A | The Court of Justice in 2025
The Court of Justice deals mainly with requests for a preliminary ruling. When a national court is uncertain as to the interpretation or validity of an EU rule, it stays the proceedings before it and refers the matter to the Court of Justice. When the matter has been clarified by the Court of Justice’s decision, the national court is then in a position to settle the dispute before it. In cases calling for a response within a very short time (for example, in relation to asylum, border control, child abduction, and so forth), an urgent preliminary ruling procedure may be used.
The Court also deals with direct actions, which seek either the annulment of an EU act (‘action for annulment’) or a declaration that a Member State is failing to comply with EU law (‘action for failure to fulfil obligations’). If the Member State does not comply with the judgment finding that it has failed to fulfil its obligations, a second action, known as an action for ‘twofold failure to fulfil obligations’, may result in the Court of Justice imposing a financial penalty on it.
Furthermore, appeals may be brought against decisions handed down by the General Court. The Court of Justice may set aside such decisions of the General Court.
Lastly, requests for an Opinion may be made to the Court of Justice to determine the compatibility with the Treaties of an agreement which the European Union envisages concluding with a non-member State or an international organisation (submitted by a Member State or by a European institution).
Activities and developments at the Court of Justice
Koen Lenaerts
President of the Court of Justice of the European Union
2025 was a milestone year in several respects.
First and foremost, it was the first full year of implementation of the final strand of the reform of the European Union’s judicial architecture provided for in Regulation 2024/2019, which seeks to rebalance the workload between the two courts of the European Union with the ultimate goal of delivering high-quality judicial decisions within the best timeframes.
That final strand involved, in particular, a partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court, which has been in effect since 1 October 2024, in six specific areas (VAT, excise duties, the Customs Code, tariff classification, passengers’ rights and the emission allowance trading system). It is based on the ‘one-stop shop’ mechanism, under which all requests for a preliminary ruling are submitted to the Court of Justice. Where a request for a preliminary ruling falls within one of those six areas, the President, after hearing the Vice-President and the First Advocate General or the Court of Justice, at a general meeting, decides whether that request is to be transmitted to the General Court or retained at the Court of Justice. In the course of 2025, 65 of the 74 requests for a preliminary ruling examined by the one-stop shop were transmitted to the General Court. The transmission decisions were taken in good time thanks to the continuous engagement of the chambers and services, in particular from the Registry of the Court and the Research and Documentation Directorate.
With effect from 1 September 2024, the mechanism used to determine whether appeals against judgments or orders of the General Court are allowed to proceed has been expanded to include the decisions of six new independent appeal chambers and to cover disputes concerning the performance of contracts containing an arbitration clause; this has been implemented in line with the practice developed since that mechanism was introduced. Thus, of the 36 requests examined by the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed, two requests – one concerning a contractual dispute (order in SC v Eulex Kosovo (C‑881/24 P) now falling within the jurisdiction of that chamber – were allowed to proceed because they raised issues that were significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
Next, turning to the composition of the Court, 2025 was marked by the arrival of the new Slovenian Judge, Mr Bošnjak, to take up the post left vacant following the death, on 20 June 2024, of our late colleague Marko Ilešič, and by the departure of the first Bulgarian judge of the Court of Justice, Mr Arabadjiev, who was replaced by Mr Kornezov, previously a Judge at the General Court.
Lastly, 2025 represents a major turning point in the Court’s communication and transparency policies. Significant progress has been achieved with a view to bringing European justice even closer to citizens and to better meeting the needs of legal professionals.
In terms of communication, in addition to the launch of explanatory audiovisual debriefings – by which Members of the Court of Justice provide summaries of some of the most significant judgments given by that court – significant progress has been made with several major projects with a view to their implementation at the start of 2026: the redesign of the Curia website, the development of an extensively overhauled search engine for external users and the transformation of Curia Web TV into a version accessible to all internet users. Those changes considerably improve access to judicial information for everyone.
As regards strengthening the transparency of the procedures conducted before the Court, mention must also be made of the publication of the statements of case and written observations lodged in preliminary ruling cases, a decision made as part of the most recent reform of the judicial system, together with the adoption on 1 April 2025 of the decision on the implementing rules and procedures for the broadcasting of hearings. Such broadcasting promotes better understanding of the role of the Court and its activities and provides wider access both to the pleas, arguments and observations submitted by the parties as well as to the Opinions of the Advocates General and the judgments given by the court.
As a complement to its judicial activities, the Court has pushed ahead with its efforts in the fields of training, communication and exchanges with the courts and tribunals of the Member States. For instance, the third ‘EUnited in diversity’ conference was held from 3 to 5 September 2025 in Sofia (Bulgaria), bringing together the constitutional courts and the equivalent institutions with constitutional jurisdiction of the Member States of the European Union and the Court of Justice, with the goal of galvanising judicial dialogue and bolstering interactions within the common legal order formed by the European Union and the Member States’ legal systems. On 1 and 2 December 2025, the Court welcomed around 150 judges from the Member States for its annual Meeting of Judges. The event, first organised in 1968, offers national judges the opportunity to familiarise themselves with how the Court functions and to discuss matters of joint interest directly with its Members within the Institution itself, thus strengthening the close cooperation which binds the Court to the national courts and tribunals. Also worth mentioning is the development of meetings and training sessions organised within the framework of the Judicial Network of the European Union (JNEU) and in cooperation with the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN), covering in particular the preliminary ruling procedure. Lastly, in December 2025, the Court played host, for the first time, to the Grand Final of the THEMIS competition, organised by the EJTN. This prestigious competition offers future judges and prosecutors from the four corners of Europe a unique opportunity to hone their practical knowledge of EU law, and thus contributes to consolidating a common judicial culture within the European Union.
The statistics for the past year again reveal that a high number of cases were both brought before the Court of Justice (889) and closed by it (774); the latter figure is due in large part to the partial replacement of the Judges at the Court in 2024. Accordingly, there were 1 322 pending cases as at 31 December 2025. The average duration of proceedings, all manner of cases combined, stood at 16.7 months in 2025.
Members of the Court of Justice
The Court of Justice is composed of 27 Judges and 11 Advocates General.
The Judges and Advocates General are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States after consultation with a panel responsible for providing an opinion on prospective candidates’ suitability to perform the duties concerned. Judges are appointed for a term of office of six years, which is renewable.
They are chosen from among individuals whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment, in their respective countries, to the highest judicial offices, or who are of recognised competence.
The Judges perform their duties in a totally impartial and independent manner.
The Judges of the Court of Justice appoint, from among their number, the President and Vice-President. The Judges and Advocates General appoint the Registrar for a term of office of six years.
The Advocates General are responsible for delivering, with complete impartiality and independence, an ‘Opinion’ in the cases assigned to them. This Opinion is not binding, but allows for an additional view to be provided on the subject matter of the dispute.
2025 saw the entry into office of the following persons as Judges: in June, Mr Marko Bošnjak (Slovenia), replacing Mr Marko Ilešič, and in September, Mr Alexander Kornezov (Bulgaria), replacing Mr Alexander Arabadjiev.
K. Lenaerts
T. von Danwitz
F. Biltgen
K. Jürimäe
C. Lycourgos
I. Jarukaitis
M. L. Arastey Sahún
M. Szpunar
I. Ziemele
J. Passer
O. Spineanu‑Matei
M. Condinanzi
F. Schalin
J. Kokott
S. Rodin
M. Campos Sánchez‑Bordona
E. Regan
N. J. Cardoso da Silva Piçarra
A. Kumin
N. Jääskinen
J. Richard de la Tour
A. Rantos
D. Gratsias
M. Gavalec
N. Emiliou
Z. Csehi
T. Ćapeta
L. Medina
B. Smulders
D. Spielmann
A. Biondi
S. Gervasoni
N. Fenger
R. Frendo
R. Norkus
M. Bošnjak
A. Kornezov
A. Calot Escobar
Order of Precedence as from 7 October 2025
B | The General Court in 2025
Proceedings may primarily be brought before the General Court, at first instance, in direct actions brought by natural or legal persons (individuals, companies, associations, and so forth), where they are directly and individually concerned, and by Member States against acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, and in direct actions seeking compensation for damage caused by the institutions or their staff.
The decisions of the General Court may be the subject of an appeal, limited to points of law, before the Court of Justice. In cases which have already been considered twice (by an independent board of appeal and then by the General Court), the Court of Justice will allow an appeal to proceed only if it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
Since 1 October 2024, the General Court has also had jurisdiction to hear and determine requests for a preliminary ruling, transferred by the Court of Justice, which fall exclusively into one or more of the following six specific areas: the common system of value added tax; excise duties; the Customs Code; the tariff classification of goods under the Combined Nomenclature; compensation and assistance of passengers in the case of denied boarding or of delay or cancellation of transport services; the system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading.
A large part of the litigation before it is economic in nature: intellectual property (EU trade marks and designs), competition, State aid, and banking and financial supervision. The General Court also has jurisdiction to adjudicate in civil service disputes between the European Union and its staff.
Activities and developments at the General Court
Marc van der Woude
President of the General Court of the European Union
For the General Court, 2025 was particularly marked by two events that occurred in September: first, a partial replacement of its Judges and, second, the end of the transitional period for dealing with requests for a preliminary ruling.
On 15 September 2025, three Members departed the General Court as part of the partial replacement, namely Judge Tomljenović and Presidents of Chambers Mastroianni and Porchia, whereas Mr Kornezov was appointed as a Judge at the Court of Justice. The General Court thanks them for their important contribution to its case-law. On that same date, Judges Bestagno, Pezzuto and Pavelin took the oath as new Members of the General Court. The new college thus established subsequently re-elected its President and its Vice-President for three-year terms and elected ten Presidents of Chambers.
Those events also coincided with the end of the transitional period established by the General Court following the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice to the General Court provided for in Regulation 2024/2019 (a reform which came into effect on 1 October 2024). Internally, this saw the creation of two specialist chambers for the handling of requests for a preliminary ruling, each composed of six judges, including one Advocate General designated for those requests. Unlike direct actions, requests for a preliminary ruling are, without prejudice to a subsequent referral of a case to an alternative formation, initially assigned to a five-judge formation. To ensure optimum handling of requests for a preliminary ruling, the General Court also elected two Judges to replace those Advocates General if the latter are prevented from acting.
That reorganisation and the arrival of the new Members did, however, have a positive impact on the General Court’s judicial activities as, over the course of 2025, it was able to close 1 527 cases (including 404 joined cases brought by former MEPs against the European Parliament concerning the additional pension scheme), which represents its absolute historic record. Taking into account the 989 cases brought, the number of cases pending at the end of the year was reduced to 1 167. As regards requests for a preliminary ruling more specifically, 65 were transferred to the General Court in 2025 and 16 were closed.
The average duration of proceedings stands, all matters and decisions combined, at 18.9 month. If the 404 essentially identical cases are treated as a single case, the average duration of proceedings falls to 16 months. For the handling of requests for a preliminary ruling, that duration is shorter and comes to 6.2 months.
In 2025, 34.7% of the cases closed were closed by formations sitting with five judges (including the abovementioned 404 joined cases). The most important cases (see Chapter entitled ‘A look back at major judgments of the year’) included two in which the General Court sat as a Grand Chamber, composed of 15 judges, and two as an Intermediate Chamber of nine judges, which the General Court established at the time of the most recent reform in 2024. The cases in question were those of Stevi and The New York Times v Commission and Austria v Commission (Grand Chamber), as well as the joined cases of YL v Council and YL v Council and EUIPO (Intermediate Chamber).
In this first full year since the partial transfer of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on 1 October 2024, the General Court has been able to consolidate its new role and to integrate perfectly the handling of such requests into its internal operations, whilst in overall terms ruling in an exceptionally high number of cases. Thanks to the – now proven – effective and proactive handling of cases, the General Court is more ready than ever to rise to new challenges.
Major case-law developments
Savvas Papasavvas
Vice‑President of the General Court of the European Union
2025 was primarily marked by the impact of the reform introduced by Regulation 2024/2019. Adopted against the backdrop of an increase both in the number of pending preliminary ruling cases and in the average duration of their handling before the Court of Justice, that reform makes two substantial changes within the General Court, creating a new formation of that court for the hearing and determination of cases and transferring to the General Court jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in certain matters.
The Intermediate Chamber, composed of 9 judges, thus gave its first judgment and was entrusted with a number of cases. The creation of that chamber was guided by the intention to preserve, inter alia, the consistency of the preliminary rulings given by the General Court and out of concern to ensure the proper administration of justice.
The preliminary rulings chamber of the General Court also made its first rulings. Those rulings fell within the scope of two of the six specific areas transferred to the General Court: specifically, excise duties and the common system of value added tax.
Thus, in the first preliminary ruling case on which the General Court ruled, which resulted in the judgment of 9 July 2025, Gotek (T‑534/24), the request concerned the interpretation of Articles 7 and 8 of Council Directive 2008/118/EC and had been made in proceedings between a natural person and the Croatian Ministry of Finance concerning the recovery of the excise duty payable by that person, in the context of a fictitious supply of excise goods appearing on falsified invoices.
In connection with the common system of value added tax, the General Court, in the judgment of 26 November 2025, Versãofast (T‑657/24), ruled on a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 135(1)(b) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC made in proceedings between Versãofast and the tax authority concerning the activities of a credit intermediary carried out by that company which that tax authority had classified as transactions in respect of the negotiation of credit that are exempt from value added tax.
The Advocates General assisting the General Court in dealing with requests for a preliminary ruling also delivered their first Opinions.
Thus, in her Opinion in Accorinvest (T‑653/24), delivered on 29 October 2025, Advocate General Brkan examined a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Article 1(2) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC in which the General Court would be called upon to determine whether a tariff-based transmission contribution may be classified as an ‘other indirect tax’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of Directive 2008/118 and falls within the scope of that provision.
In his Opinion in European Air Charter (T‑656/24), delivered on 26 November 2025, Advocate General Martín y Pérez de Nanclares examined the request for a preliminary ruling made by the Düsseldorf Regional Court (Germany), which asked the General Court to clarify the concept of a ‘“direct” causal link’ between the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances, for the purpose of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004, which affected a flight and the delay to a subsequent flight.
The transfer to the General Court of jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in certain matters is an important step for that court, whose original mission was to rule on disputes necessitating an in-depth examination of complex facts and which is now tasked with entering into dialogue with the national courts and tribunals. In the past year the General Court has proven to be up to the task as regards both the quality of the first rulings made and the average length of proceedings.
Members of the General Court
The General Court is composed of two Judges from each Member State.
The Judges are chosen from among individuals whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices. They are appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States after consultation with a panel responsible for giving an opinion on candidates’ suitability. They are appointed for a term of office of six years, which is renewable. They appoint, from among their number, the President and Vice-President for a period of three years, and appoint the Registrar for a term of office of six years.
The Judges perform their duties in a totally impartial and independent manner.
M. van der Woude
S. Papasavvas
E. Buttigieg
N. Półtorak
K. Kowalik‑Bańczyk
G. De Baere
M. Sampol Pucurull
P. Škvařilová‑Pelzl
K. Kecsmár
I. Gâlea
S. Kingston
S. L. Kalėda
M. Jaeger
H. Kanninen
J. Schwarcz
M. Kancheva
L. Madise
A. Marcoulli
I. Reine
R. da Silva Passos
P. Nihoul
J. Svenningsen
U. Öberg
M. J. Costeira
C. Mac Eochaidh
T. Pynnä
L. Truchot
J. C. Laitenberger
J. Martín y Pérez de Nanclares
G. Hesse
M. Stancu
I. Nõmm
G. Steinfatt
T. Perišin
D. Petrlík
M. Brkan
P. Zilgalvis
I. Dimitrakopoulos
D. Kukovec
T. Tóth
B. Ricziová
E. Tichy‑Fisslberger
W. Valasidis
S. Verschuur
L. Spangsberg Grønfeldt
H. Cassagnabère
R. Meyer
J. Hettne
D. Jočienė
F. Bestagno
R. Pezzuto
T. Pavelin
V. Di Bucci
Order of Precedence as from 16 September 2025
C | Case-law in 2025
- Focus EU citizenship and the ‘golden passports’
- Focus The Minimum Wage Directive before the Court of Justice
- Focus Access to text messages exchanged between the President of the Commission and the CEO of Pfizer
- Focus Information society: the Digital Services Act (DSA) and very large online platforms
- A look back at major judgments of the year
Focus
EU citizenship and the ‘golden passports’
Judgment in Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment) (C‑181/23)
Since 2014, Malta introduced mechanisms allowing third-country nationals to acquire Maltese nationality in exchange for financial contributions and investments. In 2020, those arrangements were replaced by a new ‘Citizenship by Naturalisation for Exceptional Services by Direct Investment’ scheme. That scheme allowed a foreign investor, together with some of his or her family members, to obtain Maltese citizenship in return for the payment of substantial sums of money to the State, the purchase or lease of property in Malta, a donation to an approved organisation and compliance with a requirement of legal residence, the duration of which could be reduced in return for an additional payment.
The European Commission considered that that scheme raised difficulties in the light of EU law, because a person’s acquisition of the nationality of a Member State automatically confers Union citizenship on that person. In the Commission’s view, the new Maltese scheme introduced in 2020 was based on an essentially transactional logic. The financial conditions were the key component of the scheme, whereas the residence requirement did not require actual, long-term presence in Malta. The possibility of reducing significantly the required period of residence in exchange for a higher payment demonstrated that the link between the applicant and the Member State was not a decisive criterion for the grant of nationality. The Commission thus took the view that that scheme ultimately amounted to a form of commercialisation of Union citizenship which was incompatible with that status.
The Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice, which recalled that Union citizenship is the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States. That status confers rights and imposes duties, and is based on a special relationship of solidarity and good faith between the State and its nationals. That relationship also forms the basis of the mutual trust between the Member States which governed the establishment of Union citizenship on the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, with each Member State recognising the effects of other Member States’ decisions in matters of nationality.
The Court noted that, under that scheme, the grant of Maltese nationality was primarily dependent on compliance with predetermined financial conditions and that, since it did not require that the applicant demonstrate actual residence for a particular period in Malta, the residence requirement did not entail genuine integration into Maltese society. It also observed that those findings could not be called into question by the security and background checks relied on by Malta, as such checks were essentially confined to preventing certain public interest risks.
The Court held that a naturalisation scheme based on such a transactional procedure disregards the very nature of Union citizenship. By granting a person its nationality, and therefore European citizenship, primarily in exchange for predetermined payments or investments, without requiring a genuine link of solidarity and good faith between it and the applicant for naturalisation, a Member State undermines the mutual trust upon which the Union is based.
By establishing and implementing that citizenship by investment scheme, Malta therefore failed to fulfil its obligations as a Member State and infringed the principle of sincere cooperation.
What is citizenship of the European Union?
Citizenship of the European Union is one of the key facets of the European project. Introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht and now enshrined in Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it confers on every national of a Member State a common status, which is a supplement to national citizenship without taking its place. That status affords significant rights, such as the right to move and reside freely in the Member States, the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal and European elections in the State of residence, and the right to the diplomatic and consular protection of the other Member States in third countries.
Union citizenship has its basis in the solidarity and mutual trust between the Member States and their nationals. Its grant stems automatically from the status of national of a Member State, which is based on the existence of a special relationship of solidarity and good faith between a Member State and its nationals. It is that special relationship which justifies the grant of rights attaching to Union citizenship which are exercised throughout the European Union.
EU citizenship in the Court’s case-law
Since its introduction by the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the case-law of the Court of Justice has continually shed light on the precise scope of Union citizenship. As early as the judgment in Martínez Sala (C‑85/96), the Court acknowledged that the status of Union citizen meant that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality could be relied on directly in certain situations. That development was confirmed in the judgment in Grzelczyk (C‑184/99), in which the Court held that Union citizenship is intended to be the ‘fundamental status’ of nationals of the Member States, marking a symbolic and legal turning point in European integration.
The Court subsequently clarified the scope and the limits of that status. In the judgment in Rottmann (C‑135/08), it held that national decisions on the loss of nationality, where they entail the loss of Union citizenship, must comply with the principle of proportionality. Shortly thereafter, in the judgment in Ruiz Zambrano (C‑34/09), it confirmed that a minor child who is a national of a Member State, and is therefore a citizen of the Union, must be able genuinely to enjoy the substance of the rights attaching to that status. Therefore, his or her parents, who are third-country nationals, cannot be refused a residence permit. Without such a permit, that child would be forced to leave the territory of the European Union in order to accompany his or her parents and would thus be deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by Union citizenship.
In the same vein, in the judgment in Stolichna obshtina, rayon ‘Pancharevo’ (C‑490/20), the Court held that a Member State is obliged to recognise, for the purpose of applying EU law, a parent-child relationship lawfully established in another Member State involving two persons of the same sex so as to ensure the child has genuine enjoyment of the rights attaching to Union citizenship, in particular the right of free movement. The Court thus enshrines in that judgment a concept of European citizenship which is exercised specifically through the right to enjoy a normal family life.
Finally, more recently, in the judgment in Udlændinge- og Integrationsministeriet (C‑689/21), the Court confirmed that, while the Member States remain competent in matters of nationality, they must exercise that competence in a manner which does not disproportionately undermine the very substance of the rights conferred by Union citizenship, underlining once more the central and protective nature of that status in the EU legal order.
A citizen of the Union has the right to:
- move freely, live, work or study in another Member State;
- vote and stand as a candidate in municipal and European elections in his or her State of residence;
- submit a petition to the European Parliament or a citizens’ initiative to the European Commission;
- make a complaint to the European Ombudsman pertaining to an act of maladministration by an EU institution;
- benefit from the consular protection of another Member State where his or her own State is not represented in a third country;
- request access to documents of the EU institutions;
- contact the EU institutions in one of the 24 official languages of his or her choice.
Focus
The Minimum Wage Directive before the Court of Justice
Judgment in Denmark v Parliament and Council (Adequate minimum wages) (C‑19/23)
Adopted in October 2022 by the European Parliament and the Council, Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on the minimum wage seeks to improve the living and working conditions of workers in the European Union. It establishes a common framework intended to promote the adequacy of statutory minimum wages where they exist and to strengthen the role of collective bargaining in wage-setting. Adopted on the basis of Article 153(1)(b) TFEU, which concerns working conditions, the Directive explains that it respects the competence of the Member States to set wages and the autonomy of the social partners.
Denmark, supported by Sweden, had contested the competence of the European Union to intervene in this field. Denmark considered that, despite its seemingly procedural nature, the Directive in reality entailed the direct intervention by the European Union in wage-setting. In its view, that field is expressly excluded from the competences of the European Union under Article 153(5) TFEU. Denmark also claimed that some of the obligations imposed on the Member States undermined the right of association and the Danish model of professional relations, based on broad autonomy of the social partners.
The Court recalled that the Union can act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Treaties. It explained that the exclusion relating to ‘pay’ seeks to prevent any direct harmonisation of the level of wages at EU level. However, that exclusion cannot be interpreted so broadly that it would deprive the social policy competences of the Union of their substance, in particular those which seek to improve working conditions.
The Court held that the Minimum Wage Directive does not introduce either a European minimum wage or a harmonised level of pay within the European Union. In essence, it simply lays down minimum procedural requirements, leaving the Member States broad discretion to determine and update their minimum wages.
As for the promotion of collective bargaining, the Court stated that the Directive does not impose any obligation as to the result to be achieved. Member States in which fewer than 80% of workers are covered by collective bargaining simply have to create a framework favourable to such bargaining and, consequently, adopt an action plan to encourage that bargaining. The obligations laid down are obligations as to means, which respect the diversity of national traditions and the autonomy of the social partners, as the Directive does not lay down, in particular, any obligation on those Member States to achieve such a level of coverage as a minimum requirement.
The Court did, however, hold that certain provisions of the Minimum Wage Directive went beyond that procedural framework. It considered that requiring Member States to take specific criteria into account in setting and updating statutory minimum wages, such as the cost of living, the general level of wages or productivity, amounted to harmonising some of the constituent parts of statutory minimum wages. It ultimately made a similar finding regarding the provision of that directive prohibiting any decrease in the statutory minimum wage where those wages are subject to automatic indexation systems. Those provisions therefore constitute direct interference in the determination of pay. Consequently, the Court annulled the provisions of the Directive amounting to such direct interference by the European Union in the determination of pay, which therefore go beyond the competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties. It dismissed Denmark’s action as to the remainder.
Thus, the Court clarified the balance between the European Union’s social policy competence and the exclusion relating to pay, confirming that the European Union can provide a procedural framework and promote collective bargaining without intervening directly in wage-setting.
What does Article 153 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) provide?
Article 153 TFEU lists the fields in which the European Union may support and complement the activities of the Member States in matters of social policy. It allows the Union, inter alia, to adopt directives establishing minimum requirements in fields such as working conditions, the protection of workers, equality between men and women, or the information for and consultation of workers.
That article does, however, lay down clear limits on the Union’s actions. Paragraph 5 of the article expressly excludes certain matters from the scope of the Union’s competence, in particular pay, the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs. The purpose of that exclusion is to preserve the autonomy of the Member States and of the social partners in fields regarded as essential to their social and constitutional traditions. The case-law of the Court of Justice explains that, while the Union may adopt rules having an indirect impact on wages, it cannot intervene directly in the setting of the level of wages.
Directive (EU) 2022/2041 on adequate minimum wages
The aim of Directive (EU) 2022/2041 is to improve living and working conditions in the European Union by strengthening the protection provided by adequate minimum wages. It does not lay down a European minimum wage or set a uniform level of pay. Its objective is to establish a common framework guaranteeing that minimum wages, where they exist, ensure a decent standard of living, whilst respecting national traditions and the autonomy of the social partners.
The Directive pursues those objectives primarily by means of procedural provisions. It thus requires Member States with legislation that introduces a statutory minimum wage to provide for clear and transparent procedures for setting and updating that wage.
It also promotes collective bargaining, which is considered a core component of ensuring adequate wages, in particular by asking those Member States in which the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining is low to adopt measures promoting dialogue between management and workers. Accordingly, the Directive seeks to strengthen social convergence within the Union without encroaching, in that regard, on the competence of the Member States in matters of wage-setting.
The minimum wage in the Court’s case-law
Even before the Directive on adequate minimum wages entered into force, the Court had already had occasion to develop a substantial body of case-law on minimum wages. The scope of national competences and of the requirements under EU law were marked out in several judgments.
Cases relating to the posting of workers played a central role. In the judgment in Laval (C‑341/05), the Court clarified the scope of the ‘minimum rates of pay’ that can be imposed on foreign undertakings which post workers, drawing attention to the need for a clear legal basis and sufficient transparency for economic operators.
A second major flank of the case-law concerns the relationship between the minimum wage and legislation on public contracts. In the judgment in Bundesdruckerei (C‑549/13), the Court thus examined the compatibility of an obligation to comply with a minimum wage set by the legislation of the host State under a public contract partly performed abroad, and insisted on observance of the requirement that such measures are proportionate having regard to the freedom to provide services. That being established, in the judgment in RegioPost (C‑115/14), the Court accepted that contracting authorities can make the performance of a public contract subject to compliance with a minimum wage imposed by law or by a regulation, where that requirement pursues a legitimate social objective and is applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Finally, the Court has also clarified the very concept of ‘minimum rates of pay’ in the context of the Posted Workers Directive, in particular in the judgment in Sähköalojen ammattiliitto (C‑396/13), in which the elements of pay covered by that concept are set out.
All that case-law forms the bedrock upon which litigation relating to the Directive on adequate minimum wages is currently brought within the European Union. It provides a framework for the discretion exercised by the Member States, whilst ensuring that the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the FEU Treaty remain effective.
Focus
Access to text messages exchanged between the President of the Commission and the CEO of Pfizer
Judgment in Stevi and The New York Times v Commission (T‑36/23)
Transparency in public life is a fundamental principle of the European Union. Accordingly, all EU citizens or legal persons can access Parliament, Commission or Council documents. That access is governed by Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents.
That legislation forms the legal basis of the public’s right of access to the documents of those EU institutions and is primarily intended to strengthen transparency, a fundamental requirement of European democracy and for the legitimacy of the Union’s actions. That principle of transparency applies fully to the activities of the institutions, including where those activities take the form of modern means of communication such as text messages.
In May 2022, Ms Stevi, a journalist at The New York Times, asked to consult the text messages exchanged between the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and the Chief Executive Officer of the pharmaceutical company Pfizer pertaining to the COVID-19 vaccine contract negotiations.
The European Commission refused that request, stating that it did not hold the messages sought. According to the Commission, the text messages exchanged were not documents retained by the institution and could not therefore be provided.
Ms Stevi brought proceedings before the General Court, which began by recalling a core principle: the purpose of the right of access to documents is to ensure the greatest transparency possible of the actions taken by the European institutions. Where an institution states that it does not hold a document, that statement is, in principle, presumed to be accurate. However, that presumption can be called into question if the applicant produces firm evidence to show that the documents existed.
The General Court found that that was the case in these proceedings. It noted that several public sources, including press articles, statements by the President of the Commission and a report by the European Court of Auditors, pointed to direct contacts, including by SMS, between the two senior figures at the time of the negotiations. Those elements were sufficient to show that the messages had existed, at least at one time.
Presented with that evidence, the Commission should have provided a clear and detailed statement explaining why the messages could not be found. According to the General Court, the Commission did not provide any such explanation. It simply stated that searches had been conducted, without specifying where, how or on which media, or stating whether the messages had been deleted, archived or transferred when the phones used were replaced.
The General Court observed that the institutions cannot deprive the right to transparency of all substance by failing to retain documents. The institutions are required to manage their documents in a meaningful and predictable way to enable the public to understand and review their actions. Exchanges connected with important decisions, such as the purchase of vaccines for the entire Union, cannot be precluded simply because they took the form of text messages.
Finding that the Commission had failed to provide adequate explanations about the fate of the messages requested, the General Court held that the refusal of access was unlawful. It therefore annulled the contested decision.
Clear procedure
Regulation (EC) No 1049/2011 establishes a clear procedure, requiring a reasoned decision from the institution and the possibility of an internal re-examination followed by judicial review. The Regulation provides citizens with a way to understand, monitor and, where appropriate, challenge the actions of the institutions.
Whilst providing for exceptions intended to protect sensitive public or private interests, the Regulation governs strictly their use by requiring that those exceptions are interpreted restrictively, that specific reasons are provided for refusals and that the possibility of granting partial access is examined systematically.
EU case-law has lent weight to that approach, stating that transparency must take precedence, in particular in legislative processes, in order to guarantee democratic accountability.
As early as the judgment in Sweden and Turco v Council (C‑39/05 P), given on appeal, the Court of Justice set the foundations for that approach by requiring that requests for access to the legal advice provided to the Council be subject to concrete, individual assessment and rejecting any approach based on the automatic secrecy of legislative documents, thus enshrining the principle that transparency is the rule and secrecy the exception. That guidance was bolstered by the judgment in De Capitani v Parliament (T‑540/15), in which the General Court ruled out the systematic confidentiality of trilogue documents (documents concerning the tripartite meetings and exchanges between the three institutions involved in the legislative process), clarifying that the exception relating to the protection of the decision-making process cannot be used to conceal the ordinary functioning of the Union. More recently, in the judgment in Kaili v Parliament (T‑1031/23, the subject of an appeal before the Court of Justice – C‑632/25 P), the General Court annulled the Parliament decision refusing to grant its former Vice-President access to certain documents. It thus confirmed the requirement that refusals of access must be subject to a robust and individual review as well as the specific scope of the right to transparency, including in sensitive institutional contexts.
Focus
Information society: the Digital Services Act (DSA) and very large online platforms
The European Union plays a key role in the development of the information society to foster an environment conducive to innovation and competition while protecting the rights of consumers and providing legal certainty. Those principles are set out in the Digital Markets Act (DMA), Regulation (EU) 2022/1925, and the Digital Services Act (DSA), Regulation (EU) 2022/2065. They form a substantial legislative framework, the purpose of which is to structure the European digital space around two objectives. First, to guarantee the effective protection of the fundamental rights of users and consumers within the digital environment and, secondly, to introduce requirements of fair competition between economic operators, in particular given the growing power of certain large digital platforms. Together, these two regulations represent a decisive step in the construction of a European framework for digital regulation.
2025 saw the first judgments given by the General Court in proceedings brought against Commission decisions implementing the DSA.
The first judgments concerning the DSA
Judgment in Zalando v Commission (T‑348/23)
In April 2023, the European Commission designated the online shop Zalando as a ‘very large online platform’ within the meaning of the Digital Services Act (DSA). More than 83 million people use its services each month, meaning that the platform significantly exceeds the threshold of 45 million laid down in the act. Zalando nevertheless challenged that designation, arguing that the Commission had made calculation errors.
The General Court dismissed Zalando’s action. It confirmed that Zalando is indeed an online platform as it hosts third-party sellers under its ‘Partner Programme’, even though its direct sales activity (‘Zalando Retail’) does not come under that category. The Commission was entitled to find that all the users were exposed to the information provided by third-party sellers. The General Court also rejected the arguments alleging infringement of the principles of legal certainty, equal treatment and proportionality, recalling that such platforms must be subject to enhanced obligations so as to limit the risks of dangerous or illegal products being disseminated.
Judgments in Meta Platforms Ireland v Commission and Tiktok Technology v Commission (T‑55/24 and T‑58/24)
The General Court annulled the decisions by which the European Commission had set the 2023 supervisory fee payable by Facebook, Instagram and TikTok as ‘very large online platforms’ within the meaning of the Digital Services Act (DSA). It held that the methodology used to calculate the fee, based on the average number of monthly users, should have been adopted in a delegated act and not simply in implementing decisions because it is an essential element of the calculation. However, as there was no error affecting the obligation of those platforms to pay the fee, the General Court temporarily maintained the effects of the annulled decisions pending the adoption by the Commission of a compatible methodology and of new decisions. That transitional period may not, however, exceed 12 months from the date on which the judgments become final.
Judgment in Amazon EU v Commission (T‑367/23)
The General Court dismissed Amazon’s action for annulment of the European Commission decision designating the Amazon Store platform as a ‘very large online platform’ within the meaning of the Digital Services Act (DSA), which imposes enhanced obligations on services exceeding 45 million users in the European Union. Amazon relied on the infringement of several fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, including the freedom to conduct a business, the right to property, equality before the law, the freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life and confidential information. However, the General Court took the view that, while they may entail costs and affect the platform’s organisation, the obligations imposed by the DSA are provided for by law, proportionate and justified by the objective of general interest of preventing the systemic risks associated with very large platforms, inter alia the dissemination of illegal content and consumer protection. It concluded that the contested measures, such as the recommender system option without profiling, the public register of advertisements or researchers’ access to data, do not affect the essence of the rights relied on and come with strict guarantees as to confidentiality and security.
The Digital Services Act (DSA)
The DSA, which has been applicable since 17 February 2024, is the counterpart to the DMA on the regulation of digital content and services. Its purpose is to establish a more secure, more transparent and more predictable online environment for European users. The act revamps the rules governing the liability of intermediary service providers and imposes enhanced obligations on very large online platforms and very large search engines. Those obligations relate inter alia to the establishment of effective mechanisms for handling illegal content and the assessment and reduction of systemic risks – such as disinformation, infringements of fundamental rights or risks for the protection of minors – as well as the greater transparency of the algorithmic systems and recommender system mechanisms.
The DMA and the DSA do not therefore target exactly the same categories of actors. The DMA is focussed on those platforms which exert structural weight on the internal market and represent a vital gateway allowing the undertakings that use them to reach the end users. In turn, the DSA covers a wider field of undertakings which provide intermediate services to European users, whilst imposing particularly stringent requirements on very large platforms and search engines on account of their systemic impact on the information and economic space.
With regard to the DSA, the Commission, in an updated decision of December 2025, identifies a series of very large online platforms and very large search engines subject to the enhanced obligations laid down in the act, which include inter alia Amazon, Apple, Booking.com, Google, LinkedIn, Meta, Microsoft, Pinterest, Snap, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), Wikimedia Foundation and Zalando, as well as a number of other actors operating on the European market.
Significant penalties have already followed from the implementation of the two acts. The first fine imposed under the DSA, totalling EUR 120 million, was imposed on 5 December 2025 on the platform X because of the latter’s failure to comply with several obligations laid down in that act.
Understanding the main terms in the DSA
The Digital Services Act is a European regulation intended to govern digital services in order to guarantee a more secure, more transparent and fairer online environment. Here are some simple explanations of its key concepts:
- Online platform: a digital service that allows users to publish, share or view content (social media, marketplaces, video platforms etc.);
- Very large online platform (VLOP): a platform with more than 45 million active users in the European Union. Given their significant impact on society, such platforms are subject to enhanced obligations;
- Illegal content: any content that infringes applicable EU or national law (for example, hate speech, illegal products or copyright breaches);
- Content moderation: a series of measures taken by platforms to detect, assess and, where appropriate, remove or restrict access to problematic content;
- Algorithmic transparency: obligation on certain platforms to explain, in clear language, how their content recommender systems work.
Using those concepts, the DSA seeks to provide better protection for users, to hold large platforms to account and to build trust in the European digital space.
A look back at major judgments of the year
Freedom of movement
The European Union guarantees its citizens the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States. For that freedom to be effective, the States must recognise personal and family situations lawfully acquired in another Member State, which must be considered in the light of the fundamental rights protected by the European Union, in particular the right to private and family life and the principle of non-discrimination.
Equal treatment and non-discrimination
The European Union has a common legal framework that seeks to ensure equal treatment and to combat discrimination. Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC form the pillars of that framework: the first prohibits discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, whilst the second concerns equality in employment and occupation. These Directives prohibit all direct or indirect discrimination, subject to certain possible justifications, and thus require Member States to guarantee effective and homogenous protection within the European Union.
Rule of law
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, like the Treaty on European Union (TEU), refers expressly to the rule of law, which is one of the values common to the Member States pursuant to Article 2 TEU. The independence and impartiality of courts are key aspects of the rule of law.
Common foreign and security policy
An essential tool of EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP), restrictive measures or ‘sanctions’ are used as part of an integrated and global policy which includes, in particular, political dialogue. The European Union uses the CFSP, inter alia, to protect its values, fundamental interests and security, to prevent conflict and to strengthen international security. The purpose of sanctions is to encourage a change of policy or conduct on the part of the persons or entities concerned in order to promote the objectives of the CFSP.
Migration and asylum
The European Union has adopted a body of rules in order to establish an effective, humanitarian and safe European migration policy. The Common European Asylum System lays down minimum standards applicable to the treatment of all asylum seekers and to the processing of their applications throughout the European Union.
Consumers
EU consumer policy seeks to protect the health, safety and security, and economic and legal interests of consumers, wherever they live, travel to or make their purchases within the European Union.
Intellectual property
The rules adopted by the European Union to protect intellectual property (copyright) and industrial property (trade mark law, protection of designs) improve the competitiveness of undertakings by fostering an environment conducive to creativity and innovation.
Competition
The European Union applies rules to protect free competition. Practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market are prohibited and may be sanctioned by fines. The right of every person to seek compensation for damage caused by anticompetitive conduct strengthens the operational nature of EU competition rules and can discourage conduct that undermines free competition.
Judicial cooperation
The area of freedom, security and justice includes measures to promote judicial cooperation between the Member States. This cooperation is based on the mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and seeks to harmonise national laws in order to combat transnational crime by guaranteeing that the rights of victims, suspects and detainees are protected within the European Union.
Privacy
The European Union has set out detailed rules for the protection of personal data. In order to be lawful, the processing and storage of such data must satisfy the conditions laid down in legislation, be limited to what is strictly necessary and not disproportionately undermine the right to privacy.
Environment
The European Union is committed to preserving and improving the quality of the environment and to protecting human health. If the Court of Justice finds that a Member State has infringed EU law, that Member State must comply with the relevant judgment as soon as possible. If the Commission considers that the Member State has not complied with the judgment, it can bring a new action seeking financial penalties.
Information society
The European Union plays a key role in the development of the information society, so as to foster an environment conducive to innovation and competition whilst protecting the rights of consumers and providing legal certainty. It guarantees that digital markets are fair and open, and it removes the barriers to cross-border online services within the internal market so that they can move freely.
Access to documents
Transparency in public life is a fundamental principle of the European Union. Accordingly, all EU citizens or legal persons may, in principle, access the documents of the institutions.
The Research and Documentation Directorate offers legal professionals, as part of its Collection of Summaries, a ‘Yearly Selection of Major Judgments’ and a ‘Monthly Case-law Digest’ of the Court of Justice and the General Court.