64
Ingolf Pernice
Deuxième séance de travail — Les retombées
environment established by the citizens of the Union, and vice versa. This im-
plies mutual respect for the EU and the national legal orders as required by
Article 4(3) TEU. The regard to be given to the other legal orders respectively
is for each legal order an element of its autonomous self-conception as a com-
plementary component in one composed constitutional system.
The Union’s constitutional setting is a compound, embracing and based
upon the constitutions of its Member States. The European Treaties add to
them a supplementary level of action by establishing powers to make policies
possible for objectives, which are beyond the reach of national sovereignty (
29
).
Autonomy of the EU legal order in this compound is an important tool to en-
sure the functioning of the system; this function, in turn, is what qualifies it as
‘embedded autonomy’. For the application and interpretation of European law
always needs to take into account the constitutional context.
e. Common responsibility of courts and the judicial dialogue
From the perspective of the citizens, European and national institutions
bear a common responsibility for the effective functioning of the Union and
are bound to avoid constitutional conflicts or settle them through the existing
system of judicial dialogue.
If both, national constitutions and the constitution of the European Union,
are, ultimately, as explained by the underlying concept of multilevel constitu-
tionalism (
30
), established by, and a matter of, the citizens, there is no room,
in the composed constitution of the EU, for competition among courts claim-
ing autonomy. Instead, Articles 4(3) TEU and 267 TFEU make clear, that co-
operation in the spirit of mutual respect and assistance is required as a nor-
mative condition making the system a compound on the basis of ‘embedded
(
29
) Ingolf Pernice,
Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action
, 15 Columbia Law Journal (2009) 3,
p. 349, 374 et seq. WHI-Paper 02/09.
(
30
) Supra notes 12 and 29; for further developments towards a ‘multilevel constitutionalism
senso lato
’ see: Neil Walker,
Multilevel Constitutionalism: Looking Beyond the German
Debate
, in LSE’s Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series No 08/2009, also in: Kaarlo
Tuori and Suivi Sankari (eds.),
The Many Constitutions of Europe
(2010) p. 143. Critical:
René Barents,
The Fallacy of European Multilevel Constitutionalism
, in: Matej Avbelj and Jan
Komárek 8eds.),
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond
, 2012, p. 153;
see also: Matthias Jestaedt,
Der Europäische Verfassungsverbund – Verfassungstheoretischer
Charme und rechtstheoretische Insuffizienz einer Unschärferelation
, in: Christian Calliess
(ed.), Verfassungswandel im europäischen Staaten- und Verfassungsverbund. Göttinger
Gespräche zum deutschen und europäischen Verfassungsrecht, 2007, p. 93.
