complaints are unfounded.
32 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in her application, the applicant also claimed that OLAF had blatantly acted in breach of the principle of proportionality, since the disclosure of false and misleading or confidential information published in the press release at issue could not be deemed appropriate or necessary for the purposes of informing the public. In order to dismiss the applicant’s action, the Court dismissed that complaint as unfounded in paragraphs 181 to 187 of the annulled judgment.
33 Point 1 of the operative part of the judgment on appeal states that the annulled judgment is set aside in so far as, by that judgment, the General Court rejected the form of order of the action seeking an order that the Commission pay compensation for the damage resulting from the infringement by OLAF of its obligations under Regulation 2018/1725, of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the right to good administration. In so doing, the Court of Justice partially set aside the annulled judgment.
34 Once the Court of Justice has set aside a judgment and referred the case back to the General Court, the latter Court is seised, pursuant to Article 191 of its Rules of Procedure, of the case by the judgment on appeal and must rule again on all the pleas in law in support of annulment raised by the applicant, apart from those elements of the operative part not set aside by the Court of Justice and the considerations on which those elements are essentially founded, as those elements have acquired the authority of res judicata (see judgment of 26 January 2022, Intel Corporation v Commission, T‑286/09 RENV, EU:T:2022:19, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited).
35 It follows that paragraphs 181 to 187 of the annulled judgment have the authority of res judicata, with the result that the General Court is not required to rule again on the complaint alleging breach of the principle of proportionality.
2. The disclosure of personal data
36 The applicant complains, in essence, that OLAF published the press release at issue, which contains information and personal data which make it easy to identify her, namely her nationality, gender, young age, the fact that her father worked at the Greek university concerned, and the amount of the grant awarded, even though such information was not essential and could therefore have been omitted.
37 The applicant submits that OLAF thus infringed Articles 4 and 5 of Regulation 2018/1725 by including, in the press release at issue, a set of data permitting her identification.
38 The Commission contends that this complaint is unfounded.
39 It must be stated at the outset that Articles 4 to 6 of Regulation 2018/1725 confer rights on individuals. Therefore, it is appropriate to start by determining whether, by publishing the press release at issue, OLAF infringed those provisions, before going on to examine whether it is a sufficiently serious breach.
(1) The existence of unlawful processing of personal data
40 According to the applicant, first, none of the conditions laid down in Article 5 of Regulation 2018/1725 is satisfied, since disclosure of the information in question could not possibly be regarded as necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in OLAF, as stipulated in paragraph 1(a) of that article. Similarly, the processing carried out by OLAF is not justified by any of the provisions referred to in Article 5(1)(b) to (e) of that regulation in so far as (i) it is not justified by any legal obligation to which OLAF is subject, or by any vital interest of the applicant, and (ii) there is no contract or consent on the part of the applicant.
41 Furthermore, the applicant submits that the Court will have to examine whether, in the light of the objectives of the investigation as set out by Commission Decision 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 28 April 1999 establishing OLAF (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 20) and Regulation No 883/2013, by adopting and publishing the press release at issue, OLAF not only exceeded its powers but also acted in breach of the principle of conferral of powers of the institutions as guaranteed in Article 5(1) and (2) TEU. Relying on the judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission (T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384), she is of the opinion that a distinction must be drawn between informing the public as a power of OLAF and the interest in informing the public. The applicant adds that it does not follow from Regulation No 883/2013 that informing the public constitutes OLAF’s core activity. This would appear to be an entirely secondary objective.
42 Second, the applicant submits, in essence, that OLAF used her personal data collected in the course of its investigation for purposes – namely informing the public – other than those which justified their collection – namely the detection of irregularities and fraud cases.
43 According to the applicant, that inclusion of personal data in the press release at issue constitutes further processing of the data collected for the purposes of OLAF’s final report and infringes Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1725. In addition, the applicant claims that OLAF infringed its obligation to inform the applicant of the further processing of her personal data, under Article 15(3) of Regulation 2018/1725.
44 Furthermore, the applicant argues, in essence, that OLAF infringed Article 6 of Regulation 2018/1725 by failing to take into consideration the nature of the personal data.
45 The Commission contends, in the first place, that the publication of the press release at issue constituted lawful processing under Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2018/1725. In its view, the fact that an administrative authority informs the public of its activities, in particular by issuing press releases, amounts to a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the EU institution or body, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725. That activity is a clear application of the principle of openness towards civil society laid down in Article 15 TFEU.
46 The Commission argues that the press release at issue contains only information that is adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to fulfil the obligation of informing the public as accurately as possible, while taking into account the applicant’s interests, in accordance with the obligation of lawfulness, objectivity and transparency imposed by Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725. It states that, without the information mentioned in the press release at issue, the probability that the content of that press release would be picked up by the media would have been reduced, thus undermining the attainment of the objective pursued.
47 In the second place, the Commission contends that OLAF did not further process the applicant’s personal data within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1725, since informing the public is part of OLAF’s core activities and is a power recognised by Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013. Consequently, according to the Commission, OLAF was not required to inform the applicant of the processing of her personal data under Article 15(3) of Regulation 2018/1725.
48 As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that it follows from the judgment on appeal that the applicant must be regarded as a natural person who can be identified indirectly within the meaning of point 1 of Article 3 of Regulation 2018/1725. In addition, the publication by OLAF of a press release falls under the concept of ‘processing of personal data’ for the purposes of point 3 of Article 3 of that regulation (judgment of 12 September 2007, Nikolaou v Commission, T‑259/03, not published, EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 222). Accordingly, that regulation is applicable in the present case.
(i) Article 4(1)(a) and Article 5 of Regulation 2018/1725
49 Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 provides that personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.
50 In that regard, Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2018/1725 provides that processing is lawful only if and to the extent that it is necessary either for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the EU institution or body, or for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject. Recital 20 of that regulation states that the personal data should be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary for the purposes for which they are processed.
51 Furthermore, it follows from the case-law that an EU institution or body may issue press releases or otherwise communicate with the public, even in the absence of a provision expressly empowering it to do so. The fact that an administrative authority informs the public of its activities, in particular by issuing press releases, may be regarded as an activity ancillary to its main administrative activity (judgment of 12 September 2007, Nikolaou v Commission, T‑259/03, not published, EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 218).
52 It follows that informing the public of OLAF’s activities, in particular by issuing press releases, falls within the scope of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in OLAF, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725.
53 That conclusion is not affected by the arguments put forward by the applicant.
54 It is true that, in paragraph 175 of the judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission (T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384), the Court held, with regard to a press conference given by the Director-General of OLAF, that the latter had an ‘interest’ consisting in ‘informing, as precisely as possible, the public of actions implemented in the context of possible failures or fraud’. However, contrary to what the applicant claims, using the term ‘interest’ instead of ‘power’ cannot be interpreted as meaning that the provision of information to the public no longer falls within OLAF’s powers since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In the context of that judgment, use of the term ‘interest’ did not refer to OLAF’s power to inform the public by means of press releases, but referred to the balancing exercise to be carried out between the interests of the applicant and those of OLAF in having certain information disclosed at the press conference in question.
55 Similarly, it is true that Article 5(2) of Regulation 2018/1725 provides that the basis for the processing referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of that article ‘shall be laid down in Union law’.
56 However, the requirement laid down in Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 must be read in the light of recital 22 of that regulation, from which it is apparent that the processing of personal data for the performance of tasks carried out in the public interest by the EU institutions and bodies includes the processing of personal data necessary for the management and functioning of those institutions and bodies. In the light of Article 15(1) TFEU and the principle of openness which applies to EU institutions and bodies, the fact that an administrative authority informs the public of its activities, in particular by issuing press releases, forms part of the functioning of the EU institutions and bodies.
57 Accordingly, it cannot be found that OLAF exceeded its powers by issuing a press release, without prejudice, however, to the question whether OLAF complied with its obligations, in particular as regards the processing of personal data, when drafting the press release (judgment of 12 September 2007, Nikolaou v Commission, T‑259/03, not published, EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 219).
58 It is therefore also necessary to ascertain whether the publication of the applicant’s age, nationality and gender, of the fact that her father worked at the Greek university concerned and of the amount of the grant constitutes processing of personal data under a task carried out in the public interest, within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725.
59 Such information not only permits identification of the applicant, but, in addition, it is not necessary, with the exception of the amount of the grant awarded, for the purpose of reporting on the allegations made against the applicant following OLAF’s investigation. The applicant’s age, gender, nationality and family ties had no bearing on the facts at issue and reference to them in no way forms part of the task of informing the public of OLAF’s activities.
60 Moreover, by arguing that, without the information provided in the press release at issue, the probability that the content of the press release would be picked up by the media would have been reduced, the Commission implicitly acknowledges that the reference to the aspects set out in paragraph 59 above, which relate to the applicant’s privacy and are of purely anecdotal interest, is not intended, as such, to inform the public of OLAF’s role in combating fraud. In fact, it is clear from the various articles published in the media that disclosure of that information attracted the interest of the media only as regards the context in which the alleged fraud took place and the identity of the applicant. It did not raise media interest in OLAF investigations, and in particular the importance of having access to bank records to combat fraud, which the Director of OLAF wished to highlight.
61 Accordingly, the publication of those data constitutes unlawful processing under Article 4(1)(a) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725.
62 As regards the amount of the grant awarded to the project, it constitutes objective information which provides the public with useful details on the amount of the sums in question from the EU budget. Moreover, contrary to what the applicant maintains, the reference to that amount at the beginning of the press release at issue does not mislead the reader as regards the extent of the ‘fraud’. On the contrary, it is quite clear from the press release that, while the amount of the grant was EUR 1.1 million, OLAF’s recommendations called on ERCEA to recover approximately EUR 190 000, that is to say ‘the share of the … grant allegedly paid to the international researchers’.
(ii) Article 4(1)(b) and Article 6 of Regulation 2018/1725
63 Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1725 provides that personal data are to be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, and must not be further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.
64 That provision must be read in the light of recital 25 of that regulation. That recital states, inter alia, that the processing of personal data for purposes other than those for which the personal data were initially collected should be allowed only where the processing is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected. In such a case, no legal basis separate from that which allowed the collection of the personal data is required. Further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes should be considered to be compatible lawful processing operations.
65 Moreover, that recital specifies that, in order to ascertain whether a purpose of further processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected, the controller, after having met all the requirements for the lawfulness of the original processing, should take into account the criteria listed in Article 6(a) to (e) of Regulation 2018/1725.
66 Article 6(a) to (e) of Regulation 2018/1725, entitled ‘Processing for another compatible purpose’, provides, in essence, that, where the processing of data for a purpose other than that for which the data have been collected is not based on EU law which constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 25(1) of Regulation 2018/1725, it is necessary to ascertain whether that processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data were collected, taking into account, inter alia, any link between those purposes and the purposes of the intended further processing, the context in which the personal data have been collected, in particular as regards the relationship between the data subjects and the controller, the nature of the personal data, in particular whether the processing concerns personal data related to criminal convictions and offences, the consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects, and the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may include pseudonymisation.
67 In the present case, the applicant’s personal data were collected in the context of the investigation conducted by OLAF, for a specified purpose which reflects OLAF’s anti-fraud mission. The data were not collected with a view to the publication of the press release at issue, which corresponds to a different, albeit related, purpose, namely informing the public of OLAF’s activities.
68 In accordance with the usual meaning of the term ‘further’ in everyday language, any processing of personal data which is subsequent to the initial processing constituted by the initial collection of those data constitutes ‘further’ processing of those data, regardless of the purpose of that further processing (judgment of 20 October 2022, Digi, C‑77/21, EU:C:2022:805, paragraph 31). The publication of the press release at issue must therefore be regarded as further processing within the meaning of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation 2018/1725, and it is necessary to ascertain whether it is compatible with the purposes for which the personal data were initially collected.
69 In that regard, the applicant argues, in essence, that OLAF infringed Article 6 of Regulation 2018/1725 by failing to take into consideration the ‘criminal law’ nature of the personal data.
70 First of all, it should be noted that the publication of the press release at issue does not correspond to the processing of personal data carried out for a purpose for which the applicant consented to the collection of her data, or for a purpose based on EU law constituting a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to safeguard the objectives referred to in Article 25(1) of Regulation 2018/1725.
71 Next, there is a link between the purposes for which the personal data have been collected and the purposes of the further processing, within the meaning of Article 6(a) of that regulation. As has already been noted, the publication of OLAF’s press release is an activity ancillary to OLAF’s core activities.
72 Similarly, in view of that ancillary nature, the view may be taken, in the light of Article 6(b) of Regulation 2018/1725, that the context in which the applicant’s personal data were collected is somewhat close to that in which they were subsequently processed, in particular as regards the relationship between the applicant and the controller, being OLAF.
73 However, the view cannot be taken, within the meaning of Article 6(c) of Regulation 2018/1725, that OLAF took into account the nature of the personal data, in particular in so far as they make it possible for the applicant to be identified in connection with alleged criminal offences.
74 Similarly, given the allegations made against the applicant and judging by the content of the press articles following the publication of the press release at issue, OLAF did not take sufficient account of the possible consequences, for the applicant, of the further processing, within the meaning of Article 6(d) of Regulation 2018/1725.
75 Lastly, it follows from the judgment on appeal that OLAF did not take sufficient account of the existence of appropriate safeguards, within the meaning of Article 6(e) of Regulation 2018/1725. Although OLAF did not reveal the identity of the applicant, the processing of personal data in the press release at issue made it possible for her to be identified by the public.
76 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that, by publishing the press release at issue, OLAF unlawfully processed the applicant’s personal data in breach of Article 4(1)(a) and Article 5(1)(a) of Regulation 2018/1725 and further processed those data in breach of Article 4(1)(b) and Article 6(c) to (e) of that regulation.
(2) Existence of a sufficiently serious breach
77 The applicant submits, in essence, that OLAF has no margin of discretion since the provisions of Regulation 2018/1725 lay down mandatory rules.
78 The Commission contends that the EU institutions have a certain margin of discretion in determining the extent to which the processing of personal data may be necessary for the performance of a task entrusted to the public authorities. In any event, according to the Commission, it cannot be argued that the alleged infringement constitutes an inexcusable error. If that infringement were to be established, it would be due to a lack of caution, meaning that it could not be argued that it was committed deliberately.
79 Even if, as the Commission submits, OLAF has a certain margin of discretion for the purposes of applying Article 4(1)(a) and (b), Article 5(1)(a) and Article 6(c) to (e) of Regulation 2018/1725, it must be held that those provisions were gravely and manifestly disregarded by the publication, in the press release at issue, of the applicant’s nationality and age, and by the mention that her father worked at the Greek university concerned.
80 The provisions that have been infringed do not lack clarity nor do they give rise to any particular difficulties of interpretation or assessment in that regard. In particular, the Commission’s statement that, without the information included in the press release, the probability that the content of the press release at issue would be picked up by the media would have been reduced not only makes it possible to rule out that the error committed was excusable, but also establishes an element of intent.
81 It follows that, by publishing the press release at issue, OLAF unlawfully processed the applicant’s personal data in breach of Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Regulation 2018/1725, which constitutes a sufficiently serious breach capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the European Union under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
3. Breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the good administration of justice
82 As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, while the applicant relies on two different legal bases, she nevertheless refers to the same facts.
(a) Breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence referred to in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and infringement of the obligation to respect the confidentiality of investigations referred to in Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013
(i) Existence of a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and of the confidentiality of investigations
83 The applicant submits that OLAF blatantly infringed her right to the presumption of innocence laid down in Article 48(1) of the Charter and in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013. According to the applicant, OLAF issued a press release which, first, contained personal data that make it possible to identify her and, second, was drafted in a biased manner, contained omissions and inaccurate facts contrary to the conclusions of its final report, and distorted those facts with the aim of making her appear guilty, in the eyes of the public, of fraud against all researchers, while the investigation at national level was still ongoing.
84 She also submits that Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 confers rights on individuals, since it is a mandatory provision which requires OLAF to comply with certain obligations in order to respect the legitimate rights of the persons concerned, in accordance with recital 25 of that regulation.
85 The Commission contends, in essence, that OLAF did not in any way distort the conclusions of its final report, since it presented the findings of fact in a succinct and precise manner, without making any classification in law and without passing any judgment as to the applicant’s guilt or innocence. In addition, the Commission argues that the press release at issue came with a detailed description of OLAF’s mission clearly stating that it is to investigate cases of fraud and then to make recommendations to the national authorities competent to rule on whether the person concerned is guilty. Thus it claims that no breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence has been established.
– Preliminary observations
86 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that it is apparent from the judgment on appeal that the applicant is identifiable, at least indirectly, on the basis of the information contained in the press release at issue, which is an essential prerequisite for the examination of whether there has been a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence.
87 Moreover, the principle of the presumption of innocence, which constitutes a fundamental right set out in Article 6(2) ECHR and in Article 48(1) of the Charter, confers rights on individuals which are enforced by the EU Courts (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 168 and the case-law cited).
88 In that regard, Article 6(2) ECHR guarantees that no one will be described or treated as guilty of an offence before his or her guilt has been established by a court. The presumption of innocence is breached by statements or decisions which reflect the sentiment that the person was guilty, which encourage the public to believe in his or her guilt or which prejudge the assessment of the facts by the competent court (see judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 210 and the case-law cited).
89 Article 6(2) ECHR cannot, in the light of Article 10 ECHR, which guarantees freedom of expression, prevent the authorities from informing the public about criminal investigations in progress, but requires that they do so with all the discretion and circumspection necessary if the presumption of innocence is to be respected (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 173 and the case-law cited).
90 As regards, more specifically, OLAF, Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides, in essence, that OLAF is to seek evidence for and against the person concerned in accordance with the principle of the presumption of innocence. Article 10(5) of that regulation states that its Director-General is to ensure that any information provided to the public complies with the principles set out in that article and in Article 9(1) of the regulation. The Court has held in that regard that the principle of the presumption of innocence has its corollary in the obligation to maintain confidentiality placed on OLAF pursuant to Article 10 of Regulation No 883/2013, and which also confers rights on individuals who are affected by an OLAF investigation in so far as they are entitled to expect that the investigations concerning them will be conducted in a manner that respects their fundamental rights (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 169 and the case-law cited).
91 It has already been held that respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence did not preclude, in the interests of informing the public as precisely as possible of actions implemented in the context of possible failures or fraud, an EU institution from reporting the main findings of OLAF’s final report concerning a member of an institution. It is nevertheless for OLAF to do so using balanced and measured wording and in an essentially factual manner (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2022, KN v Parliament, T‑401/21, EU:T:2022:736, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
92 It follows that OLAF cannot be criticised for acting in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and the confidentiality of investigations merely because it informed the public of the conclusions set out in its final report, including as regards the recommendations addressed to the national authorities, even if those recommendations do not give a final ruling as to whether the person at issue is guilty.
93 However, in order to assess whether there has been a breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, account must be taken of the choice of words used in the press release at issue, taking into consideration the actual meaning of the statements in question and not their literal form, as well as the particular circumstances in which they were made (see, by analogy, judgment of 30 November 2022, KN v Parliament, T‑401/21, EU:T:2022:736, paragraphs 69 and 73 and the case-law cited).
94 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must determine whether OLAF infringed Article 9(1) and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 by publishing the press release at issue, before determining whether it is a sufficiently serious breach.
– The alleged infringements
95 In the first place, the third paragraph of the press release at issue states that the bank accounts that were opened had ‘multiple beneficiaries’, without specifying that the researchers concerned were themselves co-beneficiaries of those accounts. The applicant deduces from this that OLAF deliberately gave the impression that she was the only one in a position to manage those accounts, without the knowledge of the researchers concerned.
96 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that it is also stated in the press release at issue that ‘none of [the researchers contacted] had any knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names’ and that the researchers were ‘co-beneficiaries’ of those accounts. That argument therefore cannot succeed.
97 In the second place, the applicant criticises OLAF for suggesting, in the fourth paragraph of the press release at issue, that she attempted to obstruct the proper conduct of the investigation, in particular by contacting the researchers who participated in the project.
98 On that point, reference should be made to paragraph 85 of the judgment on appeal, in which the Court of Justice rejected the appellant’s argument seeking a finding that the General Court had distorted the conclusions of OLAF’s final report by holding that it was apparent from that report that OLAF had found that during its investigation the applicant had on several occasions contacted a number of researchers and that it had regarded those acts as constituting an obstacle to its investigation. That argument must therefore be rejected.
99 In the third place, the applicant criticises OLAF for stating, in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, that she was withdrawing cash or had ‘transferred [large sums] into her private account’. OLAF failed to specify, inter alia, that, in its final report, it had admitted that a large sum had been transferred to the bank accounts indicated by the researchers and that other amounts had remained in the researchers’ accounts.
100 That assertion concerns a finding of fact which reflects the conclusions reached by OLAF in its final report. It is apparent from the last paragraph of the press release at issue that ERCEA was invited to recover a sum of approximately EUR 190 000.
101 Furthermore, as the Commission points out, no obligation on OLAF to include in the press release information which militates in favour of the applicant can be inferred from Regulation No 883/2013.
102 It follows that, in that context, the absence of an explanation for certain withdrawals and transfers made by the applicant cannot be regarded as compromising the principle of the presumption of innocence.
103 In the fourth place, the applicant submits that there is a serious breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence as soon as the conclusions of OLAF’s final report concerning the replies of the researchers who participated in the project do not reflect reality and are contradicted by new evidence.
104 In that regard, it is sufficient to note that that argument is in fact aimed at criticising OLAF’s final report and not the press release at issue. However, only the latter is the subject of the present action, as the Commission argues and the applicant acknowledges. That argument must therefore be rejected.
105 In addition, it should be noted that, under Article 10(3) and Article 11(3) to (6) of Regulation No 883/2013, reports drawn up by OLAF in the course of its investigations are in principle confidential and intended to provide the national and EU authorities with information and evidence intended to enable them to assess whether it is appropriate to adopt measures at EU level or for proceedings to be initiated by national judicial authorities.
106 It follows that OLAF’s final report is liable to cause damage to the applicant either indirectly, following the adoption of a decision, by the Commission or by a national authority, after its transmission, which would be based on the information contained in that report, or, directly, following disclosure of all or part of that report. Therefore, the only damage likely to flow directly from that report is that which would have been caused by such disclosure (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 June 2023, IMG v Commission, T‑752/20, EU:T:2023:366, paragraph 36 (not published)).
107 In the present case, the various errors and inaccuracies allegedly vitiating OLAF’s final report are unrelated to the dissemination of the press release at issue, but relate to the conduct of the investigation and the drafting of that report. Accordingly, the alleged errors, even if established, do not have a sufficiently direct link with the damage claimed by the applicant.
108 In the fifth place, the applicant complains that OLAF described her actions as ‘fraud’. She claims, inter alia, that the fourth paragraph of the press release at issue is worded in such a way as to suggest that she intended to commit ‘fraud’ by appropriating the funds of the researchers participating in the project. She points out in that regard that, although OLAF is required, under the second sentence of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 883/2013, to make a preliminary classification in law of the facts established, that classification must appear in the final investigation report and not in the press release.
109 The Court has already held that, by giving the impression, through a press release, which was freely accessible to the public, that an applicant was involved in mismanagement, the Commission acted in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and cast a slur on that applicant’s reputation and honour (judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 403).
110 It must be stated that, contrary to the Commission’s contentions, use of the term ‘fraud’ is the result of a classification in law of the facts and implies guilt on the applicant’s part.
111 Furthermore, contrary to the Commission’s submissions, the fact that the press release at issue came with a description of OLAF’s investigative mission stating that it was for the competent national authorities to rule on whether the applicant is guilty is not sufficient to dispel the impression of guilt created by using the term ‘fraud’ (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 308). The absence of any indication in the press release at issue as to the type of proceedings – whether criminal, administrative or other – recommended to the national authorities is also irrelevant.
112 It should be noted, moreover, that the applicant also criticises OLAF for stating, in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, that none of the researchers were aware that their names were linked to the project nor had they been informed that a bank account had been opened in their name. Similarly, according to the applicant, the statement made by the Director of OLAF, in the sixth paragraph of that press release, that ‘[the names of] the bona fide researchers … were being exploited as part of the fraud attempt’, is false and inaccurate. OLAF’s final report clearly states that ‘ten researchers … confirmed that they participated in the … project’.
113 In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the judgment on appeal, the Court of Justice held that the General Court had distorted the conclusions of OLAF’s final report by holding that OLAF had not disclosed inaccurate information in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue.
114 Without prejudice to whether that disclosure of inaccurate information constitutes a breach of OLAF’s duty to act diligently, the fact that ‘all researchers’ or ‘ten researchers’ are involved is not decisive for the purpose of establishing whether the applicant is guilty. However, that information, in that it highlights the number of persons concerned, reinforces the sentiment that the applicant is guilty resulting from the term ‘fraud’ being used.
115 It follows that use of the term ‘fraud’ in that context is not measured within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 91 above.
116 Similarly, the classification of the applicant’s actions as ‘fraud’ goes beyond an essentially factual presentation of the conclusions of OLAF’s final report. Indeed, the latter refers to ‘irregularities’ and describes certain acts as fraud under Greek criminal law by using the conditional tense (‘would appear’ in English and ‘φαίνεται να’ in Greek).
117 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that OLAF, by using the term ‘fraud’, acted in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence guaranteed in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and Article 10(5) of that regulation.
(ii) Existence of a sufficiently serious breach
118 In order to determine whether the infringement of Article 9(1) and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 constitutes a sufficiently serious breach, it is necessary to determine the margin of discretion available to the institutions.
119 In that regard, the applicant submits that OLAF has no margin of discretion. Conversely, the Commission contends that OLAF has a certain margin of discretion. It thus relies on paragraph 129 of the judgment of 4 October 2006, Tillack v Commission (T‑193/04, EU:T:2006:292), in which the Court held that, in view of the autonomy granted to OLAF by Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 concerning investigations conducted by [OLAF] (OJ 1999 L 136, p. 1), then applicable, and the general objective of providing information to the public through press releases, OLAF was to be found to enjoy discretion as regards the appropriateness and content of the press releases in respect of its investigative activities.
120 While it is true that OLAF enjoys a certain margin of discretion as regards the appropriateness and content of press releases, that discretion ceases when it comes to compliance with the fundamental rights of the persons concerned. As the Court has already held, the Commission has no margin of discretion with respect to its obligation to respect the principle of the presumption of innocence (judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraphs 219 and 314). In any event, and assuming that a margin of discretion is available to OLAF, it must be held that use of the term ‘fraud’ in the press release at issue constitutes a grave and manifest infringement of Article 9(1) and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013.
121 First, those provisions do not lack clarity nor do they give rise to any particular difficulties of interpretation or assessment. Second, that fault cannot be regarded as excusable. It is a classification of the allegations made against the applicant going beyond a mere factual description of the conclusions set out in OLAF’s final report and forming part of OLAF’s communication strategy, which may be regarded as lacking the restraint expected of an EU body.
122 Consequently, using the term ‘fraud’ in the press release at issue constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, guaranteed in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and Article 10(5) of that regulation, capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the European Union under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
(b) Infringement of the right to good administration under Article 41 of the Charter and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013
123 The applicant submits that OLAF blatantly infringed the right to good administration provided for in Article 41 of the Charter. She argues that that right confers rights on individuals through a set of mandatory rules or prohibitions.
124 In particular, the applicant submits that, by disclosing in the press sensitive and even misleading information from the investigations and by allowing the general public to have access, in the course of the investigation procedure, to confidential information, OLAF infringed the duty to act diligently and the obligation of impartiality, also referred to in Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013, which are a component of the right to good administration.
125 The Commission contends that the principle of good administration does not confer rights on individuals, except where it constitutes the expression of specific rights, and that the applicant has not been able to demonstrate the infringement of a right expressing that principle.
(i) Breach of the principle of good administration
126 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the principle of good administration does not, in itself, confer rights upon individuals except where it constitutes the expression of specific rights such as the right to have one’s affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time, the right to be heard, the right to have access to files, or the obligation to give reasons for decisions, for the purposes of Article 41 of the Charter (see judgment of 4 October 2006, Tillack v Commission, T‑193/04, EU:T:2006:292, paragraph 127 and the case-law cited). That is also the case of the duty to act with all necessary diligence, which is inherent to the principle of good administration and obliges the relevant institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant facts of the case (judgments of 16 December 2008, Masdar (UK) v Commission, C‑47/07 P, EU:C:2008:726, paragraph 91, and of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 200).
127 The duty to act diligently applies generally to the actions of the EU administration in its relations with the public. It entails that the EU administration must act with care and caution (judgments of 16 December 2008, Masdar (UK) v Commission, C‑47/07 P, EU:C:2008:726, paragraphs 92 and 93, and of 30 April 2019, UPF v Commission, T‑747/17, EU:T:2019:271, paragraph 160).
128 It must also be borne in mind that Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides that the Director-General of OLAF is to ensure that any information provided to the public is given neutrally and impartially, and that disclosure thereof respects the confidentiality of investigations and complies with the principles set out in Article 9(1) of that regulation, which include the objective and impartial conduct of investigations.
129 On the one hand, Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 imposes an obligation to inform the public in a neutral and impartial manner, which may be linked to the duty to act diligently referred to in paragraphs 126 and 127 above. On the other hand, that provision refers to OLAF’s obligation of impartiality in the context of the investigation. The latter is not at issue in the present action, since the purpose of the action is to establish the non-contractual liability of the European Union as a result of the publication of the press release at issue and not as a result of the investigation carried out by OLAF.
130 In addition, Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 ensures that the confidentiality of investigations must be respected. In that regard, the Court has held that the obligation to maintain confidentiality also confers rights on individuals who are affected by an OLAF investigation in so far as they are entitled to expect that the investigations concerning them will be conducted in a manner that respects their fundamental rights. In the same way, individuals are entitled to rely on the principle of good administration in that it entails the right to have their cases dealt with in such a way that confidentiality is maintained (judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 218).
131 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the various arguments raised by the applicant.
132 In the first place, the applicant alleges, in essence, a breach of OLAF’s duty to act diligently in relation to the disclosure of misleading information.
133 First, she claims that the third paragraph of the press release at issue states that the bank accounts that were opened had ‘multiple beneficiaries’, without it being specified that the researchers concerned were themselves co-beneficiaries of those accounts.
134 It is sufficient to note that it is also stated in that press release that ‘none of [the researchers contacted] had any knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names’ and that the researchers were ‘co-beneficiaries’ of those accounts. That argument therefore cannot succeed.
135 Second, the applicant criticises OLAF for suggesting, in the fourth paragraph of the press release at issue, that she attempted to obstruct the proper conduct of the investigation, in particular by contacting researchers who participated in the project.
136 On that point, reference should be made to paragraph 85 of the judgment on appeal, in which the Court of Justice rejected the appellant’s argument seeking a finding that the General Court had distorted the conclusions of OLAF’s final report by holding that it was apparent from that report that OLAF had found during its investigation that the applicant had on several occasions contacted a number of researchers and that it had regarded those acts as constituting an obstacle to its investigation. That argument must therefore be rejected.
137 Third, the applicant claims that the conclusions of OLAF’s final report concerning the replies of the researchers who participated in the project do not reflect reality and are contradicted by new evidence. That argument must be rejected for reasons similar to those set out in paragraphs 103 to 107 above.
138 Fourth, the applicant criticises OLAF for stating, in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, that none of the researchers were aware that their names were linked to the project nor had they been informed that a bank account had been opened in their name. Similarly, according to the applicant, the statement made by the Director of OLAF, in the sixth paragraph of that press release, that ‘[the names of] the bona fide researchers … were being exploited as part of the fraud attempt’, is false and inaccurate. Indeed, claims the applicant, OLAF’s final report clearly states that ‘ten researchers … confirmed that they participated in the … project’.
139 In that regard, it should be recalled that, in the judgment on appeal, the Court of Justice held that the General Court had distorted the conclusions of OLAF’s final report by holding that OLAF had not disclosed inaccurate information in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue.
140 It must therefore be held that OLAF did not act with care and caution in writing that ‘none of [these researchers] were aware that their name was linked to the project or had any knowledge of the bank accounts opened in their names or of any payments made into them’ in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue. It is apparent from paragraph 2.2.3.2 of OLAF’s final report that the ten researchers who replied to OLAF ‘confirmed that they participated in the … project’, and that only ‘some researchers did not confirm the costs declared on their behalf [by the Greek university concerned] nor the ownership of a Greek bank account’.
141 It should also be noted that, in the summary of OLAF’s final report, no reference is made to the question whether the researchers knew that their names were linked to the project. However, it is stated that ‘the investigation established that certain researchers were unaware of the existence of the jointly owned bank accounts or of the remuneration claimed for them by [the Greek university concerned] from [ERCEA]’. In its press release, OLAF therefore deliberately amplified the facts, including as regards the summary of the report, which does not necessarily include all the nuances of that report.
142 It follows that OLAF failed to fulfil its duty to act diligently by disclosing inaccurate information in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue.
143 In the second place, the applicant submits that OLAF made public confidential data from the investigation, in breach of Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013. The press release at issue disclosed the existence of alleged attempts to obstruct the investigation, which, in her view, constitutes confidential information. In addition, she claims that the final paragraph of that press release reveals the existence of OLAF’s recommendations to the national authorities, which should have remained confidential.
144 As regards the reference, in the fourth paragraph of the press release at issue, to attempts to obstruct the proper conduct of the investigation, it follows from paragraph 85 of the judgment on appeal that the General Court did not distort the facts when it held that it was apparent from OLAF’s final report that, during the investigation, the applicant had on several occasions contacted a number of researchers and it had regarded those acts as constituting an obstacle to OLAF’s investigation. Thus, OLAF stated in a neutral manner facts established in the course of its investigation which are set out in its final report. That argument must therefore be rejected.
145 As regards the reference to the recommendations made by OLAF to the national authorities, it must be pointed out that the alleged breach of the principle of confidentiality of investigations is examined here in so far as it is raised in connection with the principle of good administration, guaranteed by Article 41 of the Charter, and not in connection with the principle of the presumption of innocence, since that complaint has already been examined, inter alia, in paragraph 92 above.
146 In that specific context, it must be held that there is a breach of prohibition on undermining the confidentiality of investigations by disclosing information to the public, referred to in Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013, only where that disclosure undermines the conduct of the investigation carried out by OLAF.
147 In the present case, it is apparent from paragraphs 7 to 11 above that OLAF’s investigation was completed, the final report had been drawn up and the recommendations addressed to the competent national authorities before the press release at issue was published. Therefore, the reference to those recommendations in that press release cannot be regarded as undermining the proper conduct of the investigation.
148 It follows that that argument must be rejected.
149 In the third place, the applicant claims that, by submitting only incriminating evidence against her in the press release, OLAF did not demonstrate the neutrality and objectivity with which it is required to act under the right to good administration and Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013.
150 In that regard, the applicant criticises OLAF for stating, in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, that she was withdrawing cash or had ‘transferred [large sums] into her private account’. She claims that OLAF failed to specify, inter alia, that, in its final report, it had conceded that a large sum had been transferred to the bank accounts indicated by the researchers and that other amounts had remained in the researchers’ accounts.
151 Relying in particular on the statement made by the Director of OLAF, set out in the sixth paragraph of the press release at issue, that ‘[the names of] the bona fide researchers … were being exploited as part of the fraud attempt’, the applicant further submits that the press release at issue is the result of biased information provided to the public, with the aim of portraying her as guilty.
152 The Commission contends that the press release at issue is neither a summary of the final report of the investigation nor a document that is intended to reflect the views of the parties involved. Moreover, the applicant does not clearly indicate which elements militate in her favour and should have been included in the press release. The Commission thus takes the view that OLAF did not gravely and manifestly infringe its obligation of impartiality, either subjectively or objectively.
153 As regards the reference, in the second sentence of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue, to cash withdrawals or transfers of ‘large sums … into her private account’, it must be held that it must be regarded as a neutral statement of facts which reflect the conclusions reached by OLAF in its final report.
154 Furthermore, as the Commission points out, no obligation on OLAF to include in the press release information which militates in favour of the applicant can be inferred from Regulation No 883/2013. Thus, the absence of any explanation for certain withdrawals and transfers made by the applicant cannot be regarded as establishing a failure to act diligently on the part of OLAF.
155 However, as indicated in paragraph 128 above, Article 10(5) of that regulation imposes an obligation of neutrality and impartiality on the Director-General of OLAF when providing information to the public.
156 Use of the term ‘fraud’ constitutes a breach of that obligation of neutrality and impartiality. Contrary to what the Commission maintains, that term does not come under a mere factual presentation of the elements of the investigation. It is the result of a classification in law of the facts implying for the reader of the press release at issue that the person concerned is guilty.
157 In that regard, for reasons similar to those set out in paragraph 111 above, the fact that the press release at issue came with a description of OLAF’s investigative mission, stating that it is for the competent national authorities to rule on whether the applicant is guilty, and the absence of any indication in the press release at issue as to the type of proceedings – whether criminal, administrative or other – recommended to the national authorities are irrelevant.
158 Accordingly, it must be held that OLAF failed to fulfil its obligation of neutrality and impartiality under Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 and guaranteed in Article 41(1) of the Charter.
159 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that OLAF infringed the duty to act diligently and the obligation of neutrality and impartiality, guaranteed in Article 41 of the Charter, by publishing the press release at issue.
(ii) Existence of a sufficiently serious breach
160 In order to determine whether the breach of OLAF’s duty to act diligently and the obligation of neutrality and impartiality under Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013, both of which are guaranteed in Article 41(1) of the Charter, constitutes a sufficiently serious breach, it is necessary to determine the margin of discretion available to OLAF.
161 In that regard, according to the applicant, the EU bodies have no margin of discretion, or have a particularly limited margin of discretion, with the result that a mere breach of a right to good administration would establish the existence of a sufficiently serious breach. When it discloses false and misleading information, which it nevertheless presents as findings, OLAF cannot be regarded as exercising its discretion.
162 The Commission points out that breach of the duty to act diligently does not automatically constitute unlawful conduct capable of giving rise to liability on the part of the European Union. In order to do that, it is necessary to establish that the limits on the discretion of the administrative authority concerned were gravely and manifestly disregarded, taking into account the context and all the aspects characterising the situation at issue.
163 In its observations following the referral, the Commission adds that the imprecise wording of the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue cannot be regarded as exceeding the limits of the discretion, because that error is excusable. The Commission claims that that had little impact on the accurate overall representation of all the other, more important, facts in the press release at issue, as the Court definitively confirmed.
164 It should be borne in mind that in order for it to be concluded that there is a sufficiently serious breach of the duty of the administrative authority to act diligently, it is necessary to establish that, by failing to act with all the requisite care and caution, it gravely and manifestly disregarded the limits on its discretion in the exercise of its powers. Whilst having regard to that context, account must, to that end, be taken of all aspects characterising the situation concerned, including, in particular, the obviousness of the lack of care shown by the administrative authority, whether it was excusable or inexcusable, or whether the conclusions drawn from its examination were inappropriate and unreasonable (see judgment of 4 April 2017, Ombudsman v Staelen, C‑337/15 P, EU:C:2017:256, paragraph 41 and the case-law cited).
165 In the present case, irrespective of the discretion available to OLAF in drafting its press releases, the limits of such discretion are necessarily exceeded when OLAF publishes information that is not only incomplete or imprecise, but also manifestly inaccurate. Given that the failure to act diligently is manifest, that breach cannot be regarded as excusable.
166 It follows that the factual error contained in the fifth paragraph of the press release at issue constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of OLAF’s duty to act diligently, which is capable of giving rise to its liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
167 The same is true as regards the use of the term ‘fraud’ in the press release at issue.
168 In that regard, the Commission submits that OLAF has a certain margin of discretion available to it. It thus relies on paragraph 129 of the judgment of 4 October 2006, Tillack v Commission (T‑193/04, EU:T:2006:292), in which the Court found that, in view of the autonomy granted to OLAF by Regulation No 1073/1999 and of the general objective of providing information to the public with press releases, OLAF enjoys discretion as regards the appropriateness and content of its press releases in respect of its investigative activities.
169 While it is true that OLAF enjoys a certain margin of discretion as regards the appropriateness and content of press releases, that discretion ceases when it comes to compliance with the fundamental rights of the persons concerned (see, by analogy, judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraphs 219 and 314).
170 In any event, and assuming that OLAF has a margin of discretion available to it, it must be held that using the term ‘fraud’ in the press release at issue constitutes a grave and manifest infringement of the obligation of neutrality and impartiality under Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013 and guaranteed in Article 41(1) of the Charter.
171 First, those provisions do not lack clarity nor do they give rise to any particular difficulties of interpretation or assessment. Second, that fault cannot be regarded as excusable. Use of that term goes beyond a mere factual presentation of OLAF’s action and beyond the conclusions set out in its final report. It seeks to characterise the allegations made against the applicant and therefore cannot be the result of a simple oversight or clerical error.
172 Consequently, using the term ‘fraud’ in the press release at issue constitutes a sufficiently serious breach of OLAF’s obligation of neutrality and impartiality, which is capable of giving rise to its liability under the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
173 It follows from all of the foregoing, first, that, by publishing the press release at issue, OLAF unlawfully processed the applicant’s personal data and thus committed a sufficiently serious breach of Article 4(1)(a) and (b), Article 5(1)(a) and Article 6(c) to (e) of Regulation 2018/1725. Second, OLAF committed a sufficiently serious breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence guaranteed in Article 9(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 and Article 10(5) of that regulation. Third, OLAF committed a sufficiently serious breach of its duty to act diligently and of its obligation of neutrality and impartiality under Article 10(5) of Regulation No 883/2013, both guaranteed in Article 41(1) of the Charter.
B. Damage alleged and causal link
174 As regards the damage alleged, the applicant puts forward various types of damage caused by the publication of the press release at issue by OLAF, which can be grouped into three heads of damage, namely non-material damage from the slur on her honour and reputation, non-material damage from the prejudice to her professional career and damage linked to the deterioration in her state of health.
175 The Commission denies that the applicant actually suffered the damage claimed by her, since, in its view, it has not been established to the requisite standard that the damage is actual and certain, and the damage cannot be attributed exclusively to the press release at issue. In fact, the applicant does not clearly define the nature of the alleged damage and relies almost exclusively on hypothetical facts.
176 Specifically, the Commission contends that the press release at issue is anonymous, does not disclose any personal data of the applicant and does not contain any incorrect data. Accordingly, it cannot cause her any damage.
177 In addition, the Commission points out that the applicant should have taken action to limit the damage caused by multiple parties, in particular by taking action against third parties and requesting the case before the General Court to be rendered anonymous. Furthermore, the Commission contends that the calculation of the various types of damage proposed by the applicant is excessive and arbitrary.
178 As regards the causal link, the applicant maintains that there is a direct causal link between the publication of the press release at issue and the damage she suffered. The non-material damage she suffered is the direct result of the disclosure of personal data in that press release, which made it possible for journalists and people in her social circle and professional environment to identify her, and of the communication of false and misleading information, which cast a slur on her honour and reputation by making her appear guilty in the eyes of the public. Moreover, she claims that all of that harm is directly linked to the psychological distress and hardship she endured.
179 The Commission contends that the applicant does not prove that the damage alleged is a sufficiently direct consequence of unlawful conduct on the part of OLAF. In any event, the Commission argues that the causal link was broken by the applicant’s conduct, since she should have, inter alia, requested to have the case before the General Court anonymised, and by the action of third parties who identified her by means of additional information and linked her back to the press release at issue. It also states that the evidence provided by the applicant concerns the way in which the project is managed or the content of third-party publications, but not the press release at issue.
180 Article 65 of Regulation 2018/1725 provides that any person who has suffered material or non-material damage as a result of the infringement of that regulation has the right to receive compensation for the damage suffered, subject to the conditions provided for in the Treaties, including the second paragraph of Article 340 TFEU.
181 In that regard, it must be stated at the outset that the mere infringement of the provisions of Regulation 2018/1725 is not sufficient to confer a right to compensation (see, by analogy, judgment of 4 May 2023, Österreichische Post (Non-material damage in connection with the processing of personal data), C‑300/21, EU:C:2023:370, paragraph 42).
182 As regards the condition relating to damage, it should be recalled that the application must contain the information which makes it possible to identify the damage alleged and to assess the extent and the nature of that damage. That requirement is also applicable to non-material damage (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 221 and the case-law cited).
183 Moreover, the damage for which compensation is sought in an action to establish non-contractual liability on the part of the European Union must be actual and certain, which is for the applicant to prove. It is for the applicant to adduce conclusive proof as to the existence and extent of the damage alleged (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 222 and the case-law cited).
184 The causal link required by the second paragraph of Article 340EEU presupposes a sufficiently direct link between the conduct of the administrative authority and the damage. It is for the applicant to adduce evidence of such a causal link (see judgment of 6 June 2019, Dalli v Commission, T‑399/17, not published, EU:T:2019:384, paragraph 223 and the case-law cited).
185 In principle, there are two theories of causation which can be applied where the same damage has more than one cause, namely the theory of ‘equivalence of conditions’ and that of ‘adequate causation’. In EU law, the second theory prevails. The EU Courts have ruled that the European Union cannot be held liable for any damage other than that which is a sufficiently direct consequence of the misconduct of the administrative authority concerned (see judgment of 24 October 2000, Fresh Marine v Commission, T‑178/98, EU:T:2000:240, paragraph 118 and the case-law cited) and that the applicant must show that, had it not been for the breach, the damage would not have occurred, and that the breach was the decisive cause of the damage suffered (see judgment of 7 December 2017, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others v Commission, T‑401/11 P-RENV-RX, EU:T:2017:874, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited).
186 Thus, a conception on which, in order for a causal link to exist, it is sufficient for the unlawful conduct to have been a necessary condition of the occurrence of the damage, in the sense that the damage would not have occurred in the absence of that conduct, does not reflect the view which prevails in EU law. The liability of the European Union is limited to damage flowing directly – indeed, sufficiently directly – from the unlawful conduct of the administrative authority concerned, which, in particular, prevents such liability from extending to damage which is only a remote consequence of that conduct (see judgment of 7 December 2017, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others v Commission, T‑401/11 P-RENV-RX, EU:T:2017:874, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited).
187 Although the application of the theory of adequate causation prevails in the case-law, it does not absolutely rule out the application of the theory of equivalence of conditions. It only establishes that, if the breach committed by the administrative authority is remote from the damage and if the Court finds that the causal link has been broken, the theory of equivalence of conditions cannot be applied. Conversely, where the damage flows directly or sufficiently directly from the administrative authority’s breach and where, therefore, that breach is not so remote from the damage as to break the causal link, the EU Courts may apply the theory of equivalence of conditions (judgment of 7 December 2017, Missir Mamachi di Lusignano and Others v Commission, T‑401/11 P-RENV-RX, EU:T:2017:874, paragraph 70).
188 It is in the light of those considerations that the Court must examine the various types of damage put forward by the applicant, which may be grouped under three heads of damage.
1. Non-material damage arising from the slur on the applicant’s honour and reputation
189 The applicant submits that the disclosure of personal data made it easy for journalists and any reader to identify her and therefore made her suspect in the eyes of the people in her social circle and professional environment, by suggesting that she was guilty. In her view that damage was amplified by the fact that the press release at issue was drafted in English, a language which is widely accessible.
190 In particular, first, the applicant alleges particularly serious non-material damage, in particular in the light of her international reputation. She assesses that non-material damage at EUR 100 000.
191 Second, the applicant submits that the dissemination of false and misleading information and the derogatory tone adopted towards her caused irreparable damage to her reputation. That is particularly true of the reference, in the title of the press release at issue, to the sum of EUR 1.1 million, which suggests that the alleged fraud concerns that amount. She assesses that non-material damage at EUR 350 000.
192 As regards the non-material damage alleged by the applicant, the Court has already held that, by giving the impression, through a press release, which was freely accessible to the public, that the applicant was involved in mismanagement, the Commission acted in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and cast a slur on the applicant’s reputation and honour (judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T‑48/05, EU:T:2008:257, paragraph 403).
193 In the present case, OLAF damaged the applicant’s reputation. First, the unlawful processing of personal data makes the applicant identifiable. Second, the use of the term ‘fraud’ and the inaccuracies contained in the press release prejudge the applicant’s guilt.
194 It should also be added that the non-material damage suffered by a subject of law as a result of the unlawful processing of personal data concerning him or her does not, in principle, depend on that person’s social standing or the positions that person has held. That said, a person’s reputation may be taken into consideration only in so far as the impact of the disclosure of information concerning that person, in particular in the press, was greater than it would have been for a simple subject of law (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 September 2007, Nikolaou v Commission, T‑259/03, not published, EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 301).
195 The applicant, who had a distinguished academic career, until the publication of the press release at issue, has an international reputation in the scientific field in which she works, which the Commission does not dispute. Accordingly, first, the press release at issue was able to attract the interest of specialist media, other than local media, particularly as it was published in English. Second, those factors have multiplied the impact, within the scientific community, of that press release, which was directly linked to a research project led by the applicant, and therefore the extent of the damage suffered.
196 As regards the causal link between the non-material damage alleged and the infringements of EU law committed by OLAF, it must be stated that the damage flows directly from the breaches attributable to OLAF, which led to the applicant’s personal data and the accusations of fraud against her, as well as the inaccuracies relating to the findings in OLAF’s report, being publicly disseminated, with the whole weight of the authority attaching to the press release of an EU body.
197 It is necessary, however, to determine whether, as the Commission maintains, that direct causal link has been broken by the action of third parties, in this case journalists who published articles in the press.
198 In that regard, in the first place, the Commission’s argument that the causal link was broken by the applicant’s conduct because she did not ask the Court to have the present case rendered anonymous must be rejected as ineffective. It is irrelevant whether or not the applicant requested anonymisation, since it is clear from the judgment on appeal that the applicant was identifiable from the information contained in the press release at issue. The damage had therefore already materialised at the time when that judgment was delivered.
199 In the second place, the Court has held, in circumstances where confidential information concerning an OLAF investigation had been communicated, directly or indirectly, to a journalist, that that leak had to be regarded not only as a cause sine qua non of the damage resulting from the publication of that information, but also as a sufficiently direct cause of that damage. Thus, the journalist’s action, by publishing the information, may be regarded as not having broken the causal link, since such publication was highly probable given that the leak had taken place, particularly since the applicant was known to part of the public on account of her professional activity (judgment of 12 September 2007, Nikolaou v Commission, T‑259/03, not published, EU:T:2007:254, paragraph 320).
200 In the present case, the unlawful processing of personal data, making it possible to identify the applicant, the breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, in particular through use of the term ‘fraud’, and OLAF’s lack of impartiality and neutrality and failure to act diligently constitute not only the cause sine qua non of the damage to the applicant’s reputation, but also a direct cause thereof. The press articles merely increased the dissemination of information already contained in the press release at issue. Indeed, the press articles on that issue were published after the press release.
201 Thus, while it may be considered that the press articles published following that press release accentuated the damage to the applicant’s reputation, they merely contributed to the non-material damage resulting directly from the publication, by OLAF, of the press release at issue. It can therefore not be held that the causal link was broken by the independent action of third parties.
202 In the light of all of the foregoing, it must be held that the applicant has established the existence of non-material damage consisting of the slur on her reputation and honour arising from the sufficiently serious breaches of EU law that OLAF committed by publishing the press release at issue.
2. Non-material damage arising from the prejudice to the applicant’s professional career
203 The applicant invokes, in essence, damage caused to her current professional situation and her career being jeopardised.
204 According to the Commission, the applicant does not prove the existence of damage to her professional situation that is actual and certain, but puts forward only grounds that are unrelated to the press release at issue or are purely hypothetical. Similarly, the Commission argues that the applicant relies only on purely hypothetical grounds in order to justify alleged damage to her professional career.
205 In the first place, the applicant submits that the press release at issue caused particularly serious damage to her professional situation, since it gave rise to the suspension of various promotions and is affecting her professional relations.
206 The applicant claims, inter alia, that, at her university in Florida (United States), she was asked to discuss the activities subsidised by the European Union with the Research Integrity Officer. She also explains that the allegations made against her, in that they may be classified as a crime, constitute grounds for dismissal. Furthermore, the applicant asserts that the press release at issue undermines her status as a professor vis-à-vis her students. She assesses that non-material damage at EUR 300 000.
207 In her written pleadings, however, the applicant refers only to the compilation of a file with a view to obtaining a promotion, but does not explain clearly how the press release at issue called that process into question. She relies, at most, on a meeting with the Research Integrity Officer at her university, without drawing any conclusions from this. In response to an oral question put at the hearing, it was merely explained to the Court that her application ‘was unsuccessful’, without giving the reasons for the rejection.
208 It follows that the applicant submits that the absence of promotion to a tenured professor position at the University of Florida is the consequence of the publication of the press release at issue, without any evidence to that effect being adduced. Accordingly, it must be held that the applicant has not demonstrated the existence of a sufficiently direct causal link between the fact that the procedure for promotion was unsuccessful and the publication of the press release at issue.
209 Moreover, the risk of dismissal invoked must be regarded as purely hypothetical. First, in her written submissions, the applicant proceeds only by assertions without relying on any specific evidence. Second, in response to an oral question put at the hearing, it was indicated to the Court that the applicant had not been dismissed by the University of Florida. She continues to hold the post of associate professor that she held before the publication of the press release at issue.
210 In the second place, the applicant is of the opinion that OLAF jeopardised the development and advancement of her professional career, since the prejudice to her reputation affects her day-to-day tasks and relationships, thus preventing her from carrying out various academic projects, in particular for lack of funding. She refers, inter alia, to the withdrawal of an official offer for a role as professor and the termination of advanced discussions with the Greek State Secretariat for Research and Technology. The applicant assesses that damage at EUR 200 000.
211 As regards the alleged difficulties encountered in her research activities, in particular financing difficulties, it is not apparent from the documents produced by the applicant that that damage is actual and certain. Indeed, the email produced consists of a message of support addressed to the applicant’s father.
212 As regards the discussions with the Greek State Secretariat for Research and Technology concerning the creation of an interdisciplinary centre of emerging technologies and a metal lithium recovery plant, the applicant does not demonstrate the existence of the damage alleged. It follows only from the email produced that the administrative authority is concerned about the bad reputation generated by OLAF’s allegations for the applicant, but also for the university and the committee of Greek researchers, and urges the applicant to take rapid action to ‘shed light’ on the matter.
213 However, as regards the withdrawal of a formal offer for the post of professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, it is clear from the emails produced by the applicant that an official offer had been made to her and that it was withdrawn following ‘the OLAF allegations’.
214 The term ‘allegations’ implicitly yet inevitably calls into question the unlawful processing of the applicant’s personal data which made it possible to identify her, as well as the breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence and OLAF’s lack of impartiality and neutrality and failure to act diligently in drafting the press release at issue, which may have led potential recruiters to have doubts as to the probity of the applicant.
215 In response to a measure of organisation of procedure, the applicant stated that the position held at the material time was that of a non-tenured associate professor at the University of Florida. Her contract was renewed annually. Her annual salary amounted to 108 150 United States dollars (USD). That salary covered a nine-month period, with no additional remuneration for the three-month summer period. She also provided documents showing that the formal offer, which had not been finalised, from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University was for a full professor position, which is the highest rank at that United States university. It is also clear from those documents that the annual salary offered was USD 135 000 plus additional remuneration of USD 37 500 for the summer period. She would also have USD 50 000 in ‘discretionary funds’.
216 Accordingly, the applicant has established the existence of non-material damage due to the withdrawal of a formal offer as a full-time tenured professor, arising from the sufficiently serious breaches of EU law that OLAF committed by publishing the press release at issue.
3. Damage linked to the applicant’s state of health
217 The applicant submits that the damage linked to the publication of the press release at issue caused her serious psychological distress, which takes the form of depression and a deep emotional burden, as well as great anxiety, stress and insomnia, as attested by certificates and medical opinions. She assesses that damage at EUR 150 000.
218 According to the Commission, the applicant’s psychological distress has not been proven to the requisite standard to establish damage that is actual and certain and, in any event, it is attributable not to the press release at issue, but to the actions of third parties, the applicant’s involvement in OLAF’s investigation and possible criminal prosecution.
219 The applicant has produced medical certificates attesting to a very poor state of health, requiring medication and regular monitoring. It is also attested that that state of health was directly caused by the publication of the press release at issue.
220 In that regard, first, it must be stated that the medical certificates produced by the applicant implicitly yet inevitably call into question the unlawful processing of personal data which made it possible to identify the applicant, the breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, in particular through use of the term ‘fraud’, and OLAF’s lack of impartiality and neutrality and failure to act diligently in drafting the press release at issue.
221 Second, the medical certificate issued on 20 October 2020 showed that the applicant suffers from ‘intense psychological distress which became apparent after the publication of the press release [at issue]’. This includes, inter alia, depressive thoughts, panic attacks with intense stress, reduced concentration, tinnitus, insomnia, headaches and anorexia leading to a weight loss of more than 10 kg in three months.
222 Consequently, the applicant has established the existence of damage linked to her state of health arising from the sufficiently serious breaches of EU law that OLAF committed by publishing the press release at issue.
223 It cannot, however, be ruled out that OLAF’s investigation, the conclusions reached by OLAF and prosecution by the national authorities also contributed to the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health.
224 Similarly, it is apparent from the information available to the Court that the press articles, in particular those published by a ‘blogger’, named the applicant and strongly criticised her alleged conduct, and even criticised her in general. They also incorrectly reproduced the press release at issue, claiming that she ‘stole’ the entire grant allocated to the project, namely EUR 1.1 million. Accordingly, those articles may also have contributed to the deterioration in the applicant’s state of health.
225 It follows from all of the foregoing that the infringements committed by OLAF, namely the unlawful processing of the applicant’s personal data making it possible to identify her, the breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence, in particular through use of the term ‘fraud’, and the lack of impartiality and neutrality and failure to act diligently in drafting the press release at issue, gave rise to three types of damage caused to the applicant.
226 First, the applicant has established the existence of non-material damage consisting of a slur cast on her reputation and honour, since the press release at issue, as drafted by OLAF, may have prejudged her guilt in the eyes of the people in her professional environment. That damage is all the more significant because the press release was drafted in English and, since the applicant enjoyed an international reputation in the scientific world, it attracted the attention of specialist media, other than local media.
227 Second, the applicant has established the existence of non-material damage arising from the prejudice to her professional career as a result of the publication of the press release at issue. This is due to the withdrawal of a formal offer as a full-time tenured professor, which would have allowed her to occupy a prestigious position in the academic world.
228 Third, she has established the existence of damage linked to her state of health, both physical and psychological, which entails taking medication and regular medical monitoring.
229 Taking into account all the specific circumstances of the case, the amount of compensation to be awarded to the applicant in respect of the various heads of damage is to be assessed ex aequo et bono at EUR 50 000.
Costs
230 Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the Commission has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the costs, in accordance with the form of order sought by the applicant.
On those grounds,
THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber)
hereby:
1. Orders the European Commission to pay OC EUR 50 000;
2. Orders the Commission to pay the costs.
Škvařilová-Pelzl | Nõmm | Meyer |
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 1 October 2025.
[Signatures]